Continuities in crisis : everyday practices of disaster response and climate change adaptation in Mozambique by Artur, L.
 CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS 
 
 
Everyday Practices of Disaster Response and 
Climate Change Adaptation in Mozambique  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luís Artur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
 
Thesis supervisor 
 
Prof. dr. Ir. Dorothea Hilhorst 
Professor of humanitarian aid and reconstruction 
Disaster studies, Wageningen University 
 
 
Other members 
 
Prof. dr. Linden Vincent 
Wageningen University 
 
Prof. dr. Greg Bankoff 
University of Hull, UK 
 
Prof. dr. Ton Dietz 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands 
 
Dr. Maarten van Aalst 
Center for Climate Change, International Federation of the Red Cross, The Hangue, 
The Netherlands 
 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of the Wageningen School of Social 
Science 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
  
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS 
 
 
Everyday Practices of Disaster Response and 
Climate Change Adaptation in Mozambique  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luís Artur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at the Wageningen University 
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. dr. M.J. Kropff, 
in the presence of 
the Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Tuesday 12 April 2011 
at 11.00 AM in the aula 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luís Artur 
Continuities in Crisis. Everyday Practices of Disaster Response and Climate Change 
Adaptation in Mozambique 
 
Thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2011) 
With references, with summaries in Dutch, English and Portuguese 
ISBN: 978-90-8585-926-0 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ADPC Asia Disaster Preparedness Centre 
CBDRM Community Based Disaster Risk Management 
CEA Centro dos Estudos Africanos 
CDM Clean Development Mechanisms 
CENOE Centro Nacional Operativo de Emergencias 
CVM Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique 
DNA Direcção Nacional de Aguas 
DPCCN Departamento de Prevenção e Combate as Calamidades 
Naturais 
DRC Danish Red Cross 
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
GACOR Gabinete de Coordenação do Reassentamento 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GoM Government of Mozambique 
GPZ Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze 
GTZ German Technical Assistance  
HCB Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa 
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INE Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
INGC Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
MDG Millennium Development Goals 
MPF Ministerio do Plano e Finanças 
NAPA National Action Plan for Adaptation  
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
NWO Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research 
RENAMO Resistência Nacional de Moçambique 
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme 
SCF Save the Children Fund 
WFP World Food Programme 
UEM Universidade Eduardo Mondlane 
UNAPROC Unidade de Protecção Civil 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
USD United States Dollar 
 
 
 vi 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of  Mozambique 
 
 
 
 vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This book is a collective endeavor. It would never have been accomplished 
without the support and cooperation of different people and organizations, at 
different levels. I am ever grateful to people on the Zambezi delta, their 
collaboration was critical to achieve this outcome. I owe my special gratitude 
to Inácio and his parents, Tomé Gole and António Marromo for their kind 
consent to my ethnography of their lifewords.  
In Holland I am thankful to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Ir. Dorothea 
Hilhorst. Thea, your endless intellectual capacity intertwined with your 
personal commitment and caring abilities made this journey so interesting 
and lively. I also admire your sixth sense. You know when the student needs 
a push, needs a break, needs a mammy shoulder and above all you are able to 
coach students to discover their own potential. Thank you very much.  
My wife Eliane and my daughters Elaine and Daniella deserve all the 
merits and my deepest gratitude. For four years of the PhD journey I had 
been an absent husband and father but their affection to me never vanished. 
Thanks for your endless love, support and understanding.  
I also want to thank my friend and life mentor Bart Pijnenburg. Bart, 
you and your family made this possible. Without your endless support and 
encouragement the journey would have been very painful. Thank you.  
My deepest thanks go to Disaster Study Group and Rural Development 
Sociology Department at the Wageningen University for the good working 
environment. Many thanks to a growing group of researchers especially to 
Maliana, Hilde, Annelies, Rens, Lucie, Mieke, Jos, Jeroen, Bram, Gemma, 
Georg, Peter for their moral and academic support.  
In Holland I owe my deepest gratitude to NWO, the institution that 
funded my PhD programme.  Without your financial commitment this work 
would never be possible. Thank you very much  
In Mozambique my list is endless. In Mopeia district my 
acknowledgments go to the Mozambican Red Cross branch, especially to Mr. 
Melo, Mr. Ernesto and the local Red Cross volunteers. They were very good 
companions for long periods of time as well as valuable sources of 
information even when I was away. I also want to extend my thanks to the 
district Agricultural directorate, especially engineer Natalino, for their open-
ended support. Also to the district Education and Health directorates for their 
cooperation. My acknowledgement also goes to Mr. Osvaldo from the World 
Food Program in Mopeia for our friendship and ooh, of course, our football 
team. Osvaldo, I honestly think that, as a goalkeeper, you are a complete 
disaster!  
To the Save the Children organization, I want to thank dra. Sophie for 
our long discussions on how to break what she methodologically termed ‘the 
emergency thinking’. I also extend my thanks to my friend Salomão who was 
working for the Save the Children while I was conducting my fieldwork. 
Salomão fed me, time to time, with field information when I was away.  
 viii 
In Caia, Mutarara, Marromeu districts, my thanks to the local Red 
Cross branches for their cooperation. I also thank engineer Dambiro and Mr. 
Lucas Renço both from the INGC and Carolina from the GTZ all in Caia.    
At provincial levels, my special thanks to Mr. João Zamissa from the 
INGC in Zambezia province. Zamissa, there are no words to thank you and 
your team for your full cooperation in this research. I also thank the governor 
and his cabinet, who friendly opened their library for an entire week for my 
consultation. In Quelimane I also thank my friends Kilu and Nelia for their 
support. In Beira, Sofala province my thanks to the Red Cross and the INGC 
delegate, engineer Luís Pacheco, all for their support.  
In Maputo I am grateful to the Mozambican Red Cross headquarters 
especially to the former secretarygeneral dr. Fernanda Teixeira, to dr. Eunice 
Mucache, dr. Respeito, dr. Rabeca Chalufo, dr. Jorge as well as dr. Ataibo. 
Very special thanks to dr. Ivete Dengo, ex- coordinator of the Community 
Based Disaster Preparedness project within the Mozambican Red Cross.  
At the Eduardo Mondlane university in Maputo, my 
acknowledgements to Professor Roland Brouwer, Professor Almeida Sitoe, 
Professor Boaventura Cuamba, Professor Rui Brito, Professor Glead M`lay 
and to my colleagues Nicia Givá and Eunice Cavane with whom I shared 
most of my worries and for giving me scientific and moral support to 
continue the journey. I also thank Professor Andrade Egas, Professor Mário 
Falcão and Professor Emilio Tostão for their full cooperation on my studies.       
At the INGC headquarter in Maputo, my thanks to dr. Bonifácio 
António, dr. Higino Rodrigues, dra. Ana Cristina, and dra. Marta Manjate and 
to the ex- general director dr. Paulo Zucula for their encouragement and 
support. 
At the National Water directorate I extend my thanks to dr. Chivambo 
and the library managers for their cooperation and patience. At the German 
organization INWENT my thanks to dr. Wegner, dr. Bene in addition to dr. 
Florian for our lively discussion on disaster management in Mozambique.    
At the National Institute of Meteorology my thanks to dr. Benessene 
for his personal cooperation, interest and encouragement on the research 
topic. 
In the Philippines, my thanks go to mammy Lorna Victoria from APC. 
Mammy, remember we are like ants! I also want to thank the Philippines’s 
Red Cross for their technical support and advice. In Bangladesh I offer my 
thanks to Professor Atiq Rahman from the Bangladesh Center for Advanced 
Studies for his helpful insights. Professor, I also believe in a better world 
emerging from a development thinking embraced with disaster risk reduction 
thinking. In Thailand I extend my thanks to Dr. Babette Resurreccion and 
Professor Suvit Yodmani from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center 
(ADPC).   Thanks Professor Yodmani for letting me browse through your 
library and for taking your time to share your experiences on disaster 
management.  
Last but not least, many thanks to my friends who shared my worries 
and successes: Bambissa, Gregório, Olivier, Nascimento, Mate, Perosa, Albert, 
 ix
Arsénio, Paulo, Gessica and Professor Rui Maia. A special thanks to my friend 
Peter Hungwe for turning my ‘Portu-English’ into readable English.  
To all who directly or indirectly contributed to this outcome but did 
not receive mention I say, MUITO OBRIGADO; many thanks; Brigado 
Maningue; Ndiku Pereka Takhuta Unkulu! 
 
Luís Artur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
List of Figures        page 
 
Figure 1: Map of Mozambique       vi 
Figure 2: A typical poster during the 1977 flooding    44 
Figure 3.1: Districts along the delta Zambezi     64 
Figure 3.2: National newspaper reporting lynching    73 
Figure 3.3: Map of Mopeia district      76  
Figure 4: Flood preparedness box       116 
Figure 5.1: Helicopter with UN and WFP logos     136 
Figure 5.2: The car with CVM goods in Caia     141 
Figure 6.1: The granary and the main house     147 
Figure 6.2: The hierarchical response      153 
Figure 7. Antonio Marromo crafting mattress     186 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Investiments priorities in Cocorico and Mopeia village  83 
Table 3.2: Productive and non productive items    84 
Table 4.1: Major information source regarding the 2007 flooding  118 
Table 4.2: Radio used as the source of information    118 
Table 5.1: Appeals by organizations      129 
Table 5.2: Cluster roles and leaders      133 
Table 6: Prefered mean of evacuation      157  
 
List of Graphs 
 
Graph 2.1: Number of people affected by hazard type    37 
Graph 2.2: Number of people killed by hazard type    37 
Graph 2.3: International aid 1978-2007      47 
Graph 3.1: Recorded water flows in the delta Zambezi    65 
Graph 3.2: Household feeding period based on own production  79 
Graph 6: Life, livelihoods and optimal moment for evacuation  163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In memory of my grandmother, Sungue Tomo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ..............................................................................................v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................vii 
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND GRAPHS......................................................x 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.............................................................................1 
DISASTER AND EVERYDAY PRACTICES ................................................................................................. 1 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................................... 5 
MOZAMBIQUE: AN OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................6 
EXPLORING THE EVERYDAY PRACTICES OF DISASTER RESPONSE. THE 
ANALYTICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION ...................................................................................................11 
DISASTER RE-ATTACHING EXCEPTIONALITY TO NORMALITY .............................................11 
ACTORS, ARENAS AND INTERFACES .................................................................................................... 12 
ACTORS AND DOMAINS OF DISASTER RESPONSE ........................................................................14 
DISASTER INTERVENTIONS AND INTERFACES ...............................................................................16 
CLIMATE CHANGE, VULNERABILITY TO DISASTERS AND ADAPTATION ..................... 17 
LIVELIHOODS AND DISASTERS ............................................................................................................... 20 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................22 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ............................................................................................................. 27 
 
CHAPTER 2: MANAGING DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
MOZAMBIQUE .......................................................................................................31 
NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE: AN OVERVIEW ................... 33 
CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN THE OCCURRENCE OF NATURAL HAZARDS 
AND DISASTERS .................................................................................................................................................36 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE............................. 38 
THE ‘KINGDOMINATION’ OF DISASTERS: PRE-COLONIAL DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES........................................................................................................................ 38 
THE ‘COLONIZATION’ OF DISASTERS: DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD .......................................................................................................... 40 
1975-1979: THE ‘SOCIALIZATION’ OF DISASTERS ............................................................................42 
1980-1986: DISASTERS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF MARXISM ................................................44 
1987-1994: ‘UN-NEUTRAL’ AID. AID EMPOWERING FRELIMO ................................................47 
CREATING ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE: FRELIMO’S STRATEGIES IN DEALING WITH 
DONORS ..................................................................................................................................................................48 
1995-1999: AID WITHDRAWAL, RESTRUCTURATION AND CONFLICTS............................53 
2000-2004: FLOODS AND THE RE-EMERGING OF HUMANITARIAN AID ..........................53 
2005 ONWARD: STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY ON DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT...................................................................................................................................................54 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE: BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS ....................................................................................................56 
ACTORS AND STAKES ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE: POWER 
STRUGGLES AND STRATEGIES .................................................................................................................. 58 
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................59 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiv
CHAPTER 3: LIVING ON THE FLOODPLAINS - ADAPTING TO 
FLOODING IN BUILDING LIVELIHOODS ON THE DELTA OF THE 
ZAMBEZI RIVER.....................................................................................................61 
ZAMBEZI DELTA AND FLOODING EVENTS ......................................................................................63 
FLOODING AND THE ENSEMBLE OF INTERVENTIONS, DISCOURSES AND 
PRACTICES.............................................................................................................................................................66 
ADAPTATION TO FLOODING IN THE DELTA ZAMBEZI............................................................ 74 
COCORICO ‘COMMUNITY’........................................................................................................................... 75 
ADAPTING TO FLOODING IN BUILDING LIVELIHOODS IN COCORICO ......................... 78 
CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................................................................91 
 
CHAPTER 4: STRENGTHENING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY - THE CBDRM 
PROJECT IN COCORICO .....................................................................................93 
CVM: CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES ..................................................................................................96 
CVM: ARENAS AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL ........................................................................98 
DISASTERS AS AN OPPORTUNITY ......................................................................................................... 105 
THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF A CBDRM: CBDRM PROJECT IN COCORICO ............................. 106 
DISPUTING PROJECT OWNERSHIP........................................................................................................ 107 
THE POLITICS OF CHOOSING COMMUNITIES ............................................................................... 108 
THE PROJECT AT DISTRICT LEVEL: EXCLUSION AND THE MYTH OF LACK OF 
CAPACITY ............................................................................................................................................................ 109 
THE PROJECT AT COCORICO LEVEL: THE UNBUNDLING OF COCORICO 
COMMUNITY.........................................................................................................................................................111 
PROJECT CAPTURE BY THE LOCAL ELITE ..........................................................................................112 
CBDRM AND POWER POLITICS IN COCORICO................................................................................113 
CONTESTATIONS AND PROJECT APPROPRIATION BY ORDINARY PEOPLE.................115 
THE PROJECT AND THE 2007 FLOODING ............................................................................................117 
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................121 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE 2007 FLOODING ON THE ZAMBEZI DELTA AND THE 
HUMANITARIAN ARENA.................................................................................123 
THE ARENA: THE 2007 FLOODING ON THE DELTA ZAMBEZI AND ACTORS 
INVOLVED ............................................................................................................................................................125 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE 2007 FLOODING: LEADERSHIP AS AN 
EMERGING PROPERTY ................................................................................................................................. 126 
CVM RESPONSE: POWER, CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATIONS ................................................138 
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 144 
 
CHAPTER 6: SAVING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS - THE LOCAL 
RESPONSE TO THE 2007 FLOODING ............................................................147 
RESPONSE TO HAZARDS AND DISASTERS: A LITERATURE OVERVIEW........................ 150 
LOCAL RESPONSE: SAVING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS .............................................................151 
SECURING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE............................................152 
SEARCHING FOR TOGETHERNESS.........................................................................................................154 
SECURING ASSETS ...........................................................................................................................................155 
KEEPING POWER AND CONTROL ......................................................................................................... 156 
NOT AGAINST OUTSIDERS BUT NEED FLEXIBILITY ................................................................... 156 
BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE MIDST OF 
FLOODING ............................................................................................................................................................158 
EXPECTATIONS AND GENDERED EVACUATIONS...................................................................... 159 
BUILDING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES................................. 159 
ANALYSIS: SAVING LIVES OR LIVELIHOODS? ................................................................................ 161 
 
 xv 
CHAPTER 7 RESETTLING THE EVACUEES - IN SEARCH FOR 
SECURITIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT....................................................165 
RESETTLEMENT THINKING: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES................................................. 166 
RESETTLEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ........................................ 170 
ACTORS’ INTERFACES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESETTLEMENT 
PROGRAMME .......................................................................................................................................................171 
INTERFACES AT REGISTRATION .............................................................................................................172 
INTERFACES IN THE BUILDING OF HOUSES ...................................................................................175 
INTERFACES AT THE SEEDS AND TOOLS FAIRS............................................................................179 
´AID WITHDRAWAL’, CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES ...........................................182 
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 190 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION - CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS .......................193 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN OF DISASTER RESPONSE
.................................................................................................................................................................................... 195 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE DOMAIN OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE ......................... 196 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE LOCAL DOMAIN OF DISASTER RESPONSE...................198 
….. BACK TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................. 199 
 
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................203 
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................219 
SUMÁRIO ...............................................................................................................223 
SAMENVATTING ................................................................................................227 
ANNEX 1: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS.........230 
ANNEX 2: CHECKLIST AND QUESTIONNAIRE.........................................234 
ANNEX 3: BUDGET ALLOCATION DURING THE 2001 FLOODING....245 
ANNEX 4: ACTORS DURING THE 2007 FLOODING .................................246 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR........................................................................................249 
TRAINING AND SUPERVISION PLAN.........................................................250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
DISASTER AND EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
 
This thesis is about everyday practices of disaster response in Mozambique 
and analyzes how different actors, with particular focus on local people, deal 
with disaster hazards hitting the country. Mozambique is a disaster-prone 
country and over the past years, the frequency and intensity of climate-related 
disasters has increased steadily. The country experiences, on average, one 
disaster per year (INGC et al., 2003:7) and ranks third on global weather-
related damage following Bangladesh and Ethiopia (Buys et al., 2007:38). For 
reasons discussed below, I will start the thesis by presenting the story of a 
local boy and how he experienced the floods of 2007. 
 
Inácio is 11 years old and he is from Cocorico, a settlement of households along the 
Zambezi floodplains in Mopeia district, Mozambique. He is the second of four 
children (two brothers and two sisters). In 2007, Inácio was at school in grade three, 
Terceira classe, but he still had problems with elementary Portuguese. Writing, 
reading, speaking and counting are taught in the first two grades. He claimed that 
his limitations were, partly because he was in a composite class comprising grades 
one to three students using one classroom.This hampered the learning process since 
there was only one teacher lecturing from grade one up to grade five in two 
classrooms at the same time. This meant that the teacher kept moving from one 
classroom to the other leaving no room for meaningful student supervision and 
instruction. The teacher lived in Mopeia village about 30 kilometers away.He cycled 
on average about two to three times a week to Cocorico where he lectured from 
around 9 o’clock in the morning to about 2 o’clock in the afternoon. The teacher said 
there was no way that he could live in Cocorico. There was no potable water, no 
electricity, no market place, no hospital and the area was infested with mosquitoes. 
When the teacher did not show up, which happened frequently, Inácio went fishing 
with his friends and sold part of his catch to traders coming from outside Cocorico. 
In adult life, Inácio intended to become a big angler with a big boat and lots of 
fishing nets. 
In the beginning of 2007 there was a ‘slow on-set’ flooding in Cocorico.  
Inácio’s parents decided, at the beginning of the flooding, to harvest their 
agricultural products in the farms located on the local islands. They left Inácio and 
his elderly sister behind for a few days to look after the house and other assets. In the 
meantime they asked neighbors to look after the two of them during their absence. It 
was a local practice to help each other and Inácio’s parents had looked after others in 
past flooding events.  
On the second day of their absence, the floods had steadily set in. Military 
forces and Red Cross volunteers arrived in Cocorico to carry out a rescue mission. 
Inácio and his sister were among the evacuees.  The volunteers pointed out that if 
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they had not shown up on time, Inácio and his sister would have perished. The 
military forces and the Red Cross volunteers condemned the parents’s attitude of 
leaving the children ‘alone’. Staff from the Save the Children Alliance that provided 
them with initial food, shelter, clothes and health care called it gross negligence.  
When Inacio’s parents came back in the afternoon of the second day, they 
were told by chief Cocorico- who hid from the rescue teams because he wanted to be 
the last to be evacuated- that Inácio and his sister were taken by the military forces to 
a safe place. One of the neighbours, Ernesto, who was rescued and brought to 
Mopeia village but had gone back to Cocorico to look for food he had left in his 
granary and to do fishing, informed Inácio’s parents of the whereabouts of their 
children.He told them that Inácio and his sister were staying with António -another 
neighbour- at the 24 de Julho Resettlement centre in Mopeia village. Ernesto and 
chief Cocorico said that the flooding was not that serious to warrant evacuation but 
people in Cocorico, including Inácio and his sister, had been forcibly evacuated by 
the military. Notwithstanding, Ernesto said he and his household agreed to the 
evacuation mainly expecting that humanitarian aid would flow to where they would 
be temporarily placed. However this was taking some time, that is why he had come 
back to find food in Cocorico. Inácio’s parents went to 24 de Julho resettlement centre 
and found Inácio and his sister staying with António’s household. They settled at the 
24 de Julho resettlement centre but by May 2007 waters had receded steadily and 
Inácio and his household returned to the flood-prone Cocorico. Inácio’s mother said 
she returned mainly because she was not used to buying almost everything for her 
daily needs.What irked her most was buying vegetables that she used to produce in 
her own backyard. Inácio’s father stated firmly that he could not leave behind the 
land of his ancestors and the burial grounds because this could bring along 
misfortunes. 
 
My intention of presenting the story of Inácio is to offer an alternative 
representation of local response to natural hazards in Mozambique. I have 
been involved in humanitarian work since the year 2000 and ever since, I have 
seen conflicting realities of disaster responses in Mozambique. In 2000, 
Mozambique was hit by record floods that killed about 700 people and 
affected nearly one quarter of the population of the country. Due mainly to 
this flooding the national GDP sank from the expected 10 percent growth to 
just 2 percent. They were the worst floods to be recorded in 150 years. Media 
coverage, academic reports and everyday conversation at the time pictured 
widespread suffering and a disruption of people’s lives. ‘They have nothing’ 
and ‘they lost everything’ were the central claims and most of those 
interviewed at national and international level went on to ask for any kind of 
support for the affected.  
Moved by these claims I entered the humanitarian domain by donating 
a number of personal belongings to the Mozambican Red Cross and by 
running, with colleagues of mine, a humanitarian campaign within our 
university campus in Maputo. We were deeply moved by the idea that the 
affected people lost everything and were in need of any kind of support. A 
book by Christie and Hanlon depicted how the affected came to lose 
everything and how international and national compassion helped to save 
lives and reconstruct people’s livelihoods. National government efforts and 
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third parties (donors, NGOs, private sector and individual external aid) have 
all been highlighted in saving lives and reconstructing the livelihoods of the 
affected (Christie and Hanlon, 2001).    
The Inácio case shows a similar representation of the affected people 
during the 2007 flooding. Outsiders approached the village with this image of 
helplessness in mind. Helplessness is a representation that tends to be 
reproduced in every disaster situation in Mozambique and, likely, in many 
other countries affected by disasters.  Statements such as ‘due to the flooding  
people will lose everything’1 or ‘people have been displaced and no longer 
have shelter or equipment for cooking and cleaning`2are reproduced disaster 
after disaster. This image of helplessness of victims is juxtaposed by a counter 
image of outsiders that have the competences and principled ethics to come to 
their assistance. 
As I came to interact more with people affected by the floods, like 
Inácio, his parents and neighbours, I was stunned by their life experiences 
with floods. They revealed their strategies and struggle to deal, not only with 
the floods, but also with their ancestors, various government departments, 
various humanitarian organizations. Also, they had to deal with family 
members, fellow community members, the market, their past and future. 
NGOs providing humanitarian aid had to strategize, struggle and negotiate 
with donors, local government officers, the affected so that their response 
would make sense to the local government, the donors, to local people and to 
themselves. I came across different disagreements, conflicts and negotiations 
between and within local actors such as NGOs, donors and government.  In 
everyday practices, intervention models and humanitarian principles were, in 
most of the cases, reinterpreted, transformed and continuously negotiated in 
the interactions between the different actors. This was very different from the 
often portrayed images of helpless victims and their competent saviours. 
Increasingly I came to a realization that responses to disasters in 
Mozambique take place in contexts where actors with different worldviews, 
interests, and power relations meet and dispute or negotiate open-ended 
processes and outcomes.  I came to recognize that the representation of 
disaster as a single event in time and space, framed in a single discourse 
marked by powerlessness, homogeneity and expected inputs and outcomes 
masks complex processes and tends to sideline many other representations 
and response practices. This thesis is about this other side of disasters that 
tends to pass unnoticed in Mozambique. It delves into the everyday practices 
of disaster response looking at how the different representations and 
responses to disasters in Mozambique conflict or complement each other and 
what emerges from the different actors’ encounters.  
It is my understanding that approaches that fail to analyze the agency 
and heterogeneity in disaster response tend to reduce, implicitly, the interests 
of all involved to a singular universally generalizable survival-utility. They 
assume that hazards and disasters tend to render ‘normal’ concerns for 
                                                 
1
 www.actionaid.org.uk/101129/mozambique accessed January 16, 2008 
2
 www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/mozambique-floods.asp accessed January 16, 2008 
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engagement in ongoing political and socio-cultural life-strategies virtually 
insignificant in shaping behaviour and practices. Consequently, they assume 
that the affected become only interested in saving their lives, willing therefore 
to give up ‘freely’ all their manifold interests and concerns.  In this 
representation all this happens under the auspices of the aid providers that 
are guided only by humanitarian interests and work under humanitarian 
principles.  
The present thesis claims that the way in which the affected are 
represented affects the ways in which external responses are shaped. If they 
are portrayed as weak, passive, irresponsible like Inácio and his parents were 
depicted, then the interventions will tend to take a top-down approach with 
little understanding of local capacities, knowledge and motivations to act in 
alternative ways.  This process in not separated from politics and power 
relations. For the government and humanitarian organizations, people were 
powerless and evacuations appeared to be the best option. For the locals, 
evacuations or the timing of the evacuations were not the right ones. Sending 
military forces for rescue operations evidenced power relations and this was 
legitimated by playing the humanitarian politics of saving lives.  
A second claim of the book is that a discursive focus on powerlessness 
allows resource flows and gains to many actors in the development and 
humanitarian sectors, and beyond. NGOs and governments have been 
depicted to act in ways that best suit their own interests in the first place 
rather than the interests of the affected (Harrell-Bond, 1986; De Waal, 1997). In 
the same vein, I see statements such as ‘saving lives’, ‘rebuilding livelihoods’, 
‘reducing disaster risk’, ‘lost everything’ as strategic narratives used to mask 
the agendas of the actors. These involve strengthening their financial, 
political, economic, and socio-cultural and negotiation positions. These 
agendas tend to lead to the production and reproduction of a powerlessness 
discourse and the buffering of alternative discourses.  
A third major claim of the book is that local actors in Mozambique are 
neither passive victims of disasters nor submissive recipients of disaster 
responses interventions by external actors. Within the limits of their 
knowledge and information local people tend to respond to hazards and 
interventions in ways that best suit their own interests. They tend to craft 
continuities in crisis, find the right moment for evacuations and participate in 
the rescue operations attempting, generally, to maintain or improve their 
financial, political, economic, socio-cultural and negotiation positions as well. 
To grasp these concerns and claims the thesis has set out to answer the 
following questions:  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The main research question of the book is how are disasters and adaptation to 
climate change programmes interpreted and acted upon by different actors in 
Mozambique. More specifically, the research answers the following questions: 
1. How do local people experience and interpret climate-related extreme 
weather events? 
2. How do local people integrate disaster responses in their everyday 
livelihood practices? 
3. How do local people, national government authorities, NGOs, donors 
interact in disaster response and what are the outcome(s) of their 
interactions? 
4. How do intervening agencies (i.e. government and NGOs) translate, 
(inter) national policies and projects to make them suit their own needs 
and the needs of local people?  
5. How do different actors at local level appropriate, integrate or transform 
project interventions on disaster risk reduction to suit their needs?  
 
To answer the research questions posed above I decided to focus analytically 
and methodologically on local actors and on everyday practices as entry-
points. I chose local actors for different reasons. First, the discourse of local 
powerlessness led to focus on government and third parties´ responses to 
disasters overlooking local responses to disasters and the complexities 
involved when government, third parties and local actors meet. Second, as 
climate change takes place and climate related natural hazards increase in 
intensity and frequency (IPCC, 2007; IFRC, 2009) there is an increasing need 
for empirical cases on how local people respond to disasters, what limitations 
they face and what policy recommendations can be advised for mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change. Third, there is an emerging consensus as 
highlighted under Hyogo Framework for Action that community based 
disaster management offers major prospects for disaster reduction and local 
disaster response practices should be the ground for further interventions and 
research (Van Aalst et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, I decided to focus on the everyday practices as they 
allow exploring the processes of negotiation, (re)interpretation and 
transformation of interventions, of different worldviews and interests, which 
are hard to reveal by using different approaches. There have been a growing 
number of disaster studies but we still need to piece together fully the variety 
of ways in which disasters are shaped, modified amplified or attenuated 
within the social dynamics of day-to-day life (Wilkinson, 2010:60). Further 
disaster and humanitarian studies have hardly approached the thematic from 
a perspective where actors negotiate the process and the outcome in their 
everyday encounters (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010: 183-184).  
 
For this endeavour, the thesis uses an anthropological and sociological 
perspective for disaster studies.It is based on eighteen months of fieldwork in 
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Mozambique.  During this period, I followed different actors and interactions 
between actors. Of particular relevance, I followed actors involved with the 
Mozambican Red Cross project on disaster risk reduction in Cocorico and 
actor’s responses to the 2007 floods on the Zambezi delta. The 2007 flooding 
coincided with the starting of my fieldwork in Mozambique and became a 
major critical event to analyse actors’ interfaces and everyday practice of 
disaster response. The 2007 flooding is used, mainly, to answer research 
questions 1, 2 and 3 while the Red Cross project is used, mostly, to answer 
research questions 3, 4 and 5. Out of the eighteen months of fieldwork, I spent 
twelve months living with local people along the Zambezi delta in Mopeia, 
Mutarara, Caia, Marromeu and Chinde districts. This aided me in getting in-
depth data on local perspectives and responses to disasters, which is the core 
objective of the book.  The remainder of the present chapter introduces shortly 
the Mozambican context, and then deals with the analytical concepts, the 
methodology of the study and finally the outline of the book. 
   
MOZAMBIQUE: AN OVERVIEW  
 
Mozambique (figure 1) is a former Portuguese colony located on the Eastern 
coast of the Southern African region between the latitudes 10o 27’ and 26o 52’ 
South and the longitudes 30o 12’ and 40o 51’ East. In the north, Mozambique 
borders Tanzania, first a German former colony and then a British former 
colony after the Second World War. In the west, Mozambique borders 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe all British ex-colonies. South Africa and 
Swaziland also British former colonies border Mozambique in the south. In 
the east Mozambique comprises 2,700 km of coastline along the Indian Ocean. 
The country covers a surface of 799, 380 km2, and by 2007 had about 21 
million inhabitants (INE, 2007).  
To understand the occurrence of disasters and the ways in which actors 
respond to them in Mozambique we need to reflect upon the historical and 
contemporary, socio-economic and political contexts of which disasters are 
constructed. Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world.  
Although  economic growth has been impressive over the past few years and 
the country managed to reduce absolute poverty by 15 percent over the 
period from 1997 to 2003 (MPF et al., 2004), more than half of the country’s 
population still lives under absolute poverty and the country ranks 172 out of 
182 on the world Human Development Index (UNDP, 2009:183). Cocorico is 
illustrative of this prevailing poverty. Like Inácio in Cocorico, 58 percent of 
children live under absolute poverty (UNICEF, 2007:7) and nearly half of the 
children under the age of two years, in 2008, were suffering from chronic 
malnutrition (UNDP and GoM, 2008:10). More than half of the population of 
Mozambique has no access to potable water and hospital care (UNDP and 
GoM, 2008:12).  
Due to the prevailing poverty Mozambique has been depending on 
external aid for more than 25 years. Mozambique is Africa’s single biggest aid 
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receiver and the world’s eighth most aid dependent country (Arndt et al., 
2006:3; Renzio and Hanlon, 2007:3). Natural hazards such as flooding occur in 
such a context and, as widely held, poverty, vulnerability and natural or man-
made hazards is a perfect ‘cocktail’ for disasters (Blaikie et al., 1994; Oliver-
Smith, 1999; Bankoff et al., 2004 ).This context may, to a large extent, explain 
why the powerlessness discourse on disasters prevails over alternative 
representations.  
Poverty, vulnerability and disasters in Mozambique emerge from a 
multiple and complex interplay of factors. From a historical and economic 
perspective, Mozambique was colonized by Portugal, one of the poorest 
countries in Europe by the time of colonization. Up to the sixteenth century, 
Portuguese people’s livelihoods and the overall Portuguese economy 
depended heavily on fishing and salt production (Newitt, 1995: 14). When 
agriculture, industry and services ‘flourished’ in Portugal by the eighteenth 
and mid-nineteenth century this was basically dominated by the English 
business class rather than by the Portuguese themselves (de Brito, 1980:24;  
Rita-Ferreira, 1999:19). This Portuguese context came to influence how 
Portugal colonized Mozambique.  
The Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1489. An expedition 
commanded by Vasco da Gama was on its way to India searching for sources 
of the lucrative spice business. Pepper from India was a particularly good 
source of fortune in Europe by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and 
Portugal was very much interested to take the monopoly of the spice business 
(Newitt, 1995:17). On the way to India, Vasco da Gama stopped in 
Mozambique, on the shores of now Inhambane province and then at the 
Mozambique Island, to replenish stocks and explore the economic and 
geographical potential of the area. This marked the beginning of the 
Portuguese presence in Mozambique. By the time of the Berlin conference in 
1884/5, Portugal had already been present in Mozambique for nearly 400 
years.  
Notwithstanding this, up to mid-nineteenth century, Portuguese 
authority throughout the country was very limited. Its physical presence was 
limited to a small number of forts and trading ports along the Mozambican 
seashores and the Zambezi River. The southern region of Mozambique was 
largely a labour pool for the mining industry in South Africa while large 
portions of land in the central and northern part of the country were granted 
to companies owned mainly by non-Portuguese (de Brito, 1980; Newitt, 1995). 
The companies took up the administrative role of these areas and the 
populations living in them. They were involved in large plantations of cash 
crops such as cotton, sugar cane, sisal using local population as cheap or non-
paid labour force and in most cases applying physical violence. They were 
also heavily involved in selling the native labour force, from their granted 
areas, to the neighbouring British colonies (Wuyts, 1980:12-13).  
When Portugal managed to extend its administration throughout the 
country over the 1930s, it did so in the most brutal way impinging killings, 
slavery, forced labour and coercive production of cash crops. Portuguese 
 8 
administration to the native people was one of the most brutal amongst the 
colonizers (Vail and White, 1978; Isaacman, 1996; Rocha et al., 1999). These 
colonial practices separated native families either temporarily or permanently 
and the local peasantry lived in fear of abuses of the Europeans and their 
African mercenaries (Vail and White, 1978). Local institutions and values 
were violated. In the economic sphere, the export of an appreciable part of the 
native labour force, and the coercive recruitment of labour force for the 
plantation companies intensified local workforce shortage. This led to a 
reduction in native production and a decline of the living standards of the 
natives (Isaacman, 1996). Although the context was not smooth and local, 
people actively or overtly rebelled against all forms of coercion and brutality 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1976; Isaacman, 1996; Rocha et al., 1999) a more 
coordinated struggle for national liberation was organized and started by the 
FRELIMO party in 1964, and Mozambique became independent from 
Portugal in June 1975.  
Portuguese investment in its colonies was very marginal because of 
Portugal’s limited ‘financial’ capacities, the interest in improving its national 
economy and the fact that non-Portuguese owned most of the large 
companies. Compared to other colonizers the overall living standards of the 
populations on the ex-Portuguese colonies were very poor and traumatic 
(Chabal, 2002).  By the time of Mozambican independence in 1975, about 95 
percent of the native population- that lived mainly from agriculture- were 
illiterate and social services such as clean water, health care amongst others 
were extremely limited for the native people (Cravinho, 1995: 47).  This was 
the legacy at independence, which tended to make people vulnerable to 
natural and man-made hazards.  
After independence, FRELIMO adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and private property was abolished. The economy was centralized and 
collective models of production were introduced in the agricultural sector. To 
implement collective production and state farms, rural populations were 
forced to live in communal villages and resettlement programmes were 
undertaken in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Most of the Portuguese and 
foreign nationals left the country and the services they owned, controlled or 
provided were left abandoned, destroyed or expropriated by the state. These 
new developments had considerable negative impacts on the already weak 
Mozambican economy and low living standards of the population. By 1976, 
cash crops and national industrial production fell by two-thirds and the 
global national export volume fell by half compared to 1973 (Egero, 1992:77). 
The farming sector, which absorbed the majority of the population, was hit 
the most. By 1978, food shortage was widespread in the country to an extent 
that cereal imports had more than tripled compared to 1973 (Fitzpatrick, 
1981:81). The national GDP started to fall by an average of 5 percent per year 
and by 1982 the country could no longer afford to pay its debt demands 
(Fitzpatrick, 1981: 80-81; Plank, 1993:410).    
Beyond colonial heritage and failures of policies after independence, 
the deteriorating socio-economic and political contexts were also a by-product 
 9 
of natural hazards and civil war. In 1977 and 1978, Mozambique was affected 
by two big floods. The 1977 flooding on the Limpopo basin claimed 300 lives 
and affected about 400 thousand people (Wisner, 1979: 296) while in 1978, 
floods on the Zambezi basin claimed 45 lives and affected about 450 thousand 
(Palmer and Tritton, 1979:89). From 1980, southern Mozambique started to 
face drought which became acute from 1983 to 1985 affecting more than 5 
million and claiming lives of more than 100 thousand (GoM, 1988: 15). In the 
next chapter, I discuss in more detail the occurrence of natural hazards in 
Mozambique and its influence on the state formation process.  
Civil war started in 1976 around the Mozambican border with 
Zimbabwe in Manica and Tete provinces but by 1986 it had spread all over 
the country (Weinstein and Francisco, 2005). A number of different sources 
both internally and internationally, fed the RENAMO guerrilla movement 
that fought FRELIMO during the civil war. The white minority administered 
both the Ian Smith government in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. They are overwhelmingly cited to have 
bred and fed RENAMO to destabilize Mozambique.   
However, RENAMO’s growth and strength over time should in fact be 
attributed to a more complex interplay of national and international forces. 
These include the cold war strategies, RENAMO’s violence and coercion on 
local people, dissatisfaction with FRELIMO’s policies, both internally and 
internationally, regionalism and the weakness of the state and economy by 
the independence in 1975 (Morgan, 1990; Weinstein and Francisco, 2005). 
The civil war ended in 1992 but left behind widespread horrendous 
memories. Its is estimated that almost 1 million people lost their lives while 2 
million were forced to find refuge in neighboring countries and another 4 
million were internally displaced (UNHCR, 1996). Virtually all infrastructures 
in the countryside were in shambles and many rural areas were deserted. The 
16 years of civil war produced nationwide economic damages estimated at 15 
billion US$ and incalculable socio-cultural impacts (Middleton and O’Keefe, 
1997: 82-97). 
 Facing increasing opposition and economic problems in the 1980s and 
1990s, FRELIMO was obliged to reshape its national and international 
policies. It turned to the west and by 1984 adhered to the Bretton Woods 
institutions to access financial resources. Under the auspices of the World 
Bank and IMF economic reforms started in 1987, Marxism was abandoned 
and the first multiparty elections were held in 1994.  Ever since, Mozambique 
has depended largely on international aid for its development and 
humanitarian needs. By 2009 about 54 percent of the national budget 
depended on aid from the international community.  
This dependency on the international community has been relevant to 
the production and reproduction of the powerlessness discourse emphasized 
at the beginning of the present chapter. For many scholars, Mozambique’s 
recurrent reliance on international donors and NGOs for humanitarian and 
development aid has eroded local capacity, created, and perpetuated a 
national dependency on the international community (Adam, 1990; Hanlon, 
 10 
1991; Plank, 1993; Renzio and Hanlon, 2007; Hanlon and Smart, 2008).  Both, 
ordinary people and the government, are said to have become accustomed to 
a ‘beggar mentality’ (Adam, 1990:19) and to ‘cargo thinking’ (Hanlon and 
Smart, 2008: 318).  Hanlon and Smart went to an extreme to suggest that the 
international community is governing Mozambique. They claimed that 
‘international donors have taken the seat of the driver and the government of 
Mozambique and its people are hitch-hikers. Otherwise, if the government 
takes the driver´s seat then, they appear to be like a taxi driver, expecting 
orders as where to go’ (Hanlon and Smart, 2008:295). 
In the next chapter I will claim that the focus on the role of the 
international actors - their strengths and power- limits in my view the 
understanding of everyday struggles and the creative ways devised by local 
actors to reshape this influence and its outcomes. While the international 
community has influenced disaster management, they have not, however, 
determined the outcomes. International response was concentrated mainly at 
the policy and programmes formulation and fund mobilization levels. At the 
implementation level the national government and local people became the 
major players and, to a large extent, reshaped the policies and programmes to 
suit their own interpretations of disaster problems and their own interests. In 
most of the cases local actors attempted to create and use a discourse from 
which a positive response from the international community could be 
expected. But, they also attempted to avoid that aid jeopardized their political 
and economic interests and those in power tried to use international aid to 
maintain them in power and, to some extent, strengthen their positions. 
Rather than eroding local capacity, international response allowed, largely, a 
greater room for manoeuvre to local actors, especially to the FRELIMO 
government.  
Greg Bankoff has demonstrated how disasters and disaster response in 
the Philippines has been a formative element in shaping socio-economic 
relations and power positions in society (Bankoff, 2003). In a similar vein, I 
will analyze, in the next chapter, how the colonial powers and then the 
Mozambican government managed to use disaster response to strengthen 
their positions. This means that disaster response in Mozambique has to be 
approached as part of the state formation process.  
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EXPLORING THE EVERYDAY PRACTICES OF DISASTER RESPONSE. 
THE ANALYTICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION  
 
The present thesis proposes the use of an actor-oriented approach for the 
understanding of disasters and disaster responses.  In the following sections I 
elaborate on this and also discuss the concepts of vulnerability, adaptation 
and livelihoods as key concepts in attempting to understand local disaster 
responses. Before elaborating on these let’s first look at how disasters have so 
far been approached, what limitations and challenges disaster studies are 
facing currently, which has led me to the use of an actor-oriented approach.   
 
DISASTER RE-ATTACHING EXCEPTIONALITY TO NORMALITY  
 
Disasters have always been characterized by their exceptionality and 
disruptive capacity. They represent a ’crisis situation that outstrips the 
capacity of a society to cope with’ (Anderson and Woodrow, 1993: 133) or, as 
become more consensual and elaborated, ‘it represents a serious disruption of 
the functioning of a community or society involving widespread human, 
material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the 
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’ 
(UN, 2009:9). In 1997 Al-Madhari and Keller went through different fields of 
knowledge to find out how they define disasters.  They enumerated 27 
definitions of disaster ranging from sociology, psychology, seismology, 
medicine, relief organizations, economics and government institutions all 
presenting similar characteristics. Frerks et al. (1999:7) identify the following 
characteristics found in disaster definitions: 
 An extreme phenomenon; 
 Of great intensity and limited endurance; 
 Occurring at certain location; 
 Involving a complex interplay between physical and human systems; 
 Causing loss of lives and threats to public health, as well as physical 
damage and disruption of livelihoods systems and society; 
 Outstripping local capacities and resources; 
 Requiring outside assistance to cope with.  
 
The characteristics outlined above tend to distinguish and, to a large extent, 
detach normality from exceptionality. In so doing, they tended, over time, to 
produce an academic and professional field of knowledge that specializes in 
exceptionalities and disruption- disaster studies and humanitarianism. They 
tend to detach themselves from the disciplines and professions focusing on 
people’s everyday or ’normal’ life. As they become highly specialized they 
become even more narrowed in terms of the type of disaster they look at (i.e. 
specialized in natural or man-made disasters; rapid or slow on-set disasters), 
disaster studies and humanitarianism come to be increasingly detached from 
everyday life.   
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This approach on disasters has been of little use for dealing with 
complex disasters (evolving from multiple sources that feed each other) and 
disasters that are only mildly disruptive, and in understanding the making 
and unmaking of disasters and disaster responses.  
Climate change is also challenging the way scientists define and 
approach disasters nowadays. Given the complexity of climate (change) 
related disasters whose causes and effects stretch over large scales of time and 
space, and the diversity of actors and value systems involved, the disciplinary 
boundaries as well as boundaries between normality and exceptionality 
become very fluid and problematic. As climate change takes place, and the 
intensity and frequency of weather- related disasters increases, disaster 
responses come to be part of the everyday life through what is now globally 
labelled adaptation. Hence, climate change is, to a large extent, forcing 
scientists to re-attach exceptionality to normality.  In doing so, disaster studies 
should de-encapsulate from the exceptionality and look at the everyday 
practices that bring about disasters and disaster responses.  In this thesis, I 
argue that the best way to do this is by using an actor-oriented approach to 
disaster studies. 
 
ACTORS, ARENAS AND INTERFACES  
 
The definition and responses to disasters are social constructions embedded 
in different perceptions, interests and power relations. People living under 
disaster risk conditions and experiencing disaster situations in their everyday 
life might perceive and act upon disasters differently from how scientists and 
humanitarian organizations perceive and act upon them. Bruijn and Van Dijk, 
for example, have captured how insecurity and crisis are defined in pastoral 
contexts of Mali and how this differed from the scientific and humanitarian 
definition. While scientists and humanitarian organizations perceived limited 
grazing capacity as an exceptional problem requiring emergency intervention, 
locals saw it as part of their normal life and used their mobility and social 
networks to cope with the ‘problem’ (Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1999).  
Since disasters are social constructions, there are wide differences on 
how actors, which may be individuals, but  also formal and informal groups 
and organizations, define and act upon them; for some natural or man-made 
disasters are a simple fact of life, god’s will, or even a window of opportunity 
(Frerks et al., 1999:32). As there are multiple understandings and responses to 
disasters, the context of disaster response comes to best resemble an arena 
where actors with different and sometimes conflicting views, strategies and 
interests interface either face-to-face or virtually and shape the process and the 
outcomes. Actors, arena and interfaces are three major cornerstones of the actor-
oriented approach. 
The actor-oriented approach departs from the premise that actors have 
agency, that is, within the limits of their knowledge and other resources, their 
understanding and interests, individuals, groups or organizations respond 
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and shape events affecting their existence. From an actor-oriented perspective 
social life is complex, heterogeneous and actors´ response to events are not 
preordained, static, single and intrinsic; they are always dynamic, contested, 
contingent and a result of social interactions (Arce and Long, 2000). Because 
responses are a result of social interactions, an actor-oriented approach 
focuses on interface analysis as a lens for understanding the diversity of 
interpretations, conflicts, strategies and negotiations taking place in the 
arenas. The concept of arena entails that practices are socially negotiated in 
interfaces between different actors. In the thesis the concept of arena is used to 
identify actors involved in particular disaster response and in mapping out 
the issues, resources and discourses entailed. Interfaces are defined as points 
of interception of different and often conflicting values, understandings and 
interests brought in by different actors in their social interactions and 
negotiations (Long, 2001:65). Social negotiation takes different forms, which 
may include coercive violence, gossiping, written statement, and formal and 
informal interactions (Hilhorst and Serrano, 2010:184).    
The actor-oriented approach stresses that at the interfaces each actor 
attempts to enrol the other parties into its own agendas and understandings, 
and actor’s actions are continuously reshaped according to their 
interpretations of actions of the others and the overall changes on the social 
and physical environment (Long, 1989:223). Hence, people and organizations 
are not passive recipients of events affecting their lives; they wittingly or 
unwittingly shape the events surrounding their everyday lives.  That is not to 
suggest that actors are always conscious about their practices.  
 Discourse analysis is an integral part of the actor-oriented approach 
because discourses are shapers of the ways in which actors understand and 
respond to ideas, situations and actions. Discourses are more or less coherent 
sets of reference that frame the way we understand and act upon the world 
around us. Foucault (1995/ 1975, 1980) has paved the way for studying 
discourse as closely interweaving knowledge and power. The effect of 
discourse is that certain ways of understanding society, including its 
organization and the distribution of power, become excluded whereas others 
attain authority. In the writing of Foucault, discourse appeared as a structure 
that imposes itself on reality.  
Discourse can indeed become dominant and operate as a mindset that 
informs policy and practices in unrecognised ways. However, Norman Long 
has pointed out that there are always multiple discourses at work. ‘Since 
social life is never so unitary as to be built upon one single type of discourse, 
it follows that, however restricted their choice, actors always face some 
alternative ways of formulating their objectives, deploying modes of action 
and giving reasons for their behaviour ‘ (Long and Long, 1992:25). Hence, 
there is a duality of discourse: it has an ordering effect, yet actors can 
strategically pick, choose and use discourse in defining their policies and 
practices (Hilhorst, 2003). It is in this duality that we find the argument to 
study how discourses such as of powerlessness and disruption work in 
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practice, to review why and how they become important and how they order 
for instance disaster response practices (Artur and Hilhorst, 2010).  
In this thesis, I explore how discourses on disasters are adopted and 
adapted by local actors, and how disaster response practices are consequently 
shaped. I also reflect on how power enters into these discourses, how 
alternative representations are excluded and others promoted and how 
particular discourses legitimize particular interventions. 
Actor-oriented approaches form in essence an alternative approach to 
structuralism and rational choice theories. On one hand, actor-oriented 
approaches deny claims by structuralists that actor’s actions are a product of 
external power and rules that give actors no way to act otherwise; rules and 
other externalities are viewed from an actor approach as a by-product of 
actors’ practices; they evolve as actors make use and reproduce them over 
time (Barnes, 2000:26). Further, the mere fact that actions are in accordance 
with some external requirements or structures does not imply passivity. To 
act consistently with a rule is not the same thing as to act guided by a rule, 
still less as to act as a rule compels to act (Barnes, 2000:47)   
On the other hand, the actor oriented approach steps away from the 
rational choice theory. The rational choice theory assumes that actors’ actions 
are predictable, based on the individualist interests of maximizing or 
achieving her/his own benefits, goals and preferences; hence, the actors use 
rational calculation and choose the best actions to fulfil their objectives. 
Contrary to this understanding, the actor-oriented approach stresses that 
although actors are actively involved in shaping the process and the 
outcomes; a great deal of their behaviour is subject to unknown conditions or 
unintended consequences of their actions (Leeuwis, 1993:293).  
  
ACTORS AND DOMAINS OF DISASTER RESPONSE  
 
One of the main challenges in applying an actor-oriented approach is how one 
can follow in-depth the constellation of different actors, interests and 
discourses entailed, especially in disaster response where the number of 
actors goes far beyond that involved in ‘normal’ development interventions.  
To facilitate the study of multiple discourses and responses to disasters 
from multiple actors, and not get lost in the challenge of studying every single 
actor, I use domains of response to risk and disasters (Hilhorst, 2004). Social 
domains can be defined as areas of social life that are organized by reference 
to a central cluster of values that are recognised as a locus of certain rules, 
norms and values implying a degree of social commitment (Long, 2001:59). 
Although these domains are diverse in themselves, they have a certain 
proximity, physical or discursive, in the ways in which people refer to 
disaster and risk. For example, the disaster discourse framed in terms of 
disruption, deaths, and weakness tends to create certain clusters such as of 
‘victims’ who are to benefit from humanitarian aid and of ‘humanitarian 
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NGOs’ that are supposed to deliver the aid. This means that we can use these 
domains as entry-points or categories to study the arena of disaster response.  
The three main domains of response to risk and disasters are the 
domain of science and disaster management, the domain of disaster 
governance and the domain of local responses (Hilhorst, 2004). They are the 
respective domains of scientists and development experts, bureaucrats and 
politicians, and local people.  
The domain of science and disaster management involves the global 
understanding of disaster and disaster response. Like the development 
discourse, disaster response is increasingly based on the global perception 
that it can be appropriated and controlled through expert knowledge and 
modern administration. Disaster response from this domain tends to be based 
on global guidance of disaster management embedded in humanitarian 
charters, international treaties and codes of conduct promoted mainly by 
donors, UN agencies, researchers and international NGOs. Global principles, 
codes of conduct and practices are promoted and increasingly researchers, 
donors and humanitarian organizations tend to seek predictability, efficiency, 
calculability and control of disasters and disaster responses (Waters, 2001:35). 
This domain is not neutral and exempted from power relations and 
politics.  As disasters happen frequently in the developing countries and most 
of technological, expert and bureaucratic knowledge is based in the west, the 
domain of science and disaster management tends to shape North-South 
relations and to promote the transfer of western technology and knowledge to 
the developing countries (Bankoff, 2004). In these cases, this domain 
reproduces existing power relations and continuously undermines alternative 
and likely more efficient and context based forms of disaster response 
(Wilkinson, 2010: 84).  
The second domain- the domain of disaster governance- represents the 
cluster of disaster response where the international domain or experts’domain 
is mediated and altered through national, political and bureaucratic 
governance practices and institutions. It represents the domain where 
international policy framework, regulations and treaties are downscaled and 
incorporated within the national frameworks and government practices. It is 
through this domain that national governments worldwide respond to 
disaster situations and based on their response a particular relationship 
between governments and citizens as well as with the international 
community develops. This requires in most of the times a balance of local 
interests and international agendas.   
The third domain- the domain of local response or knowledge- 
represents the domain where local people through everyday practices and 
based on their capacities, resources including social networks respond to 
disasters. It has been noticed indeed that local response and knowledge is 
neither genuinely local nor homogeneous and equally shared. The process of 
production, dissemination and appropriation of the so-called local knowledge 
is diverse, conflictive and embedded in different politics and power relations. 
Further, the so-called local knowledge is not static; it constantly evolves 
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through interaction, social negotiations, accommodations, exchanges and 
power struggles within the domain and with other domains of disaster 
response (Hilhorst, 2004:63). Thus, the different domains are not necessarily 
detached from each other. Practices at local level are informed, in many cases, 
by national and international policies and interventions while, practices at 
local level are, in most of the cases, frames of references for national and 
global policies.  
 
DISASTER INTERVENTIONS AND INTERFACES  
 
Interventions are an integral part of disaster responses. In the introduction of 
the book I have illustrated that hazards and disasters tend to encourage 
interventions from different actors. Interventions are considered here as a set 
of activities carried out by actors (normally from the international and 
governance domains) in a particular place with or without the participation 
and legitimization from the local actors. 
The disaster management cycle (UNDRO, 1991) provides different 
points of intervention before, during and after a disaster. Before disasters, 
actors, in the disaster field, are supposed to undertake risk assessment, 
mitigation/prevention and preparedness activities. During the disaster, actors 
are expected to undertake evacuation, give immediate assistance of food, 
water, medical care, and shelter. In post disaster times, there is a need to 
restore infrastructural services, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and economic 
and social recovery. Altogether, these interventions can help to reduce the 
frequency of exposure to and impacts of disaster events (Hilhorst and Warner, 
2009:5).  
Regardless of who plans the interventions and for what period of 
disaster response, the planning is, in most cases, based on assumptions of 
disruption, limited local capacity, and of turning these negatives into 
positives in a linear and ‘blue print’ fashion. In many cases the planners see 
themselves as the only ones possessing the right knowledge regarding the 
events and responses to it thus being well placed to determine inputs and 
outputs.  
In everyday practice, however, interventions are made up of different 
encounters between different actors including planners and beneficiaries. 
These different actors perceive hazards, disasters and the interventions taking 
place from their own projects and cultural background. In most cases, 
interventions involves struggle for resources between different actors.They 
are therefore shaped by the different demands, politics and rivalries between 
and within organizations and communities. Based on that, the assumptions 
from the planners may be challenged and the planned interventions 
unpacked at the interfaces. In so doing, interventions may get different 
meanings and outcomes, sometimes far beyond the planned process 
(Hebinck, 1995; Hilhorst, 2003).  
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It is rather naive to assume that outcomes of interventions emerge from 
the goals, activities and strategies devised from the plans.The fact of the 
matter is that they are increasingly perceived as an emerging property of 
encounters, negotiations, enrolments and coalition building between the 
different actors from the different domains of disaster response discussed 
above.  Under such contexts focus should be on the implementation and 
encounters between different actors rather than on the plans alone (Long and 
Van der Ploeg, 1995:71). As interventions are implemented they come to form 
part of the resources and constraints of many individuals and groups 
involved in shaping or reshaping continuities and changes both on the lives of 
the affected but also on the ‘life’ of the interventions (Long, 2001:72).   
 
CLIMATE CHANGE, VULNERABILITY TO DISASTERS AND 
ADAPTATION   
 
From the early 1990s, climate change has received increasing attention in 
disaster studies. Empirical scientific evidence has shown that the climate of 
the planet Earth is not the same as it used to be a hundred years ago and will 
not be the same in the coming century. Due mainly to anthropogenic 
influence (i.e. through greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere and 
deforestation), processes of climate change have been set into motion. Global 
average temperatures have been rising gradually over the last century and 
precipitation, sunlight patterns among other climate variables have shifted 
from their normal ranges (IPCC, 2007). Due to changes in climate variables, 
the planet has become hotter, glaciers have melted and sea levels have risen.  
The frequency, magnitude and timing of many weather-related phenomena 
such as droughts, floods and cyclones have deviated from their normal 
patterns.  
The relationship between climate change and disasters is one that has 
been of concern for many actors especially in the domain of science and 
disaster management. There are overall claims that climate change has and 
will largely lead to increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme 
events.There are forecasts for more short term extreme precipitation resulting 
in more floods and landslides; further, that mid continental areas will become 
much drier increasing the risks of drought, and as oceans become hotter more 
energy is put into the cyclone formation increasing their frequency and 
intensity (Van Aalst, 2006: 8; IPCC, 2007:30). All this tends to lead to disasters 
especially in poor and vulnerable countries such as Mozambique.  It is being 
argued that the Millennium Development Goals will not be achieved unless 
special attention and global policy interest is given to climate change and 
disasters (Schipper and Pelling, 2006).  
Global policy interest in disasters and climate change took shape in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988 the UN General Assembly approved, under 
ther resolution 43/53 of 6 December, the creation of the Intergovernmental 
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Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set up jointly by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 
 In 1989, the UN General Assembly designeted, under the resolution 
44/236 of 22 December, the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR); this was followed by the publication of the First 
Assessment Report by IPCC in 1990, that streghtened the importance of 
climate change and disasters as issues requiring policial platform. In the same 
year (1990) the UN General Assembly decided to establish an International 
Negotiating Committee (INC) which started preparations for the United 
Nations Fund on Climate Change agreed during the 1992 Rio Summit on 
Environment and Development. 
The Rio Summit produced three conventions - on climate change, 
biological diversity and desertification. The convention on climate change was 
strenghtened in 1995 by the release of the Second Assessment Report by the 
IPCC, leading to the Kyoto protocol in 1997. The Kyoto protocol became the 
global tool for tackling climate change by proposing industrialized countries 
to reduce their greenhouses emissions and help developing countries to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change. The protocol entered into revision in 
2009 at the Copenhagen Climate Change conference but the real impacts of 
the revision are still to be seen. In 2005, the United Nations produced the 
Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) which presents measures for 
building disaster resilient nations and communities.  
These global policies have led to various interventions in developing 
countries such as Mozambique, aiming to reduce climate-related disaster risks 
that are thought to be affected by climate change. Most (if not all) of the policy 
frames and interventions related to climate change and disasters, focus on 
reducing vulnerability and facilitate local adaptation to climate change. 
Hence, analysis and reduction of climate change related disasters came to 
focus on vulnerability and adaptation. These are currently key concepts in 
disasters and climate change discourses.   
The concept of vulnerability was first applied, conceptually, in disaster 
studies in the early 1980s when terms such as marginalization and resilience 
started to be introduced (Wisner and Luci, 1993:1). Towards the late 1990s 
when concerns over climate change increased, a growing number of 
publications on vulnerability have emerged (Weichselgartner, 2001:3). The 
vulnerability concept tries to capture social, economic, political and 
environmental variables that make people be exposed to hazards and be 
susceptible to hazard impacts (DFID, 2005:2).  
At a conceptual and practical level, vulnerability has indeed been 
approached mainly from a structural approach, addressing the macro-
structures and by designing a number of policies and intervention models to 
be implemented mainly in poor and vulnerable countries. As pointed above, 
the global policies such as the Kyoto or Copenhagen protocol and the Hyogo 
Framework of Action are mechanisms that aim to reduce vulnerability to 
disasters in poor countries and communities. Although macro-structures are 
still critical in analysing vulnerability, I believe that vulnerability should be 
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addressed at local level where these macro-structures show their relevance in 
addressing vulnerability. As discussed above, actors at the local domain are 
not only subjects of macro policies and interventions but they have 
capabilities with which they address their vulnerability and reshape policies 
and interventions (cf. Anderson and Woodrow, 1989).  
Adaptation to climate change is a parallel concept to vulnerability. 
Adaptation is believed to reduce vulnerability and to increase local resilience 
to climate change. Adaptation measures can reduce or delay economic and 
other losses from climate change related disasters (Burton et al., 2002).  
In disaster studies, concepts such as coping, coping capacity, 
adaptation and adaptive capacity have long been applied to refer to the 
different practices people apply to survive in the short or long term under the 
threats of natural or human induced hazards. Development experts, 
especially in rural development, have used livelihood strategies in a similar 
way as coping or adaptation strategies, to refer to a dynamic and complex 
bricolage or portfolio of activities that local people engage in to make a living 
in adverse conditions (Scoones, 2009:172). 
Over the past two decades, the discussion on coping and adaptation 
has re-emerged strongly with the adoption of the concept in the climate 
change discourse. Alongside there are attempts to disentangle coping from 
adaptation. For many scholars coping tends to refer to short term adjustments 
in natural and social systems while adaptation refers to the ability to adjust 
over longer timescales (Eriksen, 2004:19; UN, 2006:20). Further, differently 
from coping, adaptation practices tend to become institutionalized in the 
contexts where they are applied (Oliver-Smith, 2008).  
In climate change discourse, adaptation has primarily been defined as 
the process of adjustment in ecological-social-economic systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli, their effects or impacts (Smit et al., 
1999:200). But more recently the definition has undergone different 
metamorphoses and the last IPCC report (the fourth assessment) defines 
adaptation as the process of adjustment or change that reduces vulnerability 
or enhances resilience in response to observed or expected changes in climate 
and associated extreme weather events (Adger et al., 2007:720). This new 
definition brings vulnerability and resilience much more upfront and enables 
linking up climate change adaptation with disaster risk reduction and 
livelihood security.  
Despite this metamorphosis climate change adaptation discourse is still 
largely narrow in its conception and application. It still assumes that decisions 
to adapt to climate change are separate from the everyday lives, needs and 
constraints. Christoplos (2010) has cautioned that local people are exposed to 
a multiplicity of risks and climate change is only part of a bigger and more 
complex set of factors. Decisions regarding adaptation to climate change 
occur in the context of socio-economic and demographic changes, competition 
over natural resources, changing technologies, changes in global governance, 
social conventions and the globalising flows of capital and labour (Adger et 
al., 2005; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008; Christoplos, 2010). Thus, adaptation 
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can be induced by non-climate related social and economic changes that 
renders it difficult to detach climate change induced adaptations from actions 
triggered by other events. It is mainly by focusing on everyday practices and 
people’s livelihoods that we may best understand the process of adaptation 
and the myriad of trigger events.  
 
LIVELIHOODS AND DISASTERS 
 
Studying disaster response involves mainly examining how people manage 
their everyday lives, that is, how they construct their livelihoods.  The 
occurrence of disasters can disrupt the assets that people depend on to build 
their lives while disaster risk reduction measures that allow a certain 
continuity in livelihoods have to be applied by individuals in their daily 
activities for making a living. It is mainly by understanding people’s 
livelihoods that one can understand disaster reduction measures being taken 
or rejected by individuals and communities. The strength of a livelihood 
analysis is therefore that it allows us to attach exceptionalities to normalities.  
The concept of livelihoods emerged in development studies as a 
response to top-down development interventions that were not based on 
people’s own strategies to make a living. The publication by Robert Chambers 
in 1983 ‘putting the last first’ which calls for an inversion of the roles local 
people and development agencies and experts were playing (Chambers, 1983) 
can losely be considered as the major lever toward livelihood 
conceptualization and analysis. Chambers argued that development 
interventions were supply driven taking ‘the beneficiaries’ as merely passive 
and helpless actors. For Chambers, beneficiaries have capabilities, 
perspectives and worldviews that should be taken as the starting point for 
any intervention.  
In 1991 Chambers and Conway developed the first comprehensive 
definition of livelihood and since then an enormous body of literature on this 
topic has been published.  According to Chambers and Conway, ‘a livelihood 
comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living. To be sustainable a livelihood should 
be able to cope with or recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance 
its capabilities and sustain future generations’ (Chambers and Conway, 1991: 
9).  
In 1998, Ian Scoones took the livelihood concept further and developed 
the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (Scoones, 1998:4) which became a 
central part of the Sustainable Livelihood Guidance Sheets by DFID (1999). 
According to the framework, people make a living in a context of 
vulnerability. Within this context people have access to certain capitals 
(namely social, natural, human, financial and physical). The access to these 
capitals depends on the prevailing social, institutional and organizational 
structures which influence the livelihood strategies and outcomes.  The access 
and use of assets then produces livelihood outcomes that involves more 
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income; increased well being; reduced vulnerability; food security and more 
sustainable use of natural resource base (DFID, 1999:1).  Since its publication 
in 1999, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework or the DFID Livelihood 
Framework has become very popular, being widely adopted or adapted as a 
model for livelihood analysis and interventions.  
Despite its wide popularity, the DFID livelihood framework appears to 
have, in my view, several limitations in understanding disaster responses. It is 
essentially a normative tool conceived for intervention purposes in the 
existing status quo rather that to be grounded in local people’s agency and 
strategies. Firstly, the framework sets out by presenting the limitations actors 
have in crafting their everyday life. It starts with the vulnerability context and 
emphasizes structural factors affecting the crafting of livelihoods. This is done 
without offering analytical and methodological tools as how to deal with 
institutions, power relations, stratifications and the very dynamic and 
sometimes unpredictable processes of crafting livelihoods. This is in sharp 
contrast with the capacities and vulnerability framework proposed by 
Anderson and Woodrow (1989) which starts from capacities and is therefore 
more actor-oriented. Starting by the capacities allows grasping the strengths 
that exist within the society which are essential for the design and 
implementation of responses that aim to reduce vulnerability (Anderson and 
Woodrow; 1989:11).  
Secondly, the concept of capitals brings about a connotation that 
identifies livelihoods with economics and macro discourses rather than the 
micro level where its proclaimed focus is. The definition of five capitals, for 
instance, tends to exclude the more context based assets such as cultural 
assets3 (Bebbington, 1999: 2034) and symbolic assets4 (CERES Research School, 
2006: 5). This leads to an oversimplification of local everyday lives and to 
equate livelihood with merely making a living. In everyday life, livelihoods 
go far beyond just making a living; it embeds identity, status, life style, power 
relations and value choices (Long, 2001; Noteboom, 2003; Kaag, 2004).  
Finally, a critical analysis of the model brings out the assumption that 
livelihood outcomes are always positive (more income; increased well being; 
reduced vulnerability).  In practice indeed, livelihoods are generated in arenas 
where politics, discourses and power relations play a role. In such contexts no 
one can predict beforehand what livelihood outcomes will look like. Positive 
or negative outcomes are emergent properties of people’s interlocking 
strategies and the ways in which they socially negotiate. By pushing into 
‘positives’ and by overlooking parallel and complex processes involved, the 
livelihood framework appears to operate conceptually at the levels- 
borrowing Max Weber’s concept- of society rationalization. It works as a 
process of producing discourses which allow the development of bureaucratic 
systems and administrative practices that push people to act in a certain 
                                                 
3
 Defined by the proponent as a range of cultural practices that are valued for their meaningfulness. 
4
 Defined as a range of repertoires, images, meanings, discourses formed and used by the actors in 
making their living. 
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rationalized way prescribed by the model. In this way, the framework starts 
to act like a regulatory instrument of social control.  
In this thesis I embrace the livelihood concept to analyze local 
everyday lives and responses to disasters from a perspective that focuses on 
local capacities. I perceive of livelihoods as being crafted in contexts where 
actors negotiate and shape the assets, the institutions, the strategies and the 
generated resources. In my analysis I follow actors rather than ‘capitals’ and 
institutions. I attempt to grasp how actors shape ‘capitals’ and institutions 
and what ‘capitals’ and institutions do or represent to the actors.   
 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
The present book is based on a four-year project within the framework of the 
Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation Programme (VAM) of the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). It was a 
collaborative project involving Disaster Studies at Wageningen University in 
the Netherlands, the Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, the 
Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate 
Centre in the Netherlands. This research set up was designed in order to 
grasp everyday practices of people and their institutions, and produce 
insights, which could be of useful interest for practitioners and disaster 
managers. The research encompassed three periods: one year of building 
theoretical and methodological understandings, 18 months of fieldwork in 
Mozambique and another 18 months of writing the dissertation in the 
Netherlands.  
The study is grounded in the ethnographic tradition. Ethnography is a 
research methodology widely used by social scientists especially by 
anthropologists. The methodology aims to study social processes in everyday 
settings by depicting the activities and perspectives of actors in a setting 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:23-24). Ethnography is based on meticulous 
fieldwork, which makes use of multiple methods such as participant 
observation, interviews and a wider range of data sources. The objectives of 
ethnographic studies are not necessarily to establish universal laws of human 
behaviour. Instead they aim to create, through data gathered and analysis, 
new insights that may challenge established theories and propositions 
(Garfinkel, 1967).  
Although ethnography has long been applied in social science, there is 
still a limited understanding on what ethnography is all about. For many 
scholars, ethnography is the same as ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1983) and 
most of the academics relate it with anthropology and qualitative data. This is 
indeed an oversimplification of ethnography. Ethnography is about living 
amongst research subjects, reflecting upon their everyday lives and your own 
life amongst them, and using whichever research methods allow to 
understand, answer or reshape the research questions.  Thus, ethnography is 
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based on people’s practices, on local challenges and makes, whenever 
required, use of quantitative and qualitative tools (Sayer, 2006:23).   
Reflexivity is a core concept in doing ethnography. Reflexivity means 
that researchers reflect upon the subjects, upon themselves and their actions 
as shapers of the knowledge being produced. Knowledge production comes 
from a sharing and blending of experiences and negotiations in a field of 
interpersonal relations (Reason, 1994:11; Jackson, 1998:28). In such contexts, 
researchers should exploit their participation in the world under study to 
develop or test theories.  
One of the major challenges of reflexive ethnography is how and when 
do you follow the actors? Everyday life is complex and made up of different 
encounters. Following actors across all their everyday events and practices is 
virtually impossible. To overcome this challenge I take Long´s (1997) 
suggestion to follow critical events. Critical events refer to individual or 
collective happenings, which underline everyday practices or have had a 
substantial impact triggering changes in the process or outcomes of the 
everyday practices. They represent points, in time and space, where social 
actors interact and display their agency (Long, 1997:7). By following critical 
events researchers, focus on the process and the chain of actions and events 
throughout the process of making the outcome rather than focusing on the 
final endeavour per se (Latour, 1987:21).  
A further advantage of following critical events is that researchers are 
not bound within a specific geographical area. There is a fallacy of conceiving 
the research setting as delimited by clear geographical boundaries. In reality, 
people's practices and livelihoods are informed by and done in multiple 
localities.  Delimiting geographical boundaries tends not only to exclude the 
complexities of these multi localities but also to narrow the analysis to 
unrealistic contexts. Researchers end up not paying attention to networks 
developed beyond the research context which inform practices and processes 
taking place in their delimited research context. Rather than encapsulating on 
a clearly delimited research area, the focus on critical events and in following 
actors allows to capture processes taking place beyond a defined geographical 
research area. 
 This research is informed by these insights. I initially formulated the 
research problem with a focus on a disaster risk reduction project funded by 
the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre in the Netherlands and 
implemented by the Mozambican Red Cross in southern Mozambique. 
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the fieldwork in January 2007, central 
Mozambique was hit by floods and the Mozambican Red Cross and many 
other actors from the different domains of disaster response shifted their 
focus to humanitarian assistance to the affected population along the Zambezi 
delta. I shifted my focus as well and took the floods as a critical event to 
understand everyday practices of disaster response and actors’ interfaces. I 
moved to the Zambezi delta and for one year, I lived among local people 
along the Zambezi delta in Mopeia, Mutarara, Caia, Marromeu and Chinde 
districts. This allowed me getting in-depth data on local perspectives and 
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responses to disasters - the core objective of the book. This was eased as I 
speak the local language. 
I started the research at local level as a participant observer, placing 
focus on everyday life and attempting to get an overview of the context. In 
doing so, I asked people to be part of the research and co-opt the research 
agenda by bringing upfront issues of their interest on the research. During 
this stage, I followed some local critical events such as celebrations, church 
services, community meetings and sport events. I had also informal 
gatherings with different government servants (including teachers, police and 
military forces), NGO’s staff, kids, pilots, traders, fishermen, farmers and 
volunteers from the CVM. Through participant observations and informal 
gatherings, I was able to collect detailed description of events, people, 
interactions and observed patterns of behaviour and practices. In total, I 
attended 19 church services, 2 funerals and 3 weddings. 
As I came to understand better the context, the local jargon, hierarchy, 
concepts practices, and developed a rapport with local actors, I chose some 
key informants and conducted semi-structured interviews. In addition, I 
followed some of them to their agricultural fields, fishing and marketing 
journeys. This led me to get beyond my ‘research site’. For instance, although 
I was based in Mopeia district I ended up interacting with other actors in 
Mutarara, Caia, Marromeu and Chinde districts.  Besides this, I held separate 
focus group discussions with females, males and kids.  
Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions are similar in 
the approach. They are both guided by a checklist of issues and questions on 
which the researcher intends to collect information. Both are also flexible and 
provide data on knowledge, perceptions, beliefs and attitudes. The chief 
difference is that in semi-structured interviews, the interviewer asks questions 
to a single individual while the focus group discussion involves a group 
answering the questions. In the latter, it is still possible for an individual to 
give his or her own answers, but only in a group context (Bailey, 1994:192).  In 
Mopeia, Mutarara, Marromeu, Chinde districts along the Zambezi delta, and 
in Maputo, Beira and Quelimane I interviewed a total of 78 people from 
different domains of disaster response using semi-structured interviews and 
had 16 group discussions (with around 15 people each). Semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussion are an integral part of ethnographic 
studies and provide additional information to that collected through 
observations and informal gatherings. Annex 1 presents the list of people 
interviewed and of group discussions.  
From the participant observations, informal and semi-structured 
interviews, and focus group discussions it emerged that there were 
considerable differences between people living in the lowlands and those 
living in uplands although there were many interdependencies between 
them. To capture, quantitatively, the difference I decided to run a survey. 
Qualitative methods such as these enumerated above, are well placed in 
providing in-depth information but have limitations in telling the reader the 
differences in numerical and statistical terms. I also believe that a combination 
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of qualitative and quantitative data provides a better understanding and 
enriches the analysis.    
For the survey I used the household as the unit of analysis. There has 
been a considerable debate regarding the use of households in surveys. 
Households are composed of different members that do not necessarily share 
the same views and objectives over time. Under such a perspective, the views 
of the representative of the household may not necessarily represent the 
views and claims of the remaining members. Further, households may 
virtually expand over large territories diffusing the core concept of unit of 
analysis (Kaag, 2004:64).  
Notwithstanding these problems, as households comprise groups of 
people who share most aspects of consumption, drawing on and allocating a 
common pool of resources (including labor) to ensure their material and 
social reproduction (Schmink, 1984:89), it remains critical in analyzing social 
life. Although people at the household level do have different value systems 
and worldviews, they also share responsibilities, resources and values. 
Human beings are social creatures and for this the first social unit of analysis 
still continues to be at the level of the household.  
For data gathering using the questionnaires I employed four research 
assistants and trained them on research methodology and interviews. I chose 
them amongst the local people in Mopeia village that had been involved in 
data collection during the 2007 national census and had worked on the sites of 
interest of the present research. The survey was conducted in Cocorico 
community and Mopeia village (figure 3.3. chapter 3) in September 2007.  
I chose Cocorico and Mopeia village for different reasons. Cocorico is 
located on the floodplains of the Zambezi River and is among the most flood 
prone areas of Mozambique. Despite this, many people repeatedly refuse to 
be evacuated and resettled. This offered an opportunity to unravel the local 
domain and understand local perceptions of extreme-weather events and 
their disaster response practices. Moreover, due mainly to that aspect- of 
refusal- the Mozambican Red Cross decided to implement- with funding from 
the Danish Red Cross- a Community Based Disaster Risk Management 
(CBDRM) project. This project became a case study to understand how 
interventions enter into the lifeworlds of the locals and what can we learn 
from CBDRM (see chapter 4).  
Mopeia village is sited on uplands and due to flooding in 2007 and 
2008, some households from Cocorico ended up being resettled in that 
location. As I intended to follow actors, interfaces and everyday practices, I 
included Mopeia village in order to understand differences in livelihoods 
between the floodplains and uplands and to understand the dynamics of 
people livelihood due to their resettlement. 
By 2007 about 300 households inhabited Cocorico, see chapter 3 for 
further details on Cocorico, and the survey covered 84 households (43 in 
Mulamba; 21 in Sanguimbe and 20 in Cuara). This sample represents 28 
percent of the total population.  In Mopeia village, the survey was conducted 
at 24 de Julho and Zonas Verdes resettlement centres. Within the resettlement 
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centres the survey was administered to those resettled before the 2007 
flooding. I excluded the newcomers because as most of them had received aid 
recently, this would likely have a bias on the numerical data on items such as 
spoons, cups, income and other resources.  In total, 114 households were 
interviewed in Mopeia village: 59 households at 24 de Julho and 55 at Zonas 
Verdes. The total population in these two centres is unknown but it is 
estimated to be about 1290 households at 24 de Julho (about ½ newcomers) 
and about 500 at Zonas Verdes with nearly 1/3 newcomers (see chapter 7 for 
further details on resettlement). The survey sample represents about 10 
percent of the population already settled before the 2007 floods in each centre.    
The sample size depends on many factors, which include purposes of 
the study, total number of the population, resources available, stratification of 
the population and the level of accuracy required. A basic principle of 
sampling is that a sample should be representative of the population from 
which it is drawn (Babbie, 2007:189).  The exact size for a representative 
sample is indeed very fluid. Bless and Achola (1990:77) claim that a sample 
size of 5 percent of the population can be used when lacking a precise 
formulae. Bailey (1994:97) suggests that for studies that are more exploratory 
than entirely quantitative and statistical, which is my case, 30 cases seems to 
be the bare minimum but 100 cases should be preferred. Mwanje and Gotu 
(2001:29) suggest that for contexts where a complete measurement is 
impossible or not feasible but we still need results, which are sufficiently 
accurate for the purpose of the study, the sample size should be based on 
researcher reflexivity upon the context. My sample size was informed by 
these insights. I attempted to reach a minimal sample size and to critically 
reflect upon it. This was particularly the case when choosing the households.  
To choose the households I applied a multistage sampling 
methodology (Russell Bernard, 2005: 146). First, I used a heterogeneous 
purposive sampling (Smith, 1975: 116) by which I attempted, on purpose, to 
include in the sample, different social groups such as female-headed 
households, male headed households, widows, different ethnical groups and 
different age groups. To do this, I asked local leaders and local Red Cross 
volunteers to provide me with a list of households they recognized as 
minorities, which they used to call ‘the vulnerable’. This exercise provided 
lists of female-headed households, people with disability, etc. Then, the 
groups with few frequencies were automatically chosen to be part of the 
sample while for those with higher frequencies (including the ‘non 
vulnerables’) I set up a second sampling method. I used systematic random 
sampling (Russell Bernard, 2005: 151). For this, I recommended to the 
assistant researchers, while walking within the research areas, to pick up 
every third household of these not yet included in the sample. A total of 198 
household were interviewed using the survey. Annex 2 presents the checklist 
used for semi-structured interviews, group discussion and the questionnaire. 
To analyze the survey data I used the Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS). I ran descriptive statistics and tests of significance. Finally, I 
chose three extended case studies (including the Inácio case cited in the 
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introduction of the book) to serve as ‘illustration’ of different lifeworlds and 
strategies devised by people at local level to respond to disaster events.   An 
extended case study is a detailed study of small number of units, selected as 
representative of the groups relevant to the issue under consideration, but not 
necessarily representative of the population as a whole (Casley and 
Lury,1982:62). Extended case studies enrich the research as they are very 
particularistic, descriptive, heuristic and inductive (Meriam, 1990; Stake, 
1995). They are particularistic in a sense that they focus on a particular 
individual or phenomenon. The term descriptive is fitting in the sense that 
they provide a rich description of the phenomenon under study including 
many variables and their interaction.They are heuristic as they tend to 
illuminate the reader’s understanding of the overall arguments of the author 
but also of the phenomenon under study. Finally inductive in a sense that 
extended case studies bring up new relationships, concepts and 
understandings rather than attempting to verify predetermined hypothesis.  
Another relevant method used during the research was secondary data 
collection. This involved, amongst others, visits to libraries in Mozambique 
and in the Netherlands. In Mozambique, the libraries of the historical archive 
(Arquivo Histórico), Centre for African Studies (CEA), Land Tenure Centre 
(NET), National Water Directorate (DNA), and National Institute of Statistics 
(INE) deserve to be mentioned as they provided useful material for the 
present thesis. Secondary data was also gathered through listening to radio 
and TV programmes and by checking bulletins and newspapers. I had also 
access to various project and institutional reports and memos especially from 
the Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) and National Institute for Disaster 
Management (INGC).   
Besides these research methods, I had, in 2006, an eight weeks 
exposure visit to Thailand, Bangladesh and The Philippines. The visit was 
intended to learn how these disaster-prone countries in Asia manage disasters 
and what lessons could enrich my research on Mozambican disaster 
management practice (see chapter 4). In Thailand, I visited the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre (ADPC), while in Bangladesh I followed everyday 
practices of the NGO ActionAid.  In The Philippines, I interacted with the 
staff from the Centre for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) and their partners.   
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
The present thesis is structured in eight chapters. The next chapter sets the 
general landscape of disaster management and climate change adaptation in 
Mozambique. Using a historical perspective, the chapter looks at changes and 
continuities in disaster management practices and shows that disaster 
management is part of state formation informed by broader political and 
economic interests.  
Chapter three narrows the research down to the local level and 
discusses local adaptation strategies for flooding events. It argues that 
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adaptation strategies cut across geographical boundaries and encompass a 
balanced arrangement between individual and collective interests as well as a 
complex social and economic set up. Notwithstanding, the chapter ends up by 
suggesting that the strategies are limited for extreme events and have been 
under erosion due to political, social and economic changes taking place 
globally, nationally and in the research area.  
Chapter four deals with a Mozambican Red Cross project that was 
sponsored by the Danish Red Cross. The project aimed at strengthening local 
capacity for adapting to climate (change) related natural hazards.  
Throughout the chapter, I show that during the implementation, the project 
became a source of local power politics and conflicts. It was re-configured to 
respond to everyday needs rather than sporadic extreme flooding events as 
initially designed.  The project was also a means for different actors at 
national and provincial levels to have access to resources and reinforce their 
visibility across different settings.  
From chapter five up to chapter seven, the book follows actors’ 
interactions during the 2007 flooding. Chapter five looks at the interactions 
between the international actors, the national government and the NGOs. The 
chapter claims that there were contradictions and power conflicts between 
those actors and this was reflected in disaster response practices undertaken 
by them. Further, I claim that government control and coordination over the 
2007 flooding response was an emerging property rather than a genuinely 
devised process as claimed by some analysts. Chapter six focuses on the local 
domain of disaster response and argues that during the floods there were 
different perceptions and responses between local actors and aid providers. 
While aid providers focused on life saving, local people opted for a holistic 
approach of saving lives and livelihoods. These differences became a source 
of contradiction and conflict. In some cases, rather than reducing local 
vulnerability to future hazards, the humanitarian response tended to hamper 
and increase the vulnerability of the most destitute groups.  
Chapter seven looks at the resettlement programme devised by the 
government for the people affected by the floods. It discusses interfaces at the 
registration; at the building of the houses; at seed and tools fairs and, finally, 
the different livelihood pathways emerging from the flooding and the 
resettlement programme. There were households that managed to settle 
‘permanently’ on the upper lands. However there were households that did 
not manage to adapt to upper lands and went back to the floodplains. The 
third category was households in between the spectrum managing their 
livelihood in both lower and upper lands.  
Chapter eight concludes the book and discusses different practices 
undertaken for continuities in crisis.  Overall, this chapter claims that there 
are many continuities in crisis at the same time that continuities are in crisis. 
The chapter argues that the focus with which scholars have looked at 
disasters tended to blind them on the continuities, local dynamics and 
strategies applied by different actors to fulfill their agendas. Focusing on 
responses from the international domain narrowed them to stress crisis, 
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powerlessness and weakness, a discourse used fruitfully by local actors to 
access international aid. Nonetheless, everyday realities discussed in the book 
show that neither the government nor the local people are passive recipients 
of hazards and international interventions. Rather, through discourses and 
practices they creatively respond to natural hazards and tend to reshape 
international responses to fit their own needs and maintain continuities in 
crisis.   
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CHAPTER 2 
  
MANAGING DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN 
MOZAMBIQUE  
 
This chapter sets out to map the general landscape of disaster and climate 
change management in Mozambique. It maintains that understanding 
disaster responses by the local actors needs to be grounded in broader socio-
political and historical processes. The ways in which local actors today craft 
their relationships and responses to disasters are, to a large extent, a by-
product of national and global historical socio-economic and political 
processes. An understanding of the broader context helps to unravel the 
national and global discourses, practices and power relations and how they 
are redesigned and enter the lifeworlds of the local actors.  
In this chapter, then, I aim to reconstruct the historical relationship 
between disaster management and socio-political and economic agendas of 
the actors concerned. Mozambique has been undergoing continuous socio-
economic and political transformation shaped by local, national and 
international actors, who have fed disaster management practices in the same 
way that disasters have had an impact in shaping the country’s socio-political 
and economic situation. Hence, the chapter asks how disasters and responses 
to it by different actors co-shaped or have been co-shaped by the political and 
socio-economic agendas of the actors involved. In particular, I will focus on 
the ways in which first the pre-colonial and then the Portuguese colonial 
authorities and later the Mozambican government organized disaster 
management in such a way as to co-shape society and strengthen their own 
position vis-à-vis society. To undertake this, the chapter focuses on the 
domain of disaster governance and its interfaces with international disaster 
response and local people. 
Existing analyses on disaster governance in Mozambique fall short in 
two main ways. First, they have mainly taken a structural approach claiming 
that the governments of Mozambique both during the colonial period and 
after the independence, lacked resources (including policy frames) for disaster 
response. Therefore, these analyses far more emphasized the role of the 
international community in managing disasters, especially after 
independence, leading to an oversight of how the national government and 
local people interpreted disasters and reshaped international responses to suit 
their interests.  
A focus on the international response meant also that the analyses 
tended to centre on a specific period, which was related to international aid 
inflows neglecting the dynamics which disaster management practices have 
undergone over time in answering the changing context. In the existing 
literature there is virtually no reference on disaster governance prior to 1980 
and hardly any reference on how disaster management practices have been 
changing over time. If Mozambique has been undergoing continuous socio-
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political and economic transformations how have practices in disaster 
management swung over time? Is there continuity or have there been changes 
in disaster governance in Mozambique? This chapter will elaborate that there 
have been continuities and changes over time both in discourses and practices 
of disaster response from the government and also from the other actors 
involved in order to remain in or withdraw from the arena of disaster 
response.  
A second major limitation is that disaster governance tends to be 
detached from the economic and political agendas of the actors involved. It is 
assumed that disaster responses are guided by the humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, independency and impartiality, hence, that they are detached from 
politics. In practice, however, disasters and disaster response do play a role in 
politics and shape the relationship between governments and citizens as well 
as relationships between national governments and the international 
community (De Waal, 1987; Middleton and O’Keefe, 1997). As we shall see, 
disaster response in Mozambique has been highly politicized and 
humanitarian principles have hardly been applied. The influx of international 
aid favoured and strengthened FRELIMO as a party and it was very much 
aligned to the Breton Woods interests of structural adjustments, 
democratization and free market reforms.         
I will start the chapter by providing an overview of the major natural 
hazards affecting Mozambique and how they are presented in the mainstream 
literature. Following this, I will then reconstruct the historical relationship 
between disasters and the socio-political and economic contexts. The last 
section of the chapter addresses specifically the ways and means by which       
actors interface in the arena of climate change response. In this section, I will 
argue that there is a lack of a coherent framework for climate change 
response. This can be partly explained by the competition between different 
ministries involved in leading and coordinating the response. Nonetheless, 
actors use the room for manoeuvre created by the lack of coordination, to 
develop and implement climate change interventions according to their own 
understanding, needs and rules. The result, until now, is a proliferation of 
initiatives and interventions under the umbrella of climate change without 
coordination, evidence base, or a critical appraisal of the interventions.  
With regard to the pre-colonial and colonial history in particular, 
however, I have to make a disclaimer. I am not a historian and did not have 
the time or the skills to study original historical archives. Instead, I have based 
my analysis on secondary sources of the political history of Mozambique, re-
interpreting some of the claims the authors have made. Furthermore, I have 
based some of my arguments on oral history gathered during my fieldwork. I 
do not pretend to provide the ultimate history of disaster management, and 
parts of this chapter may be better read as an evolving narrative on the 
history and politics of disaster management that invites other scholars to 
further substantiate, elaborate or refute in future debate. 
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NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE: AN 
OVERVIEW 
 
Mozambique is a disaster-prone country. The country lies along the Indian 
Ocean where every year cyclones of different intensities are formed and make 
a landfall in the country. Mozambique is also the lower riparian country of 
ten international rivers that drain their waters into the Indian Ocean. 
Excessive rainfall coupled with rivers and dams mismanagement and 
environment degradation has produced a history of flooding of different 
magnitude in the country. Further, some of the regions of the country have a 
semi-arid climate and drought has historically been part of people’s everyday 
life. Droughts, flooding and cyclones are three major natural hazards which, 
allied with poverty and higher vulnerability of the affected people, have 
produced disasters in Mozambique. Mozambique experiences, on average, 
one disaster per year (INGC et al., 2003:7) and ranks third on global weather-
related damage following Bangladesh and Ethiopia (Buys et al., 2007:38).    
Natural hazards and disasters are manifested differently across the 
country and, as we shall see, produce differentiated responses. Drought hits 
mainly the southern part of Mozambique, flooding is concentrated in the 
central region while cyclones tend to make the landfall mostly in the northern 
parts. In southern Mozambique the low rainfall patterns (on the range of 400-
600 mm/year) and soils of lower fertility and limited water retention capacity 
have lead to cyclical drought, limited agricultural production and food 
insecurity amongst rain-fed agriculture dependent households. On average 
agricultural production from the rain-fed agriculture dependent households 
enables food security for just about four to five months especially in the 
interior of Gaza and Inhambane provinces (De Matteis et al., 2006).  
Droughts in Mozambique, with particular incidence in the southern 
region, have been depicted by different actors. Newitt (1988) describes the 
drought from 1823-1831 which led to numerous deaths, widespread 
depopulation of the countryside, massive migrations including that of many 
Portuguese settlers, a decline of the slave trade and of the Portuguese 
authority. Serra (2000) describes the drought of 1895/98, which led to massive 
migrations to South Africa. Rocha et al., (1999:9) suggest that from 1900 to 
1930s a combination of drought and forced labour led to increased migrations 
and drastic demographic changes.   
  From the 1940s up to the early 1980s, drought and reduced agricultural 
production occurred in 1940/41, 1943/44; 1948/49; 1950/51; 1953/54, 
1959/60, 1963/64, 1965/66, 1967/68, 1969/70 and 1972/73 (Santos and 
Henriques, 1999:8). The beginning of the 1980s was marked by the worst 
drought ever recorded (1980-1985) that affected nationwide more than five 
million people and claimed the lives of one hundred thousand (GoM, 1988: 
15). Severe drought was also recorded from 1991 up to 1993, affecting 1.32 
million people (INGC, UEM and Fewsnet, 2003:10). This drought forced 
Mozambique to import nearly 60 percent of its cereal needs (Holloway, 2000: 
262). On average Mozambique is affected by severe drought once every three-
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to-seven years and the southern region reports droughts almost every year 
(Tschirley, 1998:8).  
  
Central Mozambique as stated earlier is flood-prone. The region is 
characterized by high precipitation and large flat areas especially along the 
Zambezi basin (the largest basin in Mozambique). Annual rainfall in central 
Mozambique ranges between 800 to 1200 mm/year becoming exceptionally 
higher (around 1500 mm/year) in the Zambezia and Tete plateaus (Santos 
and Henriques, 1999:6). Further, out of the ten international rivers, five 
(Zambezi, Shire, Pungue, Buzi and Save) cross Mozambique through the 
central region. This leads to recurrent flooding in the region with particular 
emphasis along the Zambezi delta. 
Chidiamassamba and Liesegang (1997) found written records of 
flooding along the Zambezi delta dating back to 1548.  In a group discussion 
during my fieldwork, oral history recollected flooding on the Zambezi delta 
back as early as 1840. The floods of 1840 which opened up the ZIU-ZIU 
channel and created the Inhangoma Island in Mutarara district were 
considered the largest in cultural memory5.  Written records suggest that the 
Zambezi delta was partly flooded in 1926, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1944, 1948, 1952, 
1955, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1978, 1989, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2007 
and 2008 (Taveira, 1943; Chidiamassamba and Liesegang, 1997; Beilfuss, 2005; 
INGC, 2008). On average, floods of the magnitude of 9,000-13,000 m3/s 
(which inundates most of the lower lands) along the Zambezi River occurred, 
in the past, once in every three years (SWECO, 1982: 55).  
Floods have also been recorded, with less frequency, in the south, in 
1955, 1967, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1996 and 2000. The 2000 flooding was the 
worst in this region since 1848 (Christie and Hanlon, 2001: 141). This flood 
killed approximately seven hundred people, affected nearly five million and 
caused economic losses estimated at more than 600 million USD (GOM, 2000). 
Due mainly to this flooding the national GDP in 2000 slumped from the 
expected 10 percent increase to just about 2 percent and inflation was at its 
peak in 2000 since the end of the civil war in 1992.  
 
Cyclones affect particularly badly the northern provinces of Nampula and 
Cabo-Delgado. Mozambique is, on average, hit by one cyclone and three to 
four tropical depressions every year (INGC, UEM and Fewsnet, 2003:12). 
Hewitt recorded natural hazards all over the world for the first time in 1969 
and found records of cyclone activity in Mozambique for the year 1956 which 
claimed 110 lives (Hewitt, 1969). Ever since and indeed up to 2009, sixteen 
disasters resulting from cyclones were recorded half of them having occurred 
over the last 10 years (see graph 2.1 below). Cyclones and tropical depressions 
are linked to flooding and droughts as they are accompanied by rainfall. The 
2000 flooding for instance, was related to three cyclones: Eline, Gloria and 
Hudah.  
 
                                                 
5
 Group discussion, Inhangoma Island, Mutatara District September 10, 2008. 
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The above overview shows that natural hazards have been part of the history 
of many Mozambicans. The number of people affected and killed by natural 
hazards, which dictates to a large extent the call for relief aid, needs,  
however, to be treated with extreme caution for a variety of reasons. These 
include poor collection methods, such as the use of different units of 
measurement (individual, households, communities), outdatedness and, 
importantly, omission and commission (deliberate distortion by those 
involved in data collection and analysis).  In Mozambique, numbers play a 
political role. During the 1980s, when the government needed much 
international aid and  wanted to stress how the South African’s apartheid 
backed civil war in Mozambique had devastating impacts, presenting higher 
numbers of the affected and killed was not a major concern for the 
government. In the 1980s, data provided by the government was, in most of 
the cases, questioned by donors and verification missions were deployed to 
the affected areas to determine the number of people requiring aid relief 
(Barnes, 1998).  
Conversely, since the government has been attempting to demonstrate 
its commitment and efficiency in disaster management, there is a tendency to 
downplay the numbers. Over the recent years, not only has the government 
tended to present the lowest figures in comparison to other different sources 
but it has gone out of its way to dispute higher figures provided by external 
sources, including UN agencies which otherwise used to question 
government numbers. For example, during the 2007 flooding on the Zambezi 
delta, the government estimated that 163,045 people were displaced while 
WFP estimated 285,000 and USAID 331,500. 
There is little dispute, as we shall see, that the government response to 
disasters has improved but the production of figures needs to be taken within 
the broader national interest and international context. Of particular 
relevance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been playing a 
crucial role in producing figures. As the evaluation of the achievement on the 
MDGs requires figures and government’s performance is evaluated based on 
these figures, data production and processing have become highly politicized. 
In 2005, the state president claimed that in order to reduce poverty, plans are 
to be fully achieved- “os planos são para serem cumpridos”. In responce to this 
presidential directive, different governmental institutions have intensified 
their efforts and managed to achieve impressive results. It is not clear, 
however, how realistic the results are and to what extent they are ‘produced’ 
by providing statistics that reflect better results. In early 2010, a case leaked to 
the media revealing that the Provincial Directorate of Work in Zambezia 
province forged data in order, mainly, to prove that the plans had been fully 
achieved. The director was sacked.   
Some authors have critically questioned government data and recently 
Hanlon (2007) disputed the claim that poverty has been reduced in 
Mozambique by 15 percent between 1997 and 2003. He claims that the figure 
is based on incorrect indicators of the data analysis. Hanlon suggests that if 
the analysis was based on the consumption of maize rather than cassava, as it 
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was done, the result would be that 11.7 million, rather than 10 million people 
as claimed by the government and donors respectively are below the poverty 
datum line. Further, shifting the consumption from maize to cassava is a clear 
indicator of impoverishment (Hanlon, 2007:10).  
Given the above, data on disasters in Mozambique may be viewed at 
best as estimates of a general magnitude. In the section that follows, I will 
reconstruct the dynamics of the occurrence of natural hazards and disasters in 
Mozambique based on the EM-DAT database provided by the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of 
Louvain in Belgium. I aim to use the EM-DAT database for different reasons. 
It is an independent academic institution which takes great care to verify 
disaster reports and CRED encourages public access and scrutiny of the 
dataset (UNDP, 2004:99). Furthermore, as new information becomes available 
it updates the database, even years after an event (IFRC, 2009:159).  
 
CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN THE OCCURRENCE OF NATURAL 
HAZARDS AND DISASTERS   
 
Natural hazards are on the rise in Mozambique. Since 1970, Mozambique has 
been hit by 77 disasters of which 41 (53 percent) occurred just over the last 10 
years (2000-2009). The number of people killed has more than tripled 
compared to the previous decade and there is an increase of nearly 50 percent 
in the number of people affected by natural hazards. In 2005, an estimated 94 
percent of the population in Mozambique was affected by natural hazards 
(Mafambissa, 2007:5).  
The increase may partly reflect an improved capacity in data collection. 
They also reflect increased vulnerability to disaster. Growing population, 
environmental degradation and limited alternative sources of livelihood tend 
to increase people’s vulnerability to disasters. There is mounting evidence 
that poverty reduction programmes have failed to reach the poorest segments 
of society (James et al, 2005; Hanlon, 2007; UNICEF, 2007). Climate change is 
also adding to this trend. INGC (2009) suggests that increases in frequency 
and intensity of natural hazards in Mozambique are related to climate change 
which will continue to become manifest. As vulnerabilities to disasters 
increase, increases in frequency and intensity of natural hazards may lead to 
more disasters, if urgent action to reverse the trends is not taken.    
 While disasters are increasing, in general the precursor to these 
disasters has shifted. Droughts have historically been the major natural 
hazard claiming more than a hundred thousand lives and affecting nearly 23 
million people since 1970. Nonetheless, flooding has become the major natural 
hazard over the last 10 years (graphs 2.1 and 2.2 below).  
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Graph 2.1: Number of people affected by hazard type                  Graph 2.2: Number of people 
killed by hazard type 
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This trend may suggest an improvement in drought and cyclone management 
practices, but not much in the area of floods. The cyclone early warning 
system has improved thanks mainly to a 4.7 million USD donation by USAID. 
For drought management, irrigation schemes have been set up or expanded 
and water reservoirs have been established in a number of drought-prone 
areas. By 1998, the country had about 33,000 hectares under irrigation but this 
increased to 51,185 hectares by 2002 (Marques et al., 2002). From 2004 up to 
2009, 49 small-scale irrigation schemes were set up in Inhambane province - 
the country’s most drought-prone province - and thanks to this bold move, 
the total production area nearly doubled from 419,312 to 783,670 hectares6.   
Moreover, the government has mandated the INGC to promote the 
development of drought-prone areas and a department to undertake the task- 
Departamento de Desenvolvimento de Zonas Áridas was established in 2007. 
Drought resistant crops, water harvesting techniques and small-scale 
irrigation schemes have been promoted by INGC since then. Alongside the 
department different NGOs such as Mozambican Red Cross, World Vision 
and ActionAid have also been working in drought-prone areas introducing, 
among others, drought-resistant crops and small-scale irrigation schemes. In 
comparison, flood management has been more complex, for reasons that will 
be elaborated in the next chapters. That said I now turn to reconstruct the 
historical relationship between disasters and the socio-political and economic 
situation by looking at how disaster management practices evolved over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Noticias newspaper, July 10, 2009 
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DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Disaster management practices have undergone different transformations in 
response to changing characteristics of the disasters themselves but also to 
political and economic interests of the actors involved. In this section I 
consider eight major periods of disaster management in Mozambique. They 
reflect practices developed (1) during the period of pre-colonization and (2) 
during the colonization period.  After independence from Portugal, I 
distinguish other six periods: (3) during the socialization era (4), during the 
period of economic collapse; (5) during the period of international aid inflow 
to respond to the economic collapse and humanitarian crisis; (6) during the 
period of outflow of international humanitarian aid following the end of civil 
war; (7) during the period of re-inflow of international aid following the 2000 
great flood and (8) the later five years marked, on the one hand, by an 
ascendency of a national sovereignty discourse in disaster management and, 
on the other, by the ascendency of climate change discussions and 
interventions.  
Although within each period disaster management practices were 
diverse and dynamic, they were marked by some common elements which 
allow me to cluster them according to these periods. Amongst other elements, 
they were marked by particular interfaces between the international, national 
and local domains of disaster management that differentiate one period from 
the other.  
 
THE ‘KINGDOMINATION’ OF DISASTERS: PRE-COLONIAL 
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PRACTICES  
 
Before colonization, Mozambique was administered through lineages, 
chieftaincies and a very complex system of kingdoms. Kingdoms 
encompassed different chieftaincies and lineages; literally, there were dozens 
of them before Portugal conquered the last one (the Gaza kingdom ruled by 
Ngungunhana) in 1895. The set up, expansion, retreat or dissolution of these 
kingdoms was highly influenced by natural hazards and disasters. Serra 
(2000:88) points out that southern Mozambique had about 20 kingdoms by 
1770. Severe drought and famine that affected the region resulted in 
widespread migration, warfare and a massive dissolution and retreat of many 
kingdoms. In 1815 only 2 kingdoms (Nduandue and Mtetua) remained.  
Disaster management practices were, therefore, an integral part of the 
kingdoms in order to survive and expand. Hence, the kingdoms had to 
control and or dominate the disasters in order to exist. Two major levels of 
disaster management may be distinguished in the kingdoms, the individual 
household and the general kingdom levels. At the individual household level 
disaster management practices depended on whether the hazard was drought 
or flood, hence it affected the southern or central Mozambique. The northern 
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region was ‘less’ hit by hazards and there are hardly records on disaster 
management practices for that region.  
In the south, households tended to craft their livelihoods taking into 
account the drought phenomenon. Sorghum and millet, both drought 
resistant crops, and later on cassava, which is also drought resistant were the 
major crops in their farming systems (Junod, 1996). Additionally, like in many 
other drought prone regions, cattle became an integral part of their farming 
system7. Furthermore, to compensate for the low agricultural production 
levels, households tended to increase the production areas and this influenced 
the birth rates and polygamy practices. Having more children and wives 
provided labour to open up larger fields and increase production. Livestock 
played a role in polygamy. The dowry, lobolo, generally involved cattle 
(Hedges, 1977:190). Hence, cattle, agricultural production and drought 
became integrated into the everyday practices of local people.  
At the kingdom level, the focus was on addressing the root causes of 
drought and disasters. As droughts and disasters were perceived as natural 
problems permeated by the ancestors, the focus was on searching the 
connection with the ancestors, asking for their protection and to bring rain. 
Rainmakers and mediums became an integral part of the ruling class (Newitt, 
1995:32). Rainmakers and mediums performed rituals and offerings to 
ancestors before the rainy season so that the ancestor could bring rain and 
good harvests. Over time, the rainmakers and mediums expanded their roles 
and became involved in conflict resolution, in choosing the kings, the wives 
for the kings and by instituting ‘guiding’ practices that people were expected 
to follow in order to make ancestors happy and bring fortune instead of 
disasters. Kings that were not rainmakers or mediums or were not backed by 
rainmakers and mediums tended to have a weaker authority and shorter 
mandates (Liesagang, 1970:323; Newitt, 1995:33). Hence, disaster management 
through rainmakers and mediums played a socio-political role in the 
kingdoms and the ‘kingdomination’ of disasters. Disaster management 
became embedded in the everyday practices of the kingdoms and in shaping 
the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.   
In central Mozambique the major hazard, as we saw above, was and 
still continues to be flooding and this will be discussed in the next chapter. At 
the household level, contrary to the south, there was low investment in cattle, 
especially, along the Zambezi basin (Chidiamassamba and Liesagang, 1997:8). 
The lack of investment in cattle indeed impacted on lobolo practices. In order 
to access new wives and forge alliances and networks as well as expand 
lineages chieftaincies and kingdoms, the Tonga people that inhabited the area, 
had to resort mainly to warfare, rape and banditry. Newitt (1995:35) claims 
that the Tonga were willing to participate in wars and become mercenaries as 
far as the payment was in the form of women. Both in the south and central 
                                                 
7
 These practices are still recognizable today. By 2000 the southern Mozambique, comprising Maputo, 
Gaza and Inhambane provinces, championed on cattle production with a stock of 338,589 heads 
representing 46 percent of national cattle (INE, 2002). New livestock census was under way in 2010 
but the data to be released by 2012 may not change drastically this historical pattern.  
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Mozambique women (wives) did not only play the reproductive role but had 
also a political and administrative role. The kings, for instance, preferred to 
place their wives in the newly conquered areas rather than their sons and 
brothers as the later ones tended to rebel and claim autonomy (Serra, 2000: 
90). 
As in the south, mediums also played a crucial role on disaster 
management in central Mozambique. They were involved in ‘forecasting’ 
whether there would be extreme floods or drought and they played an 
intermediary role in the relationships between the ancestors and the living 
(Negrão, 2001:244). Moreover, they were necessary for protecting those going 
to war and in cleansing those coming back from the war. There was a belief 
that the slain would revenge, hence, those who had killed needed cleansing 
and protection, and ultimately the protection of the whole kingdom from 
revenge which would otherwise manifest itself in terms of hazards such as 
plagues, droughts and floods (Newitt, 1995: 38, and field interviews8).  
Thus, both in the south and central Mozambique, drought and flood 
management practices involved social, political and economic interests and 
were part of the creation, expansion or retreat and dissolution of lineages, 
chieftaincies and ultimately the kingdoms. Controlling disasters was an 
integral part of people’s livelihoods including their administrative systems.      
 
THE ‘COLONIZATION’ OF DISASTERS: DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
Literature on disaster management during the colonial period is scarce and 
the existing literature is dominated by a view that the colonial authorities 
were not interested in disaster management as it affected mainly the poor 
native people living in the countryside (Wisner, 1979; Bolton, 1983). This view 
is based on two arguments. First, despite recurrent natural hazards in 
Mozambique, the Portuguese authorities were not able to establish a disaster 
management institution over their nearly 500 years presence in Mozambique. 
Second, it finds strength in the cruelty and brutality with which the colonial 
rulers treated the native people. Portugal’s colonization of Mozambique was, 
as mentioned in the preceding chapter, one of the most brutal around the 
world impinging slavery, forced labour, and forced cash crop production and, 
coercive taxation (Vail and White, 1978; Isaacman, 1996; Rocha et al., 1999).   
 I would like to qualify these observations. Although I concur that the 
colonial policies have increased people’s vulnerability to disaster, there have 
also been policies that aimed to reduce disasters, or policies that were meant 
for other reasons but had nonetheless a positive effect towards disaster risk 
reduction. There are oral and written records claiming that colonial 
authorities did, somehow, intervene during disasters. During the great famine 
of 1823-1831 Portuguese authorities organized in some parts of the 
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 Interview with chief regulo Cocorico, September 24, 2007and chief regulo Chamanga, Mopeia, May 
7, 2008 
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countryside food for work programs for the most destitute groups of the 
native population (Newitt, 1988:29). Furthermore, after flooding colonial 
authorities or private companies used to distribute agricultural seeds and 
tools so that the natives could resume agricultural production (Vail and 
White, 1978: 250; Negrão; 2001:70). Life stories collected during the present 
study suggest that the authorities and private companies used to distribute 
humanitarian aid whenever they found people secluded. This included 
mainly food and clothes9.  
Defending the view that the colonizers were not interested in disaster 
management would be to suggest that they would appreciate if the entire 
native population perished from disasters. But given that colonisers 
depended on the natives for labour, food and cash crop production and 
earned considerable resources from taxing native people (Rocha et al., 1999; 
Negrão, 2001), it is hard to sustain such claims. I would like to suggest that 
the colonial authorities did pay attention to managing disasters but this was 
mainly done in order to implement their colonization interest, strengthen 
their political and economic position rather than being moved by truly 
philanthropic motivations. To sustain this claim, I will briefly use the cases of 
drought in the southern region.  
 
Droughts are, as discussed above, a recurrent natural hazard in the south of 
Mozambique. This shaped the way the Portuguese authorities in 
Mozambique administered this region. On the one hand, Portuguese people 
tended to refuse to settle unless the government provided basic 
infrastructures for agricultural production, especially irrigation schemes. 
Smith (1991:502) noted that even the Portuguese troops who were sent to 
Mozambique during the era of the scramble refused to remain as colonists; 
they preferred rather to leave Mozambique and migrate to Brazil and United 
States.  
Emerging from this and aligned with the colonization objective of 
settling Portuguese people in Mozambique, the Portuguese authority 
assembled an irrigation scheme in Chokwe district where it established the 
first colonato (an organized Portuguese settlement). Comprising 30,000 
hectares, the Chokwe irrigation scheme is the largest in Mozambique. Each 
colonist accepting to stay in Mozambique was given 4 hectares of land on the 
irrigation scheme for agricultural production and 24 hectares for livestock 
grazing outside the scheme.  They also had government technical support for 
their activities (Muchave, 1998:25). Hence, to colonize the region, the 
government had to ‘colonize’ drought first.   
On the other hand, for the native people, drought and Portuguese 
domination and the ways in which the domination was carried out, tended to 
weaken their social, economic and political fabrics and migration to South 
Africa became increasingly the primary option for livelihoods (Covane, 
2001:55). Rather than inhibiting the migration practices, the colonial 
                                                 
9
 Interview with Fernando Chapo, 63 years- Inhangoma-Mutarara, September 11, 2008; interview with 
chief regulo Cocorico, September 24, 2007and chief regulo Chamanga, Mopeia, May 7, 2008. 
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authorities decided to profit from it. In 1897, Portugal and South Africa signed 
a treaty concerning the recruitment of labour from southern Mozambique for 
the mining industry in South Africa. In exchange, the Portuguese demanded, 
among others, direct payment in gold, increased use of Maputo Port ( at the 
time called Delagoa Bay) by South Africa and a payment of 13 shillings per 
individual supposedly to cover administrative costs (Wuyts, 1981: 37; Newitt, 
1995: 491).  
To reinforce the treaty, the Portuguese authorities passed a law in 1907 
under which ‘illegal’ emigration to South Africa was punished by up to 
twenty months of forced labour without payment (Serra, 2000:201). By 1952, 
nearly 250,000 Mozambicans were working in South Africa and by 1967; the 
Portuguese earnings from those migrants were estimated to be around eight 
times the value of the marketed agricultural products of southern 
Mozambique (Murteira, 2000 in Vaz and Zaag, 2003:10). Up to independence 
in 1975, nearly one in five adult males in southern Mozambique was working 
in South Africa (Wuyts, 1981:35). 
The policies on migration were not designed to reduce disaster, but 
had the consequence that people could enhance their protection against 
drought at the same time that Portugal earned financial resources and 
strengthened its position in Mozambique. Thus, drought shaped, to a large 
extent, the colonization policy especially in southern Mozambique and the 
relationship between colonial Portugal and South Africa.  
 
 1975-1979: THE ‘SOCIALIZATION’ OF DISASTERS 
 
The period from 1975-1979 was marked by the inception of what would 
become FRELIMO’s vision of a new Mozambique. Following independence in 
1975, the FRELIMO party declared socialism and Marxism-Leninism as its 
main political ideology. It proclaimed Mozambique a People’s Republic 
which would be led by the working class classe operária and followed by the 
peasantry camponeses. Agriculture was defined as the basis of the economy 
which would be strengthened through state farms and cooperatives. 
Individual property was abolished and assets reverted to the state in 1977. A 
new socio-economic order was envisaged under which the FRELIMO 
government planned and executed most of the development interventions.  
Based on the socialist ideology, peasants who lived scattered in the 
countryside were forced to move to communal villages aldeias comunais under 
the slogan of socialization of the countryside, socialização do campo. The 
government claimed that in communal villages development take-off would 
be quicker. In communal villages, it would be cost-effective to provide 
services such as schools, clean water, agricultural inputs and electricity. 
Moreover, by embracing the collective mode of production on state farms and 
cooperatives, peasants could learn modern agriculture, engage in economies 
of scale and produce surplus, for export and inputs for the envisaged 
industrial development of the country. By moving into the communal 
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villages, hazards that scattered households tended to face individually now 
became socialized and they had to find ways to cope collectively with them.   
Government policies further tended to reinforce the ‘socialization’ of 
disasters. On February 3, 1976, the government created the Bank of Solidarity 
Banco de Solidariedade. Banco de Solidariedade was proposed by President 
Samora Machel with the major objective to help households affected by 
hazards and disasters. He proposed that those with paid jobs would have one 
day (day 3) of their monthly salary deducted to contribute to the bank.  Those 
without paid jobs such as peasants would have to contribute with a share of 
their agricultural products. Organizing groups (grupos dinamizadores) were 
given orders to collect the contribution within their neighbourhoods10.  
While the villagisation policy tended to ‘socialize’ disasters, disasters 
on the other hand were used to promote the villagisation and socialization 
policy.  In 1977, cyclone EMILY struck the southern coast of Mozambique and 
in conjunction with waters discharged from the Massingir dam in Gaza 
province, produced the worst flood in 60 years. The flooding killed 300 people 
and affected 400,000. The damage costs were estimated at about 35 million 
USD. The UN system and voluntary agencies mobilized nearly 5.5 million 
USD (Wisner, 1979:298) which was handed to the government. Internally, the 
government provided 100,000 escudos11 and goods from the Solidarity Bank12. 
To handle the disaster, the government created a political commission 
called the Commission for the Reconstruction of Gaza Province Comissão para 
a Reconstrução da Provincia de Gaza. The commission was composed of high-
ranking FRELIMO leaders- the Ministry of Interior (Armando Guebuza), 
Ministry of Agriculture (Joaquim de Carvalho) and the governor of Gaza 
province (Fernando Matavela). Interestingly, the commission was given the 
mandate criar um Homem novo e uma nova ordem social - to create a new Man 
and a new socio-economic order. This was based on three pillars. First to 
organize the affected people into communal villages, second to transform the 
Limpopo valley into the national granary celeiro do país through state farms 
and cooperatives and finally to create infrastructure which would attract 
people to remain in the communal villages , state farms and cooperatives13.  
The commission established four brigades comprising military forces, 
police, grupos dinamizadores and technical staff from the ministry of agriculture 
and others14. They used what Coelho (1993:383) called aggressive political 
mobilization to force people to go into communal villages and accept state and 
cooperative farming. In the national media, those declining the villagisation 
were called Xiconhocas- the enemies of the people, and coined anti-
revolutionary and anti-FRELIMO. They faced penalties which included jails 
or being sent to the so-called re-education centres centros de re-edução, 
established to educate the Xiconhocas. A further penalty was exclusion from 
humanitarian aid. Aid was selectively provided to those embracing the 
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 Noticias newspaper March 2, 1977 
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 Noticias newspaper February 28, 1977 
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 Noticias newspaper February 28, 1977 
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villagisation policy. As a consequence of these political measures, 26 
communal villages were created in Gaza province along the Limpopo River, 
comprising about 200,000 people (Coelho, 1993:384).   
 
Figure 2: A typical poster during the flooding in 1977. ‘Xiconhoca’ says:  ‘Stop! Why 
communal villages? Flooding is nothing! We can not leave our ancestor’s land!!!’ 
 
 
Source: Noticias newspaper, February 28, 1977 
 
The clear use of disasters for the villagisation policy was evidenced in 1978 
during the flooding of the Zambezi delta. In March 1978, the Zambezi delta 
was flooded claiming the lives of 45 people and affecting nearly 450,000 
people. The cost in damage and the subsequent humanitarian assistance was 
estimated at 62 million USD (Palmer and Tritton, 1979). During this episode, 
the government decided to create what was called the Inter-Provincial 
Commission for Natural Hazards and Communal Villages Commissão 
Interprovincial de Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais. The commission was 
chaired by the national director for communal villages Mr. Baptista Cosme 
and had the mandate to resettle people in communal villages.  
 
1980-1986: DISASTERS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF MARXISM  
 
The period from 1980-1986 was marked by a decline of the national economy. 
A complex emergency arising from policy failures, droughts and civil war 
was hitting Mozambique and the government faced serious problems that 
needed to be addressed. To understand the disastrous situation, I will give a 
brief overview of trigger events. During the first few years of independence, 
FRELIMO initiated and embarked on an ambitious socio-economic 
programme. Mozambique imported 1,200 tractors in 1977 and a further 1,000 
in 1979 for the agricultural sector. By 1981, the state enterprise responsible for 
agricultural machinery MECANAGRO, had 5,200 tractors, 120 combines and 
about 7,000 farm implements under its control (Tibana, 1989:6). In the 
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industry sector wages for factory workers increased fourfold compared to 
what the Portuguese paid in the pre-independence era.  Parallel social 
services were offered to such an extent that school enrolment tripled and 
hospitals were built in all the 10 provinces (Fitzpatrick, 1981). To undertake 
these massive investments the government relied, apart from a few grants 
and loans from the Socialist bloc and Nordic countries, heavily on its gold 
reserves. As a result, by early 1982, the country’s gold stock fell by over 80 
percent and by 1983 the foreign reserves could pay about a month of imports 
(Cravinho, 1995: 163). The economic position of the government was further 
restrained by South Africa’s decision to cut the labour force from 
Mozambique and freeze remittances by the Mozambican workers in South 
Africa.  Added to this were the losses related to the UN-led boycott to the Ian 
Smith regime in the then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1976.  Mozambique 
adhered, to the boycott which resulted in losses as Zimbabwe was a major 
client of the Mozambican Ports and Railways.  
In the meantime, all the investments were directed and implemented 
by the government which had limited human resources and weak 
infrastructure. The political ideology of socialism, state farms, and communal 
villages was also creating a considerable number of disillusioned and 
dissatisfied people. People were showing their dissatisfaction in a number of 
ways; they burned houses in communal villages; refused to participate in or 
sabotaged state and cooperative farms and increasingly deserted communal 
villages but taking seeds and agricultural implements along with them(CEA, 
1979). In the end, the results of the investments lagged far behind the 
expectations and the economy shrank.  
Besides the economic situation, Mozambique was facing two parallel 
and intertwined events. From 1980, the southern region started to face 
drought which became acute from 1983 to 1985 claiming the lives of one 
hundred thousand people and affecting more than five million. To deal with 
the natural hazards such as drought the government decided to set up the 
Department for Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Calamities Departamento 
para Prevenção e Combate a Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN) in 1980. DPCCN was 
placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was responsible for 
humanitarian aid mobilization and distribution. The humanitarian 
organizations present in the country by 1986 (Oxfam-UK, Oxfam-America, 
CUSO/SUCO-Canada, SCF-UK, ARO-Sweden) were all working directly 
with DPCCN or government line ministries, there was no parallel programme 
implementation (Barnes, 1998:10).  
In 1983, however, the US pressured the government, by imposing this 
as a condition to receive US aid, to accept that the American organization 
CARE would work with DPCCN in providing technical assistance and 
handling the financial aspects. In 1984, a Logistic Support Unit (LSU) 
managed by CARE was created within the DPCCN and DPCCN became 
mainly an aid delivery unit depending on the LSU. LSU was financed by 
USAID, SIDA, NORAD, and Overseas Development Aid (Coelho, 2001:4-5). 
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Civil war added to the emergency situation. The civil war started in 
1976 around the Mozambican border with Zimbabwe in Manica and Tete 
provinces but by 1986 the RENAMO guerrilla movement claimed control of 
about 80 percent of the country (Lyon, 1987:2). By 1985 RENAMO had an 
estimated 20,000 trained fighters while the government had 35,000. Due to 
limited resources, FRELIMO’s soldiers were thinly spread throughout the 
country,and‘poorly’ reinforced and supplied hence RENAMO was able to 
make significant advances. In 1985/86 RENAMO launched a major military 
offensive on the Zambezia province and was able to take 13 of Zambezia’s 18 
districts (Weinstein and Francisco, 2005: 170, 181). The intention was to cut the 
country into two and reduce FRELIMO’s influence to a minimum. To counter 
this attack, the government was forced to ask support from the Zimbabwean, 
Malawian and Tanzanian troops.  It launched a major counteroffensive in 
1987 using army, navy and air-force. From there on, the government was able 
to regain significant areas. This counteroffensive and further government 
military gains were based mainly on international support which increased 
from 1987 and will be discussed in the next period.  
As the outcome of the three major trigger factors (failure on policies, 
drought and civil war), the country’s social, economic, political and military 
position was seriously eroded. Mozambique’s export earnings fell from 280.8 
million USD in 1980 to 79.1 million USD in 1986; imports fell, in the same 
period, from 800 million USD to 543 million USD and the budget deficit 
escalated from 32.4 million USD in 1980 to 488 million USD in 1986 (Cravinho, 
1995:187-188). From 1982 onwards, the country could no longer afford to pay 
its external debt, which had increased to 2.9 billion USD by 1985. As a result, 
the government was having difficulties to access additional credit (Plank, 
1993:410).    
To overcome the problem, the government approached its Eastern 
allies and applied for membership to the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA/COMECON). CMEA was composed of countries 
following the socialist ideology namely the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East 
German, Cuba, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. The 
application was rejected in 1981 due to a Soviet Union veto saying that it was 
already subsidizing Cuba, Vietnam and could not afford to do the same for 
Mozambique (Cravinho, 1995:160). This left Mozambique with no choice but 
to approach the West.  In 1984, Mozambique joined the IMF, World Bank and 
Lomé convention (Adam, 2005). Negotiations for the national Structural 
Adjustment Plan (SAP) were dragged up to January 1987 when finally the 
agreement for disbursement was signed. The SAP was a clear detachment 
from the Marxist ideology to a more liberal and market oriented economy.  
Ever since, international (Western) aid has continued to flow.  
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1987-1994: ‘UN-NEUTRAL’ AID. AID EMPOWERING FRELIMO  
 
The period from 1987 to 1994 has been the most highlighted in the history of 
disaster management in Mozambique. This period was marked by an influx 
of international aid and represents the period of the emergence of the so-
called dependency and begging mentality presented in the previous chapter. 
To start the discussion of this period we need to refer to three interlinked 
major events at the turn of the year 1986 which ushered unprecedented 
changes in Mozambique. The first was the death of President Samora Machel 
in October 1986. The second was the ascension of Joaquim Chissano as the 
country’s new president in November of the same year. The third was the 
successful conclusion of the negotiations to start the structural Adjustment 
Programme. These three events are interrelated and, as I will discuss, created 
a favorable environment for the relationship between Mozambique and the 
Western international community.  
The year 1987 started with the disbursement agreement between IMF 
and the government in January and with an emergency appeal of 333 million 
USD in February, launched by the UN Secretary General. By the end of 1987, 
international aid had increased by 58 percent and in 1988 by 110 percent 
compared to 1986 (graph 3.1 below). In 1989, international aid amounted to 
nine times the national revenues from exports and represented 66 percent of 
the national GDP (Adam, 2005:180). From 1987 to 1994 emergency appeals 
totalled nearly 1.5 billion USD.  
 
Graph 2.3: International aid 1978-2007 excluding debt relief 
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How did the government manage to get such amount of support and for so 
long? Scholars such as Hodges and Tibana (2005) and Hanlon and Smart 
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(2008) claim that this is the case because the government used a subservience 
strategy and followed the conditionalities imposed by the international 
community. However, the government had already affiliated to the Bretton 
Wood institutions in 1984, so why did the influx start only in 1987? Further, 
what did local actors do with the space for manoeuvre created by the resource 
inflow? In the section that follows I argue that from 1987 onwards the 
government developed a range of strategies that together display a much 
more active attitude than subservience. The government to a large extent 
managed to negotiate, circumvent and transform the international community 
assistance towards its own objectives.  
 
CREATING ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE: FRELIMO’S STRATEGIES IN 
DEALING WITH DONORS 
 
To access the badly needed Western resources, FRELIMO devised a number 
of covert and overt strategies to gain Mozambique sympathy of the Western 
world. I was able to identify the following: 
  
(1) Appointing a mediator rather than a president.  The relationship between 
Mozambique and the West had been complicated since independence when 
the country embraced the Marxist ideology. Although Mozambique had been 
approaching the West for development and humanitarian aid from 198015, aid 
kept being delayed. After the death of Machel, FRELIMO appointed Joaquim 
Chissano as the next president. 
Chissano had already acquired considerable international acceptance 
as a negotiator with the Portuguese authorities for the national independence 
in 1974 and later as a Minister for Foreign Affairs for eleven years.  As a 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Chissano was seen by western diplomats as a 
soft, moderate, skilled politician compared to most of  FRELIMO’s leaders, 
including Samora Machel, who were perceived as being much more radical 
(Maier, 1989:15). Internally Chissano was also comfortable with the idea of 
privatizing some of the economic sectors that had been nationalized after 
independence (Cravinho, 1995:185).  
By choosing Chissano as president, FRELIMO presented to the West a 
trustworthy figure. The softness of Chissano and his way of handling internal 
and external conflicts and interests during his mandate, gave him the 
reputation, in Mozambique, of being the man of deixa andar, that is, let it go! 
Since Chissano left the presidency, he has become a reputable negotiator. 
Chissano was appointed as chief mediator of conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, 
and Madagascar among others.  
 
(2) Blaming external forces and being weak. The Mozambican government 
managed, during the 1980s, to ride successfully on the mounting sentiments 
in the West against the Apartheid regime of South Africa. Civil war backed, 
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 Joaquim Chissano interview for the newspaper  O País. Published  November 7, 2009 
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partly, by the apartheid regime became the major claim to justify the 
country’s economic collapse. In April 1988, the US State Department released 
a report which pictured RENAMO, backed by the apartheid regime, as a 
brutal movement involved in mass killing and rape (Barnes, 1996:6). The 
report was released a few days before the launch of a UN-led donor 
conference held in Maputo, 26-27 April. During this conference, attended by 
representatives of 37 countries, 41 NGOs, 10 United Nations Agencies and 2 
regional organizations16, the same message prevailed. In the conference, 
Chissano stressed civil war and apartheid over internal policy failures17. This 
gambit was resonated by the speeches from other prominent guests. In his 
speech the UN Secretary General noted: 
 
… ‘The damage of the undeclared war against Mozambique totalized more than 6 
billion USD…… and the government should be given every support.’18 
 
The UN Under-Secretary General for Special Political Issues stated: 
‘…this conference has reached a complete agreement that all possible measures must 
be taken to help the government and the people of Mozambique deal with this 
profound human suffering they face, and to strengthen their capacity to bring the 
country back onto the road to rehabilitation and recovery. The donor community 
assembled here, has also underlined the essentially political nature of the emergency 
facing Mozambique, which is vested in S.African supported desestabilization 
policies’.19  
 
Roy Stacy,at the time the US Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
fiercely condemned the war: 
‘…what has emerged in Mozambique is one of the most brutal holocausts against 
human beings since WWII’.20 
 
Since the Mozambican government was perceived as an innocent victim, 
donors and NGOs alike did not invoke the principle of neutrality in 
humanitarian aid. Without discussion, they all worked through the 
government or with the government to an extent that people at local level 
associated aid with the government.  Governmental military force was 
involved in aid escorts, received payments, fuel and got food through the 
international assistance (Vaux, 2001:105).  By 1990, 56 percent of humanitarian 
aid required governmental military escort (UN, 1990: 14). The effect was the 
politicization of aid. The escorts were used to gather military intelligence, 
move military forces around districts and strengthen the position of the 
government with the local population. It also led to a distribution of aid that 
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was far from needs-based. Maier (1989) interviewed people fleeing RENAMO 
controlled areas and most of them claimed that FRELIMO controlled areas 
were far better off because they got humanitarian aid that was absent in the 
RENAMO areas. 
Additionally, as international humanitarian aid increased, the 
Mozambican government was literally exempted from its obligation of 
feeding and dressing its people and could afford to reinforce its military force 
either numerically, materially or financially. Up to 1990, the international 
community provided 90 percent of total food requirements for both rural and 
urban population and in 1989 donors funded the purchase and armour of 12 
trucks to escort humanitarian aid (UN, 1990:2,7).  
As aid was being ‘pumped’ into the country, the government 
appointed new military leadership in 1987 and sought additional military 
assistance from UK, Italy and Portugal. By the end of 1987 the FRELIMO 
army had grown from 35,000 soldiers in 1985 to 65,000-70,000 soldiers 
(Weinstein and Francisco, 2005: 170) and started larger military operations in 
provinces of Manica, Sofala, Zambezia and Tete. By 1989 the government 
regained control of all the districts in Zambezia province which had been 
under RENAMO control. The government became so confident that it sent 
home the 3,000 Tanzanian troops that had been in Zambezia province (Maier, 
1989:14).   
SAP and international aid also strengthened financially the FRELIMO 
party and its leaders.  The structural adjustment stipulated that Mozambique 
had to move into a massive and rapid privatization process. Thousands of 
firms were privatized, 92 percent of these were sold to Mozambican nationals. 
They were expected to pay about 52,4 million USD (Cramer, 2001:91). 
Although the exact payments have been held secret, it is widely believed to 
have been much less as most of the buyers were the local elite related to 
FRELIMO. The companies have continued to support FRELIMO’s political 
agenda and finances (Hanlon, 2002: 7). Some borrowed funds from local 
banks but never repaid the loans and consequently one bank went into 
bankruptcy. Attempts to investigate the major borrowers and creditors from 
SAP and the bank and to reinforce payments led to the killings of the 
journalist Carlos Cardoso and the newly appointed bank CEO Siba-Siba 
Macuacua (Hanlon and Smart, 2008).  
 
(3) Improving the country’s image worldwide. Before 1987, Mozambique’s 
record on economic performance, human rights and other indicators was 
generally poor. Starting in 1987, Mozambique attempted to improve its 
reputation by taking a number of measures. In the economic sphere, in 1987, 
the economy rose from the negative to a 4 percent growth; this was the 
greatest achievement over the last eight years and donors, who had 
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recommended SAP from the beginning of 1987, were highly impressed with 
the improvements21.  
In parallel the government launched several measures to improve 
human rights. A first military criminal law and a military tribunal were 
approved and three militiamen were found guilty of human rights abuse and 
given prison terms which ranged from 4 to 8 years. Furthermore, around 
1,500 convicts were given a presidential pardon and, in December president 
Chissano proposed the extension of the pardon law to the RENAMO 
guerrillas who turned themselves in to local authorities and seek 
reintegration. Freedom of speech and press were more respected and freedom 
of religion was enlarged.  
In 1987 the government allowed the return of 2,000 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who had been deported or exiled since 1976 (Amnesty 
International, 1988). In September 1988, Pope John Paul II made a historic visit 
to Mozambique and in December of the same year president Chissano met 
face to face with the person who could have been called his major enemy: 
P.W. Botha president of South Africa. All these measures and events were 
highlighted in the 1988 Amnesty International report and in the US 
Department of State report on Human Rights. They tended to improve the 
country’s image worldwide and to ease relations with the West.  
 
 (4) Exploiting contradictions within the donor community. When the UN 
General Secretary launched the first Mozambican international humanitarian 
appeal in 1987, it was not yet clear who among the donor community, would 
be coordinating the efforts. To fill this position the General Secretary 
established the Emergency Operations Office (UNSCERO) in Mozambique 
and appointed the UNDP country representative as the UNSCERO Special 
Coordinator. UNSCERO was established within the UNDP but most of the 
bilateral donors, other UN agencies and international NGOs were against this.  
For example, during emergency appeals WFP and UNICEF pledged more 
funds than the UNDP and they thought they were more entitled to lead 
UNSCERO (Barnes, 1998:15).   
While international donors were arguing over the coordination of 
UNSCERO, the government provided the middle ground for the international 
donors and its own agencies working on disaster response. In May 1987, the 
government created the National Executive Commission for the Emergency 
(CENE) and the Emergency Operation Committee (COE). CENE formulated 
disaster related policies and regulations and, monitored the activities 
developed by the national DPCCN. COE was a platform between 
international and national actors. COE had weekly meetings that were 
attended by international and national organizations working on disaster 
management. It was co-chaired by the CENE and UNSCERO coordinators. 
With this set up the Mozambican government managed to maintain its stake 
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in disaster management and to a large extent continued to receive aid inflows 
through DPCCN and LSU. In general COE was much more consensual than 
the UNSCERO and became much more active compared to UNSCERO 
(Alexander, 2000: 189). 
The signing of the peace agreement in 1992 while ushering peace and 
stability also meant that money had to be mobilized for operations of 
voluntary repatriation back to their home areas of 4 million internally 
displaced people and 2 million in neighbouring countries as well as the 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-soldiers. The period from 1992 to 1994, 
when the first multiparty elections were held, saw much influx of external aid 
(see graph 3.1 above). During the period from October 1992 to December 1994, 
the United Nations committed 663 million USD to support emergency and 
rehabilitation programmes targeting the returning refugees, the resettlement 
of the internally displaced and of the ex-combatants. This was the largest 
amount ever committed in post war situations in Africa (Barnes, 1996:4).   
With increased funds, government practices in handling humanitarian 
aid started to be sharply criticized. Corruption within DPCCN became a 
widely criticized concern from donors who also blamed the UNSCERO 
coordinator for allowing the corrupt practices to prevail. Following the critics, 
the UN secretary appointed a WFP senior staff member with experience in 
emergency operations in Ethiopia and South Africa as UNSCERO coordinator 
(Alexander, 2000: 188). Among other measures taken to reduce corruption the 
international community decided to provide better salaries and incentives to 
DPCCN staff. Staff from DPCCN and LSU had a subsidized food basket and 
other monetary incentives.  
Despite these incentives, corruption and theft continued and even 
increased. But the government claimed that the best way to handle the 
problem was to improve accountability, reporting and relief delivery at 
provincial levels, which required training and funding. For that, the 
government requested additional funding. Donors were divided on the 
effectiveness of such measures but the Mozambican government managed to 
add a budget line on the emergency appeals for that purpose (Barnes, 1998).   
Nonetheless, aid started to drop by 1995 when the UN peace keeping 
mission ONUMOZ ended its mandate in January and there was an overall 
demand to move from emergency to development intervention (see graph 3.1 
above). With the move to development interventions most of the 
organizations that relied on international donations for their activities started 
a restructuring process. Within the DPCCN for instance, the LSU was closed 
in 1994 and the government faced increasing problems to keep the DPCCN 
operational. 
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1995-1999: AID WITHDRAWAL, RESTRUCTURATION AND CONFLICTS 
 
The emergency situation and funds channelled during the previous period 
had led to an increased number of staff and an accumulation of material 
assets. By 1997, the DPCCN had nearly 900 workers, about 700 vehicles and 
dozens of warehouses (DPCCN, 1997:12). Most of the logistics such as spare 
parts and car repairs, fuel, monetary incentives to DPCCN qualified staff was 
provided by the LSU. With the abolishment of the LSU and the drop in 
international funding, the government had to cut the staff and withdraw the 
incentives provided previously. A restructuring process took place to reduce 
the number of staff and redress the role of DPCCN in a development context. 
DPCCN was finally abolished in 1999 by the government decree 38/99 of 10th 
of June and in its place the National Institute for Disaster Management 
(INGC) was created. INGC availed of nearly 200 people and many of the 
former DPCCN assets such as cars, warehouses went on sale.  Other 
organizations undertook similar measures. The Mozambican Red Cross for 
instance, had to reduce its staff from nearly 500 to about 150 and sell some of 
its assets.  
The process was contentious, with different conflicts over who stays 
and who goes and, who takes what and where. Some experienced and 
qualified staff left the government to join INGOs and international 
organization that offered better conditions. Organizations such as WFP, FAO 
and CARE were  accused by the government of poaching its most qualified 
staff (Adam, 2005: 47). Some people were dismissed without compensation 
and some took the institutions such as the Mozambican Red Cross and 
DPCCN to the court22. 
 
2000-2004: FLOODS AND THE RE-EMERGING OF HUMANITARIAN 
AID  
 
In 2000 and 2001, Mozambique was hit by two successive floods of great 
impact. Together, they claimed the lives of 813 people and losses were 
estimated to be more than 750 million USD; 2,704,840 people were directly 
affected of which 767,000 had to be evacuated. Nearly 250,000 hectares under 
different crops were lost and about 18,600 fishermen lost their tools (Negrão, 
2001a:14-15). To address the emergency situation, the government appealed 
for international aid. By the end of April 2000 more than 160 million USD 
were offered to the government of Mozambique through different channels 
(Christie and Hanlon, 2001:64). Furthermore, the government made a 
reconstruction appeal in Rome in May 2000 asking for 449.5 million USD with 
donors promising 452, 9 million USD. In 2001 the government appealed for 30 
million USD for emergency operations while different organizations such as 
the UN, Red Cross society among others made their own appeals.  
                                                 
22
 Interview with Fernanda Teixeira, Mozambican Red Cross General Secretary, October 11, 2008. 
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The appeals in 2000 and 2001 marked the resurgence of humanitarian 
aid after an interlude of nearly ten years. Graph 3.1 above shows the rise in 
aid following the great flood of 2000. Christie and Hanlon (2001) analyzed the 
response to the 2000 flood and claimed that given the magnitude of the 
flooding Mozambique would not have been able to manage the response by 
itself. International response was needed and it resulted in many lives being 
saved and livelihoods (re)constructed. Nonetheless, they also stressed that 
there were considerable management problems with a number of actors 
acting outside the national coordination lines. The coordination of the 2001 
flood response was generally claimed to have been far better than in 2000. 
Amongst other reasons it has been pointed out that the government was 
better prepared and staff could improve their practices based on the lessons 
learnt from the 2000 floods (GoM, 2001; IFRC, 2002; World Bank, 2005). 
Evidence of this claim was partly found in the fact that this time ‘only’ 113 
people had died, compared to 700 in the 2000 flooding (GoM, 2001; Christie 
and Hanlon, 2001).  
My analysis on the 2001 floods shows, however, that a great amount of 
funds allocated to INGC was spent outside the affected areas. 80 percent of 
the funds were spent in Maputo rather than in the affected provinces. 
Furthermore, nearly 90 percent of funds went on aerial transportation, per 
diems, fuel and car maintenance. Finally but not least, while the disaster 
occurred in February-March, most of the funds were spent by June (see annex 
3). All this suggests that we need to qualify the improvements and not 
attribute too much significance to the mathematics of the number of people 
affected and killed. Further, it suggests that higher interests in Maputo 
prevailed over interests at the lower levels. Complaints of lack of 
decentralization, transparency and sharing of information were common 
among the affected provinces and communities (World Bank, 2005:25).  
 
 2005 ONWARD: STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY 
ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT  
 
In 2005, Armando Guebuza replaced Joaquim Chissano as the head of state. In 
his inaugural speech Guebuza mentioned three factors that in his view 
contributed to the prevailing high rates of national poverty and vulnerability. 
The first was the ‘let it go approach’ (espírito de deixa andar – laissez faire). 
According to Guebuza by following the espirito de deixa andar, public servants’ 
performance had become extremely low to an extent that people could no 
longer trust the public institutions. The second factor was corruption within 
the state administration. Corruption and deixa andar fed into each other and 
diverted resources which could be applied to alleviate national poverty. The 
third was the national lack of self –reliance and self-esteem.  
Regarding the disaster management set up, Guebuza’s government  
perceived that the INGC traditional attachment to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs portrayed its dependency to the international community and 
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therefore weakened national sovereignty, self –reliance and self-esteem. 
Secondly, there were also claims that INGC inherited a corrupt staff from the 
previous DPCCN and a corruption scandal involving the General Director of 
the INGC leaked to the media in 2005. Both aspects forced to some extent 
changes within INGC.  In December 2005, INGC was shifted from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of State Administration by the 
decree 27/2005 of December 1. In 2006 a new General Director of INGC was 
appointed and some old staff was sacked or reassigned elsewhere. New staff 
was contracted and by 2009 the number of staff had nearly tripled as 
compared to 2006. It had 380 people as compared to 134 when INGC was 
attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs23.  
In 2006, the government approved an 80 million USD, 10-year Master 
Plan focusing on disaster risk and vulnerability reduction. In 2007 the 
mandate of INGC was modified to accommodate the new responsibilities. The 
decree 52/2007 of November 27 and decree 29/2008 of July 3 set new 
responsibilities for INGC. Rather than disaster prevention and response, 
INGC is now charged with the authority for coordinating the development of 
drought prone areas and for coordinating reconstruction following disasters. 
New agencies and departments were created within the INGC that started 
operating since 2007. Three National Emergency Operative Centres Centro 
Nacional Operativo de Emergência (CENOE) were established, a Unit for Civil 
Protection (UNAPROC) was created as well as a Cabinet for the Coordination 
of Reconstruction (GACOR). These new units started to take action in 
resettling the 2007 flood affected households. Funding had also improved 
considerably. Since 2007, annual budget directly committed to INGC reached 
4.5 million USD for current expenditure and investment (Prevention, 2008:6).  
These changes were not just dynamics emerging from the new 
president and government but they also responded to national and 
international politics. At the national level, the government wants to ensure 
that the coordination of disaster management is a matter of national 
sovereignty and with this new set up, the government believes that all 
external actors can be accommodated and work through governmental lines24. 
During the 2007 and 2008 flooding, to be discussed in the next chapters, the 
government refused to appeal internationally as a matter of national self-
reliance and sovereignty.  
Internationally, the government aligned the organization of disaster 
management to the Hyogo Framework of Action on disaster risk reduction. It 
also aimed to give a new impetus on the implementation of the three Rio 
conventions- on Desertification, Climate Change and Biological Diversity25. 
Scholars and donors alike praised the new structure during the 2007 and 2008 
flooding. Jay Knott from USAID even suggested replicating the Mozambique 
set up worldwide. He stated that “The Mozambique government has responded to a 
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devastating flood and cyclone with speed and efficiency that could serve as a model for the rest 
of Africa and the world”26.  
At present, then, we can identify a shift in the international 
appreciation of disaster management in Mozambique. Instead of a powerless 
entity, Mozambique is starting to be seen as a capable and committed country.  
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE: BETWEEN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
 
One of the major reasons for the need to strengthen INGC over the past years 
relates to climate change and disaster management. The country is vulnerable 
to climate change and the strengthening of the INGC allows a better 
government response to disasters triggered by climate change27. A report by 
INGC (2009) takes stock of processes of climate change in Mozambique. Over 
the last fifty years, the average temperature in Mozambique has increased by 
1.6o C, the rainfall season has started later and there has been an increase in 
the length of dry spells. By the year 2100, temperatures are expected to 
increase by up to 6o C with further consequences of long droughts and heavy 
flooding. Although climate data are highly imprecise and scarce in 
Mozambique, the report sheds light on climate change or variability and 
resonates earlier claims (i.e. Christie and Hanlon, 2001; World Bank, 2005).  
Leaving aside the question of the accuracy of the report, the 
acknowledgement of climate change has become a social and political fact in 
Mozambique. In the footsteps of this, research on climate change in 
Mozambique is on the rise. Patt and Schroter (2008) compared perceptions of 
climate risk in Mozambique from the local people in southern Mozambique 
and the decision makers. They concluded that the two groups disagreed 
about the seriousness of climate risk and, the potential negative consequences 
either of climate change or of the adaptive measures. They recommend that 
climate risk management policies need to incorporate a great deal of 
participatory risk appraisal and response (p.466).  
Osbahr et al., (2008) analysed local responses to climate shocks, food 
insecurity and poverty and concluded that people rely heavily on their 
traditional coping mechanisms involving diversification and collective land 
use management. They also observed that planned interventions on 
agriculture have strengthened local capacity to adapt to drought, food 
security and poverty.  
Eriksen and Silva (2009) analysed how climate stressors and economic 
changes related to liberalization affects the local vulnerability in two villages 
in south Mozambique (Matidze and Massavasse villages in Gaza province). 
Contrary to Osbahr et al., (2008) they concluded that increased drought 
reduced market integration by small scale farmers and that policies and 
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regulations for liberalization have favoured commercial farmers while 
squeezing the small scale farmers hence reducing their adaptive capacity.     
In this section, I want to address two issues: first, how the government 
is responding to climate change? Secondly, how different actors in the climate 
change arena interact? I leave the analysis on how actors at local level 
interpret and respond to climate change to the next chapters.  
 
Following the Rio Summit in 1992, Mozambique has gradually 
developed a legal framework for coping with climate change. Under the 
coordination of the Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Action 
(MICOA), different working groups and regulatory tools have been 
established. An inter-institutional working group carried out the first national 
inventory on greenhouse gases and vulnerability assessment in 1998. This 
group also led the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and the National Action Plan for Adaptation (NAPA). Ever since, the 
country has produced different legal instruments related to climate and 
sustainable development. These include: (i) Regulation for Environmental 
Quality Standards and Emissions, (ii) Regulation for Environmental 
Inspection, (iii) Environmental Strategy for Sustainable Development, (iv) 
Environmental Law, (v) Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation, (vi) 
Land Regulation, (vii) Land Law, (viii) Water Resources Legislation, (ix) 
Energy Policy, (x) National Program for Environmental Management (xi) 
Regulation for Mine Activities, (xii) Territorial Planning Law.   
Despite these legal tools, the overall achievement of environmental 
sustainability (Millennium Development Goal 7) is unlikely to be achieved by 
2015 (GoM and UN, 2005). It turns out that in practice, the government is 
focusing more on MDG 1 (halving the proportion of people living in extreme 
poverty). It appears that economic growth competes with environmental 
concerns. 
A major economic policy has been to encourage private foreign 
investments with different incentives such as limited taxation. Although some 
of these seem climate-friendly, for instance the provision of five million 
hectares of land for producing biofuels28 and investments in hydro-power 
dams, others will certainly increase greenhouse emissions in the years to 
come. These include the granting of 256,680 hectares for coal exploration to 
the Australian mining company Riversdale29. Similarly, the Brazilian 
company Vale do Rio Doce will extract about 2.4 billion tons of coal over a 
renewable period of 25 years30. Both companies are planning to produce 
electricity by burning coal. Forests, in the meantime, are being depleted by 
exportation of wood mainly to China, what some ironically refer to as the 
‘Chinese takeaway’ (Mackenzie, 2006). 
Given the extreme poverty, lack of employment and basic infra-
structures, it is understandable that the government is preoccupied with 
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development concerns rather than investments in climate change whose 
returns may only be visible in the long run. The effect is, however, that 
climate change mitigation and adaptation become competing claims in the 
allocation of budgets and investment decisions by the government. The 
hopeful suggestion that climate change adaptation may lead to economic 
growth and that economic growth can provide the resources for adaptation 
(UNDP, 2008) cannot prevent that decision-making today often entails a 
negotiation between the two interests.  
 
ACTORS AND STAKES ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN MOZAMBIQUE: 
POWER STRUGGLES AND STRATEGIES 
 
In recent years, internationally-funded programmes for climate change 
adaptation are increasing. Major programmes in Mozambique in 2009 were: 
(i) Joint Program in Environmental Mainstreaming and Adaptation to 
Climate Change in Mozambique funded by MDG-F Spain and 
UNDP;  
(ii) Mozambique Poverty and Environment Initiative funded by the 
government of Ireland,  
(iii) Joint Program on Strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Emergency Preparedness by UNDP; 
(iv) Coping with Drought and Adaptation to Climate Change funded by 
GEF  
(v) A World Bank study that is expected to result in a fund for Climate 
Change Adaptation.  
 
This has led to competition among government bodies to handle these large 
programmes. As mentioned above, the Ministry for Coordination of 
Environmental Action (MICOA) was initially the coordinating body for 
climate change adaptation. Development agencies have questioned MICOA’s 
authority by claiming that climate change is a development more than an 
environmental problem. In 2005, the government of Mozambique created a 
Ministry for Planning and Development (MPD). In order to mainstream 
climate change adaptation in the national development process, this Ministry 
has started to claim the coordination of adaptation measures. This has created 
conflicts between MICOA and MPD over leadership, which became apparent 
when both Ministries wanted to handle a World Bank project for integrating 
small scale farmers into the market with a large component of climate-change 
adaptation. Another player is the Ministry for Science and Technology (MCT), 
which has the mandate to handle interventions regarding science and 
technology. This Ministry created a working group on climate change in 2007.  
The disaster management community in Mozambique, notably the 
National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) also has increased its 
stake in climate change adaptation programmes. INGC has broadened its 
mandate by incorporating prevention, vulnerability reduction, reconstruction 
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and development of drought-prone areas. Because of its strong reputation, 
nearly all international actors have a preference to work with INGC. INGC is 
handling climate change related projects with UNDP, DFID, GTZ, World 
Bank, FAO, and the Nordic countries among others31.  As mentioned above, 
INGC has also produced the first national study on climate change. At the 
launch of the study in Maputo in May 2009, which I attended, the issue of 
coordination of climate change became a major bone of contention, and many 
guests from competing institutions perceived the initiative as an attempt by 
INGC to claim the leadership.   
Municipalities are also emerging as actors in the climate change arena. 
When UN-Habitat launched a project aiming to develop mitigation and 
adaptation mechanisms in two cities of Mozambique, representatives of the 
municipalities were keen to defend their position that they had the lawful 
duty to develop any intervention in their areas of jurisdiction. Development 
agencies such as the Mozambican Red Cross, Care international, GTZ, and 
World Vision are also unilaterally or in partnerships implementing climate 
change related projects. And lastly, the private sector is also stepping into the 
climate change arena. The Matola Gas Company (MGC), the Cimentos de 
Moçambique (CM) and the Electricity Company (EDM) have all requested 
certificates to access funds under the Clean Development Mechanism.32 
The emerging property of this unfolding arena is a lack of coherent 
strategy and leadership for dealing with climate change. This leads to a 
dispersion of projects, efforts and funds. It is unclear what the outcomes of the 
dispersed initiatives will be for adapting to climate change at the local level. 
Actors use the room for manoeuvre created by the lack of coordination, by 
developing and implementing climate change interventions according to their 
own understanding, needs and rules. INGC assumes that millions of US 
dollars are being pledged annually for disaster and climate change in 
Mozambique, but the government is not aware how many organizations and 
donors are working on the issues and where33. Hence, government claims of 
sovereignty and capacity to coordinate or control the multiple actors is in 
practice being reshaped and appropriated by different actors within the 
governance domain and outside it.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
In this chapter I have reconstructed – within the limitations of available data 
and records - the historical relationship between disaster and socio-political 
and economic agendas of the actors concerned. I asked how disasters and 
disaster responses co-shaped or have been co-shaped by the political and 
socio-economic agendas of the different actors involved.  
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Throughout the chapter I have discussed disaster management as part 
of state formation. I have shown that disasters played a crucial role in the 
formation and dissolution of traditional kingdoms, in shaping the colonial 
policies and interventions, and in keeping FRELIMO in power. Further, I have 
disclosed that the over claimed local powerlessness needs to be treated with 
extreme caution. Rather than solely applying subservience, the national 
government used, throughout the time, different active strategies to shape 
disaster response, fulfill its own agenda and to keep a stake in disaster 
management despite the influx of the international community in the late 
1980s. Appointing a moderate president, blaming external forces, shifting 
strategies and alliances, exploring the room for manoeuvre created by 
contradictions within the international community, producing and promoting 
institutions have all been elements used by the national government in its 
interaction with other actors. Equally, at the local domain of disaster response, 
local people have, within the limits of their resources, responded to disasters 
in a variety of ways. By choosing crops, investments, alliances, networks and 
by migrating, local actors have attempted to reduce their vulnerability to 
disaster and to cope better with hazards.   
A current change in disaster management practice has resulted in the 
paying of attention to climate change and its presumed effects on increased 
disaster risks. Climate change adaptation has become an arena of power 
struggles where different actors in disaster management dispute resources 
including knowledge. In analyzing climate change and actors’ interfaces the 
chapters shows that there is a lack of a coherent framework for climate change 
response. This lack of a coherent framework is an emerging property of 
complex politics between different ministries (and other actors) for leading 
and coordinating the response. Nonetheless, this allows the different actors to 
operate without much concern of coordination. Actors use the room for 
manoeuvre created by the lack of coordination, by developing and 
implementing climate change interventions according to their own 
understanding, needs and rules. The result up to now is a proliferation of 
initiatives and interventions under the umbrella of climate change without 
coordination, database and above all, a critical appraisal upon them.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LIVING ON THE FLOODPLAINS: ADAPTING TO 
FLOODING IN BUILDING LIVELIHOODS ON THE DELTA 
OF THE ZAMBEZI RIVER 1  
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I analyzed actors’ strategies in the domain of 
disaster governance in Mozambique and the interfaces with the international 
and local domains. Now I turn the focus to the local domain of disaster 
response to understand how people in the delta of the Zambezi River manage 
their livelihoods in the context of disaster risk triggered by flooding. In so 
doing, the chapter aims to answer the following questions:  (1) How do 
people perceive and act upon flooding in building their livelihoods along the 
floodplains of the Zambezi delta? (2) What structures exist or have existed 
and what role do they play to enable or limit the adaptive capacity of actors in 
the Zambezi delta? (3) How have these structures been changing over time? 
By attempting to understand how people craft their livelihoods in the 
delta of the Zambezi River, I hope to shed light on the topic and contribute to 
the current academic and political discussions on adaptation to climate 
change in Mozambique. As discussed in the previous chapter, recurrent 
droughts, flooding and cyclones in Mozambique are increasingly understood 
as clear manifestations of climate change (INGC, 2009) and people, at local 
level, are supposed to adapt.  
Throughout this chapter, I will step away from climate change per se to 
discuss adaptation to flooding and adaptive capacity at local levels. I will 
focus on adaptation to flooding irrespective of the question of what climate 
change contributes to the phenomenon. As we shall see, amalgams of 
different factors cause floods, and it is hard to single out the role of climate 
change. Moreover, research on climate change in Mozambique is still 
embryonic and inconclusive. Whether current processes are part of climate 
variability or real climate change is an issue requiring further research. For 
the purpose of my research it is not important to know exactly what climate 
contributes as my interest is in people’s perceptions on climate change and 
their everyday practices to withstand its manifestations.  
I will argue that in order to understand adaptation practices, we need 
to broaden the discussion and incorporate the everyday needs, power 
relations and social negotiations of different actors operating in the climate 
change arena. As pointed out by Hilhorst (2003: 107) everyday life is best 
represented by looking at interventions as an ensemble of practices that 
provides local actors with alternative and exit options, and brings together 
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competing discourses, resources and networks. Similarly, as discussed in 
chapter 1, decisions regarding adaptation to climate change are not isolated 
from other decisions and adaptive strategies can be induced by non-climate 
related social and economic changes. This renders it difficult to detach climate 
change induced adaptations from actions triggered by other events. As this 
chapter will clarify, adaptation strategies are rarely specific. Adaptation to 
flooding is embedded in livelihood and social institutions, often as a property 
of a more general or multi-faceted strategy. Possession of a canoe, for 
example, is multi-functional as it helps households to generate income and 
provide transportation and in addition is a preferred means of evacuation in 
times of floods.    
Theoretically, adaptation to climate related disasters such as floods has 
been addressed by using two main approaches or what Burton et al., (2002) 
called generations. The first generation starts by modeling climate scenarios, 
developing impact models and later on by trying to see which regions, 
countries and people are vulnerable to the modelled impacts and what 
adaptation policies and regulations could be advised.  
The second generation starts by looking at vulnerability as a present 
inability to cope with external pressures or changes like those posed by 
climate change. As such rather than starting with climate scenarios, the 
second approach starts with vulnerability and focuses on a wider range of 
contemporary social and economic practices that bring about vulnerability 
and dampen adaptive capacity. This approach does not start from models and 
projections, but from the existing policies and regulations, and their strengths 
and weaknesses to propose policies and measures to improve current 
adaptation measures (Burton et al, 2002: 157).  
This chapter follows the second approach. It looks comprehensively at 
the causes of vulnerability and takes a broad perspective of the policy fields 
that are therefore relevant to adaptation.  
Nonetheless, I notice that both generations are based on a shared 
assumption that policy, regulation, science and technology can bring about 
expected ‘good’ adaptation practices (cf. Bankoff, 2004). My view on the 
policies and practices of adaptation is different. Drawing on the notion of 
agency I step away from the systems thinking that is characteristic of the 
engineering and interventionism approaches presented above. I see 
adaptation as a process taking place in arenas where factors leading to 
vulnerability and resilience (including policies and other measures) are 
socially constructed through everyday social negotiation. They are acted upon 
or contested by different power holders and actors who creatively attempt to 
secure their short and long-term projects. To capture this, it is not enough to 
focus on the systems thinking approach of analysis-recommendation-policy 
formulation and implementation. Approached from an arena perspective, 
adaptation is not linear but complex and, to some extent, an unpredictable 
emerging property. 
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 ZAMBEZI DELTA AND FLOODING EVENTS   
 
The Zambezi Delta is part of a larger catchment area of the Zambezi River in 
Africa. The Zambezi River is the fourth largest floodplain river in Africa, the 
largest watercourse in the Sub-Saharan region and the largest system flowing 
into the Indian Ocean (Davies et al., 2000:1; Shela, 2000:65). The river emerges 
from the plateaus of the southern border of Democratic Republic of Congo 
with Angola and its catchment area includes territories of Angola, Botswana, 
Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique. The total 
catchment area is estimated around 1,321, 800 km2 (World Bank, 2008:6). 
Being an international river, water management appears to require 
collaboration between different riparian countries and social negotiations of 
different actors involved. I will limit my analysis of interfaces and social 
negotiations to the Mozambique delta rather than the entire catchment area. 
Once in Mozambique the Zambezi basin is divided, according to its 
topography, into four major zones (Sweco, 1982; DNA, 1998). The first zone 
comprises the high plateaus of Maravia, Macanga and Angonia districts- close 
to the borders with Zambia and Malawi- where the altitudes vary between 
1000- 1500 meters. The second is the zone of medium plateaus with altitudes 
between 500-1000 meters. The third zone comprises higher plains with 
altitudes between 200-500 meters along the river in Chemba, Morrumbala and 
Cheringoma districts. The fourth zone, the Zambezi delta, is characterized by 
low plains with altitudes lower than 200 meters occupying most of the lower 
basin from the confluence of the Shire and Zambezi rivers up to the Indian 
Ocean. This area includes territories of Mutarara, Caia, Marromeu, Mopeia 
Chinde, Inhassunge and Quelimane districts2 (see figure 3.1 below).  
The last zone -the delta- is the focus of this book. The delta is a broad, 
flat alluvial plan which extends over nearly 150 Km from the confluence of 
Zambezi and Shire rivers up to the Indian Ocean (Sweco, 1982:24). Along the 
coast the delta expands 200 km from the mount of Zuni River in the south to 
the Cuacua River outlet near Quelimane in the north. All in all the entire delta 
covers an estimated total area of 1.2 million hectares and supports a vast 
mosaic of animal life as well as grassland, palm, thicket, woodland and 
mangrove forests (Beilfuss, 2005:24).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The definition of the area comprising delta Zambezi is highly fluid. Sweco (1982:24) includes as part 
of the delta the districts of Tambara (Manica province), Chemba (Sofala province) and Morrumbala 
(Zambezia province) which are located above the confluence of Shire and Zambezi. MICOA (2005:3) 
makes a list of 8 districts which includes Caia, Cheringoma, Marromeu (Sofala province) and Mopeia, 
Chinde, Inhassunge, Nicoadala and Quelimane  (Zambezia province ). They exclude Mutarara, 
Morrumbala, Tambara, Chemba from the list. I focused on districts located from the confluence of 
shire and Zambezi rivers up to Indian ocean which are geographically below 200 meters. 
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Figure 3.1: Districts along the delta Zambezi 
 
 
Source: produced by Arsénio Banze and Luís Artur based on CENACARTA database 
 
Based on the above districts and using data from the 2007 census (INE, 2007) 
the delta area shelters about 965,859 people, mainly from the Sena ethnic 
group, who build their livelihoods essentially from agricultural production, 
fishing and ‘petty’ trade.  These activities are indeed highly influenced by 
flooding which has been part of the Zambezi delta history. 
Flooding on the Zambezi delta is a historical phenomenon (graph 3.1 
below). Records collected by Chidiamassamba and Liesegang (1997) date 
flooding on the delta as far back as 1548 and in the 19th century alone different 
authors have recorded more than 21 great floods, whose dimensions and 
impacts have remained on people's mind (Taveira, 1943; Monteiro, 1955; 
Chidiamassamba and Liesegang; 1997; Beilfuss, 2005b).  
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According to Rendal Palmer and Tritton (1979:25), one third of 
floodplains on the delta are affected at 7,000 m3/s water flow of the Zambezi 
River and the flooded area may increase by up to half when water flows reach 
9,000m3/s. However, before the Cahora Bassa dam- to be discussed next- 
water flows of 9,000m3/s-13,000 m3/s occurred in every 2 years (graph 3.2 
below; Haws et al., 1982:348). If Rendal Palmer and Tritton’s claims are right 
then more than half of the Zambezi delta was flooded during a part of the 
year, in 1952, 1953, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1976, 
1978, 1985, 1989, 2001, 2007 and 2008.  
 
Graph 3.1: Recorded water flow’s peak on the delta Zambezi since 1950 
 
Source: author, based on the National Water Directorate (DNA) database  
  
Although flooding of the Zambezi has always been a ‘normal’ occurrence, 
flooding regimes and their impacts on people’s lives on the delta have been 
changing substantially due to a number of factors that are mainly related to 
policy measures and political processes beyond the locality. The effect of these 
factors on extreme weather events is usually disputed, with claims and 
counter claims made by actors from the different domains of disaster 
response. In the section that follows, I will discuss the different factors, 
discourses and practices related to flooding on the Zambezi delta.  
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FLOODING AND THE ENSEMBLE OF INTERVENTIONS, DISCOURSES 
AND PRACTICES 
 
Flooding or non-flooding and its impacts on the delta Zambezi have been 
attributed to an amalgam of different factors. Of particular relevance we may 
distinguish the following: (1) the construction of embankments, (2) the 
construction of the Cahora Bassa dam (3) the policies implemented after 
independence in 1975, (4) civil war and the resettlement process, (5) Structural 
Adjustment Programme and (6) changes in rain pattern. Along these factors 
arises different claims and practices making the flooding an arena marked by 
power struggles, different interests and social negotiations.  
 
(1) the construction of embankments: According to Beilfuss and Brown 
(2005:1), major (environmental) changes in Zambezi delta started after 1800 
with the construction of dikes in 1893 to protect sugar fields in Mopeia 
district. It  continued over the next 30 years with new embankments to further 
protect sugar fields and sugar factories (the Sena Sugar company) in 
Marromeu and Chinde districts. John Peter Hornung, an Englishman married 
to a Portuguese woman, owned the Sena sugar company.  
Hornung managed to get land from the Portuguese government and 
finances from British banks to pursue his idea of sugar production to feed 
European markets (Head, 1980). This is how globalized economic and 
political processes came to be part of the initial major (environmental) 
transformations of the delta. The embankments had a height of 7.85 meters 
above sea level and could protect floods of approximately 18-19,000 m3/s 
(Beilfuss, 2005a:5). Additionally, roadways and railways were also developed 
at dikes about 7.5-7.6 meters above sea levels (Beilfuss, ibid).   
The impacts of these embankments were contested. While the 
Portuguese authorities and the sugar industry praised the embankments, 
environmentalists claimed that they obstructed the passage of water and 
reduced the movement of floodwater from the Zambezi River to its tributaries 
along the delta. This would have negative consequences for the local flora, 
fauna and to the livelihoods of people living in the delta (Tinley, 1994; 
Impacto, 1998; Hoguana, 2000).  
A different theory suggests that different actors have felt the impacts of 
the embankments differently across time and space. By the late 1920s when 
embankments were made, the Zambezi delta was less populated and 
cultivated; less than one percent of all land in the Zambezi valley was under 
cultivation (Issacman and Issacman, 1976:79). Furthermore, embankments 
also provided refuge to local people during the flooding periods3. Ribeiro 
(2006:2) suggests that the impacts of the embankments were marginal by 
comparison to the impacts of the Cahora Bassa dam from 1975 onward.  
 
                                                 
3
 Interview with chief régulo Chamanga, Mopeia village, May 7,  2008.  
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(2) The Cahora Bassa dam: the Cahora Bassa dam is located about 350 kms 
upstream of the Zambezi delta and was constructed from 1969 to 1974. The 
construction of the dam and its subsequent impact on flooding, local 
environment and local people’s livelihoods has raised a number of different 
claims and counter claims from different actors. At least two major discourses 
can be distinguished from the current debate on the merits and de-merits of 
the Cahora Bassa. They are what I will call the pro-dam and the pro-
environment discourses.  
It is mainly the government that promotes the pro-dam discourse on 
flood management. Governments, both from the colonial period and after 
independence, portray flooding on the Zambezi delta as a natural problem to 
be solved by dams. To push towards dam construction, the colonial 
Portuguese authorities claimed that floods on the Zambezi delta produced 
annual agricultural losses of around 60 million escudos and required further 
governmental and private resources for post-flooding rehabilitation and 
reconstruction (Bolton, 1978: 148). The authorities believed that the dam 
would solve this flooding problem. The government of Mozambique also 
praises the relevance of the Cahora Bassa dam for flood control and the 
minimization of losses (GoM, 2007; INGC, 2001; 2007).  Based on such claims, 
new dams for energy generation as well as flood control are planned to be 
built along the Zambezi River. The Mpanda Uncua, an estimated investment 
cost of USD 2.5 billion (Li-EDF-KP, 2001), is the next dam to be built, starting 
in 2012.   
The environmental movement mainly articulates the pro-environment 
discourse. Environmental scientists claim that the Cahora Bassa project has 
produced devastating social, economic and environmental effects for 
downstream riverine communities (Bolton, 1978; 1983; Jackson, 1997; Beilfuss, 
1999; Beilfuss and Brown, 2005). Jackson (1997: 14) suggests that Cahora Bassa 
has the dubious distinction of being one of the major dams in Africa with the 
smallest amount of accompanying research. Beilfuss and Brown (2005:19) 
claim that with the dam, water discharges and flooding on the delta have 
become unpredictable and that the water flow has been reduced to less than 
half of the pre-dam levels (see graphic 1 above). This, they suggest, affected 
the production and reproduction of animal and plant species that depended 
on regular flooding.  Sweco (1982:10) argues that with the dam and 
subsequent lower flooding of the delta, sediments are trapped and soils get 
less organic and inorganic nutrients. Consequently, soils have now lower 
fertility affecting agricultural yields downstream. Moreover, some 
environmentalists claim that with reduced flooding, there are also problems 
with the fishing activity. Fish breeding, growth and survival depend on 
flooding and water level variations. Hoguane (1997) claims for instance that 
reduced and unpredictable flooding on the delta affects shrimp production by 
about an estimated USD 30 million a year.   
Finally, some environmentalists have claimed that the extreme 
flooding on the delta, from 1975 onwards, is partly due to the 
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mismanagement of the Cahora Bassa dam (Bolton, 1978:4; Rendal Palmer and 
Tritton, 1979:28; Sweco, 1982:69; Lopes, 2007).   
 An international workshop regarding the sustainable use of the 
Cahora bassa and the Zambezi valley was held in Mozambique in 1997. It was 
attended by more that 50 scientists, dam managers and decision makers. The 
pro-environmentalists recommended that flooding was a necessary 
phenomenon and as such natural water flows should be produced by Cahora 
Bassa dam managers. Moreover, they recommended the creation of a multi-
stakeholder platform for Zambezi river management in Mozambique 
(ARPAC, 1998).This assertion was a clear disagreement with the pro-dam 
discourse. 
With the government approval of the Mpanda Uncua, the discussion 
on the impacts of dams on the Zambezi delta has been reignited recently 
between pro-dam and pro-environment actors. In October 2009 Justiça 
Ambiental, an environmental group in Mozambique, released a report which 
pictures a number of expected negative impacts from the dam - including a 
decline in local livelihoods. However, the government, through the minister 
of energy, claimed the report was an external fabrication to hamper national 
development and as such should be ignored. The dam will go ahead.4  
At the local level, there are multiple discourses at play. In group 
discussions5 and individual interviews6 local people, especially the elderly, 
tended to make a distinction between the causes of the flooding and its 
impacts. They have distinguished flooding which results from Madzi a 
Mulungu or God’s water7, and flooding which results from Madzi a ku 
Fungula, that is, discharges from the Cahora Bassa dam. Flooding from Madzi 
a Mulungu is produced by heavy rain, coming from the skies, which they 
themselves have witnessed in their areas. This is called the natural flood and 
represents the flooding which always existed before Cahora Bassa dam. 
Flooding from Madzi a ku Fungula however is perceived as produced by the 
discharges from the Cahora Bassa dam upstream and is said to be unnatural.  
While people are right in emphasizing that floods may originate from 
local rains or dam management (i.e. rains upstream), they do not take into 
account that in addition  tributary rivers downstream the dam  may add up to 
7,000 m3/s of water flow during the rainy season and produce considerable 
flooding.  In February 1981 for instance, while water flows from the dam 
peaked at about 4,800 m3/s, tributary rivers added more than 5,000 m3/s and 
water reached downstream Marromeu district at a flow of 10,450 m3/s 
producing considerable flooding (Suschka, 1986:10). 
                                                 
4
 Mediafax Newspaper, October 21, 2009. 
5
 Canhungue (Mutarara District),  May 23, 2007; Inhangoma (Mutarara District), September 10, 2008; 
Xitsomba (Chinde district),  June 15, 2007; Luabo (Chinde District), October 23, 2007; Cocorico 
(Mopeia District), September 24, 2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu District), March 11, 2007.  
6
 Interview besides group discussions with Mr. Languitone (local governmental authority in 
Canhungue); Feliciano Luis and Fernando Samo (local traditional leaders in Canhungue); Baptista 
Cocorico (traditional leader regulo in Cocorico).  Individual interview with regulo Chamanga in 
Mopeia May 7, 2008   
7
 In Sena language Rain is Mulungu the same as God and water is Madzi 
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The perceptions of the impact of Cahora Bassa and flooding on local 
livelihoods are indeed fluid. They vary across the actors but mainly with age, 
area of origin, education and settlement within the delta. Elderly people who 
grew up along the Zambezi delta and experienced flooding before the Cahora 
Bassa tended to echo pro-environmental claims of unpredictable and less 
flooding after Cahora Bassa and its negative impacts. Young people and 
newcomers were less concerned with this distinction. Thus, within the local 
domain, a handful of actors have knowledge/expertise on the (negative) 
impacts of Cahora Bassa. These few actors tend to reproduce the pro-
environment discourse.  
Although the elderly tend to reproduce these claims to the younger 
and new comers, there is much fluidity locally. During the group discussions 
while some condemned the dam, others acclaimed it and many others where 
undecided. For instance, government authorities and some local educated 
people who had knowledge of electricity generation by the dam tended to 
praise the dam. Overall, it appeared that at local level both discourses (pro-
dam and pro-environment) coexist and in many cases, local people tend to 
use them according to the context. During flooding periods, many local 
actors, expecting compensation or external aid, tend to strengthen the pro-
environment discourse and blame Cahora Bassa while in other contexts they 
(including the elderly) may ask government to extend electricity generated by 
the dam to their residential areas.   
Regardless of the discourses, the hydrological data shows that since the 
building of the dam there is less frequent flooding on the  Zambezi delta (see 
graph 3.1. above; Beilfuss, 2005b). The effects of the dam on livelihoods are 
indeed difficult to gauge. There are different concomitant factors which also 
produced considerable transformation on the delta. They include the policies 
implemented after independence, the civil war and the process of 
resettlement after the war, Structural Adjustment Programmes and changes in 
the rain patterns.  
 
(3) The policies implemented after independence in 1975: Flooding and its 
impact on local livelihoods have also been attributed to policies and 
regulations following the Mozambican independence in 1975. While the 
government supported the socialist ideology and nationalization policies, 
social-science researchers have claimed that these policies increased local 
vulnerability to flooding in a number of ways.  
The fleeing of non-natives, predominantly the Portuguese, and those 
who did not share the socialist ideology meant, largely, that the skills and 
employment opportunities they provided were lost. The rural economy, 
which depended heavily on the expatriates for production, marketing and 
consumption virtually, sank. On the Zambezi delta thousands of irrigated 
schemes previously used by native and non-native people became 
unexploited and those who were employed shifted to ‘subsistence’ agriculture 
and fishing (BUREP, 1980). The immediate emerging property was that more 
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people became dependent on natural resources for making a living and  
became engaged in agriculture and fishing. 
 There have also been claims from social scientists that attempts by the 
government, after  independence in 1975, to ban the traditional leaders and 
practices such as rituals for rain making  and social order disrupted the social 
fabric relevant to withstanding the impacts of flooding, therefore increasing 
their vulnerability (Negrão, 2001).    
The conjunction of these interventions by the government has reshaped 
the physical, social, political and economic landscape of the Zambezi delta, 
while at the same time producing a considerable number of discontented 
people who ended by backing the guerrilla movement in the early 1980s in 
the civil war against the government (Weinstein and Francisco, 2005).   
 
(4) The civil war and the resettlement process: The civil war discussed in the 
previous chapter was another element adding to changes in the delta. Due to 
the civil war, more than 60 percent of economic and social infrastructures on 
the Zambezi delta were destroyed (GPZ, 2001:5) and many individuals lost 
possessions relevant for their resilience to flooding such as canoes and 
livestock8.   
By the end of the civil war, repatriation from the neighbouring 
countries and returnees inside the country took place from 1992 to 1995. 
However, this was also a period marked by heavy drought. The Zambezi 
River for instance reached its longest and lowest water flow ever recorded 
(graph 3.1. above) and due mainly to this, many households returning to their 
native areas- either on the delta or outside the delta- established either 
temporarily or definitively, on the floodplains of the Zambezi River to 
develop agriculture and fishing activities.  
To illustrate this, 83 percent of 270,000 people living in Mutarara 
district by 1995 were returnees from Malawi and a large number were not 
originally from that district (UNHCR and UNDP, 1997:4-5). Similarly, 91 
percent of the 177,738 inhabitants of Caia district by 1995 were returnees and 
included native and non-natives (UNHCR and UNDP, 1997b:5). In 1992 
immediately after the cease fire, 5,000 people settled in the floodplains of the 
Mopeia district (UNHCR and UNDP, 1997c:2). This and further population 
growth of about 33 percent over the last ten years9 has reshaped the 
settlement pattern including settling in areas historically not suitable due to 
flooding regimes.   
This was not indeed the only pattern. Although many people 
witnessed a decline in their livelihoods, there are claims that a considerable 
number of people benefited from the civil war, the drought, and the 
                                                 
8
 Group discussions  Canhungue (Mutarara District),  May 23, 2007; Inhangoma (Mutarara District), 
September 10, 2008; Xitsomba (Chinde district),  June 15, 2007; Luabo (Chinde District), October 23, 
2007; Cocorico (Mopeia District), September 24, 2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu District), March 11, 
2007 
9
 Between the 1997 and 2007 census,  the population on the delta Zambezi comprising the districts of 
Mutarara, Mopeia, Caia, Marromeu, Chinde, Inhassunge and Quelimane districts has increased from 
724,801 to 965,859 people.  
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resettlement process. Callamard (1994) argues that civil war and drought 
produced a flourishing trading and income-generating system in 
Mozambique along the Zambezi delta and in the District of Muanza in 
Malawi. Bowen (2000) suggests that a considerable number of better off and 
established traders in Zambezia province (including the Zambezi delta) 
accumulated their resources and networks during the period of civil war and 
immediately after it. Hence, there are competing claims on the impact of the 
civil war and resettlement for different groups of people along the delta of 
Zambezi River. 
 
(5) Structural Adjustment Program: As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
from 1987, Mozambique embarked on the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) promoted by the international financial institutions. SAP brought the 
neo-liberal agenda of market economy, private property and low government 
interference in the market. This resulted in unemployment.  For example, the 
Mozambican Railway company (CFM) which employed a considerable 
number of people from the delta reduced its work force by 67 percent while 
the Sena Sugar Company, another major employer in the delta, was closed 
down and waiting for buyers up to 2000.  
SAP and limited investments afterwards tended as well, to squeeze 
alternative sources of livelihood and to push people to rely on natural 
resources and engage more in agriculture and fishing.  This is not to suggest 
that SAP was all negative. Along the Zambezi delta, some people who were 
dismissed and paid large sums of money, invested their funds in productive 
activities and turned into successful entrepreneurs10. On the other hand, some 
of those who remained employed saw their working conditions improved11.  
 
(6) Changes in the rain pattern: In group discussions and individual 
interviews local people suggested that rain patterns have changed. People feel 
that over the last 15 years (since most of them returned after the civil war) 
rainfall has reduced and has become unpredictable and heavier. Moreover, it 
increasingly tends to start earlier and to end earlier. Changes in the rain 
pattern with extremes of floods and droughts are bringing, at local level, 
different discourses. The scientific discourse on climate change is not widely 
known, and people find different alternative explanations for the seeming 
increase in extreme weather events and changes in rain patterns.  
During the fieldwork, I found three such alternative discourses of 
attribution: a discourse finding explanation in the will of God, the ancestors 
and the wrongdoing of witchcraft. These three different cosmologies of 
disaster risk and attribution are widespread in Mozambique (MICOA, 
2006:19). The questions is how these different interpretations play a role in 
shaping people’s responses and how they are used by different actors to 
secure their political, economic and social interests?  
 
                                                 
10
 Interview with Joao Sande, entrepreneur dismissed from CFM, Marromeu October 26, 2007 
11
 Interview with Alfredo Joaquim, CFM employee, Beira  April 3, 2007 
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The first discourse I distinguish is one that attributes extreme weather events 
to the will of God. It comes in two variations: one more benign and the other 
more threatening. One of my respondents was a man from Xilembene, a place 
hit by drought after having endured the great flood of 2000. This man 
objected during a workshop on climate-change adaptation project: “Nobody 
can claim droughts and floods- only god can decide when to send rain or not”! This 
turned out to be a popular explanation, one that was moreover actively 
propagated by church leaders.  
In dozens of services in local churches along the Zambezi delta, I found 
priests talking about climate change in their sermons. Typically, a priest 
would pray for those who lost their lives and belongings. He would refer to 
God as all powerful and able to command floods and droughts, and the only 
power capable of choosing who dies and who lives. Those chosen by God 
should be mourned but people should also be aware that a long afterlife 
awaited them. One should find comfort in God, follow His commandments 
and help those in need. These sermons had three important social roles. They 
provided comfort to the survivors, helped them make peace with their 
situation, and enhanced solidarity with victims.   
In some churches, the sermon took a more threatening turn. The priest 
in these cases used different bible verses where increased flooding, drought 
and other natural hazards were connected to the end of the world and the 
urgent need for people to convert and follow the church’s guidance. While the 
latter is obviously geared towards enhancing the influence of the church, the 
comforting variation can also be seen as reproducing social order, because 
flooding and droughts are seen as produced by forces beyond human control. 
Both variations diffuse social tension and strengthen the church’s grasp of 
people. They do not recognize potentials for mitigating climate change. 
 
A second alternative discourse was found in the role of ancestors. In the 
lifeworlds of many Mozambicans, ancestors play a large role. They have to be 
placated by rituals that precede major events or the launch of new public 
works or development interventions. A lack of connectivity with the ancestors 
is linked to failures in projects and in individual and collective misfortunes. 
Hence, there are continuities with the past regarding the role of ancestors. 
This is the domain of líderes tradicionais, traditional leaders. They are deemed 
the medium to ancestors and they reproduce the beliefs and the norms. When 
there is a lack of rainfall, the líderes tradicionais, in some regions of the country, 
perform rituals to ask forgiveness from the ancestors and make peace with 
them.  Ritual offerings are made to overcome the crisis.  
The offering consists of beverages and food (mostly made of millet or 
sorghum) which are placed or poured at one of the oldest trees available 
locally or where the oldest local chief, regarded as the owner of the land, used 
to rest or is buried. In many cases, the offerings involve all the community 
members, but in some cases, it may involve just a limited number of people 
(those directly involved such as the local chiefs and elderly).  While making 
the offerings the lider tradional evokes the name of the ancestor(s), explains the 
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crisis and asks for his/her mediation to overcome the crisis. Evidence was 
found in group interviews about such rituals in Canhungue, Mutarara District 
in 2003; in Xinsomba, Chinde District in 2005, and in Cocorico- Mopeia district 
in 2006.  Searching for protection from ancestors reinforces and strengthens 
traditional leadership especially when after the offerings the crisis is 
perceived to have eased. Like the church interpretation, the ‘traditional’ 
interpretation understands extreme events beyond the influence of living 
creatures and has the same effect of deterring social tension and ignoring 
possibilities for mitigation.  
 
A third alternative discourse that can be found in Mozambique concerns 
witchcraft. Some people associate natural hazards such as droughts, excessive 
rainfall and flooding with the influence of people believed to be witches. In 
June 2009, newspapers in Mozambique reported stories about alleged witches 
who were thought to have put off rainfall (figure 3.2 below). Local people in 
some districts of the Zambézia province seeking ‘justice’ had lynched some of 
the perceived witches. In a TV interview in the first week of June 2009, 
interviewees tended to blame the lack of rain to the machinations of those 
who were better off and were thus able to maintain production and continue 
to feed their families or even have a luxurious life- ‘Eles fazem só chover na 
machamba deles, …produzem só eles… e ficam ricos”: ‘They only make it rain in 
their own fields so that they are the only ones having production and become  
rich’.  
 
Figure 3.2: A national newspaper reporting lynching related to the lack of rainfall 
  
   
Source: Noticias newspaper, June 4, 2009 
 
More than the other two discourses, this discourse displays a – misdirected – 
sense of social injustice. And it is obviously disruptive. While the other two 
discourses usually remain uncontested by the government, the lynching 
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incidents compelled government not only to arrest the perpetrators, but also 
to launch an immediate campaign. Teams from the National Institute of 
Meteorology were sent to local areas to explain what generates droughts and 
flooding and why rainfall patterns are changing.  
 
The three discourses all attribute extreme weather events to cosmological 
forces. This does not mean that people do not adapt to changes. People 
respond pragmatically to the perceived changes by using a range of strategies 
that I will discuss in the next section. It does mean, however, that the role of 
social institutions, economic processes and political choices remains hidden. 
The different interpretations of climate change affect social order: by 
reinforcing the existing order or by challenging this order, as in the case of the 
witchcraft accusations. The latter expressed people’s deep discontent and it 
compelled the government to reach down to people with educational 
campaigns on climate change. 
 
By now, it appears that rather than living far from the floodplains, the general 
political economy after independence, the environmental changes and the 
demographic trend pushed a considerable number of people to do the 
contrary: to live on the floodplains or to depend on the floodplains and the 
Zambezi River. This pattern, an emerging property of different pressure 
factors, tended to drive people to live in ‘unsafe conditions’ (Blaikie et al., 
1994) of the floodplains increasing their physical vulnerability to flooding. In 
the section that follows, I discuss how local people adapted to floods in the 
Zambezi delta.  
 
ADAPTATION TO FLOODING IN THE DELTA ZAMBEZI   
 
Flooding continues to be the major natural hazard on the delta and over the 
past 10 years the frequency and magnitude of flooding has increased steadily. 
There were three heavy floods (magnitude above 10,000 m3/s) recorded over 
the period 2000-2009 with none in the previous decade and only one of that 
magnitude in the decade 1980-1989 (see graph 3.1. above). How do people 
manage to live in such a flood-risk environment? The next section discusses 
different strategies people developed over time in order to withstand flood 
risk. The section is mainly based on data collected in Cocorico ‘community’ 
along the floodplains of the Mopeia district. I collected data through 
ethnographic methods, which included participant observations, survey, life 
stories, group discussions, interviews with key informants and informal and 
casual encounters. To do that, I lived in Cocorico for about six months and 
throughout one year, I travelled back and forth to Cocorico.   
 When I arrived in Cocorico I was invited to stay at the local chief’s 
house, but I rather preferred to negotiate a free room at the local school in 
Sanguimbe where I stayed. I asked a local boy to be my companion and to 
help me with household chores and sharing meals. I feared that  being hosted 
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by local chiefs, without a good understanding of the local context including 
the relationships between the chiefs and the ordinary people, could 
eventually limit my interaction with different groups of people.  
Once settled, I started the research by asking the local chiefs for public 
introductory meetings where I introduced myself, my research agenda and 
asked them to be part of the research. From that moment, I nearly spoke to 
people everyday. I visited families, ate and drank with them; I visited 
agricultural fields, machambas, went on fishing journeys and attended 8 
church services, 1 funeral, 1 wedding, had 4 group discussions, 15 interviews 
with key informants and 2 extended case studies. Whenever possible I gave 
my material, financial and moral support to locals. For example, on one 
occasion, a local boy was very sick and because there was no hospital I called 
Red Cross staff and health services in Mopeia village to come and assist the 
boy which they did gladly.  
This episode appeared, on the one hand, to have strengthened my 
relationship with locals but, on the other, people thought I could be a channel 
to voice their concerns to higher levels. This engulfed me between local 
desires, powers and my purposes as researcher. Whenever possible I 
channelled their concerns but I always made it clear that I had no power to 
change whatever preoccupied them.   
 
COCORICO ‘COMMUNITY’ 
 
Historically, Cocorico is a chieftaincy or ‘community’ comprising scattered 
households around three settlements (Mulamba, Sanguimbe and Cuara). 
Geographically Cocorico is located 15 km South-West of the Mopeia main 
village and expands for nearly 30 km along the Zambezi River (figure 3.3. 
below). Mulamba is the nearest to Mopeia main village while Cuara is far 
away. By 2007 the area had about 300 households and nearly 1,500 
inhabitants.  Nearly half of this number lived in Mulamba and the remainder 
in Sanguimbe and Cuara12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Interview with chief Cocorico, July 2, 2007 
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Figure 3.3: Mopeia village and Cocorico Community 
 
 
Source: Produced by Paulo Sithoe based on DINAGECA database 
  
The name Cocorico belongs to the chief who is believed to have been the first 
to rule people living in that area and Cocorico lineage has been ascribed the 
ruling position under the local term of Inhacuaua- head chief. Below the 
Inhacuaua follows the Sapanda and finally the Mwenes, or Fumos, at the lowest 
rank. By 2008, there were three Sapandas one in each of the three settlements 
and eight Mwenes under the three Sapandas.  
               Inhacuaua Sapandas and Mwenes played historically a considerable 
social and cultural role. They used to ratify and supervise marriage alliances, 
the inheritance and the redistribution process and appeared as well to 
interface with other communities. Within the community, their authority was 
directed, in most of the cases, not to individuals but to the head of the lineage 
or household, normally a man- Bhabha- who is supposed to regulate, impose 
or implement social norms within the lineage or household.  
               There is also a council of elders, Thubhu, which at a higher level 
supervises and decides on most of the issues concerning community life 
including the way Inhacuaua, Sapandas and Fumos act. The healer, Nganga, 
also supports this regulatory system. He is a key person when it comes to 
spiritual life. The Nganga acts as a doctor, as a protector and as a predictor. 
Nganga is generally responsible for the spiritual life and acts as an interface 
between the living and the dead. All these traditional institutions together 
(Inhacuaua, Sapanda, Fumos, Bhabha, Thubhu and Nganga) are important in 
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reproducing and evolving the local social norms relevant either for increasing 
the adaptive capacity or for restraining it.  
By western standards Cocorico is a poor community. Houses are 
generally made up of grass and wood and there is a tendency to build them 
on the high ground which remains dry in the wet season and in cases of 
minor flooding.  Most households have a house and a separate granary. The 
granary is usually a levelled thatched house made of the strongest wood 
available locally. Within Cocorico, Cuara appeared to have more thatched 
houses and granaries reflecting, in part, its geographical propensity to floods; 
compared to the other two settlements Cuara is the one closest to the 
bifurcation of the Zambezi and Cuacua rivers.  
Social infrastructure in Cocorico is weak. In 2007 there were two 
primary schools (one in Mulamba and another in Sanguimbe) providing 
primary education from level one to five. The schools were built by the NGO, 
Save the Children in the middle of the 1990s, after the civil war. School 
attendance was very low and dropouts, especially girls, were very high, up to 
70 percent13. In general, formal education is very low with most people 
having had no formal schooling and a few with only primary education. As 
illustrated by the Inácio case at the introduction of this thesis, the teachers 
lived at Mopeia village and their appearance in Cocorico was very irregular. 
Being appointed to work as a teacher in Cocorico was even regarded by one 
of teachers as a form of punishment.  
Apart from schools there is little social infrastructure. It used to have 
three water pumps (two in Mulamba and one in Sanguimbe) built by Save the 
Children at the time of school construction but, by the time of the research in 
2007 and 2008, none of them were operating and people were using water 
from the Zambezi River, local lagoons and lakes. There are no market places 
or stores and people use batter trade for exchanging commodities. The most 
common exchanges concern fish and fish traders may come from up Milange 
district about 250 km north. ‘Modern’ medical assistance is also deficient. For 
medical assistance people rely on the Ngangas or have to travel to Mopeia 
village or to Caia and Marromeu districts both on the other side of the 
Zambezi River.  
There has been little effort on the part of the government to improve 
the local conditions. On the contrary, the government does whatever is 
possible to force people to abandon the area. By 2005 a private investor was 
allowed to bring in about 150 water buffalo which led to competition for 
resources with local people. Further, in the past it was compulsory for 
teachers to live in Cocorico so that they could have better performance 
because of their close proximity to the workplace. They are no longer obliged 
to do so and following the 2008 flooding, local schools were shut down and 
teachers and pupils are supposed to attend class in the resettlement centres. In 
2007, people complained that hippos and buffalos were destroying their 
agricultural fields and the local chiefs went to ask for government 
intervention. The government answer was that they should move out of 
                                                 
13
 Interview with school masters 01 and 04 July 2007. 
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Cocorico14. All these developments mean that livelihoods in Cocorico are 
becoming increasingly squeezed adding to local vulnerability to flooding.     
 
ADAPTING TO FLOODING IN BUILDING LIVELIHOODS IN 
COCORICO 
 
 I have described the Cocorico landscape and argued that livelihoods in 
Cocorico are becoming increasingly squeezed. In this section, I discuss how 
people in Cocorico craft their livelihoods and how this crafting relates to 
flooding.  Livelihoods in Cocorico are crafted mainly around agriculture, 
fishing and trading. Agriculture is mainly a female domain while fishing and 
marketing tend to be dominated by males. Access to land for agriculture is 
secured in two main ways: inheritance from parents and ancestors or 
resulting from negotiations with those possessing the land. Local leaders may 
provide land only when nobody claims rights over such land, thus, it is 
deemed vacant. Local leaders intermediate disputes over land but these have 
never been major issues in Cocorico15. Overall, the Mozambican land law 
states that the land belongs to the state and cannot be sold or used as 
mortgage. People using the land for more than 10 years have the right over it 
and newcomers should consult the locals if they need land. The government 
can confiscate the land if lies idle for more than 10 years.   
In order to spread the risks, most households have a minimum of two 
agricultural fields (Munda). One is located in the upper areas (Kuntunda) 
usually around their homesteads. The other one is located on the lower land 
either close to the river or other water bodies (Kugombe) or on islands 
(Kunswa). Production in upper areas takes place during the rain and flooding 
period. This happens between October/November when field clearing and 
planting takes place until March/April, the harvesting period. Lower lands 
and islands are normally used just after flooding has taken place, for receding 
agriculture. Crops are also chosen accordingly. In upper areas, millet, 
sorghum and cassava are the dominant crops as they are drought resistant 
while on the lower lands, maize, vegetables, beans and sweet potatoes are 
dominant, as they require relatively more humidity and fertility.   
Meanwhile, changes in the rain and flooding patterns have been 
pushing women to explore distant lowlands and islands for their humidity 
and fertility; thus, one of the major changes produced by reduced rainfall and 
flooding is that women are being forced to stay longer outside their 
homesteads, on islands or lowlands where production takes place. In order to 
save time and be more productive, females may spend a week or more on 
these lowlands and islands. This requires them to improvise shelter. 
Improvised temporary shelter on the islands or lowlands, built mostly by the 
women themselves, can be seen when navigating the Zambezi delta. To look 
after the homes and children they leave behind, a group dependency system 
                                                 
14
 Interview with chief Cocorico July 2, 2007 
15
 Interview with Chief Cocorico July 2, 2007 and Group discussion in Cocorico September 24, 2007 
 79 
plays a critical role. In the absence of parents, one may ask neighbours to take 
care of their children. 
The agricultural outputs in Cocorico are still, to some extent, larger 
when compared to Mopeia. I found that in Cocorico nearly 60 percent of 
households manage to secure food for the whole year from their own 
production compared to just 20 percent in Mopeia village (graph 3.2 below). 
Mopeia village is relatively far from the Zambezi river compared to Cocorico. 
The higher levels of production on the floodplains such as Cocorico have 
largely contributed to a dependency system between households living on the 
floodplains and those living on the upper flood-free areas such as Mopeia 
village where production levels are lower. Trade relationships have long been 
established between Cocorico and upper areas. Maize and fish are major 
products in the trade system of the Cocorico households.  
Beyond markets, marriage relationships have also been historically 
forged between people in Cocorico and those in the upper flood-free areas. 
Marriages between people in Cocorico and those in upper areas are 
encouraged, and one of the benefits from these relations is that family 
members from the upper areas can access food, in times of need, from those in 
Cocorico, while those living in Cocorico can have shelter and other aid during 
flooding in the upper flood-free areas16.  This is an illustrative example of how 
livelihood comes to mean more than earning a living, encompassing social 
relations, gender, power relations and negotiations.   
 
Graph 3.2. Percentage of households and respective feeding period (months) from own 
agricultural production 
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 Group discussion in Cocorico September 24, 2007 
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Besides agricultural production, fishing and the social relationships 
established around them, adaptation to flooding in Cocorico takes other 
forms. Of particular relevance is how they build their houses and how they 
make their investments.   
 
Housing: In the previous section, I mentioned that houses in Cocorico are 
located on upper lands which remain dry in the wet season and minor 
flooding. Further, I noticed that they are made of grass and wood. The use of 
grass and wood is not necessarily a matter of poverty and lack of financial 
resources.  
In group discussions and individual interviews people mentioned 
financial limitations as a handicap in building better homes. Nonetheless, they 
also suggested that it would be ‘irrational’ to pretend to build conventional 
houses while it is clear that from time to time there will be  flooding which 
could wash away the investments. Secondly, they suggest that unless proper 
engineering takes place and people use cement in the right amounts, grass 
and wood houses are the best option. They offer better resistance to flooding 
events. Some people who had stayed in Malawi as refugees and had learnt to 
build brick houses using cement, attempted to do so in Cocorico. When the 
2001 flooding appeared their houses were the first to collapse while most of 
the wood and grass houses remained standing. Building on high ground is 
also a strategy to protect the household against low levels of flooding while 
having houses and/or granaries thatched tends to offer  safety during higher 
flooding (see chapter 6).  
 
Selective investment and reduced material accumulation. Saving, investments 
and insurance are not clearly distinguishable in Cocorico. Canoe and fishing 
nets are, for instance, amongst the most popular investments in Cocorico.  
They are at the same time saving mechanisms in a context where saving in 
currency, jewellery or animals such as cattle are restrained by flooding 
regimes as I will discuss next. However, they may also be used as collateral or 
insurance in cases of credit, marriage and other circumstances17.  
Based on our survey, which compared the Cocorico floodplain to 
upper Mopeia village, it appears that households on the floodplains make 
higher investments in canoes, fishing nets, radios and small poultry (table 3.1. 
below). These are not just investments, they are also a form of insurance as 
well as saving and preparedness measures which respond to flooding events. 
Thus, as I will demonstrate, they tend to respond to everyday livelihood 
needs of local people rather than just to extreme flooding events.   
Canoes have multiple purposes. They are used for fishing and trading 
and become an important and most used means of transportation during the 
floods. Having a canoe is a flood preparedness measure on its own. It allows 
local people to evacuate at the perceived right moment, carrying household 
members and most of their valuable assets (see chapter 6). The majority of the 
                                                 
17
 Interview with chief Cocorico,  July 2, 2007; interview with chief Nhanswimbo in Mulamba 
(Cocorico), September 20, 2007; Group discussion in Sanguimbe (Cocorico) September 24, 2007 
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people who are displaced from the flooded areas evacuate using canoes. 
During the 2001 flooding out of 220,000 people displaced on the delta 
Zambezi,  97 percent evacuated using canoes (INGC, 2001:23) and during the 
2007 flooding a similar pattern was witnessed (Foley, 2007:15). In Cocorico, 
the survey revealed that 46 percent of the households have a canoe and in 
2007, 55 percent of the interviewed households, evacuated using local canoes.  
Fishing nets are another priority investment. Fishing is a widespread 
male dominated activity carried out on the Zambezi delta and the major 
source of income. This becomes particularly relevant when agricultural 
harvests have been ‘washed away’ during flooding. When there is little or no 
harvest, households rely heavily on fish for cash and food security.  
Beyond food security, fishing nets encodes also a social meaning. 
During childhood, a normal tool used by boys is a fishhook.  As they grow 
up, they are socially expected to use tools that are more productive. After 
marriage, males are expected to start using fishing nets. There is a wider 
range of fishing nets namely Chave, Phiasso, Malichera and Cocota. 
Hierarchically, Chave and Phiasso are ranked lower and socially, younger 
people preparing for their marriage or just after marriage may use them. 
Successful adults are socially expected to buy a gill net, Malichera, or a trawl 
net, Cocota, which provides higher catches and earnings.  
People owning a Cocota are socially and economically ranked highly 
Patrão/Boss/Muzungo as they tend to employ others and have more earnings18. 
Thus, investment priorities become part of the social life and institutionalized 
practices. Investing in fishing nets, especially Cocota, does not only help to 
secure food security at the household level but it also gives social status. This 
illustrates as well that livelihoods go far beyond making a living solely by 
encoding power relations, status and gender aspects.  
The Radio appears to be another priority investment on the 
floodplains. Our survey found more households owning radios (67 percent) 
in lowland Cocorico than on the upper Mopeia village (57 percent). 
Investment in radios has multiple rewards. As environmental cues for flood 
forecast become less reliable due to environmental changes19, people tend to 
rely on the radio for information regarding flooding. In Cocorico, 62 percent 
of the households got informed about the 2007 flooding through radio.  
Thus, similar to a canoe, a radio is a preparedness measure for floods. 
It also allows, among other things, catching of emerging or more profitable 
markets either for fish or for agricultural products. Moreover, through music, 
radio is a socializing tool in a society where festivities and drinking are, as it 
will be discussed later, accepted and reinforced practices.  
                                                 
18
 Interview with chief Cocorico,  July 2, 2007; interview with chief Nhanswimbo in Mulamba 
(Cocorico), September 20, 2007; Group discussion in Sanguimbe (Cocorico), September 24, 2007. 
19
 For flood forecasting, local people have developed their folklores based on the birds, ants, rats, trees 
and wind movements as well as from their observations on local aquifers and water levels on rivers, 
lakes and lagoons. Mango tree flowering on the sunset side is related to flooding but in group 
discussion on September 24, 2007, people explained that mango trees have flowered twice before the 
2007 flooding. ‘first it flowered on the sunset side and then on the sunrise side and we did not know 
what to expect’ 
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Cyclical flooding has tended to discourage investments in productive and 
non-productive items whose dimension would jeopardize the cyclical 
evacuation process or would be lost due to flooding. Focus has been on 
accumulating only the necessary items for everyday use. There is a tendency 
to avoid accumulating animals such as goats and cattle or large furniture such 
as mattresses, beds, and tables. Similarly, items for domestic use such as pots, 
dishes, cups and spoons are possessed mainly according to their utility. 
Living amongst people in Cocorico I could see that in general six plates (two 
for serving the father, two for the boys and two for mother and daughters) 
was the average number per household while two to three spoons (one for the 
father and one or two for the remaining members of the household) was 
common. The table below shows this pattern although not all variables (i.e. 
mattress, bed and tables) were mentioned as their occurrence among the 
interviewed ranked zero generally.  
Table 3.1. below shows that on average, there are more radios, canoes, 
fishing nets, poultry (chicken and ducks) and pigs in Cocorico than in Mopeia 
village. Conversely, there are more utensils (i.e. plates, cups and spoons) as 
well as goats in Mopeia village. In addition, households earn slightly more 
than in Cocorico. Nonetheless, the differences are only statistically significant 
for canoes, plates, cups, fishing nets, spoons and polygamy.   
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Table 3.1: Investment priorities in the Cocorico floodplain and Mopeia village 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Study area 
Cocorico (N= 84) 
Mopeia village (N=114) Mean Std. Deviation 
Cocorico 83 .8313 .74603 Radios  
Mopeia village 114 .6579 .63565 
Cocorico 83 .6386 .83488 Canoes**  
Mopeia village 114 .1316 .41033 
Cocorico 49 5.6327 1.39484 Plates**  
Mopeia village 105 8.9238 5.40956 
Cocorico 49 4.2449 1.25051 Cups**  
Mopeia village 104 5.6923 3.64725 
Cocorico 82 .6585 .61302 Bikes  
Mopeia village 110 .6091 .76740 
Cocorico 82 .7439 .95337 Fishing nets*  
Mopeia village 109 .3486 .59901 
Cocorico 50 3.5800 1.53981 Spoons**  
Mopeia village 71 5.7887 3.35481 
Cocorico 81 5.2099 6.61951 Chickens/ducks  
Mopeia village 113 3.6283 4.91389 
Cocorico 81 .4815 1.81046 Goats  
Mopeia village 113 .6637 1.94390 
Cocorico 81 .6296 1.61589 Pigs  
Mopeia village 113 .5575 1.44505 
Cocorico 81 .0000 .00000a Cows  
Mopeia village 113 .0000 .00000a 
Cocorico 83 2.5000 1.06904 Polygamy*  
Mopeia village 114 2.0667 .25820 
Cocorico 80 1.2200 .50669 Overall average Income per 
month (in Meticais)  Mopeia village 110 1.3000 .56747 
a. t cannot be computed because the standard deviations of both groups are 0. 
** statistical significant differences at 1%; * statistical significant differences at 5% 
Source: author, based on fieldwork data  
 
 Other studies on the Zambezi delta show similar patterns. Schmidt 
conducted a survey in 1997 and found that the vast majority of households in 
the delta had chickens (82 percent) and a small percentage (9 percent) owned 
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goats (Schmidt, 1997: 24). Similarly Barbosa et al., (1998:38) found that 
households on the delta spent less than 1 percent of their time on rearing 
livestock while in the upper Zambezi valley in Zimbabwe, livestock rearing 
consumed more than 32 percent of a household's time. A survey by SETSAN, 
a governmental institution, which compared Zambezi flooded areas to 
cyclone and drought affected areas, shows similar patterns (table 3.2. below); 
households on the flood areas tend to have fewer productive items, such as 
bicycles, hoes, scythe, animal traction and hammers. They also have fewer 
non-productive items, such as radios, beds, telephones, watches, tables, 
mattress, chairs and plates (SETSAN, 2007:22-23). 
 
Table 3.2. Productive and non-productive items per affected areas (N=3792) 
 
Area Productive item (average) Non-productive items (average) 
Flood affected 5.09 2.65 
Cyclone 
affected  
5.90 10.25 
Drought 
affected  
7.17 16.66 
Source: Adapted from SETSAN (2007) 
 
Although poverty and other constraints may also explain these patterns, I 
found no statistical difference in earnings between floodplain Cocorico and 
upper Mopeia (1,220 Meticais vs. 1,300 Meticais; p=0.118 see table 3.1. above). 
Rather, in group discussions20 people on the floodplains suggested that small 
poultry such as chicken has multiple advantages. It is easier to carry during 
evacuations; it is easier to sell if needed; it reproduces faster and, due to its 
lower monetary value, losing it during flooding is less painful if compared to 
animals of higher monetary value. For bigger animals, they tend to prefer pigs 
rather than goats. The major explanation, apart from its faster reproductive 
capacity, was that pigs are better at resisting flooding compared to goats. 
Hence, people’s agency in reflecting upon their experiences and devising 
decisions, which are more conducive to the local environment cannot be 
ignored. 
 So far, I have discussed the average differences between floodplain 
Cocorico and upper areas of Mopeia village. Now I want to look at differences 
within Cocorico.  This I will do by using the column of standard deviation 
from table 3.1.  Standard deviation shows data dispersion from the mean; if 
there was not much inequality and people owned more or less the same 
possessions, the standard deviation for each asset presented on the table 3.1. 
would be zero or close to zero, as was the case with cows.  
Based on table 3.1 it appears that compared to Mopeia village, the 
standard deviation for canoes, wives, fishing nets and small poultry is higher 
                                                 
20
 Group discussions Canhungue (Mutarara District),  May 23, 2007; Inhangoma (Mutarara District) 
September 10, 2008; Xitsomba (Chinde district),  June 15, 2007; Luabo (Chinde District) October 23, 
2007; Cocorico (Mopeia District), September 24, 2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu District), March 11, 
<2007 
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in Cocorico, which suggests a higher degree of inequality on these assets. To 
exemplify, although on average each household in Cocorico had five chicken 
or ducks, an analysis of frequencies shows that 27 percent had none and 57 
percent had less than five chickens and ducks. Similarly, analysis of 
frequencies shows that 50 percent of the households had no fishing nets.  
Overall, it appears that not every single household in Cocorico is close 
to the mean. There are a considerable number of households below the mean 
and some far above the mean. So, how do they balance these differences and 
inequalities? In the next section, I will claim that they balance the differences 
mostly by applying social ordering principles, which appear to have resisted 
different crisis and transformations. These ordering principles have also been 
very relevant in withstanding disaster risk triggered by flooding.  
 
Continuities in crisis. Historically, people on the Zambezi delta have 
produced and reproduced a collective life. This has been done  using different 
ordering principles. Ordering principles are, according to Long (2001:56), 
different social arrangements built upon strategic interests and representation 
of self and others.  
Based on my observations during the period I stayed in Cocorico, I 
noted that the ordering principles start from childhood. In their infancy, boys 
and girls are expected to live a collective life through what is known as 
Sedzeka pabhozi, which means ‘play together’ or ‘play as one’.  Play as one 
marks the beginning of a social/collective life from childhood onwards. Those 
not complying with it tend to be sidelined and given the pejorative adjective 
apussa, meaning not bright/intelligent. It is also through Sedzeka pabhozi that 
children learn to share things they possess such as food. Not sharing may lead 
to being sidelined and being called Tshintima (egoist).  
Apussas and Tshintimas are hardly integrated into the social life of 
Cocorico. Parents would hardly accept their daughters or sons to marry 
tshintima or apussa. Similarly, hardly anyone would make friends with 
tshintima and apussa. This process tends to exclude some people who, most of 
the times, end up migrating yet it also strengthens a social redistribution 
process among households. Amongst the most important ways of spreading 
the resources, I found multiple marriages and festivities to be of particular 
relevance and worth presenting. 
 
Multiple marriages. Polygamy is, to some extent, a historical and present 
practice on the floodplains of the  Zambezi delta (see table 3.1. above; Martins, 
1960: 33; Negrão, 2001:258; SCF, 2006:12). Under Mozambican law, polygamy 
is neither forbidden nor encouraged. What  family law suggests in  articles 18 
and 30 is that the government will officially recognize  one partner (GoM, 
2004:2-3). 
Marrying more than one wife is considered a symbol of prosperity21 
and it tends to be a strategic investment in the short and long run. For food 
                                                 
21
 Interview with chief Cocorico,  July 2, 2007; interview with chief Nhanswimbo in Mulamba 
(Cocorico) September 20, 2007; Group discussions in Sanguimbe (Cocorico), September 24, 2007. 
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and flood securities in particular, marriages between lower and upper areas 
are very much encouraged. Polygamous males tend to have households both, 
in upper areas- where during the flooding period households from the 
floodplains can take refuge, and on the lower lands- from where the 
households in upper areas can get food supplies during drought periods. This 
arrangement stresses the relevance of cross-community relationships for 
disaster risk management. As it stands wives tend to provide food security for 
the husbands, as they are in principle the food producers. Finally, they also 
provide them with social security when they get older, through having more 
children and grandchildren who are supposed to take care of the elderly 
parents and grandparents.  
Marriage also tends to reinforce social security in other ways. Firstly, 
the marriage process ties two families that will both aim to uphold the bond 
and not break the marriage. This is partly related to the fact that marriage on 
the Zambezi delta is, in general, a long and costly process.  It encompasses six 
steps: Mafungula Mulomo; Kumutsa; Malumphato; Phete/Kucemba; Machinguizo, 
and Makhutchafwa that involve rituals, money and gifts from the husband’s 
family to the family of the bride22.  Although not all steps are followed 
nowadays, the payment process is still alive for different social and economic 
reasons. It includes the fact that the money being paid may be used for 
marriage of the brother of the bride or in other circumstances to ease/relieve 
temporarily, the poverty situation of the bride’s household.  
Dissolution of the marriage would force, to some extent, the bride’s 
family paying back the amount and other items received from the marriage, 
and to the male it would mean the loss of one food producer and 
reproducer23. As in many other African contexts it is a female responsibility in 
the Zambezi delta and Cocorico in particular, to produce food for the 
household (see also Barbosa et al., 1998). Female responsibility for producing 
food may be perceived as exploitation but food providership has given them 
certain protection at the household. Negrão (2001: 259) suggests that one 
crucial element, tying males to their wives on the Zambezi delta is food and 
many males who are no longer able to work in the fishing sector or elsewhere 
would starve from hunger if left unmarried.  
Women’s perception of multiple marriages is fluid. In some 
households it is a male’s decision alone to marry another wife and the present 
wife has to ‘submit’ to the decision. In others, the wife asks the husband to 
marry another wife in order to have her workload reduced. In other cases, 
husbands propose but marriage takes places only if the wife agrees. In some 
of these cases, the wife may even attempt to find the next wife for her 
husband. If a wife has fertility problems, she might ask her sister or another 
female she trusts to be the next wife in order to provide them with children. 
                                                 
22
 Group discussions in Sanguimbe (Cocorico), September 24, 2007. 
23
 Interview with Rosa Ernesto, 36 years, widow, Mulamba (Cocorico) July 7, 2007; Interview with 
chief Nhanswimbo in Mulamba (Cocorico) September 20, 2007. 
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Finally, a historical practice which is indeed in decay allowed, after the death 
of a husband, one of his brothers to marry- ‘take care of’ - the widow24.  
   
Festivities. Apart from marriage, earnings are heavily used on festivities. 
Anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s have suggested that on the Zambezi 
delta people, especially males, are disposed for festivities and drinks (Martins, 
1960: 13; Osorio, 1964: 18; Granjo, 1970:7). This is still, to a large extent, a very 
much present practice. During the fieldwork, drinking appeared to be part of 
the everyday life of many males. However, drinking appears to be a process 
of resource (re)distribution and social networking and security. There is a 
belief that by limiting accumulation and redistributing resources through 
marriage and festivities, one is less likely to be targeted by a witch Nfiti, be 
pointed as Tshintima or be accused of practicing adultery25.  
 
In the meantime, the society in Cocorico promotes an ordering principle 
called kuphezhana-helping each other. Through kuphezhana fishing, agriculture 
and evacuation during the flooding period tend to be a collective 
responsibility and these practices allow livelihood activities to be carried out 
within the required time frames. For example, fishing and trading, which is a 
male domain, requires in most of cases a minimum of two persons (at least 
one to pilot the canoe and another to do the fishing or the trading), this 
becomes a group activity and boys start accompanying their fathers from their 
youth.  
When households have no boys, kuphezhana allows boys or males from 
other households in the neighbourhood to be involved in fishing in exchange 
of a learning process as well as material or financial gains from the fishing 
catches26. For agricultural production, as I discussed previously, Kuphezhana 
plays a crucial role. In their absence parents may mutually ask neighbours or 
friends to take care of what they leave behind. It was by following this norm 
that Inácio’s parents (in the introduction of the present book), left Inácio and 
his sister in the custody of neighbours and went to their fields on the islands. 
Kuphezhana guarantees labour force for meeting peak needs, for instance 
during weeding and harvest27.  
During the flooding period Kuphezhana tends to be even stronger. Some 
males are left behind during the evacuation process with the responsibility of 
taking care of the left belongings and houses of different households while 
those evacuating take the responsibility of looking, at the resettlement centres, 
after the household members of those remaining behind (see chapter 6). 
                                                 
24
 Interview with Rosa Ernesto, 36 years, widow, Mulamba (Cocorico), July 7, 2007; Group Discussion 
with women in Mulamba (Cocorico) September 21, 2007. 
25
 During group discussion on September 24, 2007 in Sanguimbe, it was suggested that those who do 
not drink alcohol are more likely to be pointed as adulteries, as people would suggest that instead of 
alcohol they spend their money with women.  
26
 Interview with fishermen Luís Ngota in Cocorico,  October 9, 2007. 
27
 Group discussion in Cuara (Cocorico), July 20, 2007; Group Discussion with women in Mulamba 
(Cocorico) September 21, 2007.  
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In sum, witchcraft and the established codes of social conduct in this 
way become normative tools used for limiting material accumulation and to 
perpetuate local practices influenced, to a large extent, by the Zambezi River 
and flooding.  Although these normative tools including the magical beliefs 
may be interpreted as stagnation, traditionality, backwardness and circularity, 
they play a crucial role in reducing the (investment) risks to acceptable levels 
and allow people to live in normalcy and continuity in flood prone 
environments. In doing so, a certain identity is created; a ‘real’ Sena, from the  
Zambezi delta for example, is expected to be a group person, living her/his 
life within a group interdependency system. She/he must share and expect 
others to share. It is also within this social and economic environment of 
limited accumulation, selective investments and re-distribution of resources 
including labour that people on the Zambezi delta and Cocorico in particular 
build their livelihoods.  
 
Crisis in continuities: Earlier in this chapter I outlined different pressure 
factors which lead people to live in the ‘physical unsafe’ conditions of the 
floodplains. The Cahora Bassa dam, colonial heritage, policies after 
independency, civil war, drought, population growth, structural adjustment 
and limited investments are all part of the ‘push’ factors leading to settlement 
on the floodplains. Now I want to address how (some of) these factors, over 
time, have eroded continuities on the Zambezi delta and ultimately limited 
the adaptive capacity of the local actors. I will focus on the political trends, the 
development trends, population growth and environmental change, trends on 
flood risk management and on the role of churches. The main claim here is 
that due to these interlinked processes, the local physical environment is in 
degradation and the continuity of social structures have entered into crisis. As 
an emerging property neither the environment nor the social fabric are able to 
provide enough protection against disaster related hazards such as flooding.  
 
Political trends. As already discussed above, following independence 
Mozambique has undergone considerable political transformations. One of 
the transformations that had great impact for disaster management at local 
level was the abolishment of the ‘traditional’ authorities. Traditional 
authorities have been over the history of the delta, the guardians of the group 
interdependency system which allowed some disaster risk reduction. They 
ratified and supervised the marriage alliances, the inheritance and the 
redistribution process and in doing so, they tended to reproduce or evolve the 
group interdependency system. Although the government is attempting to 
rescue the traditional authority and Inhacuauas, Sapandas and muenes have 
now uniforms and subsidies provided by the government, their authority, as 
we shall see next, is being challenged and their relationship with the ‘modern’ 
structures of authority are, in some cases, conflicting.   
 
Church and social trends. Not only do the political trends tend to marginalize 
the traditional authority but increasingly churches are also playing the same 
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role. For a long time churches have played a critical role in shaping people’s 
behaviour. Similar to the Nganga, churches are an interface of material and 
spiritual life whose actions are directed toward normative socially 
‘acceptable’ practices. In Mozambique as elsewhere in Africa, churches and 
religion were used as a domination tool. People were taught not to rebel 
against colonial rulers, to obey the biblical Commandments and be faithful, as 
great rewards would be received in heaven after death. This was a major 
reason for the Mozambican government to close down the Catholic missions 
and to persecute church leaders after independence.  
However, after the democratization process took over in the 1990s, 
religion and churches are once again booming. Contrary to the Nganga, whose 
practices tend to perpetuate group interdependency, churches in rural 
Zambezi delta tend to break it. Most of the emerging churches are against 
drinking alcohol, witchcraft accusation and using the Nganga for whatever 
purposes. Although the line separating the two is thin and people jump in 
and out of the two, through these commandments churches attempt to create 
a new social order which challenges the traditional social ordering principles.  
 
Socio-economic trends. During the colonial period the group interdependency 
system was indirectly reinforced by a lower governmental investment on the 
education and health care of the native population. This led the local people 
to have more contact with their non formal education system, which tended 
to perpetuate group interdependency and contact with Nganga. Currently, the 
government is investing in education and health care service to an extent that 
primary education is free of charge and basic health services are being 
provided in many villages.  
In the meantime, during the colonial period ‘development initiatives’ 
were basically carried out by the private sector which tended to produce 
sugar-cane, cotton and rice on the Zambezi delta. However, profits of the 
private companies were made mainly through low salaries to the native 
employees (Head, 1980:331; Negrão, 2001:43). This fact allied to governmental 
taxes (mussoco) that natives had to pay, further limited capital accumulation 
by the local people and tended to reinforce the group interdependency 
system. Nowadays, however, ‘development initiatives’ are coming from 
multiple sources. For example, the government has started from the year 
2006, to allocate seven million meticais (about USD 280,000) to each district for 
development initiatives. At the same time, different NGOs and private 
companies are promoting agricultural production, fishing, timber logging and 
livestock rearing. Moreover, most of the district main villages now have 
electricity, mobile phones can operate and people are also able to watch 
videos and TV.  
All this brings local people into contact with many external actors and 
makes them open to new opportunities and lifestyles that challenge their 
perceptions of social ordering. As one fisherman in Cocorico said to me: ’I am 
going to save money so that next time when you come, you can bring me a camera like 
the one you have’.   
 90 
In group discussions in Mutarara28, Chinde29 and Marromeu30, people 
suggested that kuphezhana is becoming less evident nowadays as people 
become more individualistic and concerned with their own affairs. 
Increasingly people ask for payments for what used to be, in the past, a social 
activity.  
 
Environmental trends. The physical environment of the Zambezi delta has 
been under continuous change. Dams upstream, population increases and 
related needs for crop cultivation plots and firewood as a source of energy, 
alongside with timber logging is driving deforestation and accelerating the 
erosion process. To illustrate, since the end of the civil war in 1992 up to 2001, 
the Chinde district, neighbouring to Mopeia district, lost about 20 percent of 
its mangroves (Silva, 2005:40) while the whole delta lost, due to river erosion, 
about 26 km2 of its area from 1972 up to 2004 (Ronco, 2008:102). Nationwide, 
Mozambique loses about 220,000 hectares of forest every year (Marzolli, 
2007:72).  
During the group discussions mentioned above, people suggested that 
wood is becoming scarce and making canoes or buying them has 
progressively become more difficult and costly. Increasingly people make or 
buy small canoes which cannot withstand heavy floods or can hardly be used 
for fishing on the Zambezi River due to dangers posed by the high water 
currents. As a result, more people tend to do fishing on local lakes and 
lagoons seasonally nourished by the Zambezi River flooding leading, in some 
cases, to overfishing and reduction in catches and fish size.   
Moreover, as deforestation occurs, the risks of reduced agricultural 
yields and of increased flooding increases. Trees hold soil together, help the 
soil to absorb water, increase moisture and reduce water speed and volume 
downstream. Deforestation has also consequences for making strong and 
thatched houses that can help withstand flooding. In Inhangoma for example, 
people claimed that there were no trees to make strong or thatched houses. 
Finally, deforestation tends to create a vicious cycle. People cannot make 
strong houses and every year they are obliged to repair or remake their 
houses increasing further the deforestation problem and flood risk.   
 
Trends in government flood management practices. Government flood 
management practices shifted after independence. During the colonial period 
there was little coordinated attempt on flood risk reduction and where aid 
was provided it was done whenever the authorities found people secluded 
(see chapter 2). There were no attempts to resettle people and the traditional 
authority played a role in channelling and distributing aid amongst its 
people31. Nowadays indeed, flood management is anchored on the notion of 
living far from the floodplains; as shown from the Cocorico case, government 
                                                 
28
 In Inhangoma, September 10, 2008. 
29
 In Luabo, October 23, 2007.  
30
 In Chupanga, March 11, 2007. 
31
 Interview with Inhacuaua Chamanga, Mopeia- May 8, 2008. 
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has been discouraging people to live on the floodplains and ‘forces’ them to 
live in the resettlement centres.  
In the new resettlements, government and NGOs play the role of 
channelling and distributing aid amongst the people, overriding in many 
cases, the local authorities thus marginalizing further their role. Moreover, in 
the resettlements people tend to (re)conceptualize the social order and to take 
different livelihood pathways. For some, adaptation is no longer related to 
flooding but increasingly to droughts and to market integration on the upper 
areas. In doing so, new social arrangements and power relations are crafted 
and the traditional conceptualization of collective social order tends to be 
eroded and substituted by a more individualist and market oriented lifestyle 
(see chapter 7 for further discussions).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Delta Zambezi hosts many people who, despite seasonal flooding, take 
advantage of the Zambezi River and its ecosystem for building their 
livelihoods. Although people may willingly choose to live on the floodplains, 
changes produced over the past 30 years, due to the construction of dams 
upstream, changes in political ideologies, droughts, civil war, displacement, 
resettlement and population growth have together pushed more people to 
live on the floodplains and to rely heavily on natural resources. In doing so, 
people become physically exposed to flooding and adaptation to flooding 
becomes a crucial element in crafting livelihoods.  
On the Zambezi delta and Cocorico in particular, this crafting is done 
through different practices that include selective - flood related - investments 
and social institutions that forge a group interdependency system. Investment 
priorities focus on canoes, fishing nets, marriage, small poultry and radio as 
they respond to needs before, during and after floods. Investments in items 
whose dimension would jeopardize the evacuation process such as tables, 
beds, mattresses and big animals such as cattle tend to be discouraged. On the 
other hand, the group interdependency system tends to make individual 
households depending on each other through marriage, the sharing of gains 
and responsibilities and, within the household by the interdependency 
between females and males, elderly and younger people.  Through group 
interdependency, individual households can expect help from others during 
crisis events such as extreme flooding.  The traditional authorities, who in the 
contemporary context are being challenged and re-shaped by new 
developments, historically maintained this system. 
From the discussion presented in this chapter it emerges that 
adaptation to flooding incorporates and binds together the physical, natural, 
political, socio-cultural, human, symbolic and economic assets and, a 
successful adaptation emerges from a delicate balance of these different 
elements. Such a balance is not possible any more due to rapid changes and 
different actors’ interests along the delta Zambezi. Increasingly, the local 
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physical environment is in degradation and the social fabric is not helping 
matters. Consequently, neither the environment nor the social fabric nor 
economic opportunities are able to provide enough protection against disaster 
related hazards such as flooding. This may explain the increase in people 
being affected and killed by floods in the last 10 years that was discussed in 
the previous chapter. 
The chapter shows as well that there are alternative discourses to 
climate change at local level. People attribute changes in rain patterns to the 
will of God, the ancestors and the wrongdoing of witchcraft. Various actors 
are involved in promoting each of these discourses and the result is a mixture 
of empowerment and disempowerment of some actors. Nonetheless, 
discourses that tend to produce social disorder such as claims on witchcraft 
are compeling the government to reach down its authority and provide local 
people with information and other tools regarding climate change. It appears 
therefore, that despite negative impacts, climate change is producing parallel 
(and positive) impacts by bringing upfront local voices and obliging the 
government to intervene at local levels.  
The major lesson to be taken from this chapter is that addressing 
adaptation to climate related hazards is much more complex than focusing on 
the hazards alone. It requires looking at the historical and contemporary 
processes - beyond climate per se. This also means that measures to reduce 
vulnerability to climate related hazards such as flooding should be based on 
actors’ everyday practices including their discourses, power relations and the 
many ways in which they socially negotiate and respond to the conditions of 
their lives.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
STRENGTHENING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: THE CBDRM 
PROJECT IN COCORICO 
 
 
The socio-political and environmental transformations on the Zambezi delta, 
as described in the previous chapter, mean that local people are less able to 
handle extreme weather events and disaster risks by themselves.  Externally 
‘planned’ interventions for strengthening the local adaptive capacity are being 
proposed and promoted by different actors including government and NGOs. 
These interventions aspire, as suggested under Hyogo Framework of Action 
(2005-2015), to be inclusive, proactive and bottom-up.  Critics have suggested 
that lack of local participation in disaster management has resulted in 
ineffective disaster management measures and increased losses. It is argued 
by different scholars that local people are better placed than anyone else in 
understanding local opportunities and constraints. Their involvement in 
disaster management is vital and allows disaster reduction measures to be 
more effective and efficient compared to classical top-down disaster 
management approaches (Luna, 2001; Pearce, 2003; Heijmans, 2004; Thomalla 
and Schmuck, 2004).  
Based on this perception, interventions on disaster reduction and 
adaptation to climate change worldwide are adopting community-based 
approaches either in practice or by endorsing it in their policy statements. 
Initially developed in the Asian context, especially around the Philippines’ 
recurrent natural hazards, Community-Based Disaster Risk 
Management/Preparedness (CBDRM/P) became a worldwide approach that 
has been promoted in disaster prone countries in Africa, Latin America and 
the Pacific Islands. The approach involves engaging at-risk communities in 
the identification, analysis, treatment, monitoring and evaluation of disaster 
risks in order to reduce their vulnerability and enhance their capacities 
(ADPC, 2006: 17). CBDRM is, in essence, valued for its focus on local people’s 
perceptions of disaster, their vulnerability and resilience. By engaging local 
people, the approach is considered to promote ownership of the process and 
outcomes by the local community which leads to empowerment and 
sustainability (Pearce, 2003).  
Little knowledge has been produced so far on the challenges that 
planned adaptations and the CBDRM approach face at local level. There is 
little critical knowledge reflecting the process, achievements and lessons from 
the planned adaptation and CBDRM interventions. Several authors (cf. Mosse, 
2001: 48; Twigg, 2005:64-65) have argued that much of the research hitherto 
published is a superficial description based on too much attention on the 
strengths of the community based approach and little on its limitations. 
Planned adaptation and community based disaster management do not occur 
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in a vacuum. It takes place in an arena of social relations where different and 
sometimes conflicting interests are ill researched or overlooked. The present 
chapter explores a CBDRM project by the Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) in 
Cocorico ‘community’, Mopeia district, Zambezia province. The focus of the 
chapter is on how local people interact with external interventions and 
appropriate, integrate or transform the interventions to make them suit their 
lifeworlds. At the same time, it unravels how implementing organizations 
attempt to make the project suitable to their organizations, and to their 
beneficiaries.  
The uncritical promotion of local approaches is problematic for several 
reasons. One set of problems relates to the question whether the local level is 
indeed the appropriate level of disaster response. The concepts of the local 
community and participation are by themselves problematic under actual 
circumstances of globalization and increased frequency of disasters. 
Globalization tends to dissolve or reshape the locality. Disasters tend to 
render little time for local participation and to reinforce the perception, from 
the intervening organization, that enough knowledge has been accumulated 
from the past disasters and participation is no longer required.  
The point to highlight is that community refers to things people have in 
common; that bind them together and give them a sense of belonging with 
one another (Day,2006:1); but, under globalized flows of capital, knowledge 
and information, increasingly this togetherness is being crafted without clear 
geographical boundaries (Nuijten, 2003; Ferguson, 2009). A focus on the local 
level rather than at higher levels where disaster situations are mostly 
produced and reproduced may also lead to ineffective outcomes. 
Interventions at local levels are more likely to bring real changes if 
accompanied by interventions which focus on policies and practices 
promoted at higher levels that tend to perpetuate or increase local 
vulnerability and reduce local capacity to face hazards. Chapter 2 and 3 have 
highlighted these aspects. 
The second set of problems, which are the subject of this chapter, refer 
to problems with participation in the community. Genuine and real local 
participation would lead to empowerment of poor people and produce social 
changes.This means some power holders would have to give up or 
accommodate new demands, losing their gains and privileges which are 
likely to bring conflicts of interest and confrontation. A ‘right’ balance 
between the already privileged and unprivileged groups must be carefully 
examined if the desired effective and positive outcomes from the CBDRM are 
to be achieved and sustained.  
When societies are highly differentiated, the concept of participation 
may be used, as suggested by Mosse (2001), as a beautiful and acceptable way 
of extending client-focused networks of patronage and for subordinating local 
people. Alternatively, as argued by Cleaver (2001), community participation 
may be used for reducing a project’s transactional costs or for gaining popular 
acceptance and favours. In both cases, the participation label is used without 
substance, commitments and changes in the behaviour and attitudes required 
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to achieve the transformative process that would empower the most 
vulnerable and disaster prone people.  
These kind of observations have led Nuijten (2003) to suggest that 
people at community level as active actors, may refuse to participate or be 
selective in their participation in order to avoid to be enrolled in interventions 
which might alienate their lives and reduce their freedom and flexibility to 
respond to different constraints and opportunities.  
In sum, people do not always want to participate and if they do 
participate, they might actually be very selective in what they participate in 
and when and how they do so. Alternatively, while participating, people tend 
to reshape the interventions to suit their own present and/or future interests 
(Hilhorst, 2003).   
Due to these complexities, it is therefore understandable that the 
CBDRM approach and its outputs are not linear, straightforward and 
predictable. If we want to understand what actually happens in the 
framework of CBDRM, we need to immerse in the everyday practices of its 
implementation. In doing this, we need to ask  how planned adaptation and 
the CBDRM approach are perceived and acted upon by different actors 
(NGOs, government, donors and local communities). There is a need also to 
critically look at how the approach works or can work in practice to 
strengthen local capacity to adapt to climate related natural hazards and 
secure livelihoods. In the process, the project is invested by different actors’ 
interest and as a result is transformed and unfolds in unforeseen ways.  
Interestingly, this means that the project became neither strictly 
genuinely planned nor strictly autonomous. The distinction maintained by 
IPCC between spontaneous and planned adaptation may thus be of little 
relevance in practice. The project I studied became a hybrid form of planned 
actions that were transformed through social negotiations and compromises 
between different actors. The following sections discuss these questions at 
length.   
I will start the chapter by providing the institutional landscape of the 
Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) - the promoting organization, and then I will 
tackle the project from its inception until its implementation and final 
evaluation. Rather than attempting to focus on what went well and what went 
wrong my focus will be on the interfaces between the different actors. I  look 
at the challenges that emerged at the encounters and the different strategies 
applied by the actors present to secure a place in the arena and attempt to 
fulfill own interests. Accordingly, the chapter is analytical rather than 
evaluative. I strongly believe that there is no such thing like good or bad with 
respect to the interventions. As argued by Olivier de Sardan (1988) 
interventions are neither complete failures nor complete success stories. They 
are indeed reconfigured at the local level and may acquire different meanings 
and outcomes.  In the case of the CBDRM project, I will argue that during the 
implementation, the project became a source of local power politics and was 
re-configured to respond to everyday needs rather than to infrequent extreme 
flooding events as initially planned by the outsiders. 
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CVM: CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES 
 
CVM is a humanitarian organization created by the government of 
Mozambique in 1981 to replace the Portuguese Red Cross (CVP) that existed 
prior to independence in 1975. Following independence, the CVP stopped 
operating for different reasons. CVP had been directly linked to the 
Portuguese government. Some people that used to work for the Portuguese 
Red Cross were for example married to someone in the Portuguese armed 
forces or some Portuguese official. Racism was also evident in the ways the 
CVP undertook its activities. There were no black people in the organization 
(CVM, 1982:7). This tended also to clash with the Red Cross principles of 
independency and impartiality.  
On the other hand, the Mozambican government envisaged a new 
socialist Mozambique that instilled fear in many Portuguese. Hence, even if 
there had been interest in continuing the CVP, in practice the staff that 
worked for the CVP had generally left Mozambique. This meant that a 
process of (re)structuration and (re)mobilization was necessary for the Red 
Cross movement in Mozambique. Hence, there have been both ideological 
and practical reasons for the creation of CVM. 
Since its inception in 1981, CVM went through many metamorphoses. 
Originally, the government selected the candidates for leadership positions. 
The central committee of CVM was composed of representatives of the 
Ministry of Health, Education, and other government Ministries, as well as 
government linked NGOs like OMM (women’s organization) and Youth 
organization (OJM), all appointed by the government. Furthermore, it was the 
government who dictated what Red Cross should be and do. This can be read 
from the speeches during its launching. First, the representative of the Red 
Cross Dr.Fernando Vaz, made it known that the organization was expecting 
guidance from the state. ‘Como é nossa tradição, queriamos pedir que nos indicasse 
os marcos fundamentais que nortearão as nossas tarefas, that is, as it is our tradition, 
we would kindly request you to show us the baselines which will guide our work’.  
In  reply Joaquim Chissano, who represented the government, retorted 
that CVM was to serve the Party and the government “quando tomamos a 
decisão de criar a CVM pretendemos consagrar os sentimentos humanitários que o 
nosso povo dirigido pela Frelimo sempre soube manifestar. A CVM é uma organização 
de voluntários ao serviço do povo; … ela terá como funções principais participar 
activamente nas actividades sanitárias realizadas pelo Serviço Nacional de Saúde.  
Translated, ‘when we decided to create the CVM, we pretend to establish 
humanitarian sympathy which our people led by Frelimo always expressed’. CVM is 
an organization made up of volunteers to serve the people… it will have to be actively 
engaged in the activities carried out by the National Health Service’ (CVM, 1982:43). 
This quote makes clear that the government saw the Red Cross as an 
extension of its own apparatus.  
During the inception, CVM was assigned to work under the umbrella 
of the Ministry of Health. This Ministry provided guidelines, workload and 
budget to CVM. CVM was mandated to serve the government in promoting, 
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through voluntary staff, the national plans from the National Health Services, 
Serviços Nacionais de Saude. To undertake this, CVM was supposed to train 
voluntary staff in a broad range of basic health skills. These volunteers would 
then use their health skills in communal villages, factories and cooperatives1.  
The link with the government allowed CVM to access material and 
financial support from the government and to expand countrywide. In two 
years time (1981-83), CVM was represented in all but two provinces and by 
1986 it had representation all over the country (CVM, 2006). Up to 1987, the 
government allotted to CVM buildings, warehouses and financial resources to 
run its duties. Under such a context, CVM became a part of the government 
apparatus in implementing its national socialist and Marxist ideology.  
Although Red Cross societies worldwide have auxiliary functions to 
governments, both internally and internationally, CVM was perceived to be 
too close to the government lacking the principles of impartiality, 
independence and neutrality. This lack of core Red Cross principles 
hampered, largely, its inclusion into the international Red Cross family. CVM 
was not recognized by the ICRC until 1988 and was to become member of the 
IFRC only in 1989 - eight years after its creation (CVM, 2006).  
Changes were indeed noticed from the moment CVM became part of 
the International Federation of the Red Cross movement. By the end of the 
1980s (1989/1990), members of the committee board were no longer 
appointed by the government but elected within CVM, and increasingly CVM 
started to claim its autonomy and independence2. This was, partly, a 
reflection of the growth of CVM in terms of programmes and staff.  With 
drought and civil war in the 1980s, CVM became an international aid channel 
to assist the victims and the organization grew in financial, material and 
personnel terms. From an organization comprising a handful of people at its 
creation, providing first aid and sanitation campaigns in communal villages, 
factories and cooperatives, CVM became heavily involved in distributing 
humanitarian aid to drought and war victims. By the end of the war in 1992, 
CVM had about 500 employees3.  
In 1992 the civil war ended in Mozambique and with this, the 
international funds for emergency response started to drop. This forced many 
organizations including CVM to start a restructuration process. CVM had to 
reduce its staff to nearly 130 employees, and approved by the end of 1990s, 
new statutes, vision and mission4. Moreover, CVM decided to shift from top-
down interventions to bottom-up approaches. Within this approach, needs 
are assessed and decided at district and provincial levels while the national 
level is engaged in aggregating and producing a broader national intervention 
plan based on the inputs brought in from the local communities5. 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Respeito Chirindza, Head of CVM volunteer’s network, Maputo June 14, 2007 
2
 Interview with Fernanda Teixeira, CVM General Secretary June 8, 2007   
3
 Interview with Fernanda Teixeira, CVM General Secretary.  Maputo,  June 8, 2007   
4
 Interview with Luisa Mboana head of Human Resources Department 29 March, 2007 
5
 Interview with Ivete Dengo, CBDRM coordinator  May 22, 2007; Rabeca Chalufo Head of the 
Department of Disaster Risk Preparedness June 06, 2007 
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Currently CVM has infrastructures and representations in all of the 11 
provinces of Mozambique. At national level- the headquarters- there is a 
President and a General Secretary. Both are elected and have different 
functions. The President is a political figure with a political mandate while the 
General Secretary does the managerial tasks, coordinating the everyday 
activities from the different departments and projects all over the country. 
The headquarters comprised by 2007 six departments (Human Resources; 
Community Development; Disaster Risk Preparedness, HIV and AIDS; 
Administration and Finances, and Information Management and Marketing) 
and had five major projects underway on water and sanitation, HIV and 
AIDS, community development and disaster risk preparedness6.  
At the provincial level, CVM has a Provincial Delegation comprising 
the president and provincial secretary with similar functions like that of the 
national president and secretary but downscaled to the provincial level. The 
departments indeed stretch and one administrative staff member runs the 
organization. They may employ some short-term staff to deal with a specific 
project during the period of its implementation. The structure ends at the 
district level where a District Commission is made up of seven members. 
They are headed by a district president of the Red Cross who represents and 
coordinates the Red Cross activities at the district and community levels 
including the recruitment and training of new volunteers. By 2007 CVM had 
267 fulltime staff and about 5,000 volunteers nationwide. It had a district 
commission in nearly every district7. 
 A major challenge CVM is facing relates to sustainability. The 
organization can hardly pay staff salaries to maintain a professional and well 
motivated staff.  The fierce competition for funds and qualified staff has been 
pressuring the organization to find alternative financing mechanisms and 
new partners. Amongst other processes, CVM has been approaching again the 
government of Mozambique for financial and material support8.  
 
CVM: ARENAS AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL  
 
The history of the Mozambican Red Cross, described above, has to be 
understood within the broader national dynamics. The international 
recognition of the CVM from 1988 and its integration in the ICRC and IFRC 
movement is not a mere coincidence. It emerged from arenas where the 
national government, local and international actors deployed different 
strategies and attempted to fulfil different agendas. As I discussed in chapter 
two, the international community was very much interested in detaching 
Mozambique from the socialist block and in pushing the country towards 
market economy, democratization and structural adjustment programmes. In 
                                                 
6
 Interview with Moises Inguane head of  Information Management and Marketing Department on 
March 27, 2007 
7
 Interview with Luisa Mboana head of Human Resources Department 29 March, 2007 
8
 Interview with Luisa Mboana head of Human Resources Department 29 March, 2007 
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turn, in order to access the much needed western resources, the government 
of Mozambique started, from 1987 onwards, to implement different strategies 
which allowed it to gain western sympathy. Changes in leadership, 
implementation of structural adjustments, improvement on human rights 
records, Pope John Paul II’s visit amongst others, helped, to ease relations 
between Mozambique and the West and provided room to manoeuvre for 
CVM.  
Nonetheless, with the international acceptance, CVM had to place itself 
between international, national, and local demands.  This brought in many 
challenges. While the Red Cross had to become sensitive to the western 
approach to ‘profit’ from the international sympathy, the government wanted 
to maintain its power and influence over CVM. In 1987, the government 
replaced reverend Isaías Fuzamo from the Presbyterian Church who had been 
the president of CVM since 1981 with a military commander, General José 
Moiane. To soften its approach the government appointed Janet Rae 
Mondlane, the American wife of former president Eduardo Chivambo 
Mondlane, to be the General Secretary of CVM. Janet was somehow 
strategically placed to divert criticism for the military command but also to 
allow western sympathy, especially the Americans, in channelling aid. Janet 
was welcomed but the Army general was rejected by the international 
community and was replaced by Dr. Sinai Jossefa Nhatitima in 1989. 
The alliances with ICRC and IFRC allowed CVM to slowly detach itself 
from the government and by the end of the 1980s it was no longer receiving 
financial support or (strict) guidelines from the government. The 
organizational objectives have also shifted. While initially it was set to run 
activities related to health care under the guidance of the Ministry of Health 
and Frelimo Party, the objectives in the 1990s were to ‘contribuir para prevenir 
ou aliviar o sofrimento sem descriminação de raça, crença religiosa, condição social ou 
opinião política da vítimas, meaning, to contribute preventing or alleviating the 
suffering of victims without discrimination of race, religious belief, social status or 
political affiliation’(CVM, 2006).  
 Despite these changes, the umbilical link between Frelimo and CVM 
remains and its a valuable asset for CVM survival. Being affiliated to the 
government and to the Frelimo Party is crucial for individual and institutional 
survival in Mozambique (DFID, 2006). CVM still presents itself from time to 
time and is still largely perceived in Mozambique as a government apparatus. 
In practice, CVM finds room for manoeuvre in using and negotiating these 
different identities. Thanks to the humanitarian principles, CVM finds ground 
and has more weight in discussions with the government9 and by using a pro-
government identity it can claim access to state resources. For instance, by 
presenting itself as a government apparatus, CVM claims tax exemption on its 
imports.10.  
                                                 
9
 Interview with Dra. Fernanda Teixeira, CVM General Secretary June 8, 2007 
10
 Interview with Dra. Luisa Mboana from Human Resources Department and with Jacinto Moiane 
from Administration and Finances Department on 28 of March 2007; Interview with Moises Inguane 
head of  Information Management and Marketing Department on March 27, 2007 
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The relationship with the international community has also been taking 
place in arenas embedding different discourses and practices. In the 1980s 
when aid poured in to respond to the complex emergency described in 
chapter 2, international aid to CVM was channelled through ICRC and IFRC. 
In practice, CVM worked as a sub-contractor of these two international 
organizations. They had the financial means and CVM implemented the 
activities. It was the ICRC and IFRC through expatriates who planned, 
budgeted and reported to the donors. As the humanitarian situation 
degenerated, more resources were channelled and more international and 
local staff was needed nationwide. By the end of civil war in 1992 CVM had 
about 500 national staff, paid basically by the international community 
through ICRC and IFRC.   
The voluntary base as well as the national capacity to undertake the 
core activities of planning, budgeting and reporting had been eroded, and as 
these activities were undertaken by expatriates, a certain perception of  ‘their 
programme’ was  established within the CVM. In the meantime, the 
international community had also developed the perception that CVM had 
little or no capacity to handle tasks beyond implementation.  
The vision of CVM as ‘their project’ was coupled with an image of ‘lack 
of capacity’ within CVM. This produced a self-perpetuating vicious cycle. 
Local staff which, over time turned to be oversized and under- supervised, 
had low commitment and tended to use ICRC and IFRC projects to meet their 
individual interests. Up until the end of emergency activities in 1994 
corruption, theft, misuse and misappropriation of organizational goods 
within CVM became endemic11. This context tended to increase the 
international community distrust of the national staff and its capacity, and to 
trust and invite international staff for managerial positions.  
With the end of the emergency, funding was reduced and staff 
numbers had to be downsized. CVM entered into a restructurating process 
sending off about 1/3 of the staff and shifting from emergency operations to 
development interventions. It is within this context that the organization 
started to claim for a better placement in planning, implementing and 
evaluating the interventions. In the meantime, a trend was emerging 
internationally that would substantially change the local realities of the CVM. 
A number of national societies from the North were no longer happy to 
channel their contributions through the IFRC. They preferred to work 
bilaterally. This was a response to a perceived ineffectiveness and 
bureaucracy within the IFRC, yet they may also be understood to have a 
desire to become more active and visible in international work12.  
By 2008 there were present in Mozambique the German National 
Society, the Americans; the Australians; the Belgians; the British; the Danish; 
the Spanish; the Finnish; the Norwegians, the Swedish and the Icelandic, all of 
them working with CVM in what is locally known as the sisters societies’ 
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 Interview with Dra. Fernanda Teixeira, CVM General Secretary June 8, 2007 
12
 Interview with Dra. Eunice Mucache, CVM Program Director. Maputo, June 7, 2007 
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partnerships- parcearia de sociedades irmãs13. The number of national societies 
shifts from time to time depending on projects being implemented.  
The increase in the number of national societies leads to a number of 
new challenges. Each of the sister societies has its own programme managers 
coming mostly from its own country. They are ultimately the ones who report 
to the donors and do the planning.  CVM still plays the same role as before- to 
get money to implement the projects and submitting reports to the expatriate 
programme manager.  
There was an initial attempt to let local staff lead the process by 
allowing them to design the projects but the general response was poor. There 
are different claims on this. The national staff claims that donors are more 
willing to fund projects if their own national staff writes them even when the 
proposals are technically not superior to those produced by them14. On the 
other hand, the expats claim that CVM staff has limited capacity to write 
convincing proposals, do the planning and carry out adequate monitoring 
which can respond to donor’s demands15. 
  In this arena, CVM has chosen to follow a ‘soft approach’- the 
‘swallow the frog (engolir sapo) or sit back and take it approach’.  The ‘sit back 
and take it approach’ means that one never argues, even if one does not agree.  
CVM adopted this strategy because they depend heavily on the sister 
societies’ for its survival. CVM depends on the international community for 
about 60 percent of its needs16 and if funds were to stop flowing from the 
international community, CVM would virtually collapse. The government, as 
I said earlier, had long stopped funding CVM during the emergency phase 
when international influx to CVM started around 1988. The 40 percent comes 
from revenues based mainly on the rent of properties and some donations 
from national companies and individuals. The 40 percent is used to pay the 
housekeepers and the secretaries. The remainder of the staff, that is the large 
majority, depends on international funds17. Thus, ‘sit back and take it’ is a 
survival strategy in its own right. 
The ‘sit back and take it approach’ has shown to be very complex and 
demanding.  Different national societies had different projects, different 
planning, monitoring and reporting procedures and tended to work with a 
specific department which was handling its own project and was paying the 
salary of the staff.  CVM became a compartmentalized or projectamentalized 
institution, with different departments not necessarily reporting to the CVM 
General Secretary but to each of its project managers. Each department or 
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 Interview with Eunice Mucache, CVM program’s director, June 7, 2007 
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 Interview with Ivete Dengo, CBDRM coordinator  May 22, 2007; Rabeca Chalufo Department of 
Disaster Preparedness and Response June 06, 2007; Interview with Respeito Chirindza, Head of CVM 
volunteer’s network, Maputo June 14, 2007 Ataide Sacramento, Department of Disaster Preparedness 
and Response June 8, 2007. 
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 Interview with Finish Red Cross Country Coordinator, May 9, 2007; with German Red Cross 
Country Coordinator May 2, 2007; with Island Red Cross Country Coordinator, May 10, 2007   
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 Interview with Dra. Luisa Mboana from Human Resources department and with Jacinto Moiane from 
Administration and Finances Department on 28 March 2007 
17
 Interview with Dra. Luisa Mboana from Human Resources department and with Jacinto Moiane from 
Administration and Finances Department on 28 March 2007 
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project had its own budget, bank account, salary policy and was managed 
differently from the others. Staff within the institution was not 
communicating and it could happen that staff from two or more departments 
were going to the same place but each using their own cars and resources.  
The situation was getting chaotic and an audit carried out by 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PWC) in 1999 found a number of 
problems. There were no formal written accounting procedures and 
procedures governing procurement. Field staff had no staff procedure 
manual, tax income deduction was selective and some employees had no 
contracts.There were no salary payslips, bank statements and accounting 
records at field level.Staff debts were not paid, assets were not registered or  
accurately recorded and  there were no reports of  incomes generated at the 
provincial and district levels. The overall evaluation on key areas such as 
procurement procedures, salary policy, cash and bank balances, 
disbursements, fixed assets, travel and per diem, computer information 
system, asset verification at project field level office and on income generation 
was weak (PWC, 2000).  
Due mainly to the 2000 great flood in  southern Mozambique and 2001 
on the  Zambezi delta, CVM was not able to implement the recommendations 
from the audit but from 2002 changes started to take place. A new human 
resources director was contracted and the finances were centralized at the 
Department of Administration and Finances (DAF). By July 2002, a uniform 
payment policy entered into force by which salaries were no longer paid by 
cheques but through bank account transfer. Moreover, a salary categorization 
procedure was implemented by which all project staff regardless of their 
department would be ranked accordingly and receive a salary based on the 
category. Thus, national project managers regardless of their project received 
the same salary and at the provincial level, project managers at provincial 
level got the same salary regardless of the province and of the project in 
which they were working. To meet the administrative costs CVM asked each 
project to allocate 10 percent of their budgets as administration costs18.  
Response from national societies and donors were not straightforward. 
Although donors and national societies agreed on most of the changes, they 
were keen on their individual reporting formats and budgeting lines. Some 
had monthly reporting, others quarterly, per semester, annually or all of 
them. Moreover, there was less interest on funding administrative costs and 
salaries for non-programme staff (Moiane and Ingimarsdottir, 2006:4). This 
tended to squeeze CVM’s financial capacity and to overload the staff at the 
Administration and Finances Department. Emerging from this, CVM called 
for a partnership meeting on November 16-17, 2004 to discuss the reporting 
problem. The aim of the meeting was to produce and agree on a standardized 
and harmonized reporting format, which would increase the efficacy, 
effectiveness and timely reporting of CVM. Moreover, it was thought that the 
standardized reporting format would reduce stress and pressure among the 
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financial staff, which ultimately would restore the human rights and dignity 
to the financial staff (CVM, 2004:7).  
 
Slowly, changes have been happening. But due to a constant staff turnover 
from CVM and also from the partners, the message and the procedures have 
to be repeated over and over again. Moreover, each partner still looks at each 
situation differently and power relations still play a role. For example, during 
the 2007 flooding I attended different meetings between CVM and its 
partners. One of these was the meeting on 28 March 2007. Here power 
relations surfaced sharply when discussions were held about how to arrive at 
a needs analysis and workplan for recovery in the disaster affected areas.  
Initially it was agreed between the representatives of different national 
societies that the best way to do that was to look at what is already there- the 
existing tool for planning recovery. Therefore, it was suggested and agreed 
that partners would have to find tools and bring them for discussion next day. 
On the next day, a high ranking representative from the IFRC who had been 
absent on the last day disagreed with the methodology and with the 
assessment as such. ‘We don’t proceed with the assessment the way it was planned 
before. Most information is already available and there is no need to spend 2-3 weeks 
for extra assessment. My suggestion is to go straight to the plan of action. We bring 
representatives from the provinces, discuss with them and make plan of action. I want 
to apologize for not being here yesterday and for this inconvenience!’ 
The representative of Iceland and most of the CVM staff looked 
disappointed. The Iceland representative told me that people had already 
spent a lot of time in planning the recovery from the bottom-up and 
attempting to find the right tools. She added that it was a fallacy to think that 
from Maputo and without a clear knowledge from the field, we could make a 
proper plan of action. She was also not enthusiastic about bringing the 
provincial representatives to voice their needs and properly fix them in space 
and time, as their analytical capacity was perceived to be low. A higher 
ranked member of CVM told me the next day that ‘I was the first to look 
disappointed yesterday. I am concerned with long-term impacts; IFRC will be going 
and we will be staying to continue the job; we need a clear criteria for example to 
choose the areas where we will be working and I don’t think that the representative 
will provide us with the right information; they will attempt to choose areas of their 
interest rather than using an objective and thoughtful analysis’. When I asked why 
CVM did not voice against the proposal from IFRC she suggested that it was 
IFRC who makes the appeal!  
In the end the IFRC had its way. The provincial representatives came to 
Maputo and based on a rule of thumb the plan of action was designed on 
April 13, 2007. Backstage, some CVM staff members were just laughing at the 
plan. …‘630 latrines in six months in just one province is unrealistic’; … ‘how can 
one make a recovery plan putting aside the livelihood component?’… ’ It is awful but 
let’s use the six month recovery period to advance our life from the per diems!’  
These offstage comments and conversations tend to show that the ‘sit 
back and take it approach’ is not necessarily all about subservience and 
compliance. Overt and covert manifestations of disagreement occur and staff 
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from CVM do not necessarily fashion their experiences based on the donor’s 
discourse. This may not be obvious at the headquarters in Maputo where a 
certain diplomacy is played but, as we shall see later in this chapter, down at 
local levels this is very much the case.   
Besides the relationship between CVM and donors, there are internal 
dynamics within CVM that need to be addressed as well. CVM is still a large 
organization with nearly 5,000 volunteers and about 200 permanent staff. The 
relationship between the different staff members and departments at different 
levels from headquarters down to the local level is a hectic issue with 
hierarchies and status playing a critical role (Vonhof and Hilhorst, 2004:9). 
Different departments tend to battle for donor’s resources and to 
downplay each other. Departments that run hard interventions such as 
building schools, hospitals, water pumps, think themselves as superior 
compared to those who run sensitization campaigns and provide first aid. 
These processes tend as well to reinforce the ‘compartmentalization’ process, 
and to forge hierarchies and status. This has been reinforced by donors’ 
behaviour over time; donors prefer to fund projects and departments that can 
provide hard/numeric indicators of performance rather than those whose 
impacts are hard to evaluate in a short time19. Although the organization had 
been attempting for an integrated approach, by 2008, departmentalization and 
‘projectification’ was still the everyday institutional practice at the CVM. 
The relationships between the headquarters down to local levels 
depend on several factors including the personality and character of the actors 
involved; projects being implemented; implementing and reporting capacity; 
personalized ties between individuals in different levels; the issues under the 
relationship; the capacity of the provinces or districts to mobilize internal 
resources among others. I will exemplify this in the next section when 
discussing the CBDRM project in Cocorico.  
I followed the CBDRM project as part of the research setup, which 
involved, as mentioned in the methodology section, CVM, The Red 
Cross/Climate Centre in Netherlands, Wageningen University and Eduardo 
Mondlane University. My involvement aimed at building a case study that 
could document and learn from CBDRM approaches, revealing how CBDRM 
helps to reduce disaster risk, how it enters the lifeworlds of local people and 
how local people appropriate, transform and make use of CBDRM in their 
everyday lives. This was possible by living in Cocorico (see previous chapter) 
and by interacting with CVM staff at different levels, and volunteers at local 
level. 
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 Interview with Ivete Dengo, CBDRM coordinator  May 22, 2007; Rabeca Chalufo chief of the 
Department for Disaster Preparedness and Response June 06, 2007  
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DISASTERS AS AN OPPORTUNITY 
 
Disasters are twofold events. They may bring along deaths, losses and 
disruption, but they emerge also as an opportunity. Disasters increase the 
attention on development failures and asymmetries, and force technical, 
policy and political changes (Pelling and Dill, 2009). Disasters have forced 
political changes in Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Mexico and 
Haiti (Drury and Olson, 1998) while humanitarian aid to Afghanistan has 
been used by donors as an instrument to fight terrorism (Atmar, 2001). 
The magnitude and impacts of the 2000  ‘great flood’ in the south 
opened up  room for different actors to recommend and implement disaster 
risk reduction interventions in Mozambique (c.f. Christie and Hanlon, 2000; 
CVM, 2001; Moore et al., 2003). Internationally CBDRM was an emerging and 
growing discourse on disaster risk reduction that made its way in 
Mozambique following the 2000 disaster.  
The ‘adoption’ of CBDRM was eased by the fact that the Mozambican 
government had decided to embark on proactive and bottom-up approaches 
when it replaced DPCCN with INGC in 1999. On the other hand, many 
humanitarian and development organizations involved in rescue operations 
still had budgets available from the support generated to respond to the 
disaster and to contribute to the reconstruction process20. Moreover, the fact 
that CBDRM was also a dominant international approach on disaster 
reduction tended to ease the funding process.  
 By April 2008, the government of Mozambique claimed to have created 
130 CBDRM programmes while 28 others were in the pipeline21. CBDRM in 
Mozambique involves basically the setting up of a community committee to 
look after disaster risks within their community. The committee is expected to 
develop, with local engagement, vulnerability reduction interventions, to 
provide information on hazards and, in times of disaster, to help people 
evacuate and provide them with shelter. The committees comprises between 
10-15 people each of them with a specific mandate (i.e. person responsible for 
evacuation; for shelter; for early warning). In the section that follows I will 
discuss in-depth the everyday life of a CBDRM in Cocorico community, 
Mopeia district.  
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THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF A CBDRM: CBDRM PROJECT IN COCORICO 
 
 
Project background 
In the previous section, I highlighted that the 2000 floods opened an 
opportunity for the use of CBDRM approaches in Mozambique. The CBDRM 
project in Cocorico was part of this new approach of disaster risk reduction. 
Following the 2000 flooding IFRC and the Danish Red Cross (DRC) who were 
both heavily involved in humanitarian operations, decided to embark on a 
more proactive disaster management approach in Mozambique. They opted 
to support the CVM in implementing CBDRM projects in some disaster-prone 
areas.  
In 2001, a pilot CBDRM project was carried out in two provinces. The 
DRC supported a pilot project in two districts of Inhambane province, while 
the IFRC supported a similar project in three districts of Zambezia province. 
DRC brought an expert on CBDRM from the Philippines while the IFRC 
brought in an expert from Latin America. Those experts trained senior CVM 
staff on CBDRM who, together with the experts, disseminated the knowledge 
to local volunteers who had the final responsibility of implementing the 
approach in their communities. This pilot project focused on flood and 
cyclone early warning systems. For the implementation, volunteers received 
broad-range training on issues such as first aid, Red Cross principles, 
logistics, boat rescues, early warning, latrine building, water chlorination and 
identification of safe and risk areas (IFRC, 2002; Vonhof and Hilhorst, 2004).   
Based on the lessons learnt from the pilot project, the DRC decided to 
fund a four-year 1.7 million USD (about 10 million Danish Crown) CBDRM 
project. The project was to be implemented from 2002 to 2005 in the same 
provinces as the pilot project but with a larger number of communities. The 
project intended to assist 45 communities but successive evaluation led to 
new targets. The number was reduced to 30 in 2003 and 21 in 2004. In the end, 
18 communities were reached by the project:  9 in Zambezia province and 9 in 
Inhambane. Cocorico was one of the 18 communities chosen for this follow up 
project.   
Based on project documents, field visits and interviews, a final external 
evaluation was carried out by a consultant in July 2005 which brought 36 
recommendations which altogether would lead to better performance of  
phase II or future CBDRM projects by CVM (Reimer et al., 2005). The 
recommendations addressed a wide range of issues. It questioned the 
methodologies used in setting the project and selecting the community; the 
capacity building process; the partnerships developed during the 
implementation of the project.The recommendations also made observations 
on the administration and project management. Regarding this last point, the 
evaluator recommended to give primary responsibility and authority of the 
project to the national staff. However, there was no phase II and the 
recommendations have literarily remained in the offices. 
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 The following sections of the chapter, open up the different arenas and 
encounters between the different actors involved in the project. I attempt to 
disclose how the CBDRM project in Cocorico was perceived and acted upon 
by different actors at different arenas and encounters and how it strengthened 
local capacity to adapt to hydrologic natural hazards and secure livelihoods. 
 
DISPUTING PROJECT OWNERSHIP 
 
By the beginning of the year 2001, CBDRM and proactive disaster 
management were still very much a novelty in Mozambique. Most of the 
organizations working on disaster management including the CVM had 
accumulated a long experience of reactive humanitarian assistance but little or 
none on preparedness and risk reduction. Thus, when the project was 
proposed, CVM itself had to learn what it was and how to run it. The Danish 
Red Cross prepared the project proposal and all the proposed activities, 
methodologies, didactical material and budget. It was based mainly on 
experiences in the Philippines22.  The DRC had two expatriates in Maputo and 
one in Inhambane coordinating the project. For Zambezia, one national 
technical staff was hired.  
To link up with the project expatriates, CVM appointed, at 
headquarters level, one staff member from the recently created Department 
for Disaster Preparedness and Response who was also to learn about the 
CBDRM for future prospects. While national staff was still learning the 
approach, initial training, regulations and CVM institutional strategy for 
CBDRM were designed and promoted by the expatriates. Financial 
disbursement depended also on the approval from the expatriates23. Thus, 
during the initial stages the project was largely owned by the funding 
organization and expatriates.  
Nonetheless, over time problems around project ownership started to 
surface24. CVM staff started to ask to be given primary responsibility and 
authority of the project. They questioned the expertise of the expatriates and 
the one based in Inhambane, a touristic province, was even labelled a tourist 
rather than an expert on the CBDRM. Passive and active confrontation 
between national staff and expatriates were recorded specially in Inhambane 
province25. This was further amplified when training on CBDRM occurred in 
the provinces and districts. During the training participants complained that 
it was difficult to read and understand the materials and that it lacked 
adjustment to the Mozambican reality (Rios and Nicolson, 2002:4). There were 
also complaints that 45 districts was not a feasible scale due to distances and 
                                                 
22
 Interview with Ivete Dengo, CVM CBDRM headquarter project coordinator  May 22, 2007. 
23
 Interview with Rabeca Chalufo, head of Disaster Preparedness and Response department at the 
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available resources. The target of 45 communities was seen as an outsider’s 
ignorance (those who designed the project) of the Mozambican reality26. 
To settle the differences, a project review took place in April 2003. 
Amongst other measures, the project objectives were reformulated and the 
number of target communities reduced from the initial 45 to 30. These 
adaptations and the project review marked the initial claim of project 
ownership by the CVM.   
Despite this attempt, implementation and coordination problems 
remained and a second project review was undertaken in September 2004. 
During this second review, the number of target communities was further 
reduced to 21 and DRC agreed on handing over much of management and 
decision-making tasks to the national staff27.  This new set-up remained up to 
the end of the project although by the end, the project managed to reach 18 
rather than 21 communities. 
Project ownership has, thus, passed through different stages by which 
different stakeholders shared different ‘contested’ powers. At the start, the 
project was to a large extent owned by the DRC who had resources - both 
knowledge and financial- and tended to guide most of the intervention 
practices. Over time, project ownership was contested by CVM who 
ultimately managed to secure a large share of decision-making. A power-
sharing and less ambitious plan of action came to be the reconciliatory tool for 
different interests and contested powers. This shows that power is not 
absolute or  constant over time. It shifts from time to time, depending on how 
the actors manage to assemble the critical factors of power yielding. It further 
stresses that the ‘sit back and take it’ approach is not all about subservience in 
order to survive. Contestation is part of the process, especially at local levels 
where projects are implemented.  
 
THE POLITICS OF CHOOSING COMMUNITIES 
 
Both organizations (CVM and DRC) have defined poor and vulnerable 
groups in highly disaster prone areas as their major criteria to define the 
project beneficiary communities (CVM, 2002:6; CVM, 2002a:4; CVM, 2002b:3; 
CVM and DRC, 2002:2). Thus, humanitarianism and altruism are evoked in 
selecting and working with particular communities.   
Nonetheless, although these criteria were relevant they were finally not 
the determinant for the CBDRM project. For CVM, projects should be 
implemented in a district where the local CVM branch (i) has capacity to 
implement a project; (ii) is performing well, thus, rewarding it for its 
performance or, (iii) in a district where there is prospectus of new projects. 
Furthermore as the organization had decided to embark on an integrated 
approach (iv) projects should be implemented preferably, where there were 
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CVM, June 6, 2007 
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already projects and capacity so that the overall impact and CVM visibility 
would be higher28. For its part, DRC had been supporting relief and 
rehabilitation activities in Inhambane province since 1998 and was very much 
interested in linking up relief with long-term CBDRM projects in that 
province, especially in the communities, it had already been working (DRC, 
2002:1). The choice of communities was thus less needs based but directed by 
internal organizational considerations.  
At the local level, the government surfaced as a key player in choosing 
the communities. Project implementation either by NGOs or by the 
government tends to boost government prestige and it is used during 
electoral campaigns. In most of the country, it is widely known that NGOs 
and donors cannot present themselves as the front-liners of project 
implementation or funding. Government officials ‘oblige’ them and the local 
population as well, to acknowledge that projects are being brought in and run 
by the government. Backstage, various organizations supporting INGC were 
complaining in 2008 that they were not allowed to put their institution’s name 
in promotional materials such as T-shirts, caps, etc. although they were the 
sponsors of such material; only the INGC stamp was allowed in such 
materials. In general, communities that are selected appear to go hand in 
hand with the political objective of boosting government visibility and 
prestige. In Inhambane, for instance the selection of districts and communities 
was highly determined by the government officials (Reimer et al., 2005: 12).   
In short, community selection involved different politics and interests 
by the different actors in the arena. At the end it appeared that vulnerability, 
poverty and risk where not the sole driving forces for choosing the 
communities for project implementation. The chosen communities appeared 
to be an emerging property of different agendas and social negotiation of the 
major actors in the arena namely, CVM, DRC and the government.    
 
THE PROJECT AT DISTRICT LEVEL: EXCLUSION AND THE MYTH OF 
LACK OF CAPACITY 
 
At the provincial level in Zambezia, the project hired a national manager, 
técnico provincial do projecto, whose duty was to supervise the project 
implementation in three districts of Maganja da Costa, Namacurra and 
Mopeia. The district and the community levels were the major 
implementation sites of the project. In this chapter I focus on Mopeia district 
where Cocorico is located. In Mopeia CVM has a local branch, comissão distrial, 
comprising, a 7 member district commission, a president, 50 active volunteers, 
a warehouse and an office which turned later to be a sort of guest houses for 
increasing CVM’s revenues. The number of volunteers changes from time to 
time depending on multiple developments including humanitarian and 
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development projects. For the purpose of CBDRM in Cocorico, 20 volunteers 
were involved.  15 of them were from the 3 areas (Mulamba, Sanguimbe and 
Cuara) where the project was implemented and 5 from the district level.  The 
selection of the volunteers at the Cocorico level is an issue which I will discuss 
later. Now I will discuss the politics involved in choosing the volunteers at the 
district level and what impact it has for the CVM as a whole.  
Volunteers are the backbone of the Red Cross Societies worldwide. The 
Red Cross movement has about 20 million active volunteers worldwide29 but 
it is naive to suggest that volunteers everywhere do the job merely on a 
voluntary basis following the Red Cross principles. In Mozambique, due 
mainly to overwhelming unemployment, it appears that a significant number 
of the volunteers see their duties more as employment rather than voluntary 
work30.  
During fieldwork I accompanied volunteers on work trips, on training 
sessions and social events such as parties and soccer games. In these events 
we chatted about their occupations and how they perceived their jobs. After 
some time I started to observe some discrepancies in the capacities of 
volunteers. I had contacts with volunteers who were not in the CBDRM 
project but had considerable skills compared to those within the project. They 
were able to write proposals and successfully submitted them for funding and 
were funded. They did not expect provincial or national guidance to start new 
projects and interventions which seemed to boost CVM. Volunteers that came 
to me and asked me to help them improve their proposals or with vague 
project ideas which they needed to crystallize. I also interacted with 
volunteers involved in projects where they followed guidance from  superiors 
without questions even in the face of glaring ambiguities.  
As I attempted to understand the selection criteria I came to realize that 
selection depended heavily on the relationships that volunteers had with 
those who had the power to enrol them in projects. Developing good 
relationships with the chiefs allowed them to succeed in being enrolled 
without fuss. In turn they had to do different favours to the chiefs. They 
brought them gifts, bought them beers and never talked bad things about 
them especially to their superiors. In short, they need to ‘polish the chief’ in 
order to be enrolled. Like the ‘sit back and take it’ approach the volunteers 
could not present their own ideas or to contest the chief’s decisions. They 
were not allowed to be smart, esperto, or attempt to be esperto. In the end, in 
most of the cases, it was not one’s capacity to do the job, which was relevant 
for the enrolment in projects, but the capacity to polish the chief.This 
appeared to have been the major criterion in selecting the volunteers in 
Mopeia. 
 Most of those considered espertos were not welcomed in projects 
because they were not good polishers meaning, they were not a kind of ‘yes 
boss’. In the meantime, the polishers that became involved interacted with 
other project actors and during these interactions, their limited capacity 
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 www.ifrc.org accessed November 20, 2010. 
30
 Interview with Respeito Chirindza, Head of CVM volunteer’s network, Maputo June 14, 2007 
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surfaced. In the end, the other project actors sustained the claims of lack of 
local capacity because they had been exposed to those without capacity rather 
than to those excluded but with considerable capacity required for the local 
levels. In this way, the image was perpetuated of Mozambican Red Cross 
volunteers lacking capacities.  
 I am not suggesting that there is always capacity at local level nor that 
in every situation qualified staff is marginalized and if marginalized it is due 
to clientelism relationships. There are a number of reasons why people may 
be marginalized including their social behaviour, health problems, and 
cultural worldviews, among others. Rather, what I am attempting to highlight 
is that the claim of lack of local capacity needs to be analyzed. The analysis 
needs to look at the politics involved in contracting staff, ascribing tasks, 
confronting chiefs and bringing new and innovative ideas, rather than merely 
looking at whether the staff has received enough training. Moreover, I want to 
stress the need to look beyond the gatekeepers and attempt to get a broader 
overview of the context.  
But are we willing to do that? The system has become so well 
developed and rewarding for both external and local actors that lack of 
capacity is one of the ‘begging’ strategies and becomes instrumental to claim 
aid. Chiefs and their collaborators tend to close up contacts with those beyond 
their network of clientelism and under short term evaluation missions it is just 
impossible to go beyond their networks. But as the process crystallizes, the 
capable people may leave the institution and the institution is operated by 
people who expect guidance from national or international level. Otherwise, 
capable people close themselves in and their efforts become minimal as well. 
In both cases, the needed narrative of lack of national capacity is 
institutionalized, perpetuated and expats managers are sent in.  
 
THE PROJECT AT COCORICO LEVEL: THE UNBUNDLING OF 
COCORICO COMMUNITY 
 
As I described in the previous chapter Cocorico is a three site conglomeration 
of households about 15 kilometers from Mopeia village.  Historically, 
Cocorico has never been labelled neither a community nor a village. It is a 
chieftaincy comprising scattered houses around the north Zambezi River 
bank in the South-West region of Mopeia district. Up to now Cocorico and 
many other chieftaincies on the Zambezi delta are neither termed 
communities nor villages but regulados or povoados. Most, if not all, of what are 
called communities right now in Mozambique are geographical areas 
belonging to traditional chieftaincies- the regulados or Inhacuauas as they are 
called in the Zambezi delta. 
 External interventions brought the concept of community but also 
tended to use it according to the objectives. In 2007 humanitarian assistance to 
flood affected Cocorico’s people tended to take the three conglomerations 
(Mulamba, Sanguimbe and Cuara) as one community- the community of 
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Cocorico. Nonetheless, during the CBDRM project implementation, CVM and 
DRC took the three conglomerations as three distinct communities, basically 
as a way to increase and achieve the targeted number of communities. In the 
project documents the three appear as separate communities and if this were 
not the case the number of communities would fall to 16 rather than the 18 
achieved. 
Floods tend also to unbundle Cocorico’s geographical boundaries. 
There are ‘small scale Diasporas’ from Cocorico in each resettlement centre 
where people from Cocorico are living. As the government policy in 
resettlement centres is to place people coming from the same place together- 
attempting to recreate the origin- there is Cocorico in Mopeia village (24 de 
Julho resettlement centre); in Chimuara (Dzandza resettlement centre) and in 
Marromeu (Chupanga resettlement centre).   
From all this, it seems that the concept of Cocorico community is being 
used differently by different actors and more importantly the community 
itself does not exist locally either as a concept or as a clearly geographically 
demarcated area. For intervention purposes it appears that Cocorico is being 
unbundled, merged or split according to the intervention objectives. 
 
PROJECT CAPTURE BY THE LOCAL ELITE 
 
Once the communities have been selected the next step according to the 
implementation plan, is to approach local community leaders, autoridade 
comunitaria, to ask for permission to start the project. The overall assumption 
is that local leaders are powerful enough to influence any project’s outcome. If 
they cooperate and are fully involved then the project would succeed. 
Conversely, without their involvement the project would likely fail. This 
assumption does not take into account that local leaders have their own 
projects and may use external intervention in achieving them. This was the 
case with the current project in Cocorico and in this section I discuss the 
project capture by the autoridade comunitaria. 
CVM approached the autoridades comunitarias, explained the project 
and asked them to create a local committee consisting of six local leaders or 
people selected by them, and to provide five to six people, selected by the 
community in a community meeting, to become CVM volunteers within the 
sites where the project would be implemented. In total each community 
should have between 10 to 12 people directly involved in the project 
including volunteers and local leaders31. 
The selection process was not indeed as transparent as it should be. 
Community meetings were very restricted and most of those involved had 
some kind of strong links with the autoridade comunitaria. In Mulamba three 
out of the six committee members selected were sons of the local sapanda and 
the same people were also part of the CVM volunteers. In Sanguimbe, where 
the Inhacuaua lives, most of the committee members and volunteers appeared 
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 Interview with Inacio Melo, CVM Mopeia district president, June 26, 2007  
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to be loyal to him. In Cuara the third conglomeration the story was the same. 
Overall, the selection criteria for the core implementing team at the 
community level involved loyalty relationships, elite capture and processes of 
exclusion. By the end, as we shall see, volunteers and local leaders who were 
supposed to be the vessel of the project implementation turned to be the 
major beneficiaries. This tended indeed to split the so- called community into 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, producing power politics and contestation 
to the detriment of the concept of community as marked by unity.  
 
CBDRM AND POWER POLITICS IN COCORICO 
 
Traditional leadership such as Inhacuaua, sapanda and fumos are ascribed 
positions. Achievement and maintenance of the leadership depends heavily 
on the networks one is able to command first, within the close kin and then 
within the overall community. The positions may provide in most of the 
times, higher social status and prestige but it may also be used to secure 
material and financial gains. In Mozambique the Inhacuauas and sapandas do 
have salaries and entering and working in a community requires, as the CVM 
did, the approval of local leaders which may also mean accessing material 
and financial resources. When conducting my fieldwork local leaders would 
say things like: ‘don’t forget to bring me soap/a packet of cigars when you 
come back from the village/city’ or, ‘if you did not finish the oil/salt you are 
using for cooking may I have the remainder?’ Or ‘sorry I have a tremendous 
family problem to solve can you borrow me some money?’ 
To become Inhacuaua like for instance Inhacuaua Cocorico one needs 
to be appointed and approved within the Cocorico kin and then (to a lesser 
extent) from the community32. This process requires a lot of internal and 
external lobbying and conflicts for such positions have been noticed in 
different contexts in the south of Mozambique (Junod, 1996) and in the delta 
Zambezi (Negrão, 2001).  
  Conflicts over the position of Inhacuaua Cocorico were on the stage 
between two members of the Cocorico kin (Fernando and Baptista) when the 
CBDRM project started in Cocorico. The conflict started when Cocorico and 
other areas on the Zambezi delta were flooded in 2001 and most of the people 
evacuated to upper grounds. Most of the Cocorico’s inhabitants including the 
leader, Inhacuaua Fernando Cocorico, moved to Chupanga resettlement centre 
in Marromeu district. In Chupanga Inhacuaua Fernando Cocorico was the aid 
channel to people of Cocorico and he managed as well to enroll as a CVM 
volunteer receiving double gains- as a chief and as MRC volunteer.  
  By March/April 2001, water levels had receded and some inhabitants 
started to go back to Cocorico. Baptista Cocorico was one of these people 
going back to Cocorico, but Fernando Cocorico, the chief, remained at the 
resettlement centre. Back in Cocorico, the returnees needed the administrative 
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 Interview with chief regulo Chamanga, Mopeia village, May 7, 2008. Group discussion, Cocorico, 
September 24, 2007.,   
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structure for different reasons including resolving conflicts and for channeling 
their demands to the government. One of these demands was a need for seeds 
to restart the agricultural season.  Fernando Cocorico was called to assume his 
position in Cocorico but he did not do so immediately; he only did it about six 
months later. The Cocorico kin found it necessary to fill the gap and Baptista 
Cocorico became the chief. However, not all the people welcomed the new 
chief.  For most of the people whom I spoke to, he lacked some of the 
determinant characteristics required to be a good leader and a ‘strong man’. 
Amongst them they include the fact that although Baptista was nearly 50 
years old, he did not have any children. Moreover he did not drink, had only 
one wife and he was not an educated person.    
  In a ‘macho’ society such as Mozambique, the masculinity measured 
by the number of children and wives is a very relevant issue. Men in private 
would suggest that Baptista does not have the experience that the average 
local man has and therefore he could not solve properly social and other 
conflicts. Others have suggested that not drinking excludes Baptista from the 
average male’s practices and from socializing with his people.  
When there were negative responses from the government to their 
demands, this was largely attributed to the fact that Baptista was uneducated. 
In one group discussion with males in Mulamba one of those present claimed 
‘He does not know how to speak and convince the government. As he does not speak 
Portuguese properly, we even wonder if he actually managed to approach and speak to 
the government officials’. In that meeting another person compared Baptista 
with Fernando and said: ‘we have two primary schools and some water pumps 
thanks to Fernando; there is nothing from Baptista’. In a meeting with fishermen 
some complained that Baptista used to be a good fisherman but since he came 
to power he ceased fishing and now asks the other fishermen to provide him 
with fish for his consumption. They coined him an ’old style leader like those 
that existed in pre-independence period’, referring to the rent-seeking 
behaviour associated with the old leaders.  
  The district administrator and his immediate subordinate, the Chefe do 
posto, chief of the post, suggested that Inhacuaua Baptista was very fragile.  
In separate interviews they complained about the lack of obedience of local 
people to their chief. According to them from the overall district, tax 
collection was lowest in Cocorico. It also registered the highest refusal to the 
resettlement programme. On the 20th of October 2007 the district 
administrator visited Cocorico (in Sanguimbe) to have a meeting with the 
population and warn them about the forecasted flooding in 2008. Out of 
nearly 100 people expected, we were only about thirteen (13) at the meeting, 
mainly the local leaders. This was clearly attributed to his weak position. Due 
to his seemingly weak position Sapandas and Fumos commanded 
considerable power. People were more receptive to their commands rather 
than those of Inhacuaua Baptista. Problems were mainly resolved at the 
Sapanda and Fumos levels and sometimes people would jump to the district 
level at Mopeia village.   
 115 
  In order to rule it appeared that Inhacuaua Baptista needed the support 
of Sapandas and Fumos. He also needed external intervention to show that he 
was capable of capturing development intervention.  The CBDRM largely, 
came in to fulfil this objective. The project did not only boost his image as 
capable of bringing external interventions but the project resources were also 
used to ‘buy’ Sapandas and Fumos’ cooperation and loyalty. This included 
letting the Sapandas and Fumos appropriate the project and benefits at their 
own levels. Baptista intervention in selecting committee members and 
volunteers was very minimal outside his immediate surroundings in 
Sanguimbe.  
 
CONTESTATIONS AND PROJECT APPROPRIATION BY ORDINARY 
PEOPLE 
 
The assumption that local leaders are powerful enough to influence any 
project’s outcome and that their full cooperation allows projects to succeed 
does not take into account that leadership may be contested and locals may 
have their own needs, understanding and the capacity to reshape 
interventions. In this section I discuss how ordinary people reshaped the 
project to fit their needs and understanding of the project. 
Following the selection of committee members and of volunteers, CVM 
organized a training session in Mopeia village. In the training, CVM 
explained the objectives of the project which aimed at reducing the disaster 
risk, triggered by floods, in Cocorico. CVM explained also the role of 
committee members and of volunteers.  Out of the six committee members, 
one had to listen to the radio and disseminate the information to a second 
person who was responsible for warning the chiefs and the whole community 
regarding an approaching natural hazard. The third person had the mandate 
to identify the escape routes. The fourth and fifth were responsible for 
identifying means of evacuation. The sixth member was responsible for 
shelter. The committee mandate was within flood response but the CVM 
volunteers had a broader mandate apart from assisting flood victims. In 
‘normal times’ they were to assist in community health care through 
disseminating hygienic information, helping to build latrines and better 
granaries (CVM, 2005).  
 During training CVM announced that it would bring boxes containing 
flood preparedness material the Kit de prontidão. The rules for using the 
material were set out during the training.  It was ‘agreed’ that the boxes 
would remain at the chief’s houses (Inhacuaua and Sapandas) but the two 
keys to each box would be kept one by a volunteer and the other by a 
committee member, so that the boxes were not violated easily. At the end of 
the training, each participant immediately or afterwards received a free 
radio33, rain jackets, rain boots, gloves and T-shirts with the project stamp. 
Besides that, each CVM volunteer received a bike and had incentives in kind 
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 Free play radio does not require battery to function. It accumulates energy by cranking.   
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(mainly food basket) in a trimester periodicity. These two latter incentives 
were not extended to the six-committee members.  
Days later, the project delivered the boxes containing flood 
preparedness material. Each box contained megaphones, lanterns, kerosene 
lamps, life saving jackets, whistles, ropes and a stretcher. In total three boxes 
were delivered to Cocorico: one in Mulamba, another in Sanguembe and the 
third in Cuara. The boxes were so big that they did not fit inside the chief’s 
houses. They were left outside (figure 4 below). This created overwhelming 
curiosity on the part of local population. Thus, if there was no widespread 
information regarding the project, the boxes had done a good job by 
themselves. 
 
               Figure 4: The flood preparedness box at the Inhacuaua Cocorico’s house 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    Source: author 
 
Back to Cocorico, after the training, the committees had to wait until the next 
flooding could come, which occurred in 2007 about two years after the project 
had finished. In the meantime, committee members asked for permission to 
use the megaphones and stretcher in daily life if needed. Stretchers were used 
to carry sick people and pregnant women while the megaphone was used to 
disseminate information such as incoming visits. Besides the tools contained 
in the kit, the volunteers asked for footballs and the use of whistles in football 
matches. This was actually an indirect way to open the box and evaluate what 
was useful for their everyday life.  
In order to have access to the incentives, the volunteers were supposed 
to work about three days a week on activities related to sanitation and 
granaries. They were given forms to fill in their weekly activities.  Records at 
the CVM district branch shows dozens of latrines and granaries made by the 
volunteers although in practice I have not seen latrines in Cocorico and none 
of the existing granaries were volunteers’ work. 
Once the project started, ordinary people largely realized individual 
gains but not really collective ones. They started to complain covertly and 
overtly demanding interventions that would benefit the whole community in 
The Box 
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the short term. They mainly demanded a local hospital and canoes to 
evacuate sick people. This conflict tended to reinforce Fernando’s prestige of 
being a good leader – who supposedly brought collective benefits- and to 
weaken Baptista’s position. But the conflict over individual vs. collective gains 
went far beyond reinforcing/weakening each one’s position. It has largely 
broken the Cocorico community into three new communities-  Fernando’s  
supporters who demanded his return to power; Baptista’s supporters and the 
undecided.  
Political labelling and mudslinging surfaced. Baptista and his 
supporters labelled Fernando and his supporters a gang of RENAMO34 
members and saboteurs of government development efforts. People’s refusals 
to pay taxes and to follow Baptistas’s orders were blamed on Fernando and 
his followers. Labelling Fernando as a member of the opposition was, to some 
extent, Baptista’s strategy to gain government support. Rather than being a 
tool for social harmony and cohesion, the project was politicised and became 
a weapon for contestation, conflicts and disintegration.  
Following the contestations, the demands were channelled to CVM and 
it finally decided to build a hospital (a first-aid building) and buy a canoe. At 
last, the project was now owned by the common people not in the way it was 
designed by the intervening organizations but in the way the local people 
wanted it to be and fought in the arena to accomplish it. The project shifted 
from its initial focus on flood preparedness to people’s everyday lives.  
The  appropriation of the project by ordinary people suggests that 
although local people may have appeared weak and voiceless in reality they 
had agency to an extent that they took the project to fit their needs.  
 
THE PROJECT AND THE 2007 FLOODING  
 
In the previous sections, I have discussed how the project was appropriated 
locally and responded to everyday concerns. But the major concern still 
remains. Was the project useful for real disaster situations? To answer this 
question I will take the 2007 flooding as the critical event to analyze if the 
project managed to strengthen local capacity for disaster risk reduction. For 
this purpose I will focus on three project intervention areas: (i) the 
dissemination of information about flooding, (ii) helping people to evacuate 
and, (iii) find accommodation.   
 
Information on floods.  Information on flooding may come from different 
sources including environmental cues, family, friends, government officials, 
radios, newspapers, local chiefs among others. In Cocorico 62 percent out of 
the 84 interviewed households got information from the radio and only 4 
percent of them were informed by local committee members and 6 percent 
from local leaders (table 4.1. below). This suggests that local leaders and 
members of the local disaster management committee, especially the person 
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 By 2007 RENAMO was the major opposition party in Mozambique 
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responsible for warning, had little role in informing people. There are 
different reasons to explain this state of affairs. The committee was created 
just for the flooding period and 4 years went by without a flood occurring; 
there were no refreshing events and some members moved out of the 
community in the mean time. By the time the flooding period came to the 
fore, the megaphones had no batteries, making them useless.  
 
 
Source: Author based on fieldwork data 
 
When questioned which radios were used as a source of information, one 
third of the interviewed mentioned the Red Cross free player radios (table 4.2. 
below).  Radios distributed by the Red Cross have thus played a role in 
informing people about the floods. People praised these radios essentially 
because of two things: (i) the radio does not require a battery, which would be 
costly, and (ii) they are made of sturdy components and are therefore durable- 
after all these years, most of the radios are still functioning. Nonetheless, 
despite early warning on flooding by radio, many people did not evacuate but 
some were forced to evacuate by the authorities meaning that the decision to 
evacuate is complex and beyond providing information (see chapter 6). 
 
 
Source: Author based on fieldwork data 
 
Helping people to evacuate. During the project implementation escape routes 
and safe places were identified.  Members of the committee were supposed to 
help people escape safely from Cocorico to the identified safe places using the 
material from the provided kit. This is by and large how CBDRM appeared to 
work in the Philippines. I had about one month exposure and experience with 
disaster management practices in the Philippines from 30 October to 26 
November 2006  (see methodology, chapter 1) and during this period I 
Table 4.1: Major information source regarding the 2007 flooding 
2 2.4
2 2.4
52 61.9
3 3.6
5 6.0
20 23.8
84 100.0
Personal experience
Neighbors 
Radio 
Local disaster committee
Local leaders
Others 
Total 
Frequency Percentage 
Table 4.2. Radio used as the source of information regarding the 2007 flooding 
29 34.5 
27 32.1 
28 33.3 
84 100.0 
Distributed by Red Cross
Personal/bought myself 
No idea 
 Total 
  Frequency Percentage 
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attended a drill at Barangay Ilog, Infanta District. Before the drill, escape 
routes were set out and some people were assigned to help the evacuees to a 
safe accommodation point. The routes were well marked roads, large enough 
to allow cars to pass.  The assistants that included local committee members 
and volunteers from the Philippine Red Cross had training on a broad range 
of issues including first aid and nutrition. But how does it apply to Cocorico’s 
context? 
To analyse it, we need to elaborate on three major assumptions 
supporting the approach. Firstly, the approach assumes that there are people 
in need of external help. Secondly, there is a need for an escape route and 
thirdly, that there is a need to identify collective accommodation/safe place. 
Analyzing how the approach applies to Cocorico’s context, therefore, means 
looking at how these three assumptions are valid for that context.   
 
Need for external help:  In the previous chapter, I have described how a 
group interdependency system has evolved. This has been an adaptation 
mechanism which intermingles short and long-term interests as well as 
economic and social aspects of life saving and livelihood security. I have also 
outlined that the system is eroded and external help is increasingly needed. 
However, external help for evacuation faces different challenges in 
Cocorico. Firstly, evacuation is a delicate process because people aim to 
secure both, life and livelihoods, in the short and long term (see chapter 6). 
Secondly, by the time of flooding in 2007, the committee had passed through 
different transformations including mobility of the members and it was no 
longer clear who was responsible for what. This added to the grievances 
between committee members and the volunteers. Committee members 
complained that volunteers had periodic incentives which they did not have 
themselves, as such they thought that volunteers should carry out the task of 
helping the people to evacuate. Thus, the conflict between the two groups 
produced a gap in the responsibility for evacuation. Thirdly, in contrast to the 
Philippines, where households live in close neighbourhoods, in Cocorico 
households are scattered in heavy shrub area. Thus, although people may 
have required help for evacuating, the physical environment made the task of 
helping each household evacuate almost impossible, if they had ever tried.  
 
Need for escape route. In the Philippine context, escape routs are 
designed to facilitate the rescue operations. It is by following the escape 
routes that rescue teams help people evacuate quickly from the hazardous 
areas. People usually follow these routes which are, to a large extent, very 
visible tracks and are accessible by cars or other means of transportation.  In 
the Cocorico case indeed, escape routes are much harder to define and to 
follow for different reasons. There are dozens of small tracks normally used 
just for walking. Moreover, some tracks are seasonal. During the dry season, 
there are plenty of tracks but most of them end up disappearing during the 
rainy season. Furthermore, some tracks in Cocorico have a socio-economic, 
symbolic and cultural meaning. There are female tracks, dgira ya acazi, which 
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women use when going to bathe and males are not allowed to usethem. There 
are also male tracks, dgira ya amuna, used for what is considered to be 
uniquely a male business such as hunting for which women are not welcome. 
Some tracks cut across agricultural fields, backyards, sacred places and their 
use requires negotiation and permission. Some people - either males or 
females - have their own private tracks guiding them to still unknown 
(natural) resources which they do not want to disclose at household or 
community level.  In such complexity, defining the escape route is not as simple 
as it seems to be in the Philippines.  
To avoid confusing each other, people in Cocorico prefer to identify a 
meeting point rather than a specific route. This is what they also do during 
flooding periods. When this is the case, the local primary schools are the 
agreed meeting points when things turn for the worse.  Finally, we should 
attempt to ask ourselves why people should be squeezed to follow one route. 
For rescue operations, it may pay off but one route tends to reduce people’s 
freedom of choice and, in the case of Cocorico, their flexibility to respond to 
different socio-economic and cultural demands. A contextual analysis is 
therefore required and the CBDRM toolbox needs to be adjusted according to 
each context.  
 
Need for transportation and collective safer places.  Means of transportation 
and safe places are required during disaster periods. Nevertheless, what 
means a safe place and what and when to take transportation is a complex 
decision making process. Different factors play a role in choosing the means 
of transportation and the safe place (see chapter 6 for full discussion).  In the 
meantime, it is worth to realise that in Cocorico a large majority evacuated 
using local canoes.  The CVM project also helped people in the evacuation 
process. Locals suggested that the canoe bought by CVM was used to 
evacuate people from Cuara to the school in Sanguimbe, and then some 
people were also evacuated to Chupanga using the same canoe.   
Concerning the safe places, they must not just accommodate people 
and be physically safe but they need as well to be economically and socially 
rewarding. Places are therefore chosen from an objective and subjective 
evaluation in terms of their relevance in saving lives and livelihood in the 
short and long term. The project identified different safe places within the 
communities and outside it - Nhalubhanda, Nhamiala and Tchulu tchinampala- 
but while the exercise appeared to fulfil the objectives of the project, it had no 
real relevance to disaster management at local level.  None of the interviewed 
used these places during the evacuation. Chapter 6 will discuss at length the 
evacuation process and as we shall see, evacuation involves hierarchies and 
people tend to choose the means of transportation and the safe place. 
 
To conclude this section on the project and its relevance for the 2007 flooding, 
it appears that radios and canoes played a positive role. Radios provided 
information and canoes means of transportation for evacuation. Nonetheless, 
these tools are part of a complex process of decision making involving 
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different actors, interests, expectations and contradictions. Their availability is 
not in itself a guarantee that people will make use of them. Further, it appears 
that projects have to take cognisance of the everyday local practices and 
attempt to link normalcy with crisis if that distinction is to be made. In 
Cocorico radios and canoes played a positive role partly because, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, they are part of the everyday life either in times of 
normalcy or crisis.      
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter started by questioning how planned CBDRM is perceived and 
acted upon by different actors at different levels and  how it works or can 
work in practice to strengthen local capacity to adapt to climate related 
natural hazards and secure livelihoods. From the evidence presented 
throughout the chapter it is undeniable that CBDRM is a complex and 
dynamic process, embedded in different politics, narratives, interests and 
power relations. To understand the process and outcomes we need, on the 
one hand, to disclose the project from the viewpoint of its implementing 
agency, to unravel the (re)definition of the project among staff to fit their 
understanding and, on the other, to disclose the project from the perspective 
of community dynamics.  
 Within CVM, the project was welcomed mainly as part of their survival 
strategies. But once a project starts, it does not exclude internal power 
relations, contestations and project redefinition. In the chapter, I have detailed 
how CVM staff contested ownership and used different overt and covert 
strategies to show their disagreement to the funding agency. Nonetheless, 
project outcomes are also heavily related to the internal processes of staff 
recruitment, training, and the competition between different departments for 
funding and showing the outputs. In particular, I have highlighted processes, 
which tend to perpetuate the image of CVM as having lack of capacity for 
designing, implementing and evaluating projects.  
      Overall, it appeared that CVM survival over time depended on a balanced 
relationship with the national government, local actors and with its 
international donors. With the national government CVM places itself 
between dependency and independency. Depending on the context CVM 
may call upon the Red Cross principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
independency, voluntarity, unicity and universality or claim its role as state 
supporter and its umbilical link with the government to access government 
support. With the international donors, CVM has mainly applied the ‘sit back 
and take it’ approach in that less criticism is levelled at donors and in doing 
so, donors keep pouring in the financial resources which CVM needs for its 
survival. Nonetheless, the ‘sit back and take it’ approach does not necessarily 
mean lack of contradiction and contestations. Overt and covert contestation is 
part of the everyday interaction of donors and CVM, especially when one gets 
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far from the headquarters in Maputo. What appears is a process by which 
contestation is kept at levels that do not hamper funding. 
  At the community level I have shown the following processes: firstly, 
the definitions of communities may be squeezed, enlarged or split depending 
on what external actors want to achieve. As such, perceiving communities as 
defined by clear geographical boundaries is misleading. Moreover 
communities are not homogeneous and people do not share similar values 
and objectives. Thus, the concept becomes a virtual label relevant mainly for 
intervention purposes.  
Secondly, there is no universal CBDRM. It appears that in Cocorico the 
blue print experience from the Philippines was not fully applicable. Escape 
routes and identified safe places were, to a large extent, useless for the local 
context. This suggests that before carrying a CBDRM a critical evaluation of 
the local context and of the approach to follow is highly recommended.  
Thirdly, external interventions such as CBDRM may disaggregate the 
community and reinforce power inequalities. By empowering some groups 
and excluding others either overtly or covertly the CBDRM, instead of 
working as a unifying tool, may disaggregate or produce conflicts within the 
‘communities’ where it is being implemented. 
Fourthly, tools for everyday use such as canoes, radios and stretchers 
were the most relevant compared to those designed just for the disaster event. 
Parallel to that, due to its ‘flood’ character, the committees ended up being 
useless for people’s most pressing and everyday needs. This suggests that 
disaster reduction interventions which focus on everyday risks are more 
likely to be relevant if compared to those designed just for the disaster events 
themselves. Thus, long-term support needs to be accompanied with short-
term benefits and everyday needs. Although people have long term 
objectives, under extreme poverty conditions such as in Cocorico, people are, 
to a large extent, looking for everyday needs and interventions that may 
respond to them. 
Fifthly, we need to be cautious on the assumptions that local leaders 
are the key for interventions success. This assumption ignores that the leaders 
may have their own agendas that may be contested by the locals. Further, it 
ignores that any intervention is subject to local (re)configuration and power 
relations. This chapter has shown the process of project capture by the local 
elite and the process of contestation and project reconfiguration by local 
people. 
Finally, the impacts of the planned adaptation and CBDRM depend not 
much on how the proponents designed and fed it with appropriate resources 
but on how the different actors appropriate or misappropriate the approach 
during its implementation. The critical point lies therefore on a proper, critical 
and open mind monitoring of the process and outcomes over time. The 
classical linear planning- implementation and evaluation cycle seems to be 
inappropriate in highly disaster-prone, diverse and complex regions such as 
Cocorico.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE 2007 FLOODING ON THE ZAMBEZI DELTA AND THE 
HUMANITARIAN ARENA  
 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have discussed the adaptive capacity of local 
people on the Zambezi delta, their limitations and the interventions aiming to 
strengthen it. How does the adaptive capacity work in practice and how do 
actors from the different domains of disaster response interact in a real 
‘disaster’ scenario? This chapter and the next two address these questions for 
the 2007 flooding on the Zambezi delta.  When I started my research 
fieldwork in January 2007, it coincided with the beginning of  flooding on the 
Zambezi delta.  The Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) – research partner - was 
involved in relief aid and we took this as a research and learning opportunity 
to document CVM interventions in disaster contexts. However, I took the 
flooding as an opportunity to follow different actors (beside CVM) across 
different encounters of disaster response.  
Over the past years, humanitarianism has undergone considerable 
shifts worldwide. Most remarkably, the number of humanitarian actors has 
grown exponentially. From 1997 to 2005 the total amount of field based aid 
workers has increased by 77 percent with UN growth of 54 percent, IFRC by 
74 percent and international NGOs by 91 percent (Borton, 2009:8). On 
average, the humanitarian fieldwork population has increased by 
approximately 6 percent per year over the past 10 years (Harvey et al.; 
2010:18). This has partly happened because many organizations, created and 
conceived with other purposes in mind, have taken on some form of work 
related to humanitarian action.  
Regardless of their motivations which may include the search for 
public legitimacy, pure image, simple opportunism, or the diversification of 
the supplies of resources, these shifts mean that the subject of humanitarian 
aid has increasingly become more complex. It has become characterized by 
competition, fluid roles and interests, confusion, the squandering of resources, 
power relations and even the questioning of basic humanitarian principles 
such as neutrality and the respect for national sovereignty (Rey, 2001; Leader, 
2002; Hilhorst, 2007; Harvey et al., 2010). In this context, the question is what 
emerges out of the interaction between that amalgam of actors with different 
worldviews, interests and power relations?  
The present chapter discusses the interaction between the national 
government, UN agencies and NGOs (with a focus on CVM) while providing 
humanitarian aid to the affected people. I leave for the time being the local 
actors and their response for the next chapters. In doing so, this chapter is 
built around the two major domains of disaster response (the international 
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domain and the domain of disaster governance) conceptualized in chapter 1. 
Throughout the chapter, I claim that humanitarian assistance to the 2007 flood 
affected people was, in practice, an arena where different actors with different 
and sometimes diverging interests interacted. In this arena of contestations, 
power conflicts and negotiations, neither the process nor the outcomes 
followed in a straightforward manner the blueprint of project programming 
or the humanitarian guiding principles. The process and the outcomes, as put 
forth by Hilhorst and Jansen (2010), depended much on how different actors 
in the arena viewed and interpreted the context including how they perceived 
each other.  
As we shall see, in responding to the 2007 flooding in Mozambique, the 
international community attempted to take the leadership and the 
coordination of the humanitarian response. This was related to different 
factors, including their ‘crystallized’ perception of lack of national and local 
capacity discussed in chapter 2 and the desire to try the newly reformed 
‘Cluster Approach’. This brought in contradictions and power conflicts 
between the different actors in the arena. There were contradictions and 
power conflicts between the national government and UN agencies, within 
the UN agencies themselves and, between UN agencies and NGOs in general.  
Nonetheless, despite the attempts by the international community to 
take the leadership, the national government led the humanitarian response. 
Government leadership appeared indeed as an emerging property from the 
processes of contestation and social negotiation in the arena, especially 
following attempts to implement, for the first time, the Cluster Approach. 
Finally, I analyse the responses of the CVM and claim that its response was 
conditioned on the one hand by the multiple demands and limited resources 
to respond to them and, on the other, to internal dynamics between the 
different layers of the organization.   
The present chapter sustains the claim that the processes and the 
outcomes of humanitarian response cannot be taken for granted. The 
processes and the outcomes of humanitarian response emerge from the 
interfaces between different actors in the humanitarian arena and their social 
negotiations. This is so, because during the humanitarian response different 
actors with different roles, power and interests meet, dispute and negotiate 
the processes in a permanent flux of covert or overt contestation leading in 
most of the cases to unforeseen outcomes. To unlock these everyday practices 
this chapter follows the actors in the arena.  
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THE ARENA: THE 2007 FLOODING ON THE DELTA ZAMBEZI AND 
ACTORS INVOLVED 
 
In 2007 the rainy season was marked by heavy rainfall in central Mozambique 
and in some of the neighbouring countries forcing, to some extent, the 
opening of the Kariba and Cahora Bassa dams upstream of the Zambezi delta. 
The combination of rainfall, dam management and environmental 
degradation on the Zambezi basin resulted in a rise in the levels of the 
Zambezi River and eventually flooding downstream. On February 8, the 
water flow peaked at 10,404 m3/s, submerging considerably, low-lying areas 
along the Zambezi River. The flooding was gradual and there were no 
casualties. According to the government of Mozambique, the flooding 
affected up to 285,000 people and displaced approximately 163,045 on the 
Zambezi delta (INGC, 2007).  
Floods are, as presented earlier, a common feature of the Zambezi delta 
and the 2007 flooding was not the worst in the Zambezi delta history (see 
chapter 3). Although flooding may cause human suffering through 
displacement and loss of assets, they may also bring a bonanza. The 
importance of flooding in terms of agriculture, livestock and fishing purposes 
are widely mentioned in the literature. Seasonal flooding deposits alluvial 
soils rich in nutrients that allow the growth of a variety of crops and the 
maintenance or improvement of livestock and fishing grounds. These factors, 
which were the basis of the Egyptian civilization, have been already pointed 
out to explain settlement patterns along present-day lowlands (Rahman, 1996; 
Rita-Ferreira, 1999; INGC, 2006)  
Due to that ambiguity of suffering and bonanza and the amalgam of 
factors involved there has been a long debate between two competing 
approaches on flood management in Mozambique. Some scholars and 
practitioners defend what I call the ‘living with floods approach’, which 
stresses the need to develop flood management practices that allow people to 
live in flood prone areas and to take advantages emerging from the flooding 
events. This includes the development of early warning systems and 
awareness, means of evacuation and the mapping of safe zones. The major 
argument from the defendants of this approach is that in contexts such as 
Mozambique where living in the flood-prone areas is not so much a matter of 
choice but rather a matter of poverty which allows people few other choices it 
is hard to suggest alternative options. In Mozambique, the UN-HABITAT and 
some donors such as DFID have promoted this approach.  
On the other hand, there is what I call the ‘flood free approach’ which 
stresses the need to resettle people living on the floodplains. The argument is 
that living on the floodplains poses higher risks on human life and impinges 
higher costs for the government and international community on assistance.  
Moreover, the defendants of this approach argue that allowing people to live 
on the floodplains promotes the moral hazard. People play down the risks 
expecting that the government and international community will come to 
their aid. The government of Mozambique has followed this approach. It is 
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keen on resettling flood-affected people (see chapter 7). As we shall see, the 
2007 flood offered a testing ground for these different claims to re-surface.   
The 2007 flooding appeared as an arena where an amalgam of 
approaches and interests from different actors surfaced. At the height of 
humanitarian assistance, about 50 NGOs (international and local) and 19 
other key actors were directly involved in humanitarian aid, influencing, to a 
greater or lesser extent, the processes and the outcomes (see annex 4). In their 
interactions, as we shall see next, contradictions and social negotiations 
become part of everyday practices of humanitarian assistance. It is within this 
arena of different actors that the humanitarian response to the 2007 flooding 
in Mozambique has to be conceptualized and analysed. I will now turn to a 
comprehensive discussion on responses by the government of Mozambique, 
by UN agencies and by the Mozambican Red Cross. I focus on these actors for 
practical reasons1 and due to their relevance for the present thesis which 
attempts to understand disaster response from the domains of governance, 
international and local actors. The local domain appeared to be rather too 
complex on its own, deserving as such a different chapter (next chapter).    
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE 2007 FLOODING: LEADERSHIP AS 
AN EMERGING PROPERTY 
 
The response by the government of Mozambique evolved around two distinct 
but interlocked processes. The first relates to processes within the government 
and the second to processes of interaction with other actors in the arena. 
 
(1) government agency in responding to the 2007 flooding 
 
The government of Mozambique is, as presented in chapter 2, portrayed as 
very weak and, largely, unable to manage by itself the natural hazards and 
disasters affecting the country. This perception, as we shall see, was evident 
during the 2007 flooding and led to the UN agencies’ attempt to take the 
leadership in coordinating the humanitarian response. Nonetheless, current 
practices seem to challenge that perception.  
From the beginning of 2005, the government started to strengthen its 
political and financial commitment for disaster management. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the government approved, in 2006, a Disaster Management Master 
Plan outlining major strategies and activities for disaster risk reduction. It also 
undertook administrative and financial reforms within the National Institute 
for Disaster Management (INGC). It hired new staff including a new national 
director of the INGC and tended to allocate more financial resources.  
In October 2006, the government released a disaster contingency plan 
for the year 2007 amounting to 20.2 million USD and allocated nearly 5 
million USD for it- a record amount ever disbursed by the government for 
                                                 
1
 It is just impossible to follow, at length, each individual actor. The idea of domains is proposed to 
avoid following single actors involved in humanitarian aid. 
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contingency plans. Expecting flooding, INGC undertook a flood-response 
drill exercise on October 6 involving its staff, military forces, police forces, fire 
fighters, staff from CVM, staff from GTZ and local people.  By early 2007, the 
government had established three regional Emergency Operative Centres 
CENOE) and furnished them with staff and equipment. This strengthened the 
early warning system and communication lines considerably. Moreover, 
different agreements with different partners were signed to oversee specific 
tasks. For instance INGC has an agreement with military forces and CVM to 
oversee rescue operations under the umbrella of the National Unit for Civil 
Protection (UNAPROC-Unidade Nacional de Protecção Civil).  UNAPROC 
undertakes rescue operations while CENOE oversees the general emergency 
operations involving primarily communication lines and decision-making 
process. All these reforms were put into action during the 2007 flooding.  
The 2007 flooding started to affect badly the country by mid January 
and became worse in the Zambezi delta by the beginning of February when 
the threshold level for evacuation was reached on the river gauging stations. 
On February 4, the government issued a red alert and people living or 
working in the low-lying areas along the Zambezi River were advised to 
evacuate. As part of the red alert, the government started deploying a large 
number of staff from INGC and other government institutions, such as the 
Ministry of Health, to oversee the situation in Caia district where the 
humanitarian response was to be coordinated. Caia, along the Zambezi delta, 
hosts one of the CENOE and became the hub of the humanitarian response. 
On February 7, the country’s Prime Minister visited the Zambezi delta and 
had a brief meeting with INGC and other staff present in Caia. The following 
day she ordered that, in order to save lives, the army should forcibly evacuate 
people who had continued to defy instructions given on February 4. 
UNAPROC forces were sent on a coercive search and rescue mission. 
To accommodate the evacuees, the government created 54 
accommodation and resettlement centres. To oversee the situation, highly 
ranked staff from the government including ministers and the general 
director of INGC, moved from the capital city of Maputo and settled in Caia 
district to speed up decision making processes and reinforce the 
government’s commitment to disaster management. Finally, on February 27, 
2007 the government lifted the red alert and moved to resettlement and 
recovery (discussed at length in chapter 7). 
The overall response by the government was highly praised by the 
national and international community to an extent that some authors (i.e. 
Foley, 2007:2) and donor agencies (i.e. USAID)2 proposed that the 
Mozambique’s disaster management system could become a model for 
development of disaster response strategies by other countries. To many 
observers, contrary to previous disaster events in Mozambique, the 
government had been able this time to take the leadership and coordinate the 
humanitarian effort with success. It was acknowledged that this was the 
result of the recent changes, improvements and commitments by the national 
                                                 
2
 Jay Knott, USAID representative in Mozambique,  March 6, 2007  
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government, especially the leadership of the INGC general director (Foley, 
2007:28).     
 
(2) Interfaces and leadership as an emerging property 
   
In the preceding paragraphs, I have outlined structural changes that took 
place within the government which contributed to some extent to the general 
positive governmental response to the flooding. However, to claim that the 
response could be attributed to the national government agency would 
overlook processes in the arena of disaster response where the government 
response was contextualized. In this section, I will discuss three major aspects 
which allowed the Mozambican government to emerge, as the key, central 
and leading actor for the first time in the history of disaster management in 
Mozambique. These comprise: 
a. The new national discourse on self-reliance and self-esteem  
b. The introduction of the UN Cluster Approach 
c. The everyday practices at field level    
 
a. The ‘new’ discourse on self-reliance and self-esteem 
 
One of the most striking practices during the 2007 flooding and interface 
between government and the international community was government’s 
refusal to officially appeal internationally. Contrary to previous disaster 
events where issuing an international appeal was a common practice, this 
time the government decided to appeal for national solidarity and self-
reliance. This was a discourse brought in by the new president elected in 2005.  
The president and other senior governmental staff appeared on 
television and radio during the flooding, to ask for national humanitarian 
action, stating that Mozambique needs to learn to deal with disasters by itself. 
A nation-wide ‘civil society’ campaign called Mozambique for Mozambique 
Moçambique por Moçambique was launched and songs, advertisements and talk 
shows appealing for national solidarity and self-reliance were broadcasted 
almost everyday by the mass media (see annex 4 for details). Different 
‘humanitarian’ organizations, private companies and individuals participated 
in solidarity activities to mobilize material and financial resources in an 
unprecedented manner. The collected resources were largely deployed to 
INGC3. Thus, to withhold an international appeal tended to foster national 
solidarity.  
The lack of an international appeal produced dubious but positive 
results for the national government in its interaction with international actors. 
On the one hand it created confusion amongst donors on how to best respond 
to the flooding leading to different donors responding independently from 
one another and at different times (Foley; 2007:29). That indeed pushed 
further the need of a coordinating entity and national government was called 
in to play a central role.  
                                                 
3
 INGC General Director interview to a local television station (TVM), February 22, 2007 
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On the other hand, the lack of a governmental international appeal 
opened a window for (national and) international ‘humanitarian’ 
organizations to mobilize funds from donors and implement interventions. 
For example, based on a country analysis IFRC made a flash appeal, on 
February 16, for nearly 6 million USD. By February 20, the European Union 
pledged 2 million Euros and up to the end of February the UN country office 
had mobilized 8 million USD4. By March 12, about 19 organizations had 
appealed for more than 26 million USD (table 5.1 below). On March 13 the 
government was claimed that national and international response to the 
flooding totalled nearly 15 million USD excluding its own contribution5. 
Hence, even without launching an international appeal, the international 
community ‘pumped’ in resources that were used by the appealing 
organizations to implement interventions and, to some extent, strengthen 
them. 
As different actors-the civil society, (I)NGOs and UN agencies- were 
already making appeals and mobilizing funds the government was released 
from the need to make an international appeal and from the burden of fund 
mobilization6. This gave the government the space to focus attention on 
coordination and leadership.   
 
Table 5.1: Appeal by organizations 
 
Organization  Amount appealed (in US$) 
Actionaid 75,000 
Concern 144,870 
CVM 100,000 
Daikonie Emergency Aid 738,714 
DWHH 432,400 
FAO 2,942,929 
FFHI 111,000 
IOM 1,812,000 
MDM 120,000 
OCHA 157,000 
SC Alliance  987,670 
UNDP 1,120,834 
UNESCO 356,370 
UNFPA 931,872 
UN-Habitat 393,030 
UNICEF 7,128,968 
WFP 18,888,812 
WHO 1,547,472 
WV 690,000 
Total 26,582,033 
Source: OCHA financial tracking service in: www.reliefweb.int/fts  accessed March 30, 2007 
                                                 
4
 Notícias newspaper March 1,  2007 
5
 Government of Mozambique, Press release March 13, 2007 
6
 The scale of the flooding, considered by some as small (i.e Cosgrave et al., 2007) influenced as well 
the need for official international appeal.   
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b. The introduction of the United Nations’ (UN) cluster approach   
 
The United Nations’ response to crisis has been under constant criticism and 
metamorphosis. By 1990, 23 different Humanitarian instruments were 
codified, ratified and institutionalized by the UN (Weiss and Collins, 2000:19). 
Nonetheless, it was not until 1991 that the UN council under the General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 of December 19 approved the general guiding 
humanitarian principles. In June 1992, the UN established the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) with the mandate to oversee the 46/182 
Resolution, develop humanitarian policies, identify and address gaps in 
humanitarian response and agree with different agencies on a clear division 
of responsibilities for humanitarian response. Under the IASC, humanitarian 
reform was initiated leading to the setting up of the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998 and a number of 
evaluations on UN Humanitarian response to crisis. 
 Overall, the lack of clear and decisive authority to coordinate the UN 
response appeared to be one of the major weak points on the UN global 
Humanitarian response (Rey, 2001: 104). This was very evident during the UN 
response to the 2004 tsunami in Asia where the unprecedented resource flows 
led to dispersed and uncoordinated interventions with donors and their 
partners competing to spend money more quickly with little attention being 
paid to national and local capacity, to issues of social inequalities, exclusion, 
marginalization and hierarchy (TEC, 2006).    
In order to overcome, at least in part, this lack of leadership and 
authority within the UN Humanitarian response, IASC established, in 2005, a 
Cluster Approach and a Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). The major 
objective of the Cluster Approach and CERF funding mechanisms is better 
coordination of the international humanitarian aid, in so doing making the 
international humanitarian response faster, efficient, accountable, and 
predictable and with clear leads (IASC, 2006:2). In September 2005 IASC 
agreed on cluster leads7 and in November 2006, IASC released a guidance 
note on how to use the Cluster Approach. In short, the guidance recommends 
wide-range consultation nationwide and internationally: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 By 2005, 9 clusters were rolled out with the following leads: Nutrition- UNICEF; Logistics- WFP; 
Health- WHO; WASH- UNICEF; Emergency Shelter- UNHCR/IFRC; Camp Management- 
UNHCR/IOM; Protection-UNICEF; Emergency Telecommunications- OCHA/WFP/UNICEF; Early 
Recovery-UNDP 
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‘In the event of a sudden new emergency requiring a multi-sectoral response 
with the participation of a wide range of international humanitarian actors, the 
Cluster Approach should be used from the start in planning and organizing the 
international response. The Humanitarian Coordinator should consult all relevant 
partners at the country level and make proposals regarding the designation of any 
new cluster/sector lead, if possible within the first 24 hours. Following the 
consultation with the Humanitarian Coordinator, the Emergency Relief Coordinator 
should consult global cluster leads and other lead agencies at the global level on the 
designation of the country level cluster leads for the emergency in question. The 
Emergency Relief Coordinator is responsible for ensuring that agreement is reached 
on appropriate country-level and that this decision is communicated without delay to 
all relevant Humanitarian partners as well as donors and other stakeholders. The 
Humanitarian Coordinator should in turn inform the host government and 
humanitarian partners at the Country level of the agreed arrangement (IASC, 
2006:6).    
  
The UN response to the 2007 flooding was largely based on these later 
developments, especially on the use of the Cluster Approach and CERF 
funding mechanisms, even though, as we shall see, the core recommendation 
of broad consultation was poorly implemented. Chronologically and in brief, 
the UN response may be outlined as follows: On January 26, a team from 
WFP visited the Zambezi delta and based on their inputs, OCHA issued the 
first flood situation report. The OCHA report warned against potentially 
heavy flooding on the Zambezi delta and the need for international actors to 
be ready to respond (OCHA, 2007).  
When the water level continued to rise, UNICEF, which has a country 
office and had been following the event informally, discussed with INGC, on 
February 1, the potential use of the Cluster Approach. When the government 
issued the red alert on February 4, the UN Disaster Management Team 
(UNDMT) met on the following day (February 5) and decided to recommend 
to the UN Country Resident Representative – the Humanitarian Coordinator-  
a CERF funding application and the adoption of the Cluster Approach in 
Mozambique (Cosgrave et al., 2007:62).   
On Thursday, February 8 the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) 
met to analyse the UN response to the flooding and the recommendations 
from the UNDMT were approved. To initiate the Cluster approach, a CERF 
application and to set up a Humanitarian Country Team, the UNCT requested 
OCHA-Geneva for support. On Saturday, February 10, an OCHA officer 
arrived from Geneva and on Sunday, February 2007, the OCHA officer met 
with the UNDMT to establish the Humanitarian Country Team, the Cluster 
Approach and for preparing the CERF appeal. On Monday, February 12, the 
OCHA officer and the UNICEF representative briefed the Cluster Approach 
to NGOs in a meeting held at the UN office. In the meeting, 11 clusters and 
leads were rolled out (table 5.2 below). Finally, on February 14, the UN 
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Humanitarian Coordinator- presented, officially, the Cluster Approach and 
the leads to the donors and, to the government of Mozambique8.   
  
Table 5.2: cluster roles and leaders during the 2007 flooding on the delta Zambezi   
 
Cluster  Leader Enrolled participants later on 
Nutrition UNICEF Save the Children, WHO, FAO, WFP, Care, 
World Vision, FHI, World Relief, Samaritan’s 
Pursue International Relief, UNAIDS 
Medicins Sans Frontieres 
Logistics WFP UNICEF, UNDP, IOM, IFRC, Africare, , 
Cafod, CEDES, Care, Jacana, CUAMM, CVM, 
EC, FHI, Humedica, German Agro Action, 
LWF/ACT, Samaritan’s Pursue International 
Relief, Save the Children, UNOCHA, USAID, 
World Vision, HelpAge, Kulima, Oxfam, 
Italian Embassy, INGC, CVM 
Water, Sanitation 
and Hygiene 
UNICEF Oxfam, Samaritan’s Pursue International 
Relief, Medicins Sans Frontieres, IRD, FHI, 
Concern, IFRC, CVM, Spanish Red Cross, 
World Vision, German Agro Action, USAID 
Health WHO Medicus Mundi, World Vision, NAFEZA, 
TRIMODER, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNAIDS 
Shelter IFRC/CVM Habitat for Humanity, German Agro Action, 
Samaritan’s Pursue International Relief, 
UNICEF, Kulima, IOM, UNDP, UN Habitat 
Protection Save the 
Children/UNIC
EF 
World Vision, UNFPA, Unesco, WFP, 
Africare, Samaritan’s Pursue International 
Relief, ActionAid, Concern, Halo Trust, 
ASADEC, ASVIMO, CVM, HelpAge, Terre 
des Hommes, Rede Came, Rede da Criança, 
FHI 
Education Save the 
Children/UNIC
EF 
World Vision, Concern, Unesco, Africare, 
Samaritan’s Pursue International Relief, ICS, 
ActionAid 
Food Security WFP/FAO IRD, SCA, World Vision, World Relief, 
CEDES, ADMR, FHI, German Agro Action, 
Caritas, IMVF, CVM, Kulima, ActionAid, 
Africare, Concern, Cafod, Fewsnet, IRD, 
Oikos, USAID 
Emergency 
Telecommunicatio
ns  
WFP Télécoms Sans Frontières, Oxfam, Unicef, 
SRSA 
Camp 
Management 
IOM INGC, CVM, IFRC, UN Habitat 
Early recovery UNDP All partners 
Source: OCHA (2007a: 5) 
 
                                                 
8
 Compiled from Cosgrave et al, 2007; Foley, 2007; UNCT, 2007; OCHA, 2007, Sasin, 2008 
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The implementation of the Cluster Approach in Mozambique raises a number 
of issues:  
 
(i) A solution waiting for a problem: from the description presented above, it 
appears that the Cluster Approach was looking for an opportunity to be 
implemented. Even before the government judged the situation as critical and 
declared the red alert, the UNICEF representative was already looking for 
prospects to implement the Cluster Approach. Further, the easy and quick 
way the UNDMT recommended the approach on February 5, the following 
day after the red alert was issued, stresses the pre-existing intention to apply 
the approach. The endorsement on February 8 and the quick call to Geneva 
for OCHA support in implementing the approach without proper 
consultation with national humanitarian partners and the government further 
underpins this claim of an existing solution awaiting a problem.      
 
(ii) Continuities in practice despite changes in discourses. As seen above, 
the Cluster Approach was envisaged by the UN country team without prior 
consultation with the national authorities. The government of Mozambique 
was formally informed about the decision to implement the Cluster Approach 
only after the UN had requested support from OCHA in Geneva and had 
rolled out the Clusters. According to the UNCT (2007:10) the need to respond 
quickly to the flooding led to lower awareness raising and to a poor 
understanding of the approach by the partners. Hence, events overtook the 
process of communicating the objectives and modalities of the Cluster 
Approach (ibid).  
By ‘jumping’ into the response and rolling out the clusters, the 
international actors displayed their perception of the disaster management of 
the national government as very weak. This attitude cannot be blamed 
entirely on the UN system. The representation of ‘weak disaster victims in a 
weak state’ is often consensual among national and international 
organizations and donors to enter the arena of humanitarian relief and 
proclaim their legitimacy. However, the result is a return back to similar 
problems which called for the set up of the cluster approach such as little 
attention being paid to national and local capacity, ownership, to issues of 
social inequalities, exclusion and marginalization as noticed in the UN 
response to the Tsunami in 2004. Further, in the case of Mozambique it did 
create resentment with the implementing agencies of the government. One 
high-ranking staff member from the INGC put his dislike to the UN approach 
in the following terms: 
 
‘Lets suppose that the Mozambican embassy in the United States decides to help the 
Americans fight terrorism and, decides to create its own structure over there. Finally when 
the structure is ready it goes to the US government and informs it had created a parallel 
structure to fight terrorism in US. How do you think the American government would react 
to that? Is this a wise and responsible way of dealing with other nations’ problems?’9 
                                                 
9
 Interview in Caia, February 18, 2007 
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The UN approach did not only bypass the government but it also resulted in 
double lines of command and coordination. In Caia, international 
organizations were coordinated by UN agencies at what was known as ‘the 
UN house’ while national government and non-governmental institutions 
were being coordinated mainly by INGC at the CENOE office. The 
participation of national organizations including of the INGC at the UN 
meetings was a complete disillusion; they hardly appeared in the UN 
meetings (Foley, 2007: 19). As double lines emerged, contradictions and 
contestations surfaced not only from the part of the government, as the staff 
member quoted above, but also from an array of other actors. In so doing, the 
government of Mozambique slowly came to a position where its leadership 
was called for.  
 
c. The everyday practices at field level  
 
The implementation of the Cluster Approach brought about new dynamics 
and processes to the overall response of the flooding. On the one hand, the 
institutionalization of Cluster Approach and the CERF grants made the 
humanitarian response quicker than it would have been otherwise (Cosgrave 
et al, 2007:37; UNCT, 2007:10). However, it also brought out different 
contradictions, contestations and power relations at the field level (see annex 
4 for details). In this section, I outline three major sets of contradictions and 
contestations that emerged at field level.     
 
(i) Contradictions and power relations between the government and the 
international actors. Contradictions between the government and the UN 
agencies and (I)NGOs tended to be overlooked by the scholars who have 
reported the flooding. The Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation mentioned 
only one contradiction which related to the holding of simultaneous HCT and 
INGC briefings (Cosgrave et al, 2007:51). The other (Foley, 2007:21-22) 
mentioned two contradictions. One was related to the government’s intention 
to implement ‘communal kitchens’ which was not welcomed by the 
international community and another one related to Save the Children’s 
intention to implement a 200,000 USD Cash Transfer project which was not 
welcomed by the government.  
In everyday practice, however, I could observe many contradictions 
between the government and the international community emerging and in 
many issues (covert) negotiations were undertaken. To give an example, on 
February 14, I attended a meeting at the INGC, CENOE office in Caia, that 
was also attended by a team from OCHA. In the meeting OCHA was 
requested by INGC to state what could be expected from them. The OCHA 
representative said they would first make an assessment and later would be 
able to clearly point out what they could do. The INGC director did not agree 
with that approach. He said the government had already made the 
assessment and knew what was needed and where. Despite that, the OCHA 
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team visited  Caia and Mutarara districts the next day and  came up with their 
report.  
The second contradiction on the February 14 meeting emerged when 
the WFP delegate announced that WFP had distributed millet in different 
resettlement centers. This upset the INGC team because on the previous day it 
was decided by INGC that affected people needed ready to eat meals, rather 
than cereals that they would still have to mill. The WFP delegate said they 
were lacking ready to eat meals.  
A third contradiction emerged when the delegate from the Save the 
Children Alliance stated that they would provide a school tent to the Caia 
administration. When this was announced, INGC voiced its disapproval. 
INGC stated that it was not an individual organization’s choice. Rather, the 
INGC knew where specific goods were urgently needed. Therefore, goods 
should be channelled to the INGC, which would dispatch them accordingly. 
In the final part of the meeting INGC asked for a harmonization meeting with 
WFP and other cluster leads. Finally, INGC advised other actors interested in 
the logistics to join a meeting the next day at 9AM.  
In the backstage, national staff members from different organizations 
were in favour of the INGC approach. Some however criticized INGC for its 
practices which gave room for manoeuvre to international actors to act 
independently. INGC staff was, in many cases, accused not to have strong 
voice over the international organizations and to act like a subordinate 
institution. For instance, one noticed that there were no chairs in the room in 
the meeting of February 14, but when the OCHA team arrived, the INGC staff 
managed to find chairs for them. 
There were indeed few open disputes, but to the everyday observer it 
was apparent that irritation and much contestation over approaches and 
leadership occurred. This was not only between the government and 
international actors but also between other actors, including among the UN 
agencies themselves.  
 
(ii) Contradictions and power relations among the UN agencies.  
Contradictions among UN agencies started at the early stage of the 
humanitarian intervention. The WFP and UNICEF designed the CERF 
proposal with little input from the other UN agencies and cluster members 
(Actionaid, 2007:16; Cosgrave et al., 2007:37). Although no open disputes ever 
surfaced between them, it was clear in the field that WFP and UNICEF were 
most visible and commanded much power among the UN agencies. The 
international response to the flooding totalled about 35 millions USD of which 
40 percent was allocated to WFP; 20 percent to UNICEF; 20 percent to the Red 
Cross (Sasin, 2008:195) and the remainder to other agencies and NGOs such as 
IOM, WHO, FAO, UNAIDS, UN Habitat, Actionaid, Care, Oxfam, World 
Vision and eventually to the government10. This created considerable 
competition and power conflicts between the UN agencies themselves.  For 
                                                 
10
 Foley (2007:26) suggests that non of this funding was supplied directly to the government of 
Mozambique, but was instead channeled via humanitarian organizations  
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example, the ‘UN house’ in Caia as well as the helicopter provided by the UN 
system had only the UN and WFP logos (see figure 5.1 below). Backstage, 
staff from the ‘smaller’ UN agencies such as IOM and UN-Habitat contested 
this and complained sometimes about the way WFP treated them. At one 
occasion UN Habitat staff wanted cars for an urgent matter. He sent a request 
to WFP and UNICEF but it was turned down on the basis that the cars were 
busy at that time. He was very upset by this episode11.   
Most of the disputes among the UN agencies were related to control 
over means of transport, especially the helicopters. Although the helicopters 
were supposed to work for a collective agenda, in practice they were 
managed by WFP who tended to fulfil itsown interests first. On February 17 
for instance, WHO had an urgent medical kit to be dispatched to Mutarara 
district but WFP gave priority to food distribution and left the medicine for 
later. The WHO staff in Caia were disappointed.  
 
Figure 5. 1: helicopter with UN and WFP logos 
 
                    
Source: Author 
 
(iii) Contradictions and power relations between UN agencies and NGOs. 
Contradictions between UN agencies and NGOs in general were more overt 
than those amongst UN agencies themselves. Disputes between UN agencies 
and NGOs were derived from different sources. To start with, during the 
emergency operations not all NGOs knew about the Cluster Approach and 
those who knew, not necessarily agreed with it. Furthermore, those who 
agreed with the approach did not necessarily share similar views with the 
cluster leads that were mainly UN agencies.  
Access to funds became another issue of contradiction. NGOs were not 
allowed to apply directly to the UN-CERF funds. According to the CERF 
rules, which have now been modified, NGOs could not get funds directly 
from the CERF but they could apply for funding via UN agencies. Some 
NGOs followed the CERF rules and applied for UN-CERF funds through 
                                                 
11
 Interview, Caia February 19, 2007 
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WFP. However, only the WFP application was funded leaving out the NGOs12 
(Cosgrave et al, 2007:37). The double role of the cluster leaders (coordination 
and implementation) appeared in the eyes of other cluster members as unfair 
competition. Some argued that the cluster leaders used their coordination 
position to favour themselves13. This raised a number of contestations to the 
UN system and their agencies in the field.  
For the majority of cluster members, prospects for CERF funding 
created two major expectations. Firstly, that proposals to CERF would be 
prepared in close collaboration between them and the cluster leads and, 
secondly that funds mobilized by cluster leads would be channelled to them 
to implement the activities on the ground. The second expectation was one of 
the major stimuli for small national NGOs to participate in the clusters14. Both 
expectations failed; CERF proposals had little input from other cluster 
members and the cluster leaders themselves were heavily involved in the 
implementation (Cosgrave et al, 2007:33). This limited the role the small NGOs 
could have played as well as the role of UN agencies as cluster leaders.  
 Besides the funding disputes, there were considerable setbacks within 
the clusters. The relationships between cluster participants were not always 
smooth. WFP and World Vision had a tense dispute over leadership of the 
logistics cluster, which ended in Geneva (ActionAid, 2007:14). Cluster leaders 
tended to produce press releases and reports that failed to mention, or 
minimized the role of NGOs. Others managed the cluster in a more directive 
than participative manner and some NGOs tended to perceive a lack of 
transparency and fairness on the cluster management (Cosgrave et al, 2007: 
32).  
For the national NGOs there were two additional limitations. First, 
some clusters held meetings and circulated minutes in English, a language 
they were not familiar with. Second, there were just too many clusters and 
meetings. Contrary to the UN agencies that had specific teams for each 
cluster, most of the local organizations relied on one or a few flexible 
fieldworkers to carry out activities in a range of domains. Attending cluster 
meetings, meetings with the government authorities and, at the same time, 
implementing and monitoring activities became just impossible to reconcile.  
All these setbacks and contradictions between UN agencies and NGOs 
in general tended on one side to reinforce the government’s position as the 
leader and, on the other, to limit participation in the clusters. Participation in 
clusters was in practice limited to the UN agencies themselves. Only two 
clusters namely logistics and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) had 
considerable involvement beyond the UN agencies (Cosgrave et al, 2007:26). 
The authors claim that logistics and WASH had broad participation because 
their cluster lead’s staffer was already well known to many of the cluster 
                                                 
12
 Some NGOs complained that they were given short notice to prepare their proposals and this may 
have affected the quality of the proposals (ActionAid, 2007: 15)  
13
 Interview with ActionAid representative, Caia, February 16, 2007; with FHI representative, Caia, 
February 18, 2007 
14
 Interview with representatives of  the NGO CEDES, Caia February 15, 2007; interview with the 
representative of the NGO Kulima in Caia, February 20, 2007.  
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members and a kind of trust and personal relationship had developed over 
time. Although this may have helped I think that the fact that both clusters 
were ‘service clusters’, financially more robust, and WFP and UNICEF (the 
cluster leads) commanded resources such as helicopters, which other actors 
needed for implementing their own activities, played a big role for a broader 
involvement.  
 
CVM RESPONSE: POWER, CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
 
NGOs response to disaster situations depends on how they are able to 
mobilize different material, human and financial resources. Also it depends 
on how they are able to allocate them effectively and efficiently in time and 
space vis-à-vis other actors in the arena. CVM response can be analysed from 
that perspective within different layers of response from the headquarters in 
Maputo down to the field level. In this section, I analyse CVM response at 
three different levels: (1) the headquarters in Maputo; (2) the provincial level 
in Sofala province and (3) the local level in Caia district. The section is based 
on participant observation in following CVM actors in different encounters at 
these three different levels. 
 
At the headquarters: multiple demands and challenges to the humanitarian 
principles 
 
CVM headquarters in Maputo had been following the flood hazard since the 
start of the rainy season in November-December. Based on the wide network 
of volunteers nationwide, CVM headquarters was supplied with information 
almost on a daily basis. The department of Disaster Preparedness and 
Response worked as the focal point in collecting and disseminating 
information coming from the field. Cell phones and fax machines facilitated 
the gathering and dissemination of field information. Nonetheless, a national 
and more coordinated response to the flooding took shape after the 
government announced the red alert and ordered coercive evacuation on 
February 8. Following the announcement of coercive evacuations, CVM met 
with partners at the headquarters in Maputo the following day, Friday, 
February 9 to plan its humanitarian response. It was during this meeting, 
which I attended, that CVM announced its plan and made critical decisions.   
Fourteen people attended the meeting. It included delegates of the 
national Red Cross societies from Germany, Belgium, Iceland, Spain and 
Norway. The General Secretary of the CVM chaired it. She started with an 
overview of the flooding in the Zambezi delta and government measures. 
Regarding the government response, the General Secretary said that the 
Prime Minister reinforced government position, after her visit to the affected 
area, that it would neither declare the state of emergency nor make an 
international appeal. Nonetheless, the government asked CVM to help in the 
humanitarian actions. 
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At the field level-she said- CVM was already taking actions. Red Cross 
boats and volunteers were working on rescue operations and some volunteers 
were already providing first aid. Nonetheless, the overall CVM response was 
hindered by different constraints. Volunteers urgently needed tents in order 
to provide first aid and also to shelter victims. They needed T-shirts or other 
kind of identification like the Red Cross volunteers to make CVM visible at 
field level. Some were working full time so they were asking for some kind of 
financial or material incentives. Victims on the other hand were asking for 
first aid, food and shelter.  
At this point it is clear that CVM had to strategically manoeuvre 
different demands: from the government, from the volunteers and from the 
local people. Response to these different demands required primarily 
resources either human or financial and material.  
The General Secretary announced that the Cahora Bassa dam company 
(HCB) provided 150 thousand USD and the Aluminium Company (Mozal) 
provided 100 thousand USD. HCB wanted about 1/3 of the fund to be spent 
in the flood-affected areas in Tete province - the province where the company 
is based while Mozal wanted much of the money to be spent in Zambézia 
province. Both wanted a press conference to announce their donations. Hence, 
another layer of demand was added to the previous one. By this time, the 
companies had put their own demands including the definition of areas of 
interventions, which, once followed, would influence, to some extent, who 
would get the CVM aid. Further, these demands to a Red Cross organization 
put to the test its inner principles of impartiality and independency.  
Balancing principles and the need for funding and, donors interests 
became a hectic issue. CVM accepted and organized press conferences but, 
through negotiations and diplomacy, left fund allocation to their own 
evaluations.  For an immediate response CVM allocated (using the principle 
of impartiality) 10,000 USD to each of the four provinces affected by the 
flooding (Sofala, Tete, Manica and Zambezia). Teams were deployed on the 
same day (Friday 9) to the affected provinces with the mission of helping the 
affected provinces to assess the real needs. Based on the assessments CVM 
would allocate resources accordingly rather than follow a company’s 
imposition. Now, the humanitarian principles have been negotiated by CVM 
giving room to both their institution and the donating companies. It was 
through this negotiations and diplomacy that they could work in line with the 
principles.  
But is this always the case? The General Secretary suggested in an 
interview on June 8, 2007 it was possible to maneouver around with HCB and 
Mozal as they are long standing partners of CVM. Nonetheless, in some cases 
CVM has to ‘swallow the frog’ in order to access the funds. In most of the 
cases indeed, there are win-win solutions. The general secretary suggested 
that during emergencies a lot of companies and individuals want to be seen as 
practicing humanitarianism, which gave CVM room for negotiating a win-
win solution. In overall it appears that, depending on the other actors 
involved, CVM uses three major responses:  accept, deny or negotiate. 
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At the provincial level in Sofala 
 
Competing claims on flooding 
On February 10, I flew to Beira, Sofala province on a journey to Caia. The 
CVM officer deployed from Maputo to Sofala province had arrived the 
previous day and I learnt later that he had joined in the morning of February 
10 a group of international organizations that flew over the Zambezi River to 
assess the situation. I arrived in the mid-morning and went to the CVM office. 
Most of the preparation and activities in Sofala were still not done yet. 
Although funds had been released, it was already weekend.   
On February 12 (Monday) we started the day with a briefing given by 
the officer that flew over the Zambezi River. According to him, the situation 
was not as bad and the number of affected, if taken from the inundated area, 
was not as high as was being broadcasted. People in most of the affected areas 
seemed to live their normal lives. There were still quite considerable areas not 
yet inundated and they saw some people fishing and others trying to harvest 
their crops. This was clearly a different perception from what was evolving in 
the media and what was being claimed by the state and many NGOs.  
The perception of ‘non critical flooding’ was to some extent shared by 
the provincial staff. The provincial secretary of CVM did not welcome the 
team from Maputo. In an interview on February 13, he suggested that the 
provincial staff was still able to deal with the actual flood levels and make 
assessment without the intervention from Maputo. He suggested that rather 
than sending teams to the province  to do the supervision, the headquarters 
should have sent financial resources. In this respect, Sofala had submitted 
days before a budget of nearly 20,000 USD for immediate relief. But rather 
than receiving the requested funds they got supervision instead.  
 
Funds, power and agency 
 
Intervention at local level depended, to a large extent, on available funds.  The 
province was provided with 10,000 USD rather than the asked for 20,000 USD. 
A lot of activities and goods that the province thought was relevant for the 
immediate relief had to be cut off and allocations changed. Further, access to 
funds at the bank became another constraint to run the interventions. The 
financial manager was told on February 12 that the bank had limited USD in 
cash. She was told that a lot of international organizations and government 
institutions were withdrawing money for emergency operations. When there 
is a shortage of cash, the bank policy gives priority to the ‘big’ clients such as 
donors, international organizations and government institutions. However, 
using her personal network (within the bank) she managed to have the money 
by late afternoon. With the available funds, the province bought some goods, 
paid loaders, transport and per-diem to the staff to be deployed to the field. 
Payment to the truck owner and loaders took long negotiations and a 
considerable amount of time. They wanted more than CVM could offer. When 
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the deal was finally struck, the truck left for Chimoio, in Manica province to 
be loaded with other merchandise not available in Beira.  
In the afternoon of February 13, I joined two officers from CVM (one 
from Maputo and another from Sofala province) on their journey to Caia. The 
truck that was loaded on February 12 arrived in Caia three days later. The 
driver said he had experienced mechanical problems and he also avoided 
driving during the night for security reasons. The provincial secretary of  
CVM said he knew that the truck was quite old (figure 5.2 below) but given 
the limited funds and higher demand for trucks he could not compete with 
the World Food Programme and other organizations that were paying much 
more.  When the truck arrived with the goods, one of the local fieldworkers 
claimed: ‘It is too late now for our visibility; other organizations have taken over our 
areas of intervention’. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: the truck with the goods in Caia 
                                                                          
   
                                        Source: Author 
 
 
 
CVM response at the field level 
 
CVM response at the field level involved preparedness and response. As seen 
from the previous chapter, as part of preparedness and disaster risk reduction 
CVM implemented a CBDRM project which, to some extent, helped in early 
warning and on evacuation and resettlement processes. During the response 
phase CVM undertook a number of interventions. About 17 staff from the 
headquarter, 74 from provincial and district level and more than 740 trained 
volunteers were involved in distributing relief items, providing basic health 
care, collecting epidemiological data and, conducting hygiene campaigns to 
prevent the outbreak or spread of water borne and other diseases.  The 
organization was actively involved in search and rescue operations, potable 
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water provision, health care, sanitation and provision of non food items15 to 
about 18,000 families in 35 accommodation centres (CVM and IFRC, 2007).  
This response was possible thanks to the support of different ‘sister’ 
organizations present in the country and of IFRC. The regional delegation of 
IFRC in Harare sent, by the middle of February, staff and equipment to 
support the relief operation. An IFRC hub flood response was settled in Caia 
involving five Emergency Response Units (ERUs) in areas of Health care, 
Water and Sanitation, Relief, Logistics and Telecommunications. The overall 
response by CVM was remarkably good with volunteers, some of them also 
affected by flooding, working for long hours under very constrained 
conditions such as limited training, food, transport and equipment.   
Nonetheless, as discussed in the section above, the response was in 
some aspects problematic. As the number of actors involved in the CVM 
response increased, the response became increasingly complex with different 
actors claiming different stakes. Of particular relevance, I will now discuss the 
emergence of multiple lines of command and the reshaping of the 
interventions by the volunteers at the local level.  
 
The emergency of multiple command lines in Caia 
 
Red Cross societies work under the principle of unicity. That is, in each 
country there should be only one Red Cross society that extends its activities 
all over the country. To extend its activities countrywide, national societies of 
the Red Cross use different modalities. In the case of Mozambique, CVM has 
provincial delegations delegações provinciais and district commissions comissões 
distritais- the lowest level. National societies from other countries may 
support other societies either by bilateral support or through the IFRC. In case 
of disaster events, depending on the magnitude and existing capacity at each 
level, the response may be confined to district level or may go up to 
provincial, national or international levels through ICRC or IFRC. In any case 
the call for other levels depends on the critical evaluation of what is 
happening in the arena and the limitation of each level to intervene as 
desired.  
During the 2007 flooding the links between these different levels was 
problematic. Within CVM, the officer sent from Maputo to help/supervise the 
province in assessing the situation in the field was not welcomed. As 
mentioned earlier, while headquarters perceived the capacity at the provincial 
and district levels as limited, this was not the perception from the province in 
their own capacities.  The province had settled its communication lines using 
radio communications and cellphones and, if needed, could send their staff to 
the local level. They did not consider at the time the need for national staff16.  
This prevailed and the officer from Maputo had little support from the 
province and district levels. In Caia, data sharing was difficult and interaction 
between the Maputo officer and the provincial and district staff was very 
                                                 
15
 This included tents, kitchen sets, jerry cans, buckets, sleeping mats, mosquito nets, soaps. 
16
 Interview Custodio Giro, CVM Secretary Sofala province, February 13  
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limited. Sofala collected and sent to Maputo its own data while the officer 
from Maputo collected and in parallel sent his own data to Maputo.  
In meetings where the two teams were present, the gap between the 
national and the provincial/district staff was noticed.  On one of the occasions 
Tim, a staff member from the UNICEF, voiced his concerns that he did not 
know with whom to work because CVM appeared to have different lines of 
command. Volunteers were also getting confused. For example, the staff 
officer from Maputo requested an evaluation meeting with volunteers 
everyday around 5 PM but this was not accepted by the provincial level. The 
provincial level claimed that the volunteers were too busy to have meetings 
everyday. Furthermore, they thought that the district senior staffer was able 
to get into the field where the volunteers were working and collect the 
information without a need for a meeting which would overburden the 
volunteers.  
To settle these differences CVM headquarters decided to deploy an 
emergency coordinator to Caia who would harmonize data and make 
everyday field decisions. Nonetheless, in everyday practice there remained 
clearly to be two clusters - one composed of Sofala province staff and another 
of staff from headquarters. Volunteers tended to obey the Sofala leadership 
rather than that from headquarters.   
The linkage between CVM and IFRC was also limited. While CVM staff 
reported to Maputo, IFRC staff reported to Geneva. Staff from the two hardly 
interacted and although IFRC was in the field from mid February, the only 
common gathering between staff from the CVM and IFRC happened by the 
end of March (CVM, 2007:7). As a corollary, CVM and IFRC had little idea on 
how much aid the other one was distributing. In April 12-13, 2007 I attended a 
seminar convened by CVM and IFRC to plan the recovery interventions. In 
the meeting, the IFRC provided information on how much of aid had been 
distributed to the flood affected people. The presenter, who was the IFRC 
logistic manager in Caia, made it clear that the information represented aid 
channeled through IFRC logistics. It did not include CVM logistics. Thus, the 
interventions in Caia were based on different command lines, which did not 
communicate with each other.  
 
The reshaping of the interventions by the volunteers  
      
Volunteers are the backbone of the Red Cross societies. As pointed above, 
CVM and IFRC interventions were made possible through nearly 740 trained 
volunteers. Among other duties, they undertook search and rescue 
operations, distributed relief items, provided basic health care, chlorinated 
water, collected epidemiological data. They also conducted hygiene 
campaigns to prevent the outbreak or spread of water borne and other 
diseases.  In doing so, they became the major face of the Red Cross societies in 
the eyes of the affected. To secure ‘proper behaviour’ volunteers are trained 
and expected to work under the Red Cross principles. In practice, principles 
are permeated by different, other factors including volunteers’ needs to secure 
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livelihoods and the emerging constraints and opportunities arising in the 
arena of intervention.  
During the relief operations, a considerable number of volunteers who 
had training on Red Cross principles some time ago, had lost knowledge on 
the principles and quick re-training on Red Cross principles had to be done. 
This meant that extra budget was needed for training which was not 
available17. Moreover, the principle of voluntary work was challenged in the 
field. For example, in the second week of February volunteers refused to work 
in Sena region due to lack of payment and many others, mostly well trained 
staff, shifted from CVM or IFRC to work for OXFAM, MSF and other 
organizations that offered better material and financial incentives (CVM and 
IFRC, 2007:10).  
CVM did compensate the volunteers involved. During the emergency 
operation CVM had a policy of monthly payment for those involved. This is 
different from the ‘normal’ situation in which volunteers get incentives 
(mostly food baskets) in a trimester period when funds are available. During 
the 2007 flooding volunteers received about 2,500 Meticais per month (about 
EUR 75 by the 2007 exchange rate). But this payment did not satisfy the 
volunteers. Many of them complained of poor working conditions and the 
money being very little. They accused their superiors of lack of consideration 
as they overloaded them but made cuts on their allowances without clear 
explanations.  
Although not much was noticed by outsiders, different contestation 
practices evolved such as refusal to work mentioned above. Usually, 
however, volunteers tended to pursue non confrontational contestations. This 
included reducing the number of working days or hours, using complaint 
jokes and metaphors and in some cases stealing working equipment or goods 
supposed to be for the affected. This information makes clear that as the 
interventions entered the lifeworlds of the volunteers they acquired different 
meanings and had different responses.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter has focused on the interfaces between aid providers and has 
addressed how the government, the international community and CVM 
responded to the 2007 flooding on the Zambezi delta. I started by discussing 
government practices in responding to the flooding. In doing so, I have 
shown that it evolved around two major blocks. On the one hand, 
government response was better off due to the strengthened INGC. On the 
other, it was leveraged by the processes taking place in the arena which 
pushed for a leading role by the national government.  
The response from the international community especially from the 
UN agencies was based on an established view that Mozambique is so poor 
and, like in the past, unable by itself to withstand the impacts of the flooding. 
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 Interview with Respeito Chiridza, Head of CVM volunteer’s network, Caia February 16, 2007 
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Under such premise, they by-passed the government and created parallel 
structures through the Cluster Approach and CERF funding. Hence, despite 
changes in the discourse for stakeholder engagement, in emergencies through 
the Cluster Approach, everyday practices revealed much continuity in ways 
UN agencies operate at field level. This had impacts on how the clusters were 
perceived and operated at local levels. Although some of the clusters such as 
on logistics and water and sanitation worked reasonably well and helped for 
a quick humanitarian response, others had hardly any relevance and a range 
of misunderstanding and contradictions emerged. There were contradictions 
between the government and the UN agencies, amongst UN agencies 
themselves and between UN agencies and the NGOs.  
The CVM intervention during the 2007 flooding has to be analysed by 
looking at different layers of interventions and the different power politics, 
interests and strategies involved in each of them. From the headquarters up to 
the field level CVM had to deal with internal and external power conflicts and 
interests. The ultimate outcome of their intervention was not merely the result 
of what the headquarters intended neither was it what the donors aimed to 
be. Rather, the outcome emerged from continuous contestations and social 
negotiations on a number of issues. To implement the intervention, CVM had 
to attempt to secure the ‘right’ balance between donor demands, government 
demands, its own staff’s demands and local demands.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SAVING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS: THE LOCAL 
RESPONSE TO THE 2007 FLOODING1 
 
 
Tomé Gole was born on 01.06.1984 in Mopeia village. He grew up in Mulamba-
Cocorico and now he is living between Mulamba and 24 de Julho resettlement centre 
located in Mopeia village. He is the first out of 9 children (five boys and four girls) 
from his father’s second wife. Two of his sisters are already married; one is living in 
Chupanga and another in Mopeia village, both upper lands.  
Tomé married in 2006, but continued to live with his parents in Mulamba 
waiting to move to his own house after the agricultural harvests of 2007. It is a local 
practice that the couple remains at the groom’s household up to the harvest in order 
to get food which they will need in their new house. However, in early 2007 there 
was flooding and they had to evacuate. The flooding was gradual and at its highest 
level, it mainly inundated the floors or the houses. ‘Tomé’s household’  started by 
moving the agricultural and fishing implements from the fields located on the lowest 
and riverine areas to the main house in slightly upper areas within Mulamba. When 
waters continued to rise, his father asked him to take care of the household while he 
went to look for his other wife in one of the local Islands. Water continued to rise and 
Tomé’s mother moved valuable assets to the granary which is elevated on poles 
(figure 6.1 below). 
 
Figure 6.1: The granary and the main house 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
When waters continued to rise and military force got involved in the coercive 
evacuations, Tomé’s ‘household’ decided to evacuate. This was around February 20. 
They evacuated to Chupanga resettlement centre in Marromeu district. Tomé chose 
Chupanga for different reasons. Firstly, he has a sister living over there so she could 
come in handy when support (generally food) was needed. Secondly, as they 
evacuated using a canoe they preferred, for security reasons, to go to a nearby place 
                                                 
1
 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the 2009 World Conference on Humanitarian 
Studies, Groningen, The Netherlands,  February 4-7 with the title: The victimization of non-victims and 
the development of an emergency aid culture on the lower Zambezi  
granary 
main house 
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and Chupanga was a primary choice since it was in the nearest upper area outside 
Mulamba. Thirdly, during the 2001 flooding they had evacuated to Chupanga and 
got support from aid organizations and it seemed reasonable  to return to the same 
resettlement centre.  
To evacuate, Tomé’s ‘household’ preferred to use the canoe. Tomé said that 
the canoe allowed them to carry whatever they wanted to bring along with them 
while rescue boats from the military force did not accept belongings. He also 
complained that rescue teams tended not to transport all the household members at 
once. Military forces disapproved of their negative attitude towards voluntary 
evacuation and in some cases the military beat up people who rejected to get into the 
boats. 
By April, when the flood had receded they went back to Mulamba. 
Nonetheless, they were once again caught up by another flooding- the 2008 flooding. 
This time, Tomé and his father decided to split up. Tomé, his wife and one brother 
went to 24 de Julho resettlement centre in Mopeia village while his father and the 
remainder of the household went to Chupanga. Amongst other reasons for this split 
was their memory of the 2007 flooding when they were all enrolled as one household 
but in reality Tome and his wife rightfully constituted a separate household. Due to 
that, they had received less aid. Tomé also argued that all household members  could 
not live in Chupanga under one roof as this would place  a huge burden on his sister. 
She would not be able to provide enough food to supplement the handouts or aid  
allotted to the household.This had been the case in 2007.  Furthermore, looking at the 
2007 flooding, Tomé’s ‘household’ perceived that in Chupanga people received more 
food than (saleable) tools so, splitting up was likely to provide them with different 
types of humanitarian aid.  
In the meantime, during both the 2007 and 2008 flooding Tomé and his father 
worked shifts to protect the granary. The granary was not inundated but they could 
not take all the items remaining in the granary to the resettlement centre. Instead, 
they had to watch out for thieves in Mulamba. The granaries housed the fishing 
tools, a bike, agricultural utensils, and livestock, among other things. Most of the 
households in Mulamba did the same and those who had not enough household 
members, used friends and neighbours to look after their granaries. Friends and 
neighbours took shifts to look after each other’s granaries or to look after the 
household members in the resettlement centres.  
Tomé and his father were also heavily involved in fishing and attempted to 
build a network of direct buyers in different markets. Rather than sitting in the 
market to sell their fish they had people who came to the river to collect the fish and 
sell them in the market while they concentrated on fishing.This division of labour 
made their fishing business a very profitable activity during the flooding coupled 
with the fact that there was a sudden high demand for fish in the upper areas, 
especially with the arrival of aid organizations.  
By 2009, Tomé was a member of the Local Committee for Disaster 
Management at 24 de Julho resettlement centre (Comité Local de Gestão de 
Desastres). This was possible thanks to his relationship with the local chief who 
enrolled him. As member of the Comité Local de Gestão de Desastres he developed 
disaster awareness campaigns, and was involved in the construction of houses of the 
most destitute groups taking place in the resettlement centre- a governmental 
initiative. By developing these activities, he expected some compensation from the 
state. By October 2008, members of the Comité Local de Gestão de Desastres were 
promised material for building their own houses at the resettlement centre. 
Nonetheless, Tomé now divides his time between Mulamba-where he does fishing 
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and helps his wife in agriculture- and at the 24 de Julho resettlement centre where he 
plans to build a brick house and to develop other livelihood activities.  
 
The previous chapter focused on the interfaces between aid providers during 
the 2007 flooding. I disclosed contradictions, power conflicts and strategies 
emerging from their interactions. This chapter focuses on the local domain of 
disaster response and analyses local responses to the flooding vis-à-vis aid 
providers. It asks how local actors, such as Tomé, responded to the flooding? 
What factors lay behind their responses? How did they perceive the actors 
from the other domains of disaster response and what can we learn for future 
interventions? I start the chapter by presenting the setting of the local 
response which was marked by contradictions between local actors and aid 
providers.  
Local response to the 2007 flooding was remarkably shaped by the 
government decision to undertake coercive evacuations on February 8 (see 
chapter 5). Although the operations helped to save lives, it was in 
contradiction to the perspective of many people. While government focused 
heavily on life saving alone, local response, as illustrated by the Tomé case 
above, tended to focus on saving both lives and livelihoods.  At the interface, 
refusal to evacuate and returns after the coercive evacuation became part of 
the local everyday practices and were widely recorded by different field staff 
and media2. Television reporters interviewed and broadcast stories of people 
refusing to leave and the military forcing people to abandon flooded areas. In 
the fourth week of February a local leader was imprisoned after being accused 
of instigating his people to abandon resettlement centres and  moving back to 
the flooded areas. To explain such local responses, government officials 
tended to use pejorative terms such as stupidity, irrationality, reluctance, 
‘cultural trap’ and backwardness3.  
However, as put by Harrell-Bond (1986:283), these blanket terms tended 
to hide rather than reveal the complex setting of disaster response and this led 
to wrong diagnoses and inevitably to wrong interventions. The Tomé case, 
the widespread refusal to evacuate and the defiant return of locals despite 
floods proved indeed the complexity of disaster response and reinforced the 
need for empirical reality checks. I decided, then, to focus on the perceptions 
and knowledge about the social, economic and response structures of the 
afflicted in order to have a better understanding of their responses.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See for example Noticias newspaper February 7; BBC February 8; Washington Post February 14; 
Reuters February 15 
3
 Interventions at the CENOE meeting in Caia on February 15, 2007; Interviews on STV television 
March 8, 2007 
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RESPONSE TO HAZARDS AND DISASTERS: A LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW 
 
Factors influencing local response to events such as flooding have been 
approached from a wide range of disciplines. Amongst others, physiologists 
state that healthy and fit individuals are better placed to resist disasters and 
respond quicker to emerging opportunities compared to others. Bearing this 
in mind, special attention tends to be provided, in disaster situations, to 
children, elderly people, and pregnant women and to physically or mentally 
handicapped individuals.  
Psychologists, in turn, have highlighted our understanding of human 
behaviour in risky situations by describing how cognitive processes such as 
perceptions shape individual appraisal of threat and coping capacity and, 
mould the behaviour (see i.e Fishbein and Ajzen,1975; Rogers 1975). 
Economists have also developed explanatory models such as the utility 
rationality. According to this, people respond better to disaster risk situations 
if there are material and financial gains. For many economists adequate financial 
and material compensations can mitigate the disrupted productive activities 
and encourage people’s willingness to take actions such as evacuations and 
resettlement (Downing, 1996:35)  
Sociologists and anthropologists alike have also looked at different 
determinants of people’s responses to disasters.  Among others, they suggest 
that  previous experience plays a critical role in responding to hazards. Past 
experiences tend to heighten the awareness of future events and have a 
positive contribution to the awareness of future hazards and adjustment 
measures (see chapter 3; Walmsley and Lewis, 1984:115; Blaikie et al., 1994:64). 
They also suggest that attachment to a place plays a role in how people respond 
to disaster risks.  
Place plays an important role in individual and collective identity 
formation, reproduction and, influences to some extent moral and 
behavioural ordering (Oliver-Smith, 2005: 48). Changing space may force 
people to reassess their moral and behavioural patterns as well as how they 
set their priorities, gender and age relations and how they position 
themselves vis-à-vis others. Thus, changing space may lead to a re-
examination of individual and collective identity and raises fundamental 
questions, which are not routinely considered, or that people are not willing 
to challenge. Above all, displacement tends to constitute a loss of control over 
one’s physical space, bringing along an acute expression of powerlessness and 
this can mean a removal from life itself (i.e. death) (Downing, 1996:33; Oliver-
Smith, 1996:78; 2005:48).  
Attachment to a place was used for instance to explain the continual 
settlements along the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Ganges, Indus and Hwang Ho 
rivers. Tuan (1974: 114) in Haque (1997:74) points out that the flood hazards 
posed by these rivers have been formidable. However, the economic 
advantages of living there, and the cultural significance with which these 
places are endowed, outweigh the negative features. In living under such 
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risky environments, people tend to construct a non-risk thesis, play down the 
risks, and attempt to find supportive elements or others to reinforce the 
desired behaviour (Pain, 2002: 69). In doing so, sacred beliefs take centre stage 
and the uses of ethos like ‘what must be will be’ or ‘what will be must be’ are 
applied (ibid: 71). Risk avoidance and changing practices and lifestyles can 
increasingly be seen as bringing more risk.  
People’s response to hazards may also reflect the state-society 
relationship.  It may represent dissatisfaction with the existing political, social 
and economic order. In some societies, people may be tired of social, 
economic and political injustices and living on the edge. They put their lives 
in danger through such acts like terrorism which may represent their best 
option with which to claim their dissatisfaction. Others may respond based on 
their expectations and perceptions of what is likely to be the state’s response. 
For instance, people in western countries tend not to anticipate disasters 
because they expect government to bear the costs (Naess et al., 2005; Van 
Koppen et al., 2008).  
Others indeed, may live in risky areas and respond in certain ways not 
because of attachment to the place or their previous experience or 
dissatisfaction and expectations but simply because there are no options. The 
existing order has produced social stratification which has pushed them to live 
in unsafe conditions (Blaikie et al., 1994). Thus, social stratification influences, 
to a large extent, how actors respond to disaster events. There is enough 
evidence suggesting that ethnicity, gender, education, age, income, kinships 
and networks influence how people respond to hazards (Hewitt, 1997; Lewis, 
1999; Griffin et al; 2004).  
 
It is my understanding that all the factors discussed above play, in different 
degrees, a role in responding to disasters and may well be captured in the 
concept of livelihoods.  As I discussed in chapter 1, livelihood goes far beyond 
merely making a living. Livelihoods are defined here as embedding identity, 
status, life style, power relations and value choices (Long, 2001; Noteboom, 
2003; Kaag, 2004). It is from this framework that I now turn to local responses 
to the 2007 flooding on the Zambezi delta.   
 
LOCAL RESPONSE: SAVING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS  
 
The Tomé case presented at the introduction of the present chapter illustrates 
how the different physiological, psychological, economic, socio-cultural, 
political and environment- related factors influenced the local response to 
flooding. The sections that follow make it clear that, in responding to  
flooding, people attempted to save themselves (life) and those things that kept 
them alive and gave meaning to life (livelihoods).  This process was 
permeated by the different but intertwined factors discussed above.  
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SECURING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE  
 
As discussed earlier in chapter 3, the 2007 flooding was neither the first nor 
the worst in the history of the Zambezi delta. The Tomé case and also the 
Inácio case at the introduction of the present book illustrates that previous 
experiences with flooding played a role in responding to the 2007 flooding. 
For example, choosing different resettlement centres and moving assets 
around different geographical locations reflects people’s experience with 
flooding and evacuations.  
Based on my fieldwork observations and interviews with local actors 
such as Tomé and Inácio as well as group discussions along the Zambezi 
delta, I could identify the hierarchy of measures that people tend to take in 
case of floods. This hierarchy starts with people moving their belongings (i.e. 
utensils used for cooking, agriculture and fishing tools) and themselves from 
lowland agricultural fields and improvised shelters close to the riverbed to 
the main houses located in the upper lands. This is also the period in which 
most of the women practicing agriculture in lowlands and small islands move 
and stay longer in the main houses. Men, who practice fishing, may bring 
some of their fishing tools to the main house. They come frequently to the 
main house to make sure everything is fine and to replenish food supplies. 
Kids may cease going to school if the school is located far from the home. If 
waters recedes they may go back to their ‘usual business’, fishing, agriculture 
or schooling, but if flood levels continue to rise, a next level of measures is 
adopted.   
In this next phase, households who have an elevated thatched granary 
(a common practice along the Zambezi delta see figure 6.1 above), move their 
belongings from the main houses to the granary and they may eventually 
start living in the granary. The height of the granary depends on the materials 
people lay their hands on at the time of construction. In most cases, the height 
is adjusted to the level of the worst flood ever experienced by the household. 
When water levels threaten the granary and their lives, they may move 
away from their homestead. However, most of the times, people tend to find 
accommodation close to the homestead in the local hills and other places they 
consider as safe. Most of the ‘communities’ in the Zambezi delta have at least 
one safe place for floods. In Cocorico, where I focused my fieldwork the two 
local primary schools are considered to be safe places and there are three 
other hills considered much safer namely tsuluchinampala, nhamiala and 
nhalubhanda. Images of people sitting on houses/granaries, hills and trees 
surrounded by water on the Zambezi delta have been widely disseminated by 
the international mass media and evoked a humanitarian response.  
When water levels go beyond local ‘safety levels’ people move away 
from their community. They move either to resettlement centres or to people 
within their social networks living in the upper lands. These networks have 
historically been developed and encouraged through different means (see 
chapter 3). Marriages between people living in the lowlands and upper areas, 
such as Tomé’s sisters, are promoted because of the mutual benefits that can 
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be gained from this. In ‘normal’ times, upper land communities get food 
supplies from the lowlands where food production is relatively higher 
because of the fertility and humidity of the soils. During floods, those living in 
the lowlands can find refuge with relatives in the upper areas. Living on the 
lowlands is thus, part of a much larger network of mutual support between 
lower and upper communities. This process goes back and forth depending 
on the flood level and intensity or whether the household has an elevated 
thatched granary and other factors such as aid distribution and business 
opportunities that emerge. Schematically the process may be represented as 
follows: 
 
Figure 6.2: The hierarchical response 
 
Lowlands and Islands
Move to upper ground
(main house)
Move to the granary
Move to the hills/trees/schools
Move to the resettlement 
centre/ upper communities
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 4
Phase 3
Flood intensity/level
Low
High
        
Source: Author 
 
This hierarchy of measures appears to be based on prior experience. Such a 
complex arrangement of adjustment measures levelled around different 
flooding levels and different responses in different places can best represent 
people’s experience with flooding.  
 
Even though the tendency to be around the homestead and ‘community’ as 
the first resort may well suggests attachment to a place, this needs, however, 
to be unpacked as attachment to a place is not a stagnant attitude. Instead, 
attachment to a place is an emerging property of life experiences. People have 
invested in their places economically, socially, culturally and politically and in 
doing so they mould perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and practices. For 
example, when rescue teams arrived, just after the red alert had been issued4,   
                                                 
4
 Red alert is issued when water levels reach five meters at the hydrometric stations. Five meters has 
been established during the colonial period and it is questionable whether it accurately represent the 
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they found a considerable number of local people going about their normal 
business. Basing on their experience the locals viewed the situation as near 
normal and not yet alarming5 as seen by the government.  
In most of Cocorico, the flood had mostly inundated the floors of the 
main houses, that is, between phase two and three of the hierarchy of 
measures pictured above (figure 6.2). Hence, most of the households were still 
not ready to move, as most of their long-term assets had not yet been taken 
care of or packed. During interviews and group discussions, some people 
complained about being separated from their household members during the 
coercive evacuations and not being able to save or bring their livelihood assets 
(piombo6 and pifwio7). Helicopters and rescue boats had strict orders to 
evacuate people only. Not chickens, not goats!8  
‘We are not allowed to carry our belongings but we are taken like belongings; I 
do not know where my husband is and my son’- complained a woman just after 
arriving at the Amilcar Cabral resettlement centre in Caia on February 14, 
2007. What emerges therefore is a local response which clashed with the 
perspective of the aid providers who were interested in saving lives alone.   
 
SEARCHING FOR TOGETHERNESS 
 
In the previous section I have discussed how previous experience played a big 
role in local behavior and practices during the 2007 flooding. Based on their 
experiences people were not yet ready to leave their homesteads and 
communities.  This led to clashes with the government when it undertook 
coercive evacuation. The flooding became an arena of contradictions and 
conflicts between state authorities and a considerable number of people on 
the Zambezi delta. In this conflicting arena it appeared that local people were 
particularly keen on securing their togetherness which was being endangered 
by the coercive evacuations.    
Most of the times helicopters and rescue boats rescued people at 
random not whole families and this tended to separate household members. 
In order to rescue a complete household two to three trips were necessary.  
However, local people were not sure whether there would be a second or 
third trip. In addition, they hardly knew the pilots and they were not given 
information on the whereabouts of the other household members who had 
been evacuated first. People were reluctant to take ‘unknown’ means of 
transportation. It has been observed in a number of evacuations that 
households tend to cluster during a crisis and are more likely to accept 
                                                                                                                                            
current river geomorphology and is the best and the only threshold for the coercive evacuations on the 
entire lower Zambezi.   
5
 In Caia District, Journalists where told by a ‘reluctant’ women the following: “when its no longer 
possible to cross that bridge you passed to come to this side because waters have overflow it, that will 
be the time to move out”. STV, January 13, 2008  
6
 Household tools 
7
 Livestock 
8
 Group discussions in Cocorico in July 2, 2007;Group discussions at the 24 de Julho Resettlement 
Centre, Mopeia May 8, 2008 and interview with pilots in Caia, February 15 2007. 
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evacuation if all members are taken together or at least if they know where 
the other household members are being accommodated (Raphael,1986: 47).  
Moreover, it has been observed that lack of information is one of the factors 
that diminish people’s understanding and control to reassert satisfactorily the 
process and the changing context and this tends to reduce the environment of 
trust and increase people’s refusal to move (Oliver-Smith, 1996:79). 
To add to the complexity, polygamous households such as the Tomé 
household, have much more difficulties to evacuate. Before evacuating, a 
husband must be sure that the wives, their corresponding children, and other 
relatives are safe and together. This is not just for affection reasons but, on the 
Zambezi delta, a wife may also use this as a basis to seek divorce of a 
husband's negligence9 or the children would use this later on as a reason for 
not supporting their father. Polygamous males, in most of the times, have to 
move from one wife to the other and make sure that the family is safe and 
together.  
This attempt to secure togetherness of the family brings out the 
relevance of physiological, psychological and socio-cultural elements 
embedded in local responses to flooding.  
 
SECURING ASSETS  
 
The ‘people only approach’ used by the rescue teams meant that livelihood 
assets such as livestock, fishing nets, food, farming tools and seeds relevant 
for short and long term livelihoods were neglected.  These assets represent, on 
one side, a buffer from starvation in times of emergency before food aid is 
supplied and on the other, they represent the future stream of income that 
will sustain the household over time. Moreover, as argued by Lautze (1997), 
for assets whose accumulation may have taken a long time span and effort, 
their disposal may represent a big loss and in some instances disaster affected 
people might prefer to go hungry or even die in order to preserve their assets 
and future livelihoods.  
On the lower Zambezi, asset security can determine marriage 
breakdown. If productive, costly items are left behind and are lost or robbed, 
husbands may eventually ask for divorce citing their wife's negligence. 
Negrão (2001: 230; 241) suggests that even adultery known elsewhere as the 
major reason for divorce, is not a fundamental reason in the Zambezi delta. 
Agrieved husbands normally ask the other male to pay a given amount as 
compensation. Divorce may be asked if a wife loses productive items (mostly 
bought by a male's savings from fishing and trading), perceived laziness of a 
wife and a woman’s inadequate house and childcare. This being the case 
women may sometimes wait to be coercively evacuated in order to have a 
plausible explanation as to why they left some items behind. Moreover, if 
flooding takes place just around the harvesting, as happened with the 2007 
                                                 
9
 Negrão (2001:230,241,261) and field interviews suggests that husband’s negligence is one of the most 
plausible reason for women to ask divorce on the delta Zambezi.   
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floods, women may fight or refuse to leave the flooded areas until the last 
moment in order to protect their production and fulfil their duties as food 
producers and providers. On January 26th, 2008, the national public television 
(TVM) showed household members (especially women) refusing to leave 
flooded areas because they wanted to finish harvesting their crops.  
 
KEEPING POWER AND CONTROL   
 
Flooding and evacuation tends to reshape power relations. In some cases, 
those in power may be replaced by new actors and contradictions and 
conflicts may emerge. At the government level, one of the most striking 
problems the government faced was to convince the local chiefs to be the first 
to evacuate. The government suggested that they should be the first to 
evacuate to set the example for the remainder of the population.  
However, local chiefs saw it as a sign of weakness. Their position and 
power would be enhanced if they were the last to evacuate because earlier 
evacuations, where a chief had been evacuated first, conveyed an image of a 
fearful chief with limited interest and concern for his people. These 
perceptions tended to diminish their power with local constituencies and to 
weaken their status in the end. At the household level males tend also to see 
their power enhanced when they are the last to evacuate rather than being the 
first to ‘run’.  For many males who I spoke to, to gain respect and dignity 
from the household members and fellows at the community level, one has to 
show high resilience helping, if possible, others to evacuate or saving their 
livelihood assets.  
In the meantime, local people, especially males, suggested that 
evacuation using outsiders’ means over which one commands little or no 
control brings a sense of powerlessness and this is destructive in terms of self-
confidence and respect. As one put it in group discussions ‘Ine sine Nkuku para 
kwatiwa - I am not a chicken to be carried’.  In these group discussions, it 
appeared that this was not simply a psychological issue. It also encoded 
power relations between those who gave and those who received the help and 
tended to shape livelihoods in the long term. In interviews two distinct 
‘saviours’ emerged. The coercively evacuated labelled their rescuers as ‘evil 
saviours’ who used their power to disrupt their long term livelihoods. In 
contrast, the voluntary evacuees (mostly using local canoes) tended to 
appreciate their deep indebtedness to those who saved them.  
 
NOT AGAINST OUTSIDERS BUT NEED FLEXIBILITY  
 
The interaction between local people and external actors is both conflicting 
and harmonious. Local people are not against external aid. Table 6 below 
shows that there is much fluidity in the decision process and there are 
moments in which external boats and helicopters would be the first option.  
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People expect flexibility which enables them to move around different 
evacuation options depending on developments in the area. Perceived 
harshness of flooding is one element which brings the need for flexibility. 
Priority concerns between life saving and livelihood security vary according 
to the level and speed of the flooding and the resilience of the existing local 
capacity. This shifts the preference for the means of transportation. When 
flood level and speed is perceived as manageable using local knowledge and 
means, people would prefer their canoes. Nonetheless, when the flooding 
level outstrips local capacities and threatens lives, outside boats and 
helicopters are likely to be accepted.  
 
Table 6: Preferred transportation mean 
 
Transp
ortation  
Reasons for accepting it in first place  Reasons for rejecting it in first 
place  
Overall 
Ranking 
Canoe - ‘Allows to carry household belongings’ 
- ‘I can choose where and when to go’ 
-  ‘I can always go back to see what is left’ 
- ‘Nobody insults or beats me’ 
- ‘When water speed is too high’ 
- ‘When water level is too high’ 
- ‘When canoe is too small or has 
structural problems’ 
1st  
Red 
Cross 
boat 
- When water speed is too high’ 
- ‘When water level is too high’ 
- ‘When canoe is too small or has structural 
problems’ 
‘We know the Red Cross from long time’ 
- ‘The rescue people do speak local 
language’ 
- ‘They do not judge our attitudes’ 
- ‘Do not bring guns’ 
- ‘Sometimes allow us to carry our 
belongings’ 
- ‘They bring life saving jackets’ 
- ‘They have 1st aid training’ 
- ‘Boats are faster and safer compared to 
canoes’   
- ‘Too soon and water levels still 
manageable’ 
- ‘ Not allowed to carry items that 
canoes normally do’ 
- ‘Most of the time do not take the 
whole household members at once’ 
- ‘Do not know where I will be 
accommodated’  
 
 
2nd  
Military
/INGC 
boat 
- When water speed is too high’ 
- ‘When water level is too high’ 
- ‘When canoe is too small or has structural 
problems’ 
‘Boats are faster and safer compared to 
canoes’ 
- ‘If the first two options are not available’ 
- ‘Too soon and water levels still 
manageable’ 
- ‘They threaten us. Some bring 
guns, insult and judge our attitudes’  
- ‘We do not know them’  
- ‘Do not allow what canoes 
normally to do’ 
- ‘Most of the time do not take the 
whole household members at once’ 
- ‘Do not know where I will be 
accommodated’  
3rd  
Helicop
ters  
- When water speed is too high’ 
- ‘When water level is too high’ 
- ‘When canoe is too small or has structural 
problems’ 
‘If the first three options are not available’ 
- ‘Similar to Military’  
- ‘Pilots are mostly white people and 
definitely do not allow more than 
just yourself as a person’  
 
4th  
Source: Author [compiled from 4 group discussion in Inhangoma (Mutarara district) September 10, 
2008; Cocorico (Mopeia district) September 24, 2007; Luabo ( Chinde district) October 23, 2007 and 
Chupanga ( Marromeu district) March 11, 2007] 
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BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE 
MIDST OF FLOODING 
  
One of the reasons for ‘quick’ intervention by the relief agents is the 
assumption that due to the hazard, social networks break down and this 
hampers local response10. Given the local heterogeneity, this may be 
particular in the case of some households. Notwithstanding, the Tomé and 
Inácio cases illustrate that during flooding there are practices that keep, build 
or strengthen social networks. Looking after granaries in the lowlands and 
after the household members on the resettlement centres, while at the same 
time engaging in fishing and trade is a taxing responsibility. It involves a 
network with neighbours, friends, kinship members and others. The cases 
illustrates as well that social networks shape the decision as to where and 
when to evacuate. The ‘Tomé household’ evacuated to Chupanga expecting 
support from kinship members.  
In everyday practices, it appeared that social networks were in 
constant flux, emerging, disappearing, re-emerging and being re-shaped by 
different circumstances and actors. Marriages between evacuees and locals 
emerged as one of the practices where networks were built around. Cajojo, a 
Red Cross volunteer in Mopeia village, married an evacuee and moved to 
Zona Verde resettlement center.  Domingos, an evacuee married a local lady 
in Chupanga and moved outside the resettlement centre.  
Aid distribution involved different networks among the affected 
population; between the affected and host communities where resettlement 
centres were located, and between aid providers and beneficiaries. For 
example, when aid was not provided by humanitarian organizations, 
evacuees tended to build and strengthen networks and relationships with 
locals around the resettlement centres with, amongst other motivations, to get 
some aid. During relief aid distribution some of the affected would shift their 
focus and attempt to build or strengthen relationships with local chiefs and 
officers from the relief organizations in an attempt to secure aid.   
 Under such conditions, building and strengthening social networks to 
secure livelihoods is a constant endeavor before, during and after flooding.  
Thus, it may be too limited to assume that networks disappear due to 
flooding. Although in some cases the networks may turn fragile due to the 
hazards, in other cases indeed, as the Tomé case, networks are strengthened 
or reconfigured in time and space to respond to particular needs and 
opportunities.         
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Interventions at the planning meeting, CVM headquarter in Maputo, February 9, 2007 
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EXPECTATIONS AND GENDERED EVACUATIONS 
 
During evacuations, men were very busy. They were searching for and 
helping relatives, neighbours and friends to evacuate as well as guarding the 
granaries and belongings that were left behind. In the meantime they carried 
on fishing and trading. This resulted in a gender-skewed evacuation on the 
Zambezi delta. Mostly women and children were evacuated to the 
resettlement centres.  This was widely broadcasted in the media and 
astonished the Mozambican minister for Youth and Sports present at the 
CENOE meeting in Caia, on February 15, 2007. He said, after visiting 
resettlement centres in Zambezia and Sofala provinces that ‘I was surprised to 
see mainly females in the resettlement centres’.   
Lower male presence in the resettlement centres demonstrated, 
amongst other aspects, local expectations of how the government and relief 
organizations operate. In group discussions, people suggested that the faces 
of women in need were more appealing to humanitarian agencies than the 
faces of men. Thus, putting women and children upfront was more likely to 
produce international mercy rather than male faces. Further, polygamous 
men argued that aid organization registered them with just one wife. This 
reduced their ability to represent different households with different wives 
and could provoke complaints by other wives that the husband was focusing 
attention on just one of them - the most loved. This, according to them, had 
future negative social consequences including breaking up of marriage. To 
avoid such consequences some men opted not to register, leaving their wives 
to do so.  
 
BUILDING LIVELIHOODS THROUGH EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES  
 
Once the evacuations have taken place and people have been moved either 
freely or coercively, a new development takes place. The evacuation is taken 
as an opportunity to secure livelihoods either by making business or by 
savings on spending and in most cases, by doing both. As humanitarian 
interventions bring many people together in a particular place, the demand 
for food products becomes higher and a market develops11. This offers a good 
opportunity for economic gains. In February 2007, fish prices in Caia district 
had almost doubled. In Mopeia during the flooding period in March, I 
witnessed a similar pattern. Fish that used to be sold for about ten Meticais12 
(Mozambican currency), were now being sold for double the price. Remaining 
in the resettlement centres would then jeopardize the lucrative emerging 
business opportunities.  
                                                 
11
 In Caia, the price of chicken has gone down during February 2007 while cereals and mineral water 
price’s increased. According to vendors this was due to the fact that a lot of flood affected people were 
selling chicken and using the money to buy cereals before the food aid distribution started. Mineral 
water price was explained by the presence of many external aid relief fieldworkers coming from the 
cities who preferred mineral water to local  ‘non potable’ water.  
12
 About 30 cents USD in 2007 
 160 
One of the reasons given by the government to lift the red alert and 
cease rescue operations by the end of February was that there were no more 
people in need to be rescued. The ‘new’ evacuees were the same people who 
repeatedly went back to the lowlands to find products to sell in the markets13.     
Apart from doing business, many saw relief aid as an opportunity to 
reduce their spending on sustaining their households. Humanitarian 
organizations were taking care of them on the resettlement centres. When I 
asked a group of men affected by flooding ,whom I used to interact with in 
Caia, why they spent money on drinks instead of household items, some just 
laughed at me and one said: ‘ta tambirisswa dzulo -the distribution took place 
yesterday’. During flooding different jokes were being spread around via email 
and mobile phones on the issue of humanitarian aid. One of these reflected 
these practices and it had the following message: ‘I was affected by the floods and 
I lost everything. Could you please send me some beers and snacks. Do not worry 
about food, water and clothes. NGOs are taking care of that. (‘Fui afectado pelas 
cheias e perdi tudo. Peço por favor que me envie umas cervejas e petiscos. Não se 
preocupe com comida, agua e roupas, as ONGs já estão a ajudar-nos nisso’). 
Humanitarian aid thus provided double gains to some of the affected 
households. On the one hand, they earned money from the emerging business 
opportunities, while on the other hand, as they were ‘victimized’ or 
victimized themselves they used the strategic narrative of ‘we lost everything’, 
and they received humanitarian aid part of which ended up on sale.  
Nevertheless, in order to have this double gain and build livelihoods 
through emerging opportunities one needed more than just going to a 
resettlement centre. There was a need to be sure that there would be a 
distribution of humanitarian aid. Thus, which centre to go and the moment 
became relevant. ‘If you move quickly you may end up staying weeks before the 
distribution starts and if you go too late you may find the distribution already 
finished’14. For example, although the red alert was issued on February 4, in 
the majority of the resettlement centres, food aid distribution started after 
February 14. This gap may well explain why local people needed to move 
with their assets and why the ‘people-only approach’ clashed with local 
people who needed to secure livelihoods as well. This brings me to my 
analysis on saving lives and livelihoods in disaster situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The same happened in 2008. See Noticias newspaper, February 14 2008 
14
 Interviews with Chief Nhanswimbo, Cocorico, July 8, 2007; and with Tomé Gole, September 22, 
2008 
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ANALYSIS: SAVING LIVES OR LIVELIHOODS?  
 
The present chapter intended to answer three major questions: (1) how local 
actors such as Tomé responded to the 2007 flooding; (2) what factors lay 
behind their response and (3) how they perceived the other domains of 
disaster response and what could be learnt for future interventions. 
   
Throughout the chapter, it became clear that when natural hazards such as 
floods strike, governments and non-governmental (humanitarian) 
organizations are confronted with what Hilhorst and Warner (forthcoming) 
called the securitization and non-securitization dilemma. For a matter of (life) 
security, ‘responsible’ governments and (I)NGOs would, as done in the delta 
Zambezi delta, advocate security reasons and try to save many lives as 
quickly as possible. This is done in most cases using a top-down approach 
with little concern over local people’s livelihoods, perception and 
participation. The major premise is that lives are in danger and a life saving 
approach is needed.  
Beyond these philanthropic claims, many stakes may play a role in 
applying the life saving approach. Action or inaction during ‘crisis’ may 
reshape political legitimacy and power relations (Drury and Olson, 1998); 
humanitarian agencies may use the ‘crisis’ as an avenue to open up new 
charity markets and areas of interventions while the military may use the 
event to legitimize their existence (Hilhorst and Warner forthcoming). 
Whether the intervention was based truly on philanthropic claims or to 
promote other interests or even both is out of scope of the present chapter.  In 
the previous chapter, I outlined the different national and international 
agendas that the flooding attempted to fulfil.  
The discussion as to whether humanitarian organizations should focus 
on life saving or on the livelihood/development relief started a long way ago. 
By the 1990s, IFRC argued in their World Disaster Report of 1997 that the two 
were irreconcilable.  
 
‘While it is possible to debate which approach is right or better, the problem is 
that many in aid try to practice both- development agencies take on relief work and 
humanitarian agencies are unable to ignore the causes of suffering. It is not impossible 
to have both approaches in one organization, just as a government has ministries of 
both defence and health, but it is profoundly wrong to mix the two operationally in 
situations where lives are at risk’  (IFRC, 1997:141-142). 
 
Duffield (2000) is another example of scepticism regarding livelihood-
oriented relief programmes. He argues that turning conflicts and disasters 
into an opportunity for development has contributed to an erosion of welfare 
and security. This is so, because development relief tended over the last years 
to raise the threshold of tolerance for emergencies making people rely on 
dangerous and unsustainable coping strategies and highly exploitative 
economic relations (p. 119). In some cases, he argues, the approach has led to 
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a complete disappearance of the beneficiaries with devastating humanitarian 
implications such as higher rates of mortality (p.116-117).  
In the last years, on the other hand, different scholars have regarded 
the distinction as artificial and unnecessary. Weiss and Collins (2000:143) 
suggest that people need both- short term relief for the acute stages of the 
crisis and long term assistance in reconstructing their lives and communities. 
In a recent paper, Hilhorst argues that it is not a matter of one or the other. 
Both have advantages but also bear particular risks thus, there is a room for 
complementarities between the two. What is needed is a strategy to have a life 
saving approach where and when it is needed and, encourage livelihood relief 
where and when it is possible (Hilhorst, 2007:10).  
The present chapter shows that, under gradual flooding, affected 
people on the Zambezi delta attempt to secure both- lives and livelihoods. 
Regarding lives, they are not only interested in saving their lives but most of 
the times they are also interested in saving (for love, affection, control) the 
lives of others. Regarding livelihoods people attempt to save their long-term 
productive assets, power positions and to take advantage of the emerging 
livelihood opportunities.  
Moving people earlier rewards in terms of life saving. The likelihood of 
life damage and material losses increases as water levels and flooding 
increase. In contrast, early, rushed evacuations in a gradual flooding tend to 
break the social capital and people’s saved assets. These are both very 
important in reducing their vulnerability and improving their well-being. 
Keeping togetherness, networks and saving food, livestock and other assets 
that are relevant for immediate and long-term livelihoods may not be possible 
if one moves very soon. If one moves early, one may also end up in a ‘wrong’ 
accommodation centre either in terms of aid relief distribution or in terms of 
business opportunities. Thus, people are reluctant to move until the optimal 
moment is reached.  
In responding to (gradual) flooding people on the Zambezi delta tend 
thus to find the right moment for evacuation. At the beginning of the flooding, 
most people are concerned in securing their short and long-term livelihood 
assets and the flood risk is down played. During that period, people will 
attempt to rescue their belongings, search for family members, friends, and 
neighbours and make sure that togetherness is maintained. This process 
encodes different social relations and responsibilities and as discussed earlier, 
males have to make sure that household members are safe. In the meantime, 
as the females are responsible for food production,  distribution, the granary 
and domestic duties, before evacuating they have to make sure and 
distinguish which item to leave behind (in the granary) and which ones to 
carry during the evacuation.  
It appears therefore that, the optimal evacuation moment in a gradual 
flooding represents the time in which life saving and livelihood security 
intercept and neither life nor livelihood interests are jeopardized.  From an 
abstract and academic reflection, we may devise that point of intersection as 
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the optimal moment (OM) (graph 6 below). The OM is a product of dynamic 
objective and subjective evaluation of actors’ vulnerability and capacities.  
 
                     Graph 6: Life, livelihood and the optimal moment for evacuation 
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From the discussion presented throughout this chapter, it is clear that people 
refusing or postponing evacuations are not necessarily based on attachment to 
neither backwardness nor stupidity. It is based on experiences of floods and 
evacuations, the present situation (including opportunities and barriers) as 
well as future livelihood security and aspirations.  
By implementing coercive (earlier) evacuation with little knowledge of 
the local context and dynamics, relief providers and disaster managers have 
shown on the one hand the power relations involved between local people 
and external actors in relief operations. On the other, they have wittingly or 
unwittingly contributed to the impoverishment and long term vulnerability of 
those who, due to coercions, lost assets, networks and had limited abilities to 
capture emerging opportunities. This is not an argument against evacuations 
and humanitarian aid. Food, medicines, shelter, seeds and tools were needed 
because some people became destitute either due to the flooding, due to 
coercive evacuations or due to both. The problem indeed, as put by Harrell-
Bond (1999) is the kind of aid that the affected receive, the way it is provided 
and the role they are supposed to play to get it. Evacuations that lead to the 
disruption of livelihood assets make people dependent on humanitarian aid, 
brings powerlessness and tends to develop or perpetuate a ‘dependency 
culture’.  In such a situation, the helper becomes the major threat and not the 
hazard itself.   
In chapter three, I argued that the social and natural environments of 
the Zambezi delta have undergone degradation over time and have become 
limited to support local people’s response to flooding events. Now, although 
humanitarian aid expands the room for manoeuvre of some affected and non 
affected actors, it also reduces the room for manoeuvre of others and, in so 
doing, contributes to the degradation of their responses to flooding events. 
 164 
Thus, reluctance by local people to evacuate is then to be perceived, on the 
one hand as their weapon against their long-term impoverishment and 
vulnerability.  On the other, it responds strategically to their perception of 
how humanitarian assistance is done and what sort of short and long term 
rewards and punishments they may eventually face. It is a creative form of 
securing long established livelihood assets at the same time that they take 
advantage of newly emerging opportunities brought in by emergency 
discourse and logic. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESETTLING THE EVACUEES: IN SEARCH FOR 
SECURITIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Following the evacuation process, discussed in the last two chapters, the 
government of Mozambique released in a donor meeting held on March 05, 
2007 a reconstruction plan of 71 million USD. The plan was centred on the 
objective to resettle the affected population. The overall claim was that by 
implementing the resettlement programme the government would, on the one 
hand, provide them with (physical) security against flooding while, on the 
other hand, it would provide development through infra-structures such as 
schools, potable water, health care, new modern brick and cement houses, 
modern seeds and tools, and market integration.  
To encourage people to participate in the resettlement programme, the 
government planned a number of interventions. A decision was made that 
humanitarian relief should be channeled to those willing to be resettled.  
Public and private investments were discouraged in the flood-prone areas 
while encouraging investments in the resettlement centres.A total of 55,809 
displaced households were provided with materials (cement, roofing 
material, doors, windows, etc) for building houses (INGC, 2008:3). It also 
designed and implemented, in partnership with (I)NGOs, donors and the 
private sector agricultural seed vouchers for distribution to the affected. Fairs 
(feiras de insumos agricolas) were organised and the affected were advised to 
form associations to link up with markets, with different governmental and 
NGO interventions and to take advantage of expected opportunities.  
 
Hence, security and development were used as two interrelated ‘marketing’ 
narratives for undertaking the resettlement. The country’s Prime Minister 
stressed this in a press conference in April 5, 2007: 
 
“…the resettlement process must take into account the expansion of economic 
activities that can be explored by the resettled, a careful selection of the resettlement 
sites out of the disaster-prone areas and the establishment of infra-structures. …the 
intention is to transform the resettlement areas into small towns with attractive 
conditions”. (“…o processo de reassentamento deve obedecer a ampliação das 
actividades económicas que podem ser exploradas pelos reassentados, escolha 
cuidadosa das zonas de reafixação fora dos locais propensos a risco de calamidades 
naturais e estabelecimento de infra-estruturas. …o que se pretende é a transformação 
das zonas de reassentamento em pequenas vilas e com condições atractivas…” 
(Noticias Newspaper, April 6 and April 11, 2007). 
 
Throughout the chapter I disclose how local actors perceived, appropriated, 
integrated or transformed these resettlement narratives and interventions in 
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building their everyday livelihoods. From a theoretical perspective, 
resettlement processes have for a long time been a field of much debate. 
Despite the amount of literature and recommendations, ‘successful’ 
resettlements worldwide remain an exception rather than the rule (Asthana, 
1996: 1475). Emerging from this, researchers and practitioners from different 
disciplines point at each other for the failure of resettlement projects, and each 
attempts from their own disciplinary or institutional stand to offer guidelines 
for ‘successful’ resettlements (i.e. Coburn et al., 1984; Cernea, 1988; World 
Bank, 1991, 2001; Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993; The Sphere Project, 2004). 
This chapter is built around the arguments provided in chapter 4, that 
interventions neither fail completely nor are they a complete success story. In 
the process of implementation, as we shall see in the present chapter, 
interventions are shaped by different actors and acquire other meanings. 
Interventions such as those related to resettlement are arenas where different 
actors with different understandings and objectives interact and the outputs 
cannot be taken for granted and do not follow predefined objectives. 
Interfaces between different actors tend to produce outputs that were 
unintended. This chapter, then, follows intervention practices around the 
resettlement programme and analyzes how these are shaped as the result of 
actors’ encounters.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I reflect on current academic 
debate on resettlement. This is followed by a historical overview of 
resettlement processes in Mozambique. Then, based on the Harrell-Bond 
(1986; 1999) distinction of resettlement stages, I discuss the 2007 resettlement 
on the Zambezi delta. In doing so, I analyze actors’ interfaces and local 
responses during the process of registration and provision of seeds and tools, 
and when aid was ‘withdrawn’. The last section provides the conclusions of 
the chapter. Empirical data for this chapter were collected through participant 
observations, group discussion, life stories and semi-structured interviews in 
two resettlement centres in Mopeia district (at 24 de Julho and Zonas Verdes 
resettlement centres).By 2008, Zona Verdes had about 500 households while 
24 de Julho had about 1290 households1. 
 
RESETTLEMENT THINKING: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
 
Resettlement perspectives 
Following years of studies on displacement, the subject of resettlement has so 
far generated inconclusive and contradicting evidence. On the one hand, 
politicians and development practitioners are in favour of resettlement. From 
the point of view of development, resettlement provides opportunities for the 
reconstruction of systems of production and human settlements that 
represents a development in the standard of life of those affected, as well as in 
the regional economy of which they are part (Cernea, 1988:19). In most of the 
cases, the negative impacts resulting from resettlement activities are often 
                                                 
1
 Interview with Alberto Ismael, chief 24 de Julho resettlement centre September 23, 2008 
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justified as the costs borne by some people for the greater public good 
(Dwivedi, 1999:44). Resettlement often finds additional support in a 
securitization discourse. When displacement results from natural hazards and 
conflicts, an amalgam of actors will use notions of danger and security to 
strengthen the case for resettlement and in doing so access legal, financial, 
informational, and institutional ‘security resources’ (Warner, 2008: 13).  
On the other hand indeed, many authors have been arguing that the 
costs of resettlement outweigh, in most of the cases, the benefits. When 
resettlement policies are ad hoc or absent, displacement often exacerbates 
rather than mitigates economic, physical and social securities. People are 
removed from an environment in which they have evolved centuries of 
adaptation (Oliver-Smith, 1991, 2005; Asthana, 1996; Hammond, 2008). In 
many cases, this leads to landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalization, morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common 
property and social disarticulation that altogether produce or aggravate 
impoverishment and vulnerability (Cernea, 1996).   
As a third position, some scholars argue that the relationship between 
displacement and impoverishment is rather complex and fluid. Displacement 
is a historically specific process embedded in particular institutional and 
political arrangement and interpreted through particular discursive frames 
(Feldman et al., 2003: 8).  
Thus, resettlement means different things to different actors involved 
in the process. For example, for a farmer depending heavily on the soil 
moisture and fertility along the floodplains for agricultural based livelihoods, 
displacement from the floodplains and resettlement in higher grounds may 
result in a dismantling of his/her production system and of his accumulated 
knowledge of farming floodplains. For a young person looking forward to a 
new life of opportunities the same process may actually represent a window 
of opportunity and he/she may welcome the process. For the government 
resettlement may be the best option to reduce vulnerability to natural or man 
made hazards and to offer (physical) security to its constituents.  But it may 
also play into the hands of other politically motivated goals such as 
population concentration and control, land reform, attempts to provide public 
services more cost-effectively, induce development or to shift power relations 
and to include or exclude some social groups (Warner, 2008). Private 
companies and NGOs may look at the resettlement process as an opportunity 
to expand their interventions, increasing their portfolio and profits.   
I position myself in this latter body of literature, and look at 
resettlement processes as an arena where different actors with different 
motivations and power relations attempt to reach their goals. This is based on 
the actor oriented approach (Giddens, 1981; Long, 2001) which defines social 
life as a continuous negotiations of different and sometimes competing 
projects of individual or collective actors. In this process the outcomes can not 
be taken for granted but emerges from actors interfaces and their social 
negotiations.    
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Resettlement typology 
Resettlements are initiated by different types of actors and follow different 
paths. MacAndrews (1979:117) provides an often-quoted typology of 
resettlement. The author distinguishes four types of resettlements. First, the 
type created by spontaneous migration with virtually no government input. 
The second, created by spontaneous migration but facilitated by government 
agencies who provides site and service facilities. Third, are government 
sponsored and controlled resettlements. The fourth type is resettlements 
created by compulsory relocation, which is usually a by-product of large-scale 
national development programmes, or resulting from natural disasters.  
Most of the scholars tend to agree that spontaneous or voluntary 
resettlement (type i and ii) are more likely to be successful than the forced or 
involuntary ones (MacAndrews, 1979; Chambers, 1982; Cernea, 1988; Oliver-
Smith, 1991; Kinsey and Binswanger, 1993; Jacobsen, 2002). The levels of 
anxiety and insecurity are much higher among the involuntary resettlers as 
the relationship of the involuntarily resettled with their old environment 
tends to be severely disrupted and the relationship with the new environment 
is, mostly, ‘an obscure and stinking encounter’ (Asthana, 1996:1468). From 
this point of view, some scholars claim that involuntary resettlement should 
be minimized or avoided if possible (Palmer, 1974:241; Cernea, 1990:26). 
This typology provides, however, an incomplete view of the dynamics 
involved in resettlement processes. The line dividing voluntary and 
involuntary resettlements is, in most of the cases, very thin and the 
relationships between them very complex and fluid. For a policy of largely 
involuntary resettlement to be successful, a minimum number of settlers must 
volunteer to be part (Hammond, 2008:520). In other situations some people, 
although not approving of the resettlement process, may temporarily enrol 
voluntarily in order to access resources. Others may coercively be resettled by 
the authorities for political reasons of visibility and international assistance 
but allowed to voluntarily resettle elsewhere once the objectives have been 
accomplished or disappointingly unaccomplished.  
Hammond (2008) claims that in Ethiopia poverty and food insecurity 
are used by the government to send people voluntarily or involuntarily  into 
resettlement programmes in remote areas under the promises of a better life. 
The new areas have few access roads, most NGOs are expressly forbidden 
from operating and the local conditions such as farmland are not immediately 
useful. The operation seemed to be an attempt of making these people 
invisible from the gaze of the public, government and international donors 
concerned with food security. This has been coined by the author as the 
invisibilization process. 
Lubkemann (2008) has described processes of ‘involuntary 
immobilization’ in some contexts such as civil war. He claims that some war 
victims are forced to remain in the same place although they may desire to 
resettle elsewhere. Those affected are mainly women, children, conscripted 
young men and the elderly.  
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From all of the above, it appears that resettlement needs to be 
approached as a multiple process with multiple outcomes. The dichotomy of 
voluntary and forced resettlements masks the complexities involved and 
hides different forms of settlement emerging from different policies or from 
the same policies but leading to multiple outcomes. A focus on the dichotomy 
tends to create an illusory ideal form of settlement and fictitious notions of 
failure and success.  In reality, resettlement may evolve in hybrid forms which 
emerge from the (re)combination of voluntary and involuntary resettlement.       
 
 
Resettlement stages 
Some scholars have stressed the need to follow the resettlement process itself 
and identify its critical stages. This requires unbundling the resettlement 
process and looking into its different stages. Scudder and Colson (1982) 
distinguished four critical phases where actors seem to interact and (re)shape 
the resettlement process that is, recruitment, transition, adaptation and 
incorporation.  
In the initial stage, people are recruited through a process of filtering to 
determine who may be entitled to the resettlement and under which 
conditions (the recruitment stage). Second, there is a process of transition from 
their old environment to a new environment. In this transition stage people go 
back and forth and a high level of risk aversion is developed. People tend to 
conserve their previous practices and they are skeptical about new housing 
arrangements as well as new land tenure patterns and new cropping 
techniques. In the third stage, the resettled are more acquainted with the new 
environment and are more willing to take risks and more open to new 
alternatives and to take advantage of new opportunities. This represents the 
adaptation stage. Finally, the new forms of knowledge and social organization 
become part of everyday life. They are applied routinely without much 
questioning. This is labelled the incorporation stage.   
In a similar conceptualization but taking humanitarian aid as the focus 
of analysis, Harrell-Bond (1986; 1999) suggested that the resettlement process 
involves three stages. The first stage consists of registering the concerned 
people and, if required, to transport them to the resettlement sites and 
provide them with immediate relief. This resembles stages 1 and 2 of Scudder 
and Colson’s model. In this stage, the resettled are expected to build their 
houses or inhabit houses built for them. In the second stage, the resettled 
receive seeds and tools. They may also get plots of land for agricultural 
production and be provided with primary education. This resembles stage 3 
of Scudder and Colson. In the third phase, aid is withdrawn under the 
assumption that by that time, the resettled are self-sufficient and integrated 
into the local economy (Harrell-Bond, 1986:9; 1999: 147). This resembles the 
last stage of the Scudder and Colson model.  
This research adopts the Harrell-Bond distinction and I will analyze 
actors’ interfaces across these three ‘stages’. Nonetheless, rather than taking 
them as stages, I see them as critical events where different actors interact and 
 170 
attempt to fulfil their goals reshaping, to a large extent, the lives and 
livelihoods of the actors involved.  
 
RESETTLEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Mozambique has a long history of resettlement processes. In chapter two, I 
mentioned shortly the villagisation policy engendered by the government 
following independence in 1975. This has probably been the most ambitious 
resettlement plan ever recorded in Mozambique and the one that has 
attracted much academic and policy debate. Up to 1982, the villagisation 
policy displaced nearly two million Mozambicans who went to live in 1,360 
resettlement villages supported by the government (Coelho, 1993:345). This 
process occurred either through government leadership and coercive 
measures or in a ‘voluntary’ way. In addition, it is likely that thousands or 
even millions of others who were opposed to the process may have migrated 
to areas and countries out of reach of the national authorities and statistics. 
But, the villagisation process was just one amongst many other experiences of 
resettlement in Mozambique. 
Colonial policies have shaped settlement patterns as well. The prazo 
system envisaged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries where large 
portions of land were expropriated from the natives by the Portuguese, led to 
the resettlement of thousands of Mozambican on the Zambezi delta (Newitt, 
1969). In the early 1970s, attempts by the colonial authorities to block the 
advance of Frelimo during the liberation war led to the creation of six 
hundred resettlement villages aldeamentos where nearly one million 
Mozambicans were concentrated (da Silva, 1994:18).  
Following independence in 1975, other resettlement processes besides 
the villagisation policy were also implemented. One such process was the 
resettlement of liberation fighters. The government sought to compensate the 
liberation fighters by allocating them large agrarian farms abandoned by the 
Portuguese farmers and turned them into what was known as the production 
centres, centros de produção. The government provided agricultural inputs to 
about 7,000 ex-combatants and their families to settle in apparently isolated 
areas and operate 23 production centres for the liberation fighters, centros de 
produção dos antigos combatentes (Taju, 1992:5). Another resettlement project 
was directed at ‘marginal’ people- ‘os marginais’. In 1983, the government 
launched a policy of resettling the unemployed, ‘petty’ criminals and those 
considered against the revolution, on state farms in the underpopulated 
northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. The Operation Production, 
operação produção as it was known, relocated nearly 50,000 people from all 
over the country (Vines, 1996: 59).   
The Civil war, 1976-1992, displaced millions of Mozambican who 
resettled temporally or permanently in different parts of the country and in 
neighbouring countries. By the end of the civil war in 1992, nearly 4 million 
Mozambicans were internally displaced and about 2 million were living 
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across the borders in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Swaziland 
and Tanzania (UNHCR, 1996:15). 
In the meantime, natural hazards such as droughts, floods, cyclones, 
epidemics and development interventions such as dam construction have 
altogether- wittingly or unwittingly- forced people to resettle elsewhere. Due 
to drought situations, millions of Mozambicans countrywide moved and 
resettled elsewhere from 1823 to 1831 (Newitt, 1988).  Because of Cahora 
Bassa dam construction, thousands of people had to be resettled in poor areas 
in the central province of Tete (Filipe, 2003:4). Government has also taken 
advantage of floods to resettle people in the Limpopo and Zambezi basin (see 
chapter 2). In overall, resettlement has been a part of the history of many 
Mozambicans.  
The 2007 resettlement can thus be viewed as the continuation of a 
history where floods have repeatedly influenced resettlement policies in 
Mozambique. Flooding was used to legitimise resettlement policies in the 
1970s and 1980s -  the era of villagisation - and the issue continues to be raised 
after each new flooding.  Following the 2000 Limpopo river floods in the 
south of Mozambique, massive resettlement processes were undertaken in 
Chokwe, Guija and Xai-Xai districts and in 2001 similar interventions were 
carried out in the districts along the  Zambezi delta. The 2007 flooding and 
resettlement process follows therefore a long history of the flood-related 
resettlement policy, which is motivated as seen at the introduction of the 
present chapter, by the use of a combination of security and development 
narratives. Hence, (permanent) resettlement appears to be a routinely 
proposed solution to the flooding ‘problem’. But how did it work in practice 
during the 2007 flooding? How did local actors perceive, appropriate, 
integrate or transform these resettlement narratives and interventions in 
building their everyday livelihoods? The remainder of this chapter deals with 
these questions. 
  
ACTORS’ INTERFACES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME 
 
This chapter focuses on the implementation of the resettlement programme 
and, as explained earlier, highlights three critical moments of interfaces 
between local actors and the external/aid providers that are derived from 
phases distinguished by Harrell-Bond. These are registration, provision of 
modern seeds and tools and aid withdrawal. Nonetheless, as the process of 
building the houses appeared to be a rather hectic arena on its own, I add 
‘installation’ as an intermediate phase.   
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INTERFACES AT REGISTRATION 
 
Cheating and facelessness 
Registering the people to be resettled and assisted with humanitarian relief is 
not an easy task and has been a question of debate in humanitarian studies for 
a long time (see Telford, 1997; UNHCR, 1998; Crisp, 1999; Kibreab, 2004). 
During the 2007 flooding there was no generally accepted statistic on the 
number of flood ‘victims’. The government estimated that 285,000 people 
were affected and 163,045 displaced (INGC, 2007). But different organizations 
have produced other statistics. USAID suggested that 331,500 people were 
affected while WFP put the figure at 140,000 displaced people (Foley, 2007:9-
10). To explain the inconsistencies in numbers, different actors referred to 
cheating practices of the flood-affected and surrounding population.  
Government and humanitarian organizations blamed local people for 
pursuing so-called opportunistic practices2 or cheating practices as stated by 
Kibreab (2004). The ‘cheating’ practices included inflating sizes of households, 
splitting the household members between different resettlement centers, and 
registering as victims while not ‘affected’ by the floods. These practices 
illustrate the challenges in the registration process but also the fluidity 
between voluntary and involuntary resettlement discussed above.   
 There are different reasons why people undertake cheating practices. 
Gaim Kibreab (2004) points out four major reasons. Firstly, for local people 
government and humanitarian organizations are faceless entities that cannot 
be subject to harm, suffering or injustice. Interacting with such entities 
without any moral principle is not condemned and as such, it does not 
generate any sense of guilt. Secondly, the rules and norms that regulate 
government and NGO activities do not incorporate elements of informal 
institutional rules that regulate access, control and use of resource among the 
locals. Thirdly, most of the agencies are managed by people who share little 
or nothing with the loal people in terms of ethnicity or religion. So, they do 
not feel any sense of loyalty to those people and exercise no moral constraint 
in dealing with them. Fourthly, locals do not know how the organizations 
raise the money or commodities they distribute to them. Further, as the 
officers tend to show a relatively lavish lifestyle, local people tend to develop 
a perception that the resources of agencies are inexhaustible and resorting to 
cheating behaviour is considered to have no negative impact on agencies’ 
wealth.   
Others have suggested that cheating practices may be promoted, 
tolerated or restrained as part of the ‘political economy’ of the country. 
Inflating numbers may be relevant to target international aid, media attention, 
for state control and to feed clientelism and corruption (Crisp, 1999; Jacobsen, 
2002).  
During flooding, moral issues played a role for both cheating and not 
cheating. Cheating outsiders was not condemned much and people tended 
                                                 
2
 Interview with Salomão from the Save the Children; Melo and Agnaldo from the Mozambican Red 
Cross, Dambiro and Renço from the INGC and Carolina from the GTZ  
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not to feel guilty in resorting to such practices. ‘Pintho pya B’homa’ 
(government relief) ‘Pintho pya azungu’ (white people’s or wealthy people’s 
relief); ‘Pintho pya calamidade’ (disaster relief) were the statements used to 
describe the distributed goods. These labels bring out the faceless image of 
humanitarian aid.    
Nonetheless, cheating was also faceless. Although people used to 
cheat, the locals would hardly disclose anyone as a cheater. Being reported as 
a cheater would lead to withdrawal from the lists, imprisonments3  and 
would render re-registration almost impossible. Some claimed that they did 
not disclose the cheaters because they feared witchcraft if they did so4. The 
fear of witchcraft (not witchcraft itself) was therefore invoked as a social 
mechanism to stay loyal to the cheaters rather than the cheated.  
For not disclosing each other and protecting each other from 
withdrawal, imprisonment and witchcraft people would, in some cases, 
prefer to use ‘redistribution strategies’. Instead of some being excluded or 
jailed, they would suggest that aid should be distributed to those who could 
accomplish to become eligible and the others would get their chance during 
the next distributions. Nevertheless, beyond the humanitarian gaze recipients 
were expected to redistribute the aid to the others. In other cases, all 
households or those with larger households were adviced by the local chiefs 
to reduce the household size to allow aid to reach all households5. In one of 
my discussions with a manager6 of Save the Children Livelihood Recovery 
Programme in Mopeia, she complained why they had to carry out the 
registration of the most vulnerable for aid when at the end almost everybody 
would get aid.  
There were, however, also exceptions. Some people would not resort to 
cheating because of their moral concerns with others that eventually would 
not get any aid. This was particularly the case of church leaders that showed 
their concerns with the elderly, orphans and handicapped.  
Overall, it appeared that cheating was, to a large extent, a community 
endeavour and depended on the compliance of others to be realized. Group 
interdependencies discussed in chapter 3 turned out to be equally relevant for 
cheating practices. Furthermore, it appears that although people had little 
moral concern for the humanitarian organizations, they had indeed moral 
concerns for their fellowmen, especially by practices of redistribution and for 
some by advocating against cheating.  This suggests that their morality did 
not decay with the resettlement process and that there were attempts to 
maintain continuity in their social fabric.   
 
                                                 
3
 In the second week of February 2008, three people were arrested in Mopeia  
4
 Interview with Carlos Froi, chief Zonas Verdes resettlement centre Mopeia,September 24, 2008 and 
Alberto Ismael, chief 24 de Julho resettlement centre September 23, 2008; interview with Tomé Gole, 
September 22, 2008 
5
 Interview with Carlos Froi, chief Zonas Verdes resettlement centre Mopeia,September 24, 2008 and 
Alberto Ismael, chief 24 de Julho resettlement centre September 23, 2008; interview with Tomé Gole, 
September 22, 2008. 
6
 Sophie Shottard from Save the Children.  
 174 
Alternative narratives to cheating  
In the humanitarian field, cheating is a linguistic and functional 
representation which aid organizations and scholars alike use to describe (and 
condemn) deceiving practices undertaken by aid receivers. But how do the 
aid receivers themselves perceive cheating? On the Zambezi delta, aid 
receivers tended to develop alternative narratives to cheating.  As far as they 
were concerned they were not making any misrepresentation. It was 
ultimately the relief organizations and the government that misunderstood, 
misinterpreted or misrepresented their lives. For them, government and 
NGOs norms and rules had little resemblance to their everyday lives.  
To start with, the registration guidelines required, for different reasons, 
that the household members should be listed by age, education, gender, 
physical fitness, pregnance, vulnerability, etc. (… idade, homem, mulher, idosos, 
deficientes, crianças vulneráveis, crianças não acompanhadas, nível de escolaridade, 
mulheres grávidas…) and had to get a registration card (INGC, 2007a). This 
process was for some of them intrusive and non-practical. To disclose in 
public whether a woman is pregnant (at an early stage) is a taboo. The 
superstition is that witches can provoke abortion at will once they are in 
possession of such knowledge. Further, as a considerable number of people 
have little formal education and hardly speak or write Portuguese, questions 
on age, education, vulnerability tended to embarrass or humiliate them. 
Keeping the registration card in the tents and improvised shelters was a 
‘nightmare’ as some people were losing them.   
Second, in the view of some people, government and NGO officers had 
wrong assumptions and did not understand their concept of the size of a 
household. In the Zambezi delta, polygamy resulted in multiple households 
often with large numbers per household (far beyond the national average of 5 
members) but government and NGO officers had a different view; they  
suspected loals of cheating. Further, young couples like that of Tomé 
(previous chapter) were denied registration as a household because they 
looked quite young. Thus, for local people they were not cheating but rather 
they were being short changed. There was a misrepresentation of them.  
This local ‘misrepresentation narrative’ prompts us to raise questions 
which are seemingly taken for granted by aid providers. Registration rules are 
the technocratic requirement of a relief operation, and seem in the eyes of the 
aid agencies neutral or evident. The question to be asked is, what are the 
assumptions involved in the registration process and what are the socio-
economic and cultural implications of the registration practices?  
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INTERFACES IN THE BUILDING OF HOUSES   
 
The resettlement process was designed to lead to a better life for the resettled. 
This was to be achieved by a range of government interventions in public 
services, market integration and urbanization. In this section I focus on the 
urbanization process and the building of the houses by the resettlers at the 24 
de Julho and Zonas Verdes resettlement centres, in Mopeia district where I 
spent about one year out of my one and half years of fieldwork in 
Mozambique. I decided to focus on these centres mainly because most of the 
people who left Cocorico (see previous chapters) were resettled there. In these 
resettlement centres, as we shall see below, contestations and the reshaping of 
the planned development marked the building of the houses. 
 
 
Development lacking resources 
24 de Julho and Zonas Verdes resettlement centers are located between about 
five and three kilometers respectively from Mopeia village. Both were 
involved in resettling people affected by the 2001 flooding on the Zambezi 
delta. In order to settle people affected by the flood of 2007, the government 
decided to expand these pre-existing resettlement centers by clearing the 
surrounding bushes and demarcating new plots (size 30x40 metres). In the 
development vision of the government, the new areas were supposed to be 
urbanized and would have roads, plots for infrastructures and for habitation. 
The plan was to resettle people according to their areas of origin in order to 
provide a sense of socio-cultural continuity but also for better control. To 
oversee and undertake the marking of plots the government granted 
authority to the Ministry of the Environment (MICOA). 
During the implementation, however, the process of clearing and 
allocating plots to the affected did not go as the government had planned. 
Nationwide, the government needed 3,325,000 USD but MICOA did not 
manage to mobilize that amount (MICOA, 2007). Donors were generally very 
skeptical about funding the resettlement process and it was ultimately the 
government with its limited funds that attempted to pursue the process7. Up 
to early 2010, dozens of houses that had started to be built in 2007 along the 
Zambezi delta were still unfinished due to limited funds8.   
Due to financial constraints deployment of technical staff to the field 
was limited and in most of the cases delayed. Hence, plans were changed, 
instead of deploying technical staff from the cities to undertake the process in 
the villages, which was costly, the government decided to deploy a few staff 
and to train 10 to 15 local volunteers to do the job. This brought new 
challenges. There were few volunteers interested in the training demacations 
of the plots. Moreover, some areas were impenetrable forests with high trees 
and doing demarcations was almost impossible without equipment and 
financial resources (MICOA, ibid). This further hampered the process and 
                                                 
7
 Interview with Dr. Higino Rodrigues, director of reconstruction program, Maputo, May 5, 2009 
8
 Mozambican Television (TVM), February 8, 2010.  
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people started to settle wherever they could find a place, regardless of their 
area of origin, plot dimension and demarcations. 
 
 
Contested layout and the emergence of mixed areas (zona mista)   
Demarcation challenges pushed the local government to follow new plans. It 
approached WFP and asked it to use its food for work programmes for clearing 
bushes, making demarcations and other services.  WFP came on board and 
devised a food for work programme, later called, food for development programme. 
In the programme some people were selected to carry out the clearing and 
marking of plots and they received food for their participation.  
When clearing and demarcation succeeded, people who had resettled 
‘arbitrarily’ were advised or forced by local authorities to reorganize 
themselves and live according to areas of origin. 24 de Julho had sections for 
people coming from Cocorico, from Massankara, from Muriua, from Dombe 
and Madogoro among others. The same thing happened at the Zonas Verdes. 
Nevertheless, this recommendation was contested and hardly followed. 
People who had settled close to water pumps, the school or close to roads did 
not see the wisdom in this so they stayed put and in 24 de Julho an area called 
zona mista (mixed area) emerged around the school and the market.  
 
 
Contested plot sizes and the emergence of differentiations  
According to the envisaged resettlement plan, each household would get a 
plot of 30x40 metres, following the Sphere guidelines. At the implementation, 
however, people contested the plot allocation. For most of the people, these 
plots were too small for building a house and a latrine leaving adequate space 
for rearing livestock, a playground and a garden. Further, polygamous or 
larger households found it nonsensical to allocate to a household of one 
person a plot of similar size to that of a household of 10 members or more. 
Similarly, chiefs thought they deserved bigger plots. These claims led to 
different plot sizes within the same resettlement centre. The Sphere guidelines 
were literally put aside. Those people selected to carry out the cleaning and 
the plot allocation applied other criteria such as household size, marital status 
and social status. In the end some got plots bigger than 30x40 m while others 
got smaller ones9. The emerging differentiation was further reinforced by the 
government’s policy to provide designs for the new houses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Interview with Carlos Froi, chief of the Zonas Verdes resettlement center; 25 July 2007 and 23 
September 2008. At 24 de Julho, for example the Regulo Cocorico was given 2 plots. 
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Exclusion and differentiation. House designs for the elite and for the 
ordinary people  
At the introduction of the present chapter, I mentioned that the government 
decided that it would provide material for building 55,809 ‘modern’ houses. 
For these ‘modern’ houses, the government provided two designs; a three-
room design which required slightly more space and became known as the 
chief’s house design and, a two room design or what came to be called the 
public’s design. It had never been clear whether the government had truly 
decided on that distinction but in practice, the process appeared as such. 
Chiefs had a three-roomed houses and the remainder of the population who 
managed to build had two roomed houses. By September 2008, there were 23 
‘modern’ houses at the Zonas Verdes. Only two were three roomed and these 
belonged to the chiefs. Similarly, 24 de Julho had 36 houses of which 6 had 
three rooms each and they belonged to local chiefs. At the 24 de Julho, one 
‘ordinary’ household attempted to build a three-roomed house but it was 
partially demolished by the authorities. They claimed that this would open 
space for others to do the same and the government did not have funds for so 
many three roomed houses.  
 
 
Elite capture and the invisibilization of the poor 
The process of building the houses was designed to be participatory. The 
government would provide materials but the resettlers were supposed to 
produce their own bricks. If bricks were made far from the construction site, 
the government would provide transport. Making bricks was not an easy 
task. According to local calculations, a two roomed house required about six 
thousand bricks and three rooms about ten thousand. This was a labour 
intensive activity. On average it took about three months (for a household of 
five members) to make the required amount of bricks for one house. This was 
also subject to weather conditions. During the rainy season (October-March) 
people almost stopped brick moulding completely. During the dry season 
(April-September), brick production was more feasible. To have the bricks as 
soon as possible households devised different practices. Some people 
contracted labour for making the bricks, others bought ready made bricks 
whose cost ranged between 1 to 1.5 Meticais per brick10 and others organized 
groups of friends, neighbors, kinships etc. and produced bricks which were 
later divided amongst the members. The brick production became therefore 
very much a result of how individuals managed to secure the necessary labor 
force or financial means to do so.The elderly, female headed households and 
the handicapped where virtually excluded from the process, becoming almost 
invisible. 
Anticipating this to happen, the government sought to produce bricks 
for the most vulnerable groups known as the target group (grupo alvo). This 
included elderly (os idosos), the handicapped or PPD (Pessoas Portadoras de 
Deficências), the women headed households or the MCF (Mulheres Chefes de 
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 1 USD= 25 Meticais, average 2008 
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Familia) and the HIV and AIDS orphaned children or the COVS (Crianças 
Orfas Vitimas do Sida).   
To target these categories, the government in partnership with WFP 
launched in the early stages of the brick making process (around April-May 
2007) a food-for-work brick making programme. A considerable amount of 
bricks were produced and later on transported to the resettlement centres and 
delivered to the chief’s houses. The bricks were supposed to be allocated to 
the most vulnerable ones- the target group. This happened before most of the 
people, including the chief’s themselves, had produced their own bricks. 
Instead of being allocated to the grupo alvo, the chiefs used the bricks to start 
building their own house. They claimed that the government had again and 
again stressed that the chiefs should be the first to build the houses so as to set 
the example and as a way to show the others that they were not planning to 
return to the flood prone areas.  
 Once the bricks had been transported, the building process was 
dependent on the government who provided the cement and the bricklayer. 
Access to these resources was another layer of invisibilization of the poor. For 
example, those close to the roads were given priority compared to those 
settled in the interior. To make this explicit and more overt some internal 
rules were devised. Amongst others, those who were not yet ready to start the 
construction but had been living alongside the main roads were advised or 
forced by local authorities to move into the interior and give their plots to 
those who were ready but the plots were located more in the interior than 
along the main roads. The underlying argument was that if the government 
wanted the resettlement centres to look like small towns, then it would make 
no sense to have brick houses scattered around the resettlement centres in a 
mixture with tents and hubs palhotas. The new houses had to be neatly lined 
up, preferably along the main roads11.  
This produced on the one hand what was referred in the backstage as 
cities- cidades (located visibly along the main roads) and bush Kutsanga (into 
the interior-invisibly beyond the main roads). On the other hand, it led to a 
process of exclusion of those considered more vulnerable, who could not yet 
afford to make or buy the bricks. Furthermore, the process of lining the brick 
houses along the main roads created a new layout. Although households 
were expected to settle according to their area of origin, the lining process 
tended to disintegrate that layout. To exemplify, chief Cocorico’s ‘modern’ 
house at the 24 de Julho resettlement centre is located along one of the main 
roads outside the area which is supposed to be for people coming from the 
lowland Cocorico region which is more into the interior. What emerged out of 
the process was elite, regardless of their origin, occupying most of the places 
along the roads, near water pumps and schools while those with limited 
resources were pushed into the interior.  
 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Carlos Froi, chief Zonas Verdes resettlement centre Mopeia,September 24, 2008 and 
Alberto Ismael, chief 24 de Julho resettlement centre September 23, 2008; interview with Tomé Gole, 
September 22, 2008. 
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In between continuities and discontinuities 
As observed in the introduction, the envisaged plan was to bring more than 
just resettlement. The idea was to move people from their traditional lifestyle 
marked by scattered wood and grass houses, limited market integration and 
social infrastructures to a modern lifestyle of brick and lined houses with 
market integration and modern infrastructure. In practice, however, life in the 
resettlement centres turned to be neither truly modern nor traditional. 
‘Modernity’ seemed to intermingle with ‘traditionality’. Wood and grass 
houses were still in the majority in the resettlement centres and people were 
still using traditional healers and previous socio-cultural practices in their 
everyday life. 
The estruturas do centro (centre’s leaders) were viewed by the locals as 
the progressive and modern men. They carried mobile phones, had cement 
and zinc roofed houses and were more of business men than farmers and 
fishermen. However, they also carried what would be called ‘traditional 
vignettes’. They were mostly polygamous, and although they had brick 
houses, they lacked latrines and fiercely feared witchcraft. The ‘estruturas do 
centro’ involved   the ‘traditional’ chiefs (the regulos, sapandas and muenes) and 
the ‘modern’ ones secretarios and chefes de centro. As they used to put it: ‘nós 
trabalhamos juntos’- ‘we work together’.   
The so-called more traditional people such as the curandeiros 
(traditional healers and witch doctors) and elderly people seemed to 
command a reasonable knowledge of modernity. The curandeiros for instance 
knew reasonably well about HIV/AIDS and they tended to advice their 
patients to go to the hospital if they saw related symptoms. The elderly, 
anciões, were also knowledgeable on ‘modern’ humanitarian assistance. When 
approached by humanitarian organizations they would present themselves in 
torn old clothes so that they could be the target group. Both (curandeiros and 
anciões) were indeed, in most of the cases, part of the traditional authority and 
were supposed to be the masters of traditional knowledge.  
What emerges from this is a fluid set of ‘traditionality’ and ‘modernity’ 
practices which coexisted and people drew on each of these depending on the 
context and actors involved. Traditional practices continued to be applied 
wherever they were required and were discontinued when modernity was the 
better option.   
 
INTERFACES AT THE SEEDS AND TOOLS FAIRS  
 
Introduction 
Seeds and tools have been part of humanitarian assistance for a long time. 
According to Sperling and Longley (2002:283), over the past 15 years the 
distribution of seeds and tools has become a popular approach to promote 
food security and development among communities affected by disasters. 
This is done under the assumption that, after a disaster, there is a lack of 
available seed and tools (Sperling et al., 2004:4). There are also misperceptions 
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that in cases where farmers are able to save seeds, these are physiologically of 
lower quality compared to the ones distributed during the humanitarian 
assistance (Jones et al., 2002: 307). Although the approach has shifted from a 
classical ‘seed and tool package’ to what Longley et al., (2003:3) called 
‘market-based’ and ‘demand-driven’ approach through seed vouchers and 
fairs strongly defended by Remington et al., (2002), the core assumption is still 
the same - inexistence or lower quality of seeds and tools after a disaster.  In 
recent years, however, much of the academic research has proven that 
farmers’ seed systems are remarkably resilient even in the face of severe 
natural hazards, requiring therefore a shift from the paternalist thinking into a 
more field-based diagnosis ( Longley et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2002; Longley et 
al., 2003; Sperling et al., 2004; Maxwell et al., 2008). 
In this section, I will not go into the question of whether the seeds and 
tools were needed by the affected people. Rather, by using the actor-oriented 
approach and conceptualizing the fairs as arenas, I will address how the seed 
vouchers and fairs were appropriated and transformed by the actors. In doing 
so, I am not so much interested in the arguments which try to portray seed 
fairs either as a success (Remington et al., (2002) or as a failure (Jones et al., 
2002). Rather I see the fairs being reconfigured at the local level and acquiring 
different meanings and outcomes. To do this, I use the case of a fair organized 
by the Save the Children UK in October 2008 at the 24 de Julho resettlement 
centre. I will discuss three aspects that emerged as relevant during the fairs 
namely (1) the power conflicts; (2) the setting of resettlers’ needs and (3) the 
setting of criteria of quality on seeds and tools. 
Save the Children UK was established in 1919 by Eglantyne Jebb after 
witnessing the impacts of the World War I (1914-1918) on children’s welfare. 
She drafted, in 1923, the universal children’s rights declaration which was 
approved by the League of Nations (UN) in 1924. The organization has 
operated in Mozambique since 1984 focusing on the well-being of the 
children. During the 2007 flooding, Save the Children provided different 
types of humanitarian aid like food, school tents, teaching material, clothes, 
hygienic items and livelihood related interventions. As mentioned in chapter 
5, Save the Children led the Education and Protection Clusters and was nearly 
involved in all the 11 clusters. The fairs were part of the Save the Children 
programme on livelihood recovery after disasters and were funded by 
USAID.   
 
The fairs: Contestation and power conflicts  
From October 27 – 30, 2008 Save the Children UK in partnership with the local 
government  organized seed vouchers and fairs in three resettlement centres 
(24 de Julho, Nhamirere and Vumbe) in Mopeia district. 5,226 households 
were beforehand registered from which 2, 594 at the 24 de Julho (SCF, 2008). 
Ten seeds and tools’ vendors were selected from the Zambezia province, of 
which six were from within Mopeia district itself. The total amount for the 
fairs was 2,090,400.00 MT (about 83,616 USD) and each of the households got 
vouchers equivalent to 400 MT (about 16 USD).  
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On the morning of 27 October, I was among the many people waiting 
for the fair to start. By 9 o’clock the SCF staff and most of the beneficiaries 
were already there and the vendors were ready at their stalls to start their 
sales. But, the district administrator who was going to do the opening 
ceremony was not yet present.  The opening ceremony started around 11 
o’clock, about two hours later.  
In October 29, I had an interview with the district administrator and I 
raised the question of the relationship between local government and NGOs.  
The administrator citing the just ended fair pointed out that local government 
was hardly involved in the planning and selection of the intervention sites.  
There was a by-pass to government institutions and due to that, he was not 
willing to be part of the process. SCF had to come to his office and give him 
assuarances that this would never happen again. This explained why he took 
long before coming for the opening ceremony. For the administrator it should 
be the government to take the lead and not the NGOs or donors. The district 
has a development plan which addresses the resettlement process as part of a 
much wider district development project12.  
  
Planned and parallel needs  
The fairs focus on providing the households with seeds and agricultural tools. 
At 24 de Julho and more likely in Mopeia district in general, not all the 
beneficiaries seemed to agree with this perception of needs. During the fair, 
some beneficiaries suggested that the fairs should provide more options 
including clothes, school material, food items, fishing tools, livestock and 
construction material.  Some households have shown these parallel needs by 
negotiating their vouchers for goods other than seeds and tools. A monitor of 
SCF fairs found one of the vendors in possession of vouchers of about 30 
households (who wanted something different). The idea was that after the 
fairs those households would approach the provider and select items of their 
choice from his shop (SCF, 2008: 15).  
   
Planned and parallel criteria for quality 
During the fairs, the vendors were advised to bring and sell certified seeds 
(SCF, 2008: 5).  This is an international donor-driven demand that rests on the 
assumption that certified seeds guarantee quality and will provide increased 
agricultural yields. In Mozambique, however, Longley et al., (2005:24) found 
that both certified and local seeds supplied during the fairs, had a low 
germination percentage and many of the commercial seeds failed to meet the 
quality standards set by law. They also found that rather than focusing on 
quality, the beneficiaries were more concerned with the vendors themselves. 
Most of the beneficiaries preferred to buy from local traders that they already 
knew and with whom a trusted relationship had been established over time 
(ibid: 22).  
In Mopeia this was also the dominant pattern; 74.5 percent of the 
beneficiaries purchased their seeds and tools from local vendors and about 61 
                                                 
12
 Interview with district administrator October 29, 2008. 
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percent purchased from just two local vendors (SCF, ibid:19).  In informal 
discussions, some beneficiaries stated that they preferred local vendors 
because a trusted relationship had been established from way back.  They 
knew them and dealing with local vendors allowed room for price negotiation 
and the possibility of going back, later on, to exchange the purchased seeds 
and tools with other commodities. This pattern suggests as well an attempt by 
the resettlers to maintain continuity in their social relations. Relationships, 
trust, previous experience and mutual expectations are relevant and used 
continuously to shape the practices.  
 
´AID WITHDRAWAL’, CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES  
 
According to the Harrell-Bond (1986; 1999) resettlement model which I have 
drawn on so far, the last stage of the resettlement process involves 
withdrawing the aid after the first agricultural harvest, basically under the 
assumption that the seeds and the tools provided earlier have allowed self-
sufficiency and the (re)integration of the resettled into the market. Although 
this may happen frequently and most organizations use that rationale for 
planning their intervention in resettlement programmes, some cautionary 
remarks need to be made. In most of the cases, the aid is not withdrawn 
completely. Development programmes run either by the government or by 
NGOs continue to provide aid to some of the resettled under the umbrella of 
development. More importantly, people do not make the aid-post aid 
distinction. From the word go, as seen in the previous chapter, they are busy 
saving their livelihoods and aid is only one of the strategies they use. In the 
remainder of the chapter I look at how the resettlers craft their livelihoods in 
the resettlement centres.      
 
Intensive and Extensive Livelihoods: The ‘Aquatics’, the ‘Terrestrials’ and 
the ‘Amphibians’  
 
Living in the resettlement centers, close to the urban village and away from 
the flood-prone areas has, to a large extent, reshaped people’s lives. One of 
the changes, which emerged for the people from Cocorico, was the sources of 
livelihoods. In the flood prone areas, households tend to rely on few sources 
of livelihoods. These included mainly practicing agriculture, raising small 
scale poultry, trading products derived from agriculture, fishing and, 
occasionally, remittances. A social network and an art de la localité (Van de 
Ploeg, 1989), by which space, knowledge and practices are crafted in each 
context and reproduced over time, evolved around these activities.  
In the resettlement centers, however, they had to expand their 
livelihood strategies in order make a daily living. They lived from agriculture, 
fishing, processing or marketing of food, beer, liquor, and other products 
from the farms or factors, from scavenging, from livestock rearing, from 
mutual help, from contract outwork, from casual labour, from hunting or 
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gathering of forestry products, from craft work, from remittances, from 
begging, from selling assets and from seasonal food-for-work, public works 
and relief.  
When comparing Cocorico (lowland) with resettlement centres (upper 
lands) I found statistical differences (p<0.001) on the livelihood activities and 
the number of months households sustain themselves from their own 
agricultural production. On average households practice more activities on 
resettlement centres (7 activities) compared to lowland Cocorico (4 activities). 
In Cocorico households are able to feed for a longer period from own 
agricultural production (average of 8 months) compared to people in 
resettlement centres (5 months).   
The need for expanding livelihood activities can be explained by a 
number of reasons. Firstly, as said above, households living on the lowlands 
tend to have food supplies from their own production for a much longer 
period compared to those living in the upper/resettlement areas.  This 
derives not just from higher soil fertility and humidity on the flood-prone 
areas, but also from a different management of agricultural fields and 
harvests. For example, as household members on the upper areas are 
involved in different activities and farms become located far from the cement 
houses, the more ‘traditional’ activities such as agriculture and fishing get less 
labour force that in turn has consequence on the production levels. Secondly, 
although earning on average similar amounts (no statistical difference 
between lower and upper areas- p=0.118), people tend to spend less money 
on the lowlands compared to upper areas as  most of their material, 
physiological and nutritional needs can be extracted from the surrounding 
natural resources. This includes, protein and oil sources, firewood, 
construction material etc, which on the urbanized resettlement centers tend to 
be monetized and for sale.   
The diversification of livelihood sources has implications far beyond 
the mere fact of practicing more activities. It actually deconstructed the 
cultural boundaries and notions of space, time and assets. This unbundling 
produced in the Mopeia case, three different categories of responses which I 
metaphorically labelled the ‘aquatics’, the ‘terrestrials’ and the ‘amphibians’. 
These categories which I will elaborate on shortly are, in practice, dynamic 
and from time to time people may swing around them. I am aware as argued 
by Lakoff (1992) and Morgan (1998) that labels and metaphors may be 
misused and misleading. They are subject to different interpretations and 
appropriations, some of them not according to intended conceptualization. 
But as observed also by Lakoff and Johnson (2003) metaphors and categories 
may be the only way to highlight and coherently organize research data 
which would otherwise be very difficult.   
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The ‘aquatics’: keeping the continuity 
‘Aquatics’ is a metaphorical concept I use to denote households whose 
livelihoods are intrinsically embedded with the lowlands around the Zambezi 
River. Thus, living on the lowlands or being an aquatic implies a flood risk 
taking behaviour. It includes households who are excluded from 
interventions taking place in the resettlement centres or, those for different 
reasons have limited ability to command adequate human, social, natural, 
financial, economic and political resources to build livelihoods on the upper 
resettlement areas. This group of households lives in or returns to lowlands 
after flooding and keep a certain continuity with their previous lives13.  
Living on the lowlands is in essence a matter of l’ art de la localité (Van 
der Ploeg, 1989). Intensification carried out on the lowlands requires, largely, 
a different arrangement of space, knowledge and practices compared to the 
arrangement for diversification undertaken on the resettlement centres.  On 
the lowlands l’art de localité involves, as discussed already in chapter 3, a 
specific crafting of livelihoods taking into consideration the seasonal flooding. 
Fishing and agriculture are the major livelihood activities and the house 
layout, investments and division of labour are all tailored to take advantages 
of the seasonal flooding while bearing minimal losses.   
Men tend mostly to develop and reproduce knowledge and networks 
on fishing and marketing the fish. Different fishing tools, discussed in chapter 
3, and rituals and regulations for fishing are developed. For example, during 
the research I was told that sexual intercourse before a long fishing journey is 
prohibited as this is perceived as making a person’s body hot ‘manungo aku 
pissa’ which in turn drives away fish  and catches are almost impossible. 
Dreams are carefully interpreted before long fishing journeys. Dreams that 
may be interpreted as cautions for not going fishing may lead to postponing 
the fishing journey. Fishing sites vary according to the time of day, month of 
the year and fishing purposes. Early morning, late afternoon and nights are 
the best times for fishing. Similarly, the beginning and the end of the rainy 
season are the best months for fishing that produce good catches14.  
Women specialise in agricultural production and domestic duties. In 
doing so, they develop extensive knowledge by which soils, seeds and tools 
acquire different meanings and purposes both for agriculture and for 
domestic uses. From deep clay to loose sand soils, women identify different 
agricultural and domestic soil uses (see also Barbosa et al., 1998). Loose sand 
soils ‘thetcha’ are not good for agricultural purposes but may be used for the 
backyard during the rainy season because they do not become slippery.  A 
mixture of sand, loam and clay in different proportions is good for the 
production of different crops and domestic uses. More sand than loam and 
clay is good for cassava; more loam and clay is good for maize. Deep clay 
                                                 
13
 There are contested numbers of those who return after flooding or do not evacuate. Government 
officials claim that there are no people returning back (interview with Dr. Higino Rodrigues, Maputo, 
May 26, 2009). But in interviews with the chiefs at the 24 de Julho and Zonas Verdes resettlement 
centres I was told that nearly 1/3 from these resettlement centres have returned back.  
14
 Group discussion with fishermen Cocorico July 23, 2007 
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‘d’hongo’ is good for making pots and plates- a typical female domain15. 
Moreover, time and social networks are, as discussed also in chapter 3, crafted 
by women around agricultural production and the reproduction of the 
domestic duties.  
In this art de la localite, a symbolic meaning is attached to the place. For 
people living on the lowlands, the land is not just a land. It is a land inherited 
from the grand-grand-grand fathers who still bless it for good harvests. The 
land has been passed over through generations and is part of the household 
like a children is. It has meaning far beyond the agricultural purposes; it 
represents generations, vivid images of the past (including the transmission of 
the knowledge of farming particular land from one generation to the other); 
represents and manifests current challenges and hopes, and hubs future 
aspirations. Food production involves, in many cases, the perceptions of 
blessing from ancestors and comes from seeds carefully selected from the 
previous harvests, most of the times that resisted better to the flooding. The 
Zambezi has meanings far beyond just a River. Fish from the Zambezi River is 
not just a fish; it is a fish caught in the biggest river, requiring one to be brave. 
Furthermore, compared to other fish, the fish from the Zambezi does not 
require cooking oil and spices and, tastes better, ‘Ndzipa maningue16.  
Finally but not the least, the Sena speaking people living in the 
lowlands of the Zambezi River consider themselves as different  and superior 
to other Sena speakers. They are ‘Sena-Gombe’- literally translated meaning 
Sena-River/water course which relates to the Zambezi River and regard 
themselves as original and true descendants17(see also Martins, 1960; Freitas, 
1971; Simbe (2004) quoted by Chambote, 2008). In this way, the place (related 
to the river) attains a much broader meaning and shapes, to some extent, 
people’s behaviour and practice. This is how livelihoods get a broader sense 
of identity formation and status, apart from food and shelter, as suggested by 
Long (2001) and Kaag (2004).  
‘Aquatics’ differ from the others by their dependency on the Zambezi 
River and its surrounding lands and ecosystem to built livelihoods. They live 
on the lowlands and build livelihoods around fishing and agriculture with 
limited diversification. The merits of the ‘aquatics’ is that in crafting their 
livelihoods in the lowlands they managed to adapt to seasonal flooding and  
take advantages emerging from it. In doing so, the notion of what constitutes 
security and insecurity becomes problematic. Security encompasses different 
aspects ranging from pure physical to socio-economic, cultural and political 
aspects. ‘Aquatics’ appear to find their overall security by living on the 
lowlands rather than on the upper lands. This is not to suggest that the 
                                                 
15
 Group discussion with women in Canhungue (Mutarara district) May 23, 2007; in Cocorico (Mopeia 
District) September 24, 2007 
16
 Group discussions Canhungue (Mutarara District)  May 23, 2007; Inhangoma (Mutarara District) 
September 10, 2008; Xitsomba (Chinde district)  June 15, 2007; Luabo (Chinde District) October 23, 
2007; Cocorico (Mopeia District) September 24, 2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu District) March 11, 
2007. 
17
 There are 5 groups of Sena speakers: the Sena Gombe; the Sena Phodzo; the Sena Rambhala; the 
Sena Bangwe and the Sena Tonga.  
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‘aquatics’ are locked in the lowlands. Although based on the lowlands they 
are very dynamic and capture a lot of knowledge, information and 
interventions from the upper lands. Cross marriages, fish marketing, visits, 
evacuations and attempts at resettlements allows information and 
interventions from upper areas to reach the lowlands.  
 
The ‘Terrestrials’: diversification, discontinuities and reconfiguration  
Terrestrials is my metaphorical concept to denote those resettled who for 
different  reasons (see case below), managed to make their living depending 
less on the Zambezi river and the flood-prone lowlands. They are living and 
building their livelihoods on the upper lands in resettlement centres. They 
turn out to be flood risk avoiders and they include those households whose 
major livelihood sources have shifted from farming or fishing to trading or 
permanent employment.  Although few cases are still available from the 2007 
flooding, that ‘transition’ has happened as illustrated in the following case: 
 
António Francisco Marromo, a handicapped man (figure 7 below) is one amongst 
those who managed to make that shift. Marromo about 60 years old was living with 
his wife and three daughters at lowland Benjuaque, Mopeia District. Their livelihoods 
were based on agriculture, fishing and craft making and selling. They also got 
support from fellow church members.  However, due to flooding in 2007, they 
evacuated to Zonas Verdes Resettlement centre.  
 
Figure 7:Antonio Marromo crafting matress  
 
 
Source: Author  
 
At the resettlement centre, Marromo’s household faced different challenges. They 
started their new life living in a tent. In the tent they were indeed robbed blankets, 
dishes and pots and Marromo had to buy some items while the Red Cross provided 
others. Furthermore, his wife eloped and married another man, leaving him behind 
with the three daughters aged 12, 7 and 4. Handicapped and without a wife, 
Marromo faced several difficulties to provide livelihoods to his daughters. He hardly 
practiced agriculture and being far from the river he could not engage in fishing. 
Craftwork became his major livelihood activity besides running several domestic 
duties previously undertaken by his wife. When his daughters were busy or tired, he 
did the cleaning of the house, the cooking and the washing.      
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To ‘meet’ household needs Marromo had to reshape his livelihood sources.  
He got integrated into the local market. He constructed mattresses (picture above) 
and other home furnishers which his daughters took to the village market for sale or 
to buyers who had a contract with him. His daughters collected the crafting 
materials.  He was happy because people bought his crafts while it was hardly the 
case in Benjuaque. Marromo expanded his network to cover NGOs and government 
bodies.Today he is one of the beneficiaries of aid from local government, the Red 
Cross, Save the Children and WFP as part of the handicapped target group (Pessoas 
Portadoras de Deficiencia).  
By October 2008, Marromo moved to a new wood and grass house built 
under the WFP food for work programme, while waiting for a brick house he has 
been promised in the near future. Marromo thinks these opportunities would hardly 
be possible in Benjuaque. He is happy that he gets support from different 
institutions, his daughters go to a nearby school close to the house and they seem 
happier on the resettlement centre compared to the Benjuaque lowlands. He says he 
will never go back to live at Benjuaque. However, from time to time he goes to 
Benjuaque to visit friends and to see what new opportunities are emerging over 
there. He plans to marry another woman in Benejuaque who would be living there to 
develop agriculture but would come to the resettlement centre once in while to help 
his daughters.  
 
Marromo’s case illustrates the changing circumstances that may disrupt and 
reconfigure livelihoods when moving from the lowlands to upper 
resettlement centres and within the resettlement centre itself. Marromo’s 
livelihood activities have shifted from agriculture and fishing to market 
integration and enrolment in NGOs and government institutions.  
 To build a living in the resettlement centres, Marromo, like many other 
people, had to reframe the cultural boundaries and notions of space, time and 
assets. Most of the households living in the resettlement centres had, as 
mentioned earlier, to expand their livelihood sources and this required to 
expand and rework networks to be able to enter into new domains of 
activities outside fishing and agriculture.  For most households this includes 
networking to find a permanent or temporary job. Also, finding buyers for 
different merchandise, being enrolled in projects and learning new skills.  
In this process, the so-called cultural divide of space between women 
and men is reconfigured. Women are no longer confined to agriculture and 
domestic duties but become active actors in the public sphere. The selling of 
different commodities is carried out mainly by women who also become very 
active in the process of searching or producing them. Many men also become 
actively involved in home duties and this was one of the advantages, referred 
to by women during group discussions, of living on the resettlement centers. 
For women, males are busy developing different activities for building 
livelihoods and have less time to drink beer and beating them. Furthermore, 
males like Marromo understand the need to let their wives and daughters 
interact with the market and increasingly accept to carry out domestic 
activities that culturally were designed as female domains.  
By expanding the networks and entering into new spaces and domains 
of activity, the time and labour required for agriculture and fishing becomes 
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limited. People actively search for new assets including knowledge, as their 
agricultural expertise is not appropriate for their new lifestyle. In a PRA 
(Participatory Rural Appraisal) carried out by the Save the Children Alliance 
at the 24 de Julho resettlement center, women did not ask for seeds and tools 
but instead they asked for training on how to run business and grants to start 
business. They also asked for better market information. Men did not ask for 
fishing tools but for diverse new skills like masonry, carpentry, plumbing or 
mechanic (SCF, 2008a).  
Market integration clearly becomes a real need by the households to 
make a living on the upper resettlement areas rather than a government 
demand. Hence knowing each type of soil and its utility becomes less relevant 
than knowing prices and markets. For example, following the October seed 
vouchers and fairs, Save the Children realized that in resettlement centers 
located close to the village such as 24 de Julho, people were less interested in 
seeds and tools and emerging from that recommended to reduce the number 
of beneficiaries of seeds and tools in these resettlement centers (SCF, 2008: 23). 
Thus, resettlement and lives in upper lands tended, in this case, to reconfigure 
the pre-existing norms and values of the resettled.  
The Marromo case illustrates that resettlement is very dynamic with no 
clear cut phases and timeframes. Although I have followed, for analytical 
purposes, the 3 stage resettlement model by Harrell-Bond the case illustrates 
that there are much discontinuities and reconfigurations of stages. People 
have different capabilities and see and explore opportunities and constraints 
differently. For Marromo whose livelihoods depended less on agriculture, the 
second stage of the Harrell-Bond model (getting seeds and tools) meant little.  
Marromo had, to a large extent, jumped into the integration stage because of 
the new context. Under such a context, it is hard to conceive of a 
homogeneous and linear process which departs from 
recruitment/registration, through seed vouchers ending up with adaptation 
and incorporation after aid is withdrawn (which in his case is still part of the 
livelihood).    
Finally, the Marromo case illustrates that resettlement does not 
necessarily mean detachment from the old site. It is neither the complete 
incorporation of new elements nor the rejection of the previou ones. Despite 
his integration into the new context, Marromo still visits the lowlands and has 
plans involving the lowlands. Thus, resettlement and life on the upper lands 
appears to be a process in constant shaping with no clear cut end. By now, 
Marromo does not want to return to the lowlands but depending on how 
livelihoods will evolve over time return is possible. Marromo now depends, 
largely, on markets and aid, but given market and aid volatility, there are 
open possibilities of going back to the lowlands if the situation turns sour in 
the upper resettlement centres. Otherwise he may well turn to be an 
‘amphibian’ as I discuss below.  
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The ‘Amphibians’: in between continuity and discontinuities   
I apply the metaphor of ‘amphibian’ to describe those who are in between the 
terrestrials and the aquatics, that is, those who settled on both sites. The 
‘amphibian’ lifestyle is adopted by households who tend to explore 
advantages (and disadvantages) of being in both sites and have the ability to 
do so. This can be done either by moving part of the household to the 
lowlands while others remain in upper areas, or by moving the whole 
household to one site in a given time.  For example, during the period 
between October and December, locally known as the ‘hunger period’ when 
market prices go up , households with limited purchasing power tend to 
move to the lowlands where they can rely more on natural resources. During 
the flood season and after harvests, these household may spend most of their 
time in the upper areas.  
In the lowlands, households tend to make use of their previous 
knowledge of living as ‘aquatics’ building livelihoods around agriculture and 
fishing while in the resettlement centres a certain discontinuity evolves with 
households going for market integration and diversification. By building 
livelihoods around the two sites they appear, neither to be flood risk avoiders 
nor flood risk takers.  They are concerned with the flooding but do not feel the 
need to avoid it completely.  
 Although some households resettled from the 2001 flood have adopted 
this as their permanent lifestyle, the ‘amphibian’ character is the dominant 
feature during the initial stages of the resettlement process. For most of the 
people who still have much of their knowledge and networks based on the 
‘aquatic’ livelihoods, being ‘amphibian’ marks a ‘transitional’ stage toward 
the ‘terrestrial’ livelihoods. On the other hand, when drought periods are 
longer, ‘terrestrial’ households may shift to ‘amphibian’ or ‘aquatics’.  
Being ‘amphibian’ requires a different spatial arrangement, division of 
labour and networks.  Most of the ‘amphibians’ tend to possess two houses or 
to develop networks which allow them to spend time at the two sites. This 
includes for instance finding a caretaker for the kids if the adults go away to 
the lower or upper lands for days or weeks.  
To remain (temporarily or in shifts) on each site depends also on what 
skills, knowledge and networks each person (within the household) has and 
can be usefully and positively explored by remaining on each site for a 
specific time. Thus, there is a special labour arrangement within the 
household and community which if not aptly managed may lead to negative 
consequences. For example, school drop outs are higher amongst this group 
compared to the ‘terrestrials’18. In some cases, young children may be left in 
the resettlement centres with their teenage sisters for hours or days while 
their parents are in the lowlands. This worried Save the Children who 
subsequently launched a project called ‘espaço amigo da criança’, kid’s space- 
where kids left behind by their parents in the resettlement centres can play 
and have some food.  
                                                 
18
 Interviews with the director of the school at 24 de Julho resettlement center, May 8, 2008 and 2 
teachers at Zonas Verdes resettlement center, May 9, 2008 
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This section on different lifestyles brings out the manifold ways actors use to   
build livelihoods. Resettlers use lowlands, uplands and swing between the 
two. This requires different knowledge, networks and careful labour 
allocation. The mobilization of these resources shows local heterogeneity and 
results in what I have metaphorically called the aquatics, the terrestrials and 
the amphibians. The section shows also that the mobilization of resources for 
building livelihoods embeds different narratives, rationales, conflicts and 
negotiations. In overall, it shows that the building of livelihoods occur across 
different geographical areas and this stresses further the need to deconstruct 
the idea of a research site as demarked by clear boundaries. It also 
deconstructs the idea that we can clearly make the aid-post aid distinction or 
take the resettlement as a linear step-by-step process, starting with 
registration and ending up with the incorporation of the resettlers into the 
new context.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter analyzed the resettlement process taking place on the Zambezi 
delta. It used the Harrell-Bond three stages resettlement model, which looks 
at the resettlement process from (i) the registration (ii) the provision of seeds 
and tools (iii) aid withdrawal. The chapter argued, however, that the 
resettlement process is rather complex without clear cut stages or a marked 
ending. Resettlers have different capabilities and see and explore 
opportunities and constraints differently. In such a context, it is hard to 
conceive a homogeneous and linear process that departs from 
recruitment/registration, through seed vouchers ending up with adaptation 
and incorporation in the new context after aid is withdrawn. 
 The resettlement of flood affected people is an idea, which the 
government of Mozambique has been pursuing since long ago. This has been 
marketed by using narratives of security and development, and reinforced 
through different incentives and disincentives. Private and public investments 
are incentivized in the new sites but discouraged in the old sites. At local level 
resettlement policy was, however, an arena of power relations, conflicts and 
negotiations. The policy was re- configured to meet local understanding and 
needs.  
Throughout this chapter, I found that resettlement in practice takes on 
a very difference shape than the projects combining securitization and 
modernization as envisaged by the government, donors and NGOs. The 
resettlement appears to fulfill different agendas, besides security and 
modernity and during the implementation parallel discourses and unforeseen 
practices emerged. The resettlement process was in practice reconfigured to 
respond to the different local concerns such as social inclusion, power 
relations, access to resources and the crafting of livelihoods. In doing so, the 
resettlement process was marked by ‘cheating’, exclusion, contestation, elite 
capture and attempts to fulfil parallel needs. As outcomes of this, some 
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households return to the lowlands keeping continuity with their previous 
knowledge and life experiences. On the other, there are households integrated 
into the life and livelihoods of the resettlement centre and tend to reconfigure 
the norms and values from the lowlands. In between, a considerable number 
of households make use of knowledge accumulated from both-lowlands and 
resettlements centres and build their livelihoods on both sites.  
For the outsiders, cheating appeared particularly annoying to most aid 
agencies. To overcome the ‘cheating problem’, some authors with whom I 
agree, to a large extent, have suggested using local participation, knowledge 
and building platforms (see Juma and Suhrke, 2002; Kibreab, 2004). 
Nonetheless, it is my understanding that the use of ‘participation discourse’ 
and ‘local knowledge’ will not end the complexities and power relations 
involved in the registration and cheating practices. Participatory mechanisms 
are just as likely to become immersed with personal agendas and power 
relations. We need sociological and anthropological researches to understand 
these dynamics (disclosing the access, control and use of resource in each 
context) and play into them with more flexible programme arrangements.   
From all this, it is hard to conceive the resettlement as a linear process 
toward securitization and development. In the resettlement centres 
‘modernity’ intermingle with ‘traditionality’. Grass and wood houses mingle 
with brick and zinc roofed houses and people make use of both- ‘traditional 
and modern knowledge’. The leadership in the resettlement centres involves 
also the traditional chiefs (the regulos, sapandas and muenes) and the modern 
secretarios and chefes de centro.  On the other hand, the chapter illustrates that 
security encompasses different variables of life and livelihood and this 
changes in time and space. For instance, despite resettlement centres being 
discursively considered secure, Marromo was robbed suggesting that physical 
security is one among multiple variables encompassing security.   
Overall, it appears that resettlement is a government’s long established 
solution for the flooding ‘problem’ which indeed fulfils a range of other 
governmental agendas. Beyond security, resettlement tends to put households 
close to each other and the government can, thus, provide social services at 
low costs. On the other, it also helps the government to collect taxes and 
expand its influence on people who otherwise could not be reached by the 
government authorities. Hence, resettlement provides a route for the 
government to steer its power and control upon the people.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION: CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS 
 
 
Sometimes you need to take one step back in order to take two steps forward 
Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique1 
 
 
The present thesis emerged out of my personal experiences with disaster 
responses in Mozambique. I have been involved in humanitarianism since the 
year 2000 and ever since I have seen conflicting realities of disaster responses 
in the country. What strikes me is that in most of the cases, a widely held 
perception is maintained of local powerlessness, and humanitarian actors 
(including government and donors) providing aid to those local powerless 
victims, moved supposedly merely by philanthropic motivations.  
Nonetheless, as I came to interact more with the affected and aid 
providers I came to experience a complex and contradictory picture to that of 
powerlessness and homogeneity. Affected people have their strategies and 
struggles. They need to deal not only with natural hazards, but also with their 
ancestors, various government departments, humanitarian organizations, 
their family members, fellow community members, the market, their past, 
their present and their future. NGOs providing humanitarian aid had to 
strategize, struggle and negotiate with donors, local government officers and  
their ‘beneficiaries’ so that their response would make sense to the local 
government, the donors, to local people and to themselves. I have come across 
different disagreements, conflicts and negotiations between and among local 
actors, NGOs, donors and government.  In everyday practices, intervention 
models and humanitarian principles were, in most of the cases, reinterpreted 
transformed and continuously negotiated in the interactions between the 
different actors.  
 To grasp these complex realities, I set out to answer the question how 
disasters and adaptation to climate change programmes are interpreted and acted 
upon by different actors in Mozambique? Mozambique is, by international 
development standards, a poor country and disaster management has a long 
history of being based on international ‘mercy’ and national ‘begging’. This 
being the case, an international and institutionalized perception has been 
developed, that assumes that there is very little national and local capacity to 
cope with disasters.  This has crystallized into a dependency culture. The two 
front cover pictures and the introductory case study are illustrative of this 
widely held perception.  
                                                 
1
 Excerpt from a seminar “The Role of the International Aid for the Development of Mozambique. 
UEM, Maputo September 03, 2008  
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What is little understood is that beyond these pictures, there are 
disaster response practices in line with the above quotation from the former 
Mozambican. Local actors (including the government of Mozambique) use 
their agency to respond to hazards and disasters in ways that they perceive to 
suit their interests best. The Mozambican Red Cross case (chapter 4), where I 
discussed how the organization takes a ‘sit back and take it’ approach 
towards the donors is an example of ‘taking one step back in order to take two 
steps forward’- a strategy widely used in Mozambique and, likely, in many 
other contexts.  
To answer my research question I have taken an actor oriented 
approach, which focuses on actors’ agency and sheds light on the structural 
factors surrounding people’s everyday lives. I conceived disaster 
management as an arena were multiple actors from different domains of 
disaster response with different knowledge, cultural backgrounds, roles, 
power and interests meet, dispute and/or negotiate the process. This means 
that the outcomes cannot necessarily be predicted or planned. I conceptualise 
the outcomes as emerging from the interfaces between those different actors 
and their social negotiations. To be able to understand that process I focused 
on the everyday interactions between the different actors, their strategies, 
emerging conflicts, negotiations and the power relations which altogether 
enable or constrain disaster responses in the short and long run.  
The major conclusion that I can draw from the present thesis is that 
disaster management in Mozambique involves the crafting of continuities in 
crisis by the different actors involved. The notion of continuities applies to 
disaster situations and responses in different ways: 
 It can be stated that for poor people ‘normal life’ can hardly be 
disentangled from the exceptionalities of disaster situations. I found 
that people seek continuity in their livelihoods once disasters 
happen in institutions and their lives.  
 
 Recurrent crises have shaped state formation in Mozambique and 
therefore have become part of the continuity or the long haul of 
historical transformations.  
 
 Crises allow the continuity of humanitarianism- a deep political, 
economic and moral endeavor. 
 
  Crises provide room to continuously claim the need to control 
nature and societies. 
 
 Crises force actors to continuously reassess their beliefs, practices 
and to produce changes.  
 
 Crafting continuities in crisis is, ultimately, what makes societies 
move.   
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In the next sections, I elaborate further on these continuities in crisis as they 
are shaped by different actors from the three domains of disaster response 
that I have analyzed throughout the book, i.e. the domain of international 
disaster response, the domain of the national government, and the domains of 
local people affected by disaster.  
 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN OF 
DISASTER RESPONSE  
 
The international domain of disaster response represents a cluster of 
international actors such as UN agencies, international NGOs, scientists who 
tend to respond to disaster situations based on a view of limited local capacity 
to deal with the disaster. These limitations include a lack of local political 
commitment and a lack of or limited material, human and financial resources. 
To undertake their responses, a wide range of global policies and regulations 
has been developed such as the UN guidelines for disaster response, the 
Sphere project, and the humanitarian principles. Individual organizations also 
have their own rules of the game. All these rules have in general a common 
goal which is to make aid delivery justifiable, predictable, calculable, efficient 
and controllable (Waters, 2001:35).  
 But, this bureaucratization of aid delivery tends to create internally 
oriented, rigid lines of communication and institutional culture which resists   
change, and reinforces existing international practices of disaster response 
which, as elucidated in chapter 5 and 6 of the present thesis, tend to overlook 
national and local capacities and even by-pass local authorities. In Chapter 5, I 
discussed the introduction of the Cluster Approach by the UN agencies, 
without previous consultation and agreement with the national government. 
In Chapter 6, I presented local response to the 2007 floods that clashed with 
external interventions that were based on the perception of local 
powerlessness.  Kent (1987:92) has argued that resistance to changes and 
continuities in practices are due, mainly, to the fact that international actors 
fear losing control and changes create an institutional insecurity, and threaten 
organizational survival. 
Although Kent is right in pointing out these aspects, I think that the 
reasons for continuities in policies and practices go far beyond the self-interest 
of the international actors. We have also to look at what national and local 
actors expect from the international actors and what gains they get.  For many 
actors there is much to gain by maintaining and playing along with the actual 
status quo. Further, we need to note that, at the field level, international actors 
may be manipulated or, as it happens frequently, aid delivery is a by-product 
of different negotiations and re-interpretation of the international codes of 
conduct. In  chapter 2 I discussed, amongst other aspects, how humanitarian 
aid came to empower FRELIMO. In Chapter 4, I highlighted that the CBDRM 
project became useful at local level after negotiations and reinterpretations of 
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the initial design. In Chapter 7, I show that the resettlement programme of the 
government is being re-configured to suit local power relations, needs and 
interpretations of security and development.  Hence, national and local actors 
generally, reinforce continuities in practices through everyday demands at 
field level.  
However, because the international rules and regulations are 
negotiated during the disaster response, they are therefore not necessarily 
static. They might be static in written form but are dynamic in their 
application. The findings that the Cluster Approach either as applied in 
Mozambique (chapter 5) or elsewhere (see Harvey, 2009) was being top-
down, dictated changes in the application  of the approach to become more 
participatory and inclusive. In short, international continuities are always in 
crisis, requiring adjustments and reformulation (in policies and practices) in 
every new disaster context even though the adjustments and reformulation 
might not be tacit or written.   
 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE DOMAIN OF DISASTER 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The domain of disaster governance represents the ways national governments 
worldwide, based on global understanding of disasters, global policies and 
regulations as well as national and local understandings and interests come to 
frame disasters and shape disaster responses either institutionally or through 
everyday practices. Disaster governance is a political process and the case 
studies in this thesis have overwhelmingly found that disaster management is 
aligned to the continuity of the actors in power, either parties or individuals.  
Disaster governance in Mozambique is part of the state formation 
process as it has, historically, been in consonance with the political and 
economic interests of government. Chapter 2 discussed how disaster 
mismanagement contributed to the erosion of kingdoms and how disaster 
management allowed, to a large extent, the FRELIMO government to remain 
in power. Disaster management within the domain of disaster governance 
requires finding the right balance with the local as well as the international 
constituents. Finding and keeping that balance is a continuous endeavor as 
the factors dictating the behavior and responses of the constituents are in 
constant flux.  
In this book, the ‘sit back and take it approach’ emerged again and 
again as one of the strategies to keep that balance. When Hanlon and Smart 
(2008:295) state that donors have taken the driver’s seat and the government is 
at most a hitch-hiker, they seem to have missed out on the active strategizing 
on the part of the government that this may entail. It can be understood as a 
strategy that allows resource flows and room for manoeuvre for many local 
and international actors. The Mozambican Red Cross has also been using the 
strategy as part of its survival politics.  
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Related to the ‘sit back and take it approach’ is a continuity in the ‘lack 
of capacity narrative’. Lack of capacity is continuously claimed by different 
actors to legitimize their entry in the humanitarian arena. ‘Sit back and take it’ 
feeds into this narrative of a ‘lack of capacity’ in the same way that the 
‘narative of lack of capacity’ feeds into the ‘sit back and take it approach’. 
From the moment local actors, including the government, adopt the ‘sit back 
and take it approach’ they appear indeed to have limited capacity and 
reinforce the narrative. Alternatively, from the moment actors are represented 
as having lack of capacity, interventions tend to take a top down approach 
and the ‘sit back and take it’approach develops.  
‘Lack of capacity’ is indeed a complex process. As I discussed in 
chapter 4 lack of local capacity needs to be analyzed from the politics 
involved in international relations, contracting staff, ascribing tasks, 
confronting chiefs and bringing new and innovative ideas, rather than merely 
looking, homogeneously, if the staff has received enough training. Hence, we 
need to critically appraise when and how the lack of capacity notion emerges 
and is applied.  
 Disaster governance means also enabling and disabling continuities 
and changes. Chapter 3 has provided four discourses on climate change. The 
scientific discourse; the discourse of climate change as an emerging property 
of God’s will; the discourse of climate change as an emerging property of 
ancestor’s will, and the discourse of climate change as an emerging property 
of witchcraft. Which discourse is allowed to perform on stage, depends on its 
relevance in keeping social order hence, allowing continuities, rather than 
disruption on everyday life. When in 2009, the discourse of climate change as 
an emerging property of witchcraft, produced discontinuities in social order, 
the government was compelled to imprison people and to stage the scientific 
discourse to produce continuities in crisis.  
 The episode illustrates as well that climate change is not detrimental at 
all. Despite the negative impacts marked, largely, by increased frequency and 
intensity of natural hazards, climate change is producing parallel (and 
positive) impacts by, for instance, bringing upfront local voices and obliging 
the government to intervene at local levels, either by providing scientific 
knowledge of climate change or by making livelihoods more resilient. 
Furthermore, it shows that there is much fluidity in discourses and practices 
of disaster response feeding each other in a number of ways and being 
relevant in different degrees at different times. The four discourses above feed 
different responses, which, as illustrated along the book, come to be neither 
genuinely autonomous nor genuinely planned. 
 Hence, disaster response from the domain of disaster governance in 
Mozambique was found to embed a continuous search for social order, either 
provided in concomitance with local actors through their different discourses 
and practice or in concomitance with the international actors also through 
their discourses and practices. The capability of crafting continuities in crisis 
will ultimately determine how disaster governance works out in practice for 
affected people. But this capability is in a constant making, which means that 
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the crafting of continuities in crisis is a constant endeavor by the actors in the 
domain of disaster governance.  
 
CONTINUITIES IN CRISIS: THE LOCAL DOMAIN OF DISASTER 
RESPONSE 
 
The local domain of disaster response represents responses by the afflicted 
population and their surrounding networks. This may geographically be 
connected to community or village levels although responses at these levels 
are informed by other geographical levels and domains. As observed by 
Hilhorst (2004:63) practices at local level are constantly evolving through 
interaction, social negotiations, accommodations, exchanges and power 
struggles within the domain and with other domains of disaster response. 
 The analysis provided throughout this thesis leads us to conclude that 
local response involves, mainly, the crafting of continuities in crisis as 
evidenced in chapter 6 and 7.  People at the local level respond to disaster by 
attempting to find the right balance between saving lives and livelihoods. 
This includes attempts to save productive assets, attempts to keep power and 
control over resources, attempts to build or strengthen social networks in the 
midst of crisis, and attempts to improve livelihoods through emerging 
opportunities. Overall, this thesis which focused on floods shows that, under 
gradual flooding, people tend to decide  who goes where, when, how and 
what to take with them. This process is informed by past experiences, current 
situation and future aspirations.  
Emerging from this, people’s refusal to evacuate or decision to wait 
until late evacuation should not be understood as a matter of backwardness, 
stupidity, irrationality as portrayed at the time in Mozambican media and 
political speeches. Rather, it is a creative form of securing long established 
livelihood assets at the same time that they take advantage of newly emerging 
opportunities brought in by an emergency logic. It is their weapon against 
their long-term impoverishment and vulnerability. It responds strategically to 
their perception of how humanitarian assistance is done, and what sort of 
short and long-term rewards and punishments they may eventually face. Patt 
and Schroter (2008:460) have observed that when taking actions will lead to 
both-gains and losses- people’s decisions will be dominated by their 
understanding of the potential losses.Likewise, when any ambiguity exists in 
their understanding, people use new information to confirm rather than 
disprove their pre-existing beliefs.    
Disaster responses by other domains may well strengthen local 
response but may also weaken it. By implementing coercive (early) 
evacuation with little knowledge of the local context and dynamics, relief 
providers and disaster managers may wittingly or unwittingly contribute to 
the impoverishment and long-term vulnerability of those who, due to 
coercions, lose their assets, networks and have limited abilities to capture 
emerging opportunities. When this occurs, discontinuities are created or 
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exacerbated which brings along crisis on the disaster response practices 
requiring reformulations. Disasters are, therefore, an emerging property of 
the inability to craft continuities in crisis at local level.  
 
….. BACK TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In the preceding section I have outlined my major conclusions on disaster 
responses in Mozambique. Before finalizing the book, it is worth to revisit the 
research questions that guided the thesis and, shortly, provide more concrete 
answers. The main research question of the book was how disasters and 
adaptation to climate change programmes are interpreted and acted upon by different 
actors in Mozambique. More specifically, the research has set out to answer the 
following questions: 
1. How do local people experience and interpret climate-related extreme 
weather events? 
2. How do local people integrate disaster responses in their everyday 
livelihood practices? 
3. How do local people, national government authorities, NGOs, donors 
interact in disaster response and what are the outcomes of their 
interactions? 
4. How do intervening agencies (i.e. government and NGOs) translate, 
(inter) national policies and projects to make them suitable to their own 
needs and the needs of local people?  
5. How do different actors at local level appropriate, integrate or transform 
project interventions on disaster risk reduction to suit their needs?  
 
After the discussion provided throughout this thesis the following 10 points 
represent, shortly, the answers to the research questions posed above: 
 
1. Local actors avail of different interpretations of extreme weather events.  
The local level is heterogeneous. There are multiple identities, multiple 
projects and goals, multiple encounters, multiple strategies, multiple tasks 
and multiple outcomes.  The perception and response to extreme events is 
based on experiences, current situation, and future aspiration and is 
subject to contingencies.   
 
2. Disaster and climate change management in Mozambique are part of the 
state formation process. It is hard to conceive disaster responses out of the 
wider process of state formation in Mozambique since disasters have been 
shaped and shape processes of ‘development’ taking place nationwide. 
 
3. Disaster management is an arena of discourses and power relations. The 
framing of disaster and responses to it is embedded in different 
(competing) discourses and, the hegemonic ones, which, generally, dictate 
the timing and the type of response, emerge out of power relations.  
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4. Disaster management may increase local vulnerability. Disaster 
responses are often based on faith rather than a critical appraisal of the 
practices and needs. When this is the case, responses may reduce resilience 
and increase local vulnerability.  
 
5. There is no ‘one size fits all’. The present thesis has shown that disaster 
response needs to be flexible and context based. The Red Cross project in 
Cocorico and the Cluster Approach have shown that we can not opt for 
one approach that can suit all contexts all the time.  
 
6. Local people are creatively adapting to climate change. Regardless of 
which discourses and interventions are hegemonic on climate change, 
local people, within the limits of their knowledge and other resources, are 
adapting to climate change by changing behaviour, practices and voicing 
out their concerns.  
 
7. Adaptation is a dynamic process. Adaptation is a continuous process of 
making people more resilient and lessening their vulnerability. This 
process is crafted in societies facing continuous crisis, which, therefore, 
makes adaptation to evolve as a dynamic process.  
 
8. Climate change is one amongst many risk factors people face in 
Mozambique. People in Mozambique face different risks (i.e. diseases 
such as HIV and AIDS, market price’s volatility, soil erosion, globalization 
among others). Hence, climate change is just one additional risk factor. 
People’s response to climate change is not singled out. It is intertwined in 
the complex crafting of responses to these different risks.  
        
9. Lack of capacity is a strategy to appropriate, integrate or transform 
interventions on disaster risk reduction. The weakness discourse 
represents, for the actors from the three domains of disaster response, a 
pathway to appropriate, integrate or transform interventions on disaster 
risk reduction. By playing weak, national and local actors grab 
international attention and sympathy and, to some extent, resources to 
fulfil their different agendas. On the other hand the international actors 
use the discourse to enter the humanitarian arena and in doing so, forge 
their multiple objectives.      
 
10. Discontinuities are relevant for continuities. Extreme events and 
disasters tend to produce discontinuities in people’s lives. In so doing, 
they unveil the limitations of the existing practices of disaster response 
and force actors to reassess their beliefs, practices and to produce changes 
in disaster response. Recurrent disasters means continuities are in crisis 
and crisis are in continuity. The interplay of continuities in crisis and crisis 
in continuity forces changes in practices. Hence, changes in disaster 
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responses are an emergent property of crisis that tend for continuities and 
continuities that tend for crisis. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Mozambique is a disaster prone country. Its geographical location along the 
shoreline of the Indian Ocean and downstream of ten international rivers 
associated to its higher levels of poverty tend to turn natural and man made 
hazards into disasters. Mozambique has a long history of disasters. The 
flooding in 1977, 1978, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2008 and the widespread drought 
from 1983-1985 among others events, have marked the history of the country 
due to their political, economic and social impacts. 
 Responses to disasters in Mozambique have relied, heavily, on the 
international community and, due to this, a certain perception of lack of 
national and local capacity was developed, reproduced and crystallized over 
time. This thesis delves into the other side, which has hardly been explored 
academically. It focuses on local and national capacity to respond to disasters 
and, the interface between and within national and international actors. For 
this endeavour, the book asks the question how disasters and adaptation to 
climate change programmes are interpreted and acted upon by different actors in 
Mozambique? 
 Three major arguments are developed throughout the book in 
answering that question. The first is that the way the affected are represented 
affects the ways external disaster responses are carried out. If they are 
represented, as passive, weak, incapable or irresponsible, interventions will 
tend to take a top down approach with little attempt to understand local 
capacity and motivations to act otherwise. The second argument is that a 
focus on weakness helps to mobilize resources and produces gains for many 
actors in the humanitarian and development sectors and beyond. Hence, the 
weakness discourse is reproduced not necessarily for humanitarian purposes 
but far beyond that. The third is that local actors in Mozambique are neither 
passive victims of disasters nor submissive recipients of international 
responses. Within the limits of their knowledge, abilities and information 
local actors respond to disasters and external interventions in ways that best 
suit their own interests. 
 Throughout the eight chapters composing the book, empirical evidence 
has been produced to sustain the claims. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the 
government of Mozambique (led by FRELIMO Party) has been very active in 
responding to disasters, coming to an extent of ‘manipulating’ the 
international community to fulfill its own agendas. The various strategies on 
disaster management developed over time such as the setting of DPCCN, 
COE, CENE, INGC, CENOE, UNAPROC, GACORE or the shift of INGC 
subordination from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of State 
Administration, results, not necessarily from international demand, but from 
internal demands, analysis and needs. Nonetheless, these strategies allowed 
the government to gain international sympathy and a continuous funding of 
different FRELIMO’s political, economic and social agendas.   
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 Chapter 3 shows, on the one hand, that the occupation of the Zambezi 
lowlands results, partly, from the human induced processes such as political 
and development strategies promoted over time and, on the other hand, from 
the occurrence of natural phenomena such as the drought that affected the 
country right after the end of civil war from 1992 to 1995. Nonetheless, the 
chapter discusses different strategies developed by the locals to build a living 
in the lowland and take advantages from their interaction with the Zambezi 
River. In living in the lowlands, people have developed a certain lifestyle 
marked by low investments in items whose dimension would jeopardize the 
cyclical evacuation process or would be lost due to flooding such as home 
furniture and large animals. Alternatively, people tend to invest in items such 
as canoes and social networks that are disaster preparedness measures. The 
chapter ends by claiming that these adaptation measures are in decay due to 
interplay of political, economic, social and environmental changes. 
 Chapter 4 shows how interventions for disaster risk reduction are an 
arena of conflicts, negotiations and are transformed at local level to fulfil an 
amalgam of different interests. It also shows processes of elite capture of 
interventions, emerging conflicts and ways of diffusing social tensions at local 
level. 
 Chapter 5 deals with the interfaces between the government, UN 
agencies and NGOs during the 2007 flooding. The chapter shows that 
government leadership during this flooding was an emerging property from 
the everyday interactions in the field and not necessarily that the government 
had a strong and well established aptitude to do so.   There were various 
contradictions between the government and UN agencies, within the UN 
agencies themselves, between UN agencies and NGOs and between 
international and national NGOs. To diffuse the tensions, the government 
emerged as a glue-actor and the coordinator of all the present actors.  The 
chapter shows that the Cluster Approach had little real impact on disaster 
response and may have been used mainly as a test road of new international 
approaches of disaster response.  
 Chapter 6 focuses on local responses to the same 2007 flooding and 
shows that the use of pejorative terms such as backwardness, irrationality, 
stupidity, reluctance, to explain the widespread refusal to evacuate or later 
evacuations masks complexes processes that dictates the behaviour of the 
inhabitants of the lower Zambezi. Contrary to these claims held by many 
actors from the international and governance domains of disaster response, 
this thesis shows that local response is highly skilled and planned. Local 
responses to flooding tend for saving lives and livelihoods requiring therefore 
the setting of the right momentum for evacuations. Generally, under gradual 
flooding people tend to decide about where to go, when to go, how to go, 
who goes, what to take with and how to manage life and livelihood in short 
and long run. 
 Chapter 7 discusses the resettlement process that evolved following the 
flooding.  Similar to chapter 4, this chapter shows how the intervention is 
appropriated and transformed to fulfil different local interests. Based on data 
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collected in two resettlement centres in Mopeia district (24 de Julho and Zonas 
Verdes resettlement centres) the chapter shows that there was elite capture of 
the process and that the international guidelines for resettlement have literally 
been put aside.  
In answering the question ‘do people stay on the resettlement centers’ 
the chapter concluded that there are three pattern of response to the 
resettlement program. There are households that I have metaphorically called 
‘aquatics’ with strong links with the lowlands and difficulties in crafting their 
livelihoods on the resettlement centers. They return to the lowlands and, as 
they always did, craft their livings with the support from the Zambezi River, 
its tributaries and the seasonally nourished fertile lowlands. The second 
pattern involves households that managed to adapt to the lifestyle of the 
resettlement centers and have definitely resettled and have now little contact 
with the lowlands. Although few cases are still available this includes 
individuals and households that found permanent employments on the 
higher grounds, are involved in trading schemes and have developed a 
(wider) network of relations that allow them to craft livelihoods on the 
resettlement centers relatively far from the Zambezi waters. I have 
metaphorically called this group ‘terrestrials’.  The third pattern involves 
households that craft their livelihoods by exploring the potentials and 
limitations of both locations (lowlands and resettlement centers). These 
groups of households that have houses in both locations or those who have a 
permanent residence in one of the sites divide their time between the two 
locations by making use of networks they develop. I have called this group 
‘the amphibians’.  
Chapter 8 concludes the book and argues that the whole process of 
disaster response is based on the need of crafting continuities in crisis. Crisis 
of different intensities and frequencies are part of our everyday life and 
through the crafting of continuities in crisis that societies move the way they 
move. A continuous management of crisis which are in continuous formation 
provide mechanisms for society control, to mold behaviors, interventions and 
dictates, largely, government and leader’s mandates at different levels.    
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SUMÁRIO  
 
Moçambique é um país bastante vulnerável à desastres. A sua localização 
geográfica ao longo do litoral do Oceano Indico e a jusante de 10 rios 
internacionais, aliado aos altos índices de pobreza da sua população, tendem 
a tornar ameaças em desastres. Moçambique tem uma longa historia de 
ocorrência de desastres. As cheias de 1977, 1978, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2008 e a 
grande seca de 1983-1985 entre outros, são eventos que marcaram a história 
do país dados os seus impactos políticos, sociais, económicos e ambientais. 
Para responder a estes eventos, o país contou e continua contando, em grande 
medida, com  o apoio internacional. Dado este facto, uma certa percepção de 
falta de capacidade nacional e local foi sendo desenvolvida, reproduzida e 
cristalizada ao longo do tempo.   
 A presente tese debruça-se sobre o outro lado que pouco ou quase 
nada se fala. Ele focaliza na capacidade nacional e local, e procura entender o 
que acontece na interacção entre os diferentes actores internos e externos.  
Para isso, o livro procura responder a questão ‘Como os diferentes actores 
interpretam e agem em desastres e, programas de adaptação `as mudanças climáticas 
em Moçambique? ’. 
Três grandes argumentos são lançados ao longo do livro. O primeiro é 
que a maneira como os afectados são representados, afecta a maneira como 
intervenções externas são levadas a cabo. Quando as pessoas são 
representadas como incapazes, passivas  e irresponsáveis, as intervenções 
tenderão a ter um carácter de cima para baixo (top-down) com pouco esforço 
para entender as capacidades e conhecimentos locais, assim como as 
motivações que as pessoas têm para agir duma determinada forma. O 
segundo argumento é de que, focalizar na incapacidade local facilita o 
processo de mobilização de recursos e produz ganhos para muitos actores nos 
sectores humanitário, de desenvolvimento e outros. Assim, o discurso de 
incapacidade local é reproduzido não apenas para fins filantrópicos, mas 
muito para além destes. O terceiro é que os actores locais em Moçambique 
não são nem vitimas passivas dos desastres nem receptores submissos da 
ajuda internacional. Dentro dos limites dos seus conhecimentos, habilidades e 
informação, eles tendem a responder à desastres e intervenções externas em 
modos que melhor respondem aos seus interesses e anseios.  
Ao longo dos oito capítulos que compõem o livro, foram produzidas 
evidências que suportam estes argumentos. O capítulo dois demonstra que o 
governo de Moçambique foi e continua bastante activo na resposta `a 
desastres, chegando inclusive, a manipular a comunidade internacional para 
responder os seus próprios interesses. As várias estratégias de gestão de 
desastres tais como a criação do DPCCN, COE, CENE, INGC, CENOE,  
UNAPROC, GACOR, a mudança do INGC da tutela do Ministério de 
Negócios Estrangeiros para o Ministério da Administração Estatal resultam 
duma análise interna bastante profunda que visam, não apenas responder 
exigências internacionais, mas sobretudo, interesses nacionais e do próprio 
governo. As estratégias desenvolvidas ao longo do tempo na componente de 
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gestão de desastres permitiram, em grande medida,  a  atracção duma grande 
simpatia internacional por Moçambique e nisso, o continuo financiamento de 
vários projectos políticos, económicos e sociais. 
O capítulo três mostra por um lado que, a ocupação de zonas de risco 
no vale do Zambeze resultou, em grande parte, de processos provocados pela 
acção humana tais como politicas e estratégias lançadas ao longo do tempo e, 
por outro, resultam de fenómenos naturais tais como a seca no período pós 
guerra civil entre 1992-1995. No entanto, o capítulo apresenta várias 
estratégias que foram desenvolvidas ao longo do tempo pelas pessoas locais 
para garantirem o seu sustento e tirar vantagens da sua convivência com o rio 
Zambeze. Das estratégias mais relevantes, as pessoas tendem a levar um estilo 
de vida marcado por baixo investimento em bens que podem facilmente ser 
perdidos durante cheias ou que dificultariam o processo de evacuação tais 
como mobílias de casa, animais de grande porte e tendem a fazer 
investimentos em bens que podem ajudar nas evacuações tais como em 
canoas e redes sociais.  Porém, o capítulo termina mostrando que, as 
estratégias estão em decadência devido à vários factores de ordem politica, 
ecológica, social e económica.  
O capítulo quatro mostra como intervenções viradas a redução de risco 
de desastres se tornam arenas de conflitos, negociações e são transformadas, 
ao nível local, para responder a vários interesses. Uma intervenção que visava 
apenas aspectos técnicos de redução de risco de desastres acabou sendo 
politizado, apropriado pela elite local e criando divisões dentro da 
comunidade de Cocorico no distrito de Mopeia. Ele mostra também como 
modelos internacionais podem não se adequar a contextos específicos. O 
modelo de redução de riscos de desastres usado no Cocorico era uma cópia de 
como se faz a gestão de riscos no contexto asiático e, dum modo geral,  houve 
muitas limitações na sua aplicação.  
O capítulo cinco fala da interacção entre o governo, as agências das 
Nações Unidas e as ONGs durante as cheias de 2007 no vale do Zambeze. O 
capítulo mostra que, a liderança do governo na resposta à esta cheia emergiu 
do que aconteceu no terreno e, não necessariamente, fruto duma forte e 
concertada capacidade da sua parte. Durante as cheias houve contradições 
entre o governo e as organizações internacionais, entre organismos das 
Nações Unidas entre si, entre organismos das Nações Unidas e as ONGs e, 
entre ONGs nacionais e internacionais. Em função disso, o governo surgiu 
como o elemento aglutinador das várias clivagens e, assim, como líder e 
coordenador de todos quanto estiveram presentes. No entanto, para além da 
liderança do governo haviam varias outras lideranças paralelas, algumas 
vezes desfasadas do controlo do governo. Por outro lado, o capítulo mostra 
que, o ‘Cluster Approach’ teve pouca relevância no terreno e, poderá ter sido 
aplicado como um ensaio duma nova abordagem internacional de resposta a 
desastres. 
O capítulo seis focaliza a resposta local a mesma cheia de 2007 e mostra 
que os termos usados tais como relutância, irracionalidade, estupidez,  
tradicionalismo, irresponsabilidade entre outros termos pejorativos para 
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explicar os comportamentos de recusa ou resistência a evacuações, encobrem 
e limitam  explicações de processos muito mais complexos que ditam os 
comportamentos dos habitantes do vale do Zambeze. O capítulo mostra que 
os afectados tem uma grande responsabilidade, racionalidade e não são 
estúpidos ou atrasados. A sua resposta à fenómenos como cheias tendem a 
levar em consideração não apenas salvar vidas, mas também, os meios de 
sustento que são importantes no curto, médio e longo prazos. Numa cheia 
gradual as pessoas tendem a evacuar depois duma análise sobre onde ir, 
quando ir, como ir, quem ir, o que levar, o que deixar, e como gerir a vida 
feita em dois locais.  
O capitulo sete discute o processo de reassentamento após as 
evacuações. A semelhança do capitulo quatro, o capitulo sete mostra como o 
reassentamento foi transformado e apropriado, muito longe do modelo e 
concepção original dos proponentes. Baseando em dados colhidos em dois 
centros de reassentamento (24 de Julho e Zonas Verdes) no distrito de 
Mopeia, o capítulo mostra processo de exclusão, de captura da elite local e do 
desinquadramento de modelos internacionais para contextos locais 
específicos.  
Com relação a pergunta se as pessoas ficam ou não nos centros de 
reassentamento o capítulo mostra que existem, duma maneira geral, três 
respostas ao reassentemanto. Existe um grupo de agregados familiares, a que 
apelidei metaforicamente de aquáticos, com uma forte ligação com as zonas 
baixas e o rio Zambeze e, que, por várias razões, têm imensas dificuldades em 
moldar o seu estilo de vida nas zonas altas. Estes voltam para as zonas baixas 
e, como sempre o fizeram, garante o seu sustento numa grande interacção 
com o rio Zambeze, seus afluentes e as zonas baixas férteis. O segundo grupo 
que apelidei metaforicamente de terrestres, representa o  grupo de agregados 
familiares que conseguiu adaptar-se ao estilo de vida da zona alta e ficaram 
com pouco contacto com a zona baixa. Apesar do número ser ainda bastante 
limitado, este grupo inclui agregados que conseguiram oportunidades de 
emprego, negócios e outras fontes alternativas de sustento, relativamente fora 
do contacto permanente com a zona baixa.  O terceiro grupo representa 
indivíduos ou agregados que moldam o seu sustento explorando as 
potencialidades e limitações que existem tanto na zona baixa assim como na 
zona alta. Neste grupo que apelidei metaforicamente de anfíbios, enquadram-
se agregados com residência dupla, ou aqueles que, mesmo sem residência 
dupla dividem o seu tempo entre zona baixa e alta através de diferentes redes 
sociais que desenvolve(ra)m. 
O capitulo oito trás as principais conclusões do livro e defende que, as 
respostas `a desastres no mundo e em Moçambique no particular, baseiam-se 
na necessidade de moldar continuidades em crises. As crises, de diferentes 
frequências e intensidades fazem parte do dia a dia das pessoas e é a partir da 
gestão destas crises que o mundo segue o rumo que segue. A gestão contínua 
de crises que estão em contínua formação, fornece mecanismos e 
instrumentos para gerir sociedades, moldar comportamentos, intervenções e 
dita, em grande medida, os mandatos de governos e líderes a vários níveis.  
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SAMENVATTING      
  
Mozambique ondergaat veel natuurrampen, dankzij zijn ligging aan de kust 
van de Indische Oceaan en aan de benedenstroom van tien internationale 
rivieren. In combinatie met hoge armoedecijfers leidt dit er toe dat natuurlijke 
dreigingen tot rampen verworden. Het land kent een lange 
rampengeschiedenis. Overstromingen in 1977, 1978, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2008 en 
de grote droogte van 1983-1985, hebben geschiedenis gemaakt als gevolg van 
hun politieke, economische en sociale effecten.  
 Rampenbestrijding is in Mozambique sterk afhankelijk van de 
internationale gemeenschap. Als gevolg hiervan is door de tijd een perceptie 
ontstaan en bevestigddat er nationaal en lokaal een gebrek aan capaciteiten is. 
Dit proefschrift verdiept zich in de andere kant van dit beeld, waar nog 
weinig onderzoek naar is gedaan. Het richt zich op de lokale en nationale 
capaciteiten om met rampen om te gaan, alsmede de interface tussen nationale 
en internationale actoren. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: Hoe worden 
rampen en klimaatadaptatie geïnterpreteerd door verschillende actoren in 
Mozambique en hoe gaan ze er mee om?   
 Het kernantwoord op de centrale vraag behelst drie argumenten. Op 
de eerste plaats dat de representatie van getroffenen door rampen mede 
bepaalt hoe externe interventies worden uitgevoerd. Als de representatie 
gekenmerkt wordt door termen als passief, zwak, incapabel of 
onverantwoordelijk, dan zullen interventies van boven af worden opgelegd 
zonder veel moeite te doen om lokale capaciteiten en drijfveren te begrijpen. 
Op de tweede plaats dat een focus op zwakte instrumenteel is in het 
verwerven van hulpbronnen, wat voordelen oplevert voor veel spelers in de 
humanitaire en ontwikkelingswereld. Het discours van zwakte dient dus 
doelen ver buiten het humanitaire speelveld. Op de derde  plaats dat locale 
actoren in Mozambique noch passieve slachtoffers van rampen zijn, noch 
ondergeschikte ontvangers van internationale hulp. Binnen de kaders van 
hun kennis, competenties en beschikbare informatie zoeken actoren antwoord 
op rampen en rampeninterventies, op zodanige wijze dat zij daarmee hun 
eigen belangen zo goed mogelijk dienen.   
 Deze argumenten worden empirisch onderbouwd in de acht 
hoofdstukken van het boek. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de overheid van 
Mozambique (onder leiding van de FRELIMO partij) heel actief is geweest in 
rampenbestrijding, en de internationale gemeenschap heeft weten te 
manipuleren in hun eigen belang. De verschillende instanties voor 
rampenbestrijding die zijn ingesteld door de tijd, zoals daar zijn de  DPCCN, 
COE, CENE, INGC, CENOE, UNAPROC en GACORE, of de overplaatsing 
van de nationale rampenbestrijdingsdienst INGC van het ministerie van 
buitenlandse zaken naar het ministerie van algemene zaken, waren geen 
antwoord op externe eisen, maar het gevolg van interne analyse, belangen en 
benodigdheden. De overheid slaagde er in om de internationale sympathie op 
zijn hand te krijgen en voldoende fondsen te werven voor de politieke, 
economische en sociale plannen van de partij.  
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 Hoofdstuk 3 toont aan dat de bewoning van het laagland bij de 
Zambezi rivier deels voortkomt uit politieke en ontwikkelingsstrategieën die 
door de jaren heen gepromoot zijn en daarnaast uit de natuurlijke factoren 
zoals de droogte die het land trof in de nadagen van de burgeroorlog van 
1992 tot 1995. Het hoofdstuk behandelt verschillende strategieën die lokale 
mensen gebruikten om hun bestaan te verzekeren in het laagland en gebruik 
te maken van hun interactie met de Zambezi rivier. Hierbij hebben mensen 
een bepaalde leefstijl ontwikkeld, die gekarakteriseerd wordt door lage 
investeringen in dingen die te groot zijn om mee te nemen bij een evacuatie of 
die makkelijk verloren gaan bijoverstromingen, zoals meubels en dieren. In 
plaats daarvan zijn mensen geneigd te investeren in kano’s en sociale 
netwerken om zich voor te bereiden op de gevolgen van overstromingen. Het 
hoofdstuk eindigt met het argument dat deze adaptatiepraktijken aan erosie 
onderhevig zijn, als gevolg van het samenspel tussen politieke, economische, 
sociale en mileuveranderingen.  
Hoofdstuk 4 belicht hoe interventies op het terrein van rampenreductie 
gezien kunnen worden als arena’s van conflicten en sociale onderhandeling 
rond een veelheid van belangen en hoe ze daardoor op lokaal niveau 
transformeren. Het toont aan dat de interventies gekenmerkt worden door 
coöptatie door elites en hoe ze ingezet worden om sociale spanningen te 
onderdrukken. 
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt de interfaces tussen de overheid, VN 
organisaties en NGO’s tijdens de overstroming van 2007. Het hoofdstuk toont 
aan hoe de leidende rol van de overheid meer tot stand kwam als resultante 
van de alledaagse interacties in het veld, dan vanuit afspraken of 
competenties. Om de spanning tussen andere actoren te dempen kon de 
overheid als bruggenbouwer en coördinator naar voren komen. Het 
hoofdstuk laat ook zien hoe de cluster benadering van de Verenigde Naties 
weinig impact had op het management van de ramp en dat deze wellicht 
vooral ingezet werd om de nieuwe benadering te testen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat over lokale responses op dezelfde overstroming van 
2007. Het toont aan dat neerbuigende termen als ‘achterlijkheid’, 
‘irrationaliteit’, ‘domheid’, en ‘weerstand’,  waarmee de weigering van 
mensen om te evacueren wordt geduid, de complexe processen maskeren die 
het gedrag van mensen aan de Zambezi rivier bepalen. In tegenstelling tot het 
beeld van veel actoren, toont dit proefschrift aan dat de lokale responses 
strategisch en adequaat zijn. Lokale responses neigen er naar behalve het 
redden van leven ook het redden van bestaansmiddelen mee te nemen in de 
besluitvorming rond het tijdstip en de middelen van de evacuatie. Bij een 
geleidelijke overstroming nemen mensen weloverwogen beslissingen over 
waar ze heen evacueren, wanneer, hoe, met wie en wat ze meenemen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 bediscussieert het hervestigingsprogramma dat volgde na 
de overstroming.  Net als in hoofdstuk 4 blijkt hierbij dat actoren zich het 
programma eigen maken en het omvormen om zo goed mogelijk aan hun 
eigen belangen te voldoen. Op basis van data in twee hervestigingscentra in 
het Mopeia district (24 de Julho and ZonasVerdes) toont het hoofdstuk aan 
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dat elite cooptatie plaatsvond en dat daarbij de beleidsvoorschriften van het 
programma aan de kant geschoven werden. In antwoord op de vraag of 
mensen zich permanent in de centra vestigen, concludeert het hoofdstuk dat 
er drie vestigingspatronen zijn. Een groep huishoudens, metaforisch geduid 
als ‘watermensen’ houdt vast aan hun sterke band met het laagland en vindt 
het moeilijk om hun bestaan te vinden in de centra. Zij gaan terug naar het 
laagland om, net als voorheen, hun leven te vormen rond de Zambezi en 
seizoenslandbouw op de vruchtbare oevers van de rivier. Het tweede patroon 
betreft huishoudens die hun levensstijl aanpassen aan het 
hervestigingscentrum, zich daar permanent vestigen en hun banden met het 
laagland grotendeels doorsnijden. Ofschoon hier weinig voorbeelden van zijn 
te vinden op dit moment, gaat het om huishoudens die vast werk hebben 
gevonden, hun bestaan vinden in handelsaktiviteiten en een sociaal netwerk 
dat hen helpt bij het vinden van bestaanszekerheid. Deze mensen worden 
aangeduid met de term ‘landmensen’. Als derde is er een groep huishoudens 
die de mogelijkheden van beide lokaties wil benutten (in het laagland en in 
het centrum). Deze groep heeft huizen in beide lokaties en verdeelt hun tijd 
daar tussen in. Deze groep wordt in dit hoofdstuk de ‘amfibiën’ genoemd.  
Hoofdstuk 8 vormt de conclusie van het boek. Het werkt het thema uit 
van de titel: continuïteit in crisis. Crises, van verschillende intensiteit en 
frequentie, zijn onderdeel van het dagelijks leven. Het aanbrengen van 
continuïteit in deze crises is een formatieve factor in samenlevingen.  Het 
voortdurende management van crises, die steeds in beweging zijn, reikt 
mechanismen aan voor maatschappelijke controle, het beïnvloeden van 
gedrag en interventies en bepaalt voor een groot deel de mandaten van 
overheidsorganen op verschillende niveaus.  
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ANNEX 1: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND GROUP 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
People interviewed  
Institution  Name Local  Position 
Fernanda 
Teixeira 
Maputo General secretary 
Eunice 
Mucache 
Maputo Program director 
Rabeca 
Chalufo 
Maputo Disaster preparedness department 
Ataide 
Sacramento 
Maputo Disaster preparedness department 
Luisa Mboana Maputo Human resource 
Ivete Dengo Maputo CBDRM team leader 
Frieda 
Drasma 
Maputo Community development 
department 
Jacinto 
Moiane 
Maputo Finance Department 
Respeito 
Chirindza 
Maputo Volunteers coordinator 
Simao 
Nhassengo 
Maputo Water and sanitation department 
Simone 
Bonate 
Quelimane Provincial secretary Zambezia 
Custodio Giro Beira Provincial secretary Sofala 
Aguinaldo 
Almeida 
Quelimane/Mopeia CBDRM Zambezia 
CVM 
Inácio Melo  Mopeia CVM president Mopeia district 
 
German 
Red Cross 
Hanna 
Schmuck 
Maputo Delegate 
 
Finish Red 
Cross 
Kaisa 
Rouvinen 
Maputo Delegate 
 
Iceland Red 
Cross 
Nina Maputo Delegate 
 
 Paulo Zucula Caia Former General director 
João Ribeiro Maputo General director (from 2008) 
Ana Cristina Maputo Prevention and mitigation 
department 
Higino 
Rodrigues 
Maputo Resettlement cabinet  
Bonifácio 
Antonio 
Maputo Coordination office manager 
João Zamissa Quelimane Provincial delegate Zambézia 
Province 
Onorio Vaz Quelimane Tecnhical staff  
Lucas Renço Caia Technical advicer 
Luís Pacheco Beira Provincial delegate Sofala Province 
INGC 
José Dambiro Caia Regional CENOE coordinator 
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Telma 
Manjate 
Maputo  Climate change focal point 
Anselmina 
Liphola 
Maputo Natural resources management 
department 
Felicio 
Fernando 
Maputo Technical staff -national level 
MICOA 
Becas Quelimane Technical staff -provincial level 
 
Sophie 
Chotard  
Quelimane Project manager Save the 
Children 
Salomão Quelimane Project manager 
 
 Florêncio  Mutarara Agriculture Services director- 
Mopeia district 
Alberto 
Chapila 
Mopeia Administrator Governmen 
of Mopeia 
District Natalino 
Frenando 
Mopeia Agriculture Services director- 
Mopeia district 
 
National 
Water 
Directorate 
Belarmino 
Chivambo 
Maputo Water Resources Department  
 
Brian Hilton Quelimane Program director 
Jorge 
Machanguane 
Quelimane Project manager 
World 
Vision 
Claudio M. Maputo  Project manager  
 
Prof. G. 
Liesagang 
Maputo Historian/Anthropologist/Archeolo
gist 
Prof. João P. 
B. Coelho 
Maputo Resettlement expert 
Prof. 
Boaventura 
Cuamba 
Maputo Climate change expert 
Academics 
Prof. Richard 
Beilfuss 
US (via email) Hydrologist/environmental 
researcher; International Crane 
Foundation  
 
GTZ Carolina 
Zelada 
Caia Project manager 
 
INAME Moisés 
Benessene 
Maputo  National director 
 
UNDP Nelson Xavier Maputo Communication officer 
 
WFP  Osvaldo 
Lucas 
Mopeia Field officer  
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Baptista 
Cocorico 
Cocorico/24 de 
Julho 
Actual Inhacuaua of Cocorico 
Fernando 
Cocorico 
Cocorico Former Inhacuaua of Cocorico 
Nhanswimbo Cocorico Chief in Mulamba/Cocorico 
Alberto 
Ismael 
Mopeia Chief 24 de Julho resettlement centre 
Carlos Froi Mopeia Chief Zonas Verdes resetlement 
centre 
A. Chamanga Mopeia Inhacuaua of Chamanga area 
José Jussa Mopeia Religious leader 24 de Julho 
António 
Alfinete 
Mopeia Religious leader Zonas Verdes 
Languitone Mutarara Chief Canhungue area 
Domingos 
Fole 
Mutarara Fumo Inhangoma area 
Manuel 
Guente 
Mutarara Field Guide in Mutarara 
Feliciano Luis Mutarara  Sapanda Jardim area 
Fernando 
Samo 
Mutarara Fumo Jardim area 
Dias Ernesto Mutarara Chief 10 houses Jardim area 
Isac Mbassa Mutarara Inhacuaua Gogodane area 
Joaquim 
Chacuamba 
Mutarara Sapanda Gogodane area 
António 
Gocha 
Chinde Fumo Xinsomba area 
João Forquia Caia Sapanda Murraça area 
Local 
Authorities 
Agostinho 
Bulande 
Marromeu Fumo Malingapanse area 
Fernando 
Chapo 
Mutarara -
Inhangoma 
Rosa Ernesto Mopeia- Cocorico 
Augusta 
Quembo 
Mopeia- Cocorico 
Luís Ngota Mopeia-Cocorico 
Gertrude 
Antonio 
Mopeia-24 de Julho 
resettlement centre 
Lina Augusto Mopeia-Zonas 
Verdes resettlement 
centre 
Tome Gole Mopeia-24 de Julho 
resettlement centre 
Antonio 
Marromo 
Mopeia-Zonas 
Verdes resettlement 
centre 
Inacio 
Joaquim 
Mopeia-Cocorico 
Joaquim 
Baptista 
Mopeia-Cocorico 
Ordinary 
people 
Joaquina 
Afonso 
Mopeia-Cocorico 
 
 
Total  78 
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Group discussions (average 15 people each group) 
District ‘village’ Number of group 
discussions 
observations 
Cocorico 4 1- mixed group (female 
and male) 
2- men’s group 
3- women’s group 
4- Red cross volunteers 
24 de Julho 
Resettlement 
centre  
2 1- women’s group 
2- men’s group 
Mopeia 
Zonas Verdes 
Resettlement 
centre  
1 Mixed group 
 
Canhungue  2 1- men’s group  
2- women’s group 
Mutarara 
Jardim  2 1- men’s group 
2- women’s group 
 
Marromeu  Chupanga 1 Mixed group 
 
Chinde Xinsomba/Luabo 1 Mixed group 
 
Tchetcha 1 Mixed group 
DAF 1 Mixed group 
Caia 
Amílcar Cabral 1 Mixed group 
 
Total  16 
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ANNEX 2: CHECKLIST AND QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
a. Checklist 
 
1. Specific for the Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) 
Method What to ask for/see To whom Observations 
Visit/interviews in 
different department  
What they do, changes over time, 
interaction with others, strong/weak 
points, if they know and how do they 
perceive CBDRM project 
Head of department and someone low ranked on that 
department 
The main idea is to have an overview of who does what on the 
organization and how the project is perceived and owned by 
others within the organization.  
Written institutional rules and regulations Personnel administration  
History of the organization National archives/ institutional library  Data might be also in different organizations i.e. national 
historical archive; ministry of Health,… Meetings with different 
actors like the first workers and leaders as well as outsiders 
might bring information about the Red Cross  
Project documents (Memos, meeting notes, 
correspondence with local staff, donors 
and other partners, reports, etc) 
DRR team at different levels It will allow the initial analysis on the written discourses and 
interfaces between MRC and other stakeholders 
Secondary data 
Budgets and cash flow DRR team or Finance department  This is important for donor-MRC relationship 
 
• Formal and informal rules and 
practices in the institution and 
specially regarding CBDRM 
• Oral and visual language 
(narratives, jokes, jargon, 
metaphors, body language …) 
 
• Paying attention to what they do, where, what 
they are expected to do and how it has 
changed over time and why? How people 
make them and are shaped by them. What is 
their meaning for disaster management  
• Paying attention to what is said, who says, 
when it is said to whom and why 
• To see if practices conform to institutional 
rules/principles and what is written in project 
documents.  
• To look within the organization and in meeting with 
others (ex. Donors, local communities, government 
Entitlement to resources within the 
organization ( ex. Computer, cars, space, 
subordination) and management 
Paying attention to who have access to what resource 
at what time and why. Attention to network building 
to access the resources (within and outside) under the 
DRR project 
 
Participant observation 
(interacting with them) 
Information flow From community to headquarter or donors and vice-
versa 
Specially within the CBDRM project 
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Semi-structured Interview 
History and overview of DRR 
• What is Red Cross Mozambique? ( here I want to know the history) 
• Since its creation could you please tell me the critical moments and why? (want to see if change from reactive to proactive is mentioned as one) 
• Where and how did you work during war time? (want to see if they have worked on RENAMO’s controlled areas and how they managed to do so. To have a look at the working of 
humanitarian principles) 
• What CVM do? And how the different activities interact? What is your specific role in the organization? 
• How do you operate in cases of natural hazards? (to see the approach) 
• When does the Red Cross consider a disaster? If there are criteria, what criteria, who created them 
• Do you personally agree with these criteria/work with them or have others? If yes, have you discussed them with others? What was the output? 
• Are there different responses/approaches to different hazards? 
• Which hazards do you find more difficult to work with and why? 
• Now Red Cross talks about proactive CBDRM. What it means? 
• Which you think is the best approach for DRR? 
Vulnerability and Climate change perception and actions 
• RC also mentions vulnerability. What do you mean? How you come to know vulnerable communities and people? 
• Now also Red Cross talks about Climate change. What does it mean? What is your perception about it? What are the ways to deal with it? Are you working with it? If yes how? 
• Do you see any link climate change and natural hazards? And with disasters? 
• What you consider to be a community? How do you work in the communities? Are there different approaches between different communities? 
• Participation is also your major concern. How do you apply it with partners and at local level? 
Partnership 
• Who are your partners? I have to categorize in terms of (Community, governmental bodies, NGOs, private sector, donors).  
• How do you work with them (ex. via memorandum of understanding, oral agreements, etc…) 
• How co-ordination is done and what is your perception regarding co-ordination? 
• What is the role of each of them? 
• What do you think has been your relationship with each of them? Which partner do you think is hard to work with and why? 
• Can you more specifically talk about your partnership with local people and with donors? (how does it work, strong points, weak points, opportunities, barriers) 
• What do you think are the weak and strong point of the Mozambican Red Cross? 
• What are the challenges for the Mozambican Red Cross and how do you think are going to deal with them? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
2. specific for the communities  
Which method For what Observation  
Secondary data Understanding of the wider environment of the community Data might be found at different geographical location (District and 
national level) 
   
Community mapping .Overview of the community geographical 
location and setting: living areas (especially who is living where), 
population, infra-structure, field areas, natural resources location, its 
use and distance to it; limits if any, communal and individual areas. 
Changes over time (i.e on settlements, population density and other 
trends) 
I would like to precisely map each household geographical position 
(house and field to be able to do purposeful sampling for questionnaire) 
Resource mapping. To find out which natural and social 
(associations, groups, churches, etc) resource exist locally, where they 
are, technologies and local knowledge on its use and dynamics/trends 
on resource stocks. Also accounts of conflicts over resources 
Transects will also be made to help have a clear idea of the community 
geography, resources and locations 
Historical record. An overview of the main events (especially natural 
hazards and disasters) that took place and discuss local mechanisms 
used to deal with. This includes nature of hazards, frequency, severity, 
duration, area and people most affected. Local words used to refer to 
disaster, hazards, vulnerability, risk, capacity. Changes on words and 
on mechanism to deal with the hazards 
To collect data also on annual rainfall, rainfall variability, deaths over 
time, product prices intra-annual and inter-annual of the main products 
sold and bought. Mainly through interviews with elderly women and 
men. Parallel hazards such as diseases, failure of markets, among others 
that might be mentioned on group discussions. Which hazard is given 
much attention and why? Which seemingly relevant are not mentioned?  
Seasonal annual calendars (agriculture, diseases, and flooding, 
higher and lower expenditures, labor need, price variation).  
Allow to understand possibilities or not for collective action and in which 
periods. To understand seasonal dynamics, vulnerabilities and its 
implications for CBDRM. 
Group discussion 
Venn diagram and interventions. To understand links within and 
outside. To discuss interventions (past and present) 
To try to find out if links with the Mozambican Red Cross will come out 
and which persons will refer to it. Will be the base to follow interfaces 
between Red Cross and local people 
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Cultural aspects: (Formal and informal) rules making/makers and 
practices 
Paying attention to what they do, what they are expected to do and how 
has it changed over time and why? How people make them and are 
shaped by them. What is their meaning/effect for disaster risk and 
livelihoods? Of who and why? 
Networks and entitlement to resources  Paying attention to who have access to what resource (i.e. land and 
agricultural inputs, forestry products, water based products, social groups, 
infra-structures), changes over time (especially over the last 5 years), 
where at what time and why. Attention to network building to access the 
resources (within and outside the community)  
Politics and economics  Questions of representation, participation and local economy trends 
(productions, prices, consumptions,…) and its meaning for DRR and 
livelihood.  
Organizations and access Existence of local forms of organizations, who created, for what purpose, 
who is part of or access them 
Information flow Within the community and from community to outside and vice-versa.  
Oral language (narratives, jokes, jargons, metaphors…) Paying attention to what is said, who says, when it is said to whom and 
why. This will be made particularly during the interaction with the Red 
Cross 
 
Key informant’s interview and participant 
observation (following the actors) 
Disaster risk perceptions and measures for disaster risk reduction Collecting perceptions (regarding risk, climate change, vulnerability, 
disaster and looking closely to practices for dealing with disaster risk. 
Collective action, participation and community meaning. After this, 
perceptions will be categorized into groups and for each particular group 
1 or 2 representatives will be chosen for extended case study.  
 Interaction with Red Cross project • To follow interaction between MRC staff and local people. Pay 
attention to language and practices of actors involved and the 
way the project is being appropriate, integrated or transformed 
at local level by different actors including MRC staff 
o Project organization at local level (from community 
side and from MRC) 
o Activities 
o Approaches on implementing activities 
o  Target areas and people/groups 
o Perception of the project by local Red Cross staff and 
local people 
   
Individual extended observations and 
interviews 
Questions related to personal history; household issues; networks 
within and outside the community, access to resources, ways of dealing 
with disaster risk, perceptions on community, collective action, climate 
change, hazards and disasters. Also perceptions on interventions, 
particularly of Red Cross and participation on interventions. 
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Questionnaire   Quantitative data on different variables which might correlate to 
people’s perceptions and actions regarding climate change, disaster risk 
and livelihoods. Specific question will be on social networks and on 
the intervention of Red Cross (see the questionnaire). 
On sampling attention will be to including people from all the categories 
in order to find meaningful/statistical differences between the categories.  
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b. Questionnaire 
 
 UNIVERSIDADE  EDUARDO  MONDLANE 
                   &  WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY  
                                           DESATRES E COMUNIDADES EM MOPEIA   
                  
 
 Entrevistador_____ 
Area (Comunidade)  ______ 
Entrevistado (AF) N0:  _________ 
Questão geral sobre desatres 
Pode nos contar a sua experiência com  desastres? (o que aconteceu, qual é o nome que da a desastre/cheia, como escapou/ o 
que fez e o que não fez) 
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1.Informação Geral do Entrevistado 
1. Sexo: 1. M                          2.  F 
1.1. Estado Civil:  1.  solteiro/a      2.  casado/a              3.  divorciado/a             4.  viuva/o   5.   vivem juntos 
1.2. Se for casado/vivem juntos pagou/recebeu: 1.  fungula mulomo; 2. malumphato; 3.  phete;  4. parcela  5. mafuwa 6. outro 
1.3. Polígamo: 1.  sim              2. não.           Se sim quantas outras mulheres ______ . vivem juntas?   1. sim              2. não   
1.4. Idade: _________   se nao sabe estime o intervalo: 1. <15            2.  15-35         3.  36-64          4. >64  
1.5. Educação escolar: __________________________________  
1.6. Maior ocupação: 1.  camponês    2.  pescador    3.  negociante   4. ganho-ganho 5.  artesão/carpintaria/sapataria....        
2. Familia 
2.1. Quantas pessoas voces consideram parte deste agregado: Total____ homens____ mulheres _____ crianças (<14) _____e 
velhos (> 64)  ____ 
2.2. Quantas pessoas que voces consideram parte do agregado estao fora (ex. A trabalhar fora da comunidade). total 
________. Deste ____H; e___Mulheres 
2.3. O que vem mais frequentemente quantas vezes por ano eles vem ? __________________________________________ 
2.4. recebem algum tipo de apoio de familia que esta fora? 1.  sim    2.  não:  se sim: tipo de apoio 1.  dinheiro     2. bens ; 
comparativament a 5 anos atras o envio é: 1.  menos frequente; 2.  igual; 3.  mais frequente 
2.5. Tiveram alguma infelicidade/morte do ano passado para ca? 1.  sim;   2. não: se sim quem foi(ram)?_________________ 
2.6. Tem alguém no agregado constantemente doente (esta doente nos ultimos 3 meses) ?  1.  sim       2. não. Se sim 
quem____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.7. No. de radios que possui familia? _________                                   No. de bicilcletas que possui a familia? ________ 
2.8. No. Canoas que possui________                                                       No de redes de pesca que possui_____ 
2.9. No de pratos que possui____________                                             No de panelas que possui_______ 
2.10. No de copos que possui___________                                               No de colheres que possui_______ 
2.11. Criação que possui: no de aves_______ no de cabritos____ no de porcos_____ no de bois______ 
2.12. Se compara o peso de trabalho/ocupacao de m.d.o na família depois das cheias de 2007: este: 1.  reduziu   2. sem 
mudanças     3.  aumentou.  Porque?___________________________________________________________________ 
2.13. Durante a guerra: 1. nao saiu da zona;      2. saiu para ilha          3. saiu para sede distrito       4.  saiu para fora do distrito 
2.14. Depois da guerra: 1. voltou a viver mesmo espaco/ e ocupou mesmas machambas   2. passou a viver em outros espacos/ 
e ocupou novas machambas;   3. mesmo espaco/machamba diferente    4. espaco diferente/mesma machamba 
2.15. Depois da guerra: 1. voltou toda a familia nuclear          2. a familia nuclear dispersou-se  
2.16. foi afectado pelas cheias de 2001? ?  1.  sim       2. não; se sim: 1. evacuou;  2. nao evacuou 
2.17. se evacuou como o fez? 1.  a pé ;   2.  de canoa propria; 3.  de canoa familiar;    4.  de canoa alugada; 5. de canoa/barco 
da CVM  6.  de barco das FADM/INGC; 7. de helicoptero; 8. de bicicleta; 9. de carro 
2.18. se evacuou: todos os membros do agregado usaram o mesmo meio mencionado acima? 1.  sim       2. não; se nao 
mencione os outros meios usados_____________________________________________________________________ 
2.19. Depois das cheias de 2001: 1. voltou a viver mesmo espaco/ e ocupou mesmas machambas  2. viver em outros 
espacos/novas machambas;     3. mesmo espaco/machamba diferente         4. espaco diferente/mesma machamba 
2.20. Depois das cheias de 2001: 1. voltou toda a familia nuclear                    2. a familia nuclear dispersou-se 
 
3. Normalmente/ na vida onde é que obtem conhecimento sobre desastres? 
3.1. experiência pessoal       clarifique ____________________________________________________      
3.2. apartir de membros da familia      clarifique____________________________________________________ 
3.3. vizinhos         clarifique_____________________________________________________ 
3.4. amigos        clarifique______________________________________________________ 
3.5. radio         clarifique____________________________________________________ 
3.6. comité local        clarifique____________________________________________________ 
3.7. lideres locais        clarifique_____________________________________________________ 
3.8. outros especifique,________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. sobre as cheias de 2007 
4.1.Foram afectados pelas cheias recentes? 1. Sim                2. não.  
4.2. teve informacao antecipada que haveria cheias? 1. Sim                2. não. 
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4.3. se sim: como teve informacao? (se for mais de 1 fonte ponha em ordem crescente: 1a fonte, 2a etc)  
4.3.1. experiência pessoal      ______        
4.3.2.  apartir de membros da familia     ______ 
4.3.3. vizinhos         ______ 
4.3.4. amigos         ______ 
4.3.5. rádio (mencionar de quem)       _____  
4.3.6. comité local        _____  
4.3.7. lideres locais         _____ 
4.3.8. outros especifique,_________________________________________________________________________ 
4.4. foi necessario alguma coisa mais para se convencer que a cheia era um problema real? 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.5. Evacuação:  1. nao evacuou;  2. evacuou 
4.5.1. se evacuou: 1.fez logo de inicio;  3.  evacuou tardiamente de livre vontade;   4.   evacuou tradiamente forcado 
4.5.2. Se evacuou: quantos dias depois de ter informacao evacuou?_______. 
4.5.3. fez alguma cerimonia (tsembe) antes de sair/evacuar para o centro? 1. sim              2. não 
4.5.4. Quem não esteve presente na hora de evacuar? 1. marido   2. esposa    3. algumas crianças  4.  todos estavam 
4.5.5. algum membro da familia se encontrava doente na altura de evacuar? 1. sim      2. nao. Se sim quem era: ? 1. 
marido    2. esposa     3. alguma criança/filho (a); 4. outros familiares ____________________________________ 
4.5.6.  como saiu da sua casa para fora (se saiu):  1.  a pé ; 2.  de canoa propria; 3. de canoa familiar;  4.  de canoa 
alugada; 5. de canoa/barco da CVM  6. de barco das FADM/INGC; 7. de helicoptero; 8. bicicleta; 9. carro; 10. outro  
4.5.7. todos os membros do agregado usaram o mesmo meio mencionado acima? 1.  sim       2. não; se nao mencione 
os outros meios usados_____________________________________________________________________ 
4.6. Conseguiram sair com alguma coisa?  1.  sim       2. nao.  Se sim: 1. utensílios da casa; 2.  criação; 3.   instrumentos de 
trabalho; 4.  semente;  5. comida;    6. Outros, Mencione__________________________________________________ 
4.7. o que procura sempre salvar custe o que custar (fora de pessoas). Fale em ordem de importancia 1. utensílios da casa; 
2.  criação; 3.   instrumentos de trabalho; 4.  semente;  5. comida;    6. Outros, Mencione_________________________ 
4.8. Perdeu-se alguma coisa no agregado? 1.  sim   2. nao.  Se sim: 1. utensílios da casa; 2.  criação; 3.   instrumentos de 
trabalho;   4.  semente;  5. comida;    6. Outros, Mencione__________________________________________ 
4.9. Se perdeu  criacao devido a cheias diga o  tipo e quantidade? .  No  de aves: _______    No de cabritos : ________   no 
de  porcos: ________ no de bois: _______    
4.10. a casa: 1. nao sofreu; 2. danificou-se completamente; 3. danificou-se parcialmente 
4.11. Para onde foram logo quando sairam de casa?   1. murmuche/zona alta;       2.casa de família;       3. casa de amigo;             
4. centro de acomodação/ centro de reassentamento; 5. igreja; 6. outro,mencione_______________________________ 
4.12. Ja ouviu falar de rota de fuga?1.  sim; 2. nao.  se sim, com quem ouviu? 1. membros do agregado; 2. vizinhos; 3. amigos; 
4. comite local; 5. voluntarios da CVM; 6. lideres locais; 7. outros_________usou agora nestas cheias 1.  sim    2.   nao 
4.13. Ja ouviu falar de local seguro de acomodacao comunitaria? 1.  sim  2.  nao; se sim, com quem ouviu? 1. membros do 
agregado; 2. vizinhos; 3. amigos; 4. comite local; 5. voluntarios da CVM; 6. lideres locais; 7. outros_________foi para lá 
nestas cheias?    1.  sim         2. nao 
4.14. Quantos lugares de refugio tiveram/passaram no total durante estas cheias?_____   enumere?          
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.15. se foi ao centro de acomodacao /reassentamento quanto tempo (meses)  ficaram la?____________________________ 
4.16. se foi ao centro, o que achou do centro onde esteve em termos de organizacao comparado com 2001(se em 2001 
tambem foi ao centro)? 1. mau;      2. igual         3. bom; porque?____________________________________________ 
4.17. Comparando com as cheias de 2001 (se sofreu), o prejuizo destas cheias foi 1. menor    2. igual    3. maior. Porque acha 
assim/o que mudou?_______________________________________________________________________________ 
4.18. Depois das cheias de 2007: 1. voltou toda a familia  2.  voltou parte e outra ficou no centro    3. ficou toda no centro          
4. dispersou-se (estao em mais de um sitio agora). Fale mais_____________________________________________ 
4.19. Depois das cheias de 2007: 1. voltou a viver mesmo espaco/ e ocupou mesmas machambas   2. em outros 
espacos/novas machambas; 3. mesmo espaco/machamba diferente; 4. espaco diferente/mesma machamba 
4.20. Fizeram alguma cerimónia (Tsembe) quando voltaram (se voltou a zona anterior) 1. sim     2.nao 
5. Sobre os comites locais de gestao de calamidades 
5.1. Ja ouviu falar dos comites locais de gestao de calamidades? 1. sim       2. nao 
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5.2. se sim, sabe o que fazem? 1. sim    2. nao . se sabe descreva o que 
sabe_____________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.3. que pessoas estão 
envolvidas?_______________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.4. como ficaram 
envolvidas?_______________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5.5. Podes dar uma avaliacao do trabalho do comite em termos de: 1. mau    2. nada a comentar     3. bom     
     
6. Actividades de sustento do agregado familiar 
Por favor mencione as actividades de sustento praticadas pelo agregado familiar 
 Actividades Importância relativa para a fam 
(as primeiras 3 mais importantes) 
Actividades novas? 
(ultimos 5 anos) 
Actividades que desapareceram 
(ultimos 5 anos) e porque? 
1   Agricultura    
2 
 criaçao  
  
3 
pesca  
  
4 
caça  
  
5 
 Remessas    
  
6 
 Ganho-ganho  
  
7 
Compra e Venda de 
produtos  
 
  
8 
 Venda de produtos da 
machamba propria  
 
  
9 
 Venda de carvao  
  
10 
 Venda de lenha  
  
11 
 Venda de material de 
construção 
 
  
12 
 Venda de bebidas 
tradicionais 
 
  
 
 Outros (pedreiro fabrico de 
cestos, barro, esteiras, etc) 
 
  
7. Qual é o rendimento medio do agregado (dinheiro/ Por mes) de todas as actividades que faz?  _______         
8. Em relação a agricultura: 
8.1. quantas machambas o agregado tem no total? _____ destas: zona baixa_____   zona alta_______ 
8.2. Quantas machambas o agregado esta neste momento a trabalhar? ____ zona baixa ___    zona alta____  
8.3.  como conseguiu té-las? 1.  Herança dos pais;    2. pediu estrutura local;  3. comprou com alguem   4. oferta de algum 
familiar  5. oferta de outras pessoas na comunidade; 6. outro mecanismo,mencione______________________________ 
8.4. Emprega mão-de-obra de fora da familia? 1.   sim  2.  não, se sim  custos________________ 
unidade____________________ 
8.5. Já mudou de lugar da sua machamba?1. sim          2. não : se sim  quantas vezes_________ razoes para isso:                        
1. fertlilidade baixa;    2. demasiado pragas e doencas; 3. mudanca de residencia; 4. conflitos de terra; 5 outros, 
mencione__________________ quando  foi a ultima vez (ano) que mudou__________________________ 
8.6.  Comparando com ano passado  a sua área total é:  1.  maior  2. mesma     3.  menor . se há mudanças no tamanho da 
área mencione as razoes: 1. mao de obra           2. insumos;          3. cheias;         4. erosao;  5. outras 
mencione______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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8.7.  usou nesta campanha novas culturas/sementes? 1. sim;      2. nao. Se sim,  
quais?___________________________________________________________________________________________
porque?__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8.8.  Nesta campanha deixou de plantar algumas culturas/sementes? Quais foram que 
deixou___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
razoes___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8.9. Quantos meses em media a produção propria alimenta o agregado? ____________________________ 
 
9. Mudanças que nota: em geral nota alguma coisa nao usual/mudanca na zona onde vive com relacao ao: 
9.1. solo ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9.2. na agua (i.e. quantidade, qualidade)___________________________________________________________________ 
9.3. na pesca (numero de pescadores, quantidade de peixe, tipo de peixe)________________________________________ 
9.4. vegetacao (i.e.aumetou, reduziu, o tipo que existe)________________________________________________________ 
9.5. animais (selvagens e domesticos)____________________________________________________________________ 
9.6. doencas (frequencia, tipo, tratamento) _________________________________________________________________ 
9.7. na sua familia (i.e. tamanho do agregado) _______________________________________________________________ 
9.8. na sua comunidade (i.e. vizinhanca reduziu, aumentou, etc)________________________________________________ 
9.9. quanto a ocorrencia e intensidade das cheias___________________________________________________________ 
9.10. quanto a ocorrencia e intensidade de secas____________________________________________________________ 
Nota: para cada elemento anotar desde quando ele nota esta mudança/algo nao usual 
 
10. Comunidade (para questionar a essencia de comunidade com observacao participante e entrevistas semi-estruturadas na 
comunidade) 
10.1. Pertence a algum tipo de organizacao?       1.  sim                 2. não ; se sim:  
Tipo Ponha X Razoes/motivacoes para fazer parte  
 Associacao profisional (i.e. de 
camponeses, de pescadores, etc) 
  
Igreja   
Xitique/ empréstimo e guarda de 
dinheiro   
  
Grupos de ajuda mutua   
Outras: specifique 
______________________________  
 
  
 
11. Em tempos de crise quantas pessoas mesmo confias que te podem ajudar? _______ quem sao em ordem de importancia? 1o 
_____________2o ___________ em ultimo_______________ alternativas: 1. pais;   2. tios  3. irmaos de sangue;   4. irmaos de 
igreja         4. amigos;    5. vizinhos; 6. outros, mencione ________________________________________________________ 
12. a pessoa que recorre depende do tipo de preocupacao? Se sim explique 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13. Se compara antes das cheias recentes de 2007 e  agora: 
13.1.  1. tenho mais amigos/amizades agora  2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.2.  1. há mais ajuda a partir de amigos agora  2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.3.  1. há mais ajuda dos familiares agora     2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.4.  1. há mais ajuda dos vizinhos agora      2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.5.  1. há mais acesso a servicos agora       2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.6.  1. há mais acesso a informacao agora   2. mesma coisa  3. menos 
13.7.  1. A comunidade é mais forte agora   2. mesma coisa   3. menos 
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14. Tem algum tipo de contacto com organizacoes/pessoas de fora? :   sim   não ; se sim:  
14.1. instituicoes do governo  
14.2. comerciantes  
14.3. pescadores de fora 
14.4. madereiros 
14.5. CVM 
14.6. ONGs ; se conhece os nomes diga _________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Em relacao a CVM sabe o que é? 1. sim    2.nao; se sabe diga: 
15.1.  o que é _________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
15.2. o que faz_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
15.3. Que organizacoes de fora estao a trabalhar aqui na comunidade? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
15.4. para cada 1 das organizacoes trabalhando na zona avalie o seu desempenho em termos de: 
15.4.1.  organizacão A (ex. CVM): 1. mal  2. nada a comentar  3. bom    
15.4.2.  organizacão B : 1. mal  2. nada a comentar  3. bom   
15.4.3.  organizacão C : 1. mal  2. nada a comentar  3. bom     
Muito Obrigado  
 
 
Espaço para observações pessoais/do entrevistador em relação ao local, ao entrevistado e  o decorrer da entrevista 
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ANNEX 3: BUDGET ALLOCATION DURING THE 2001 FLOODING 
 
 
Item/Cost per province MAPUTO SOFALA MANICA TETE ZAMBÉZIA TOTAL 
Per-diems 136,870,000.00 36,457,500.00 202,348,030.00 118,265,500.00 84,147,500.00 578,088,530.00 
Fuels 979,056,510 348,523,872.00 139,853,900.00 290,086,151.00 211,144,981.50 1,968,665,414.50 
Comunications 2,913,300.00 41,206,219.00 56,769,783.00 103,411,949.00 27,239,116.00 231,540,367.00 
Water and Electricity 0.00 0.00 2,914,178.00 0.00 70,172,613.00 73,086,791.00 
Office material (consumables) 38,938,500.00 84,807,538.00 34,262,000.00 24,166,666.00 17,784,000.00 199,958,704.00 
Cargo and Transport 1,482,202,083.54 286,124,708.00 19,239,000.00 168,010,000.00 248,622,773.00 2,204,198,564.54 
Other services 194,134,679.98 0.00 119,236,576.76 72,156,534.00 93,065,548.00 478,593,338.74 
Different products 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 218,325,000.00 218,325,000.00 
Port taxes 752,120,926.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 65,911,320.00 818,032,246.38 
Aereal transportation 16,581,619,956.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16,581,619,956.52 
Acommodation and food 0.00 1,423,924,077.00 0.00 0.00 198,541,489.00 1,622,465,566.00 
Milling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 126,650,000.00 126,650,000.00 
Stockage 588,006,901.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 588,006,901.00 
Flight tickets 122,118,000.00 16,383,000.00 0.00 15,666,666.00 3,688,000.00 157,855,666.00 
Equipment reparation 0.00 0.00 24,209,565.00 0.00 30,377,848.00 54,587,413.00 
Equipment reparation 0.00 0.00 45,670,750.00 0.00 0.00 45,670,750.00 
Office material (equipment) 0.00 0.00 20,821,982.00 0.00 0.00 20,821,982.00 
Other equipment 0.00 0.00 39,540,000.00 0.00 0.00 39,540,000.00 
Rental of spaces 93,489,594.00 0.00 5,098,500.00 0.00 0.00 98,588,094.00 
Maintainance of rented spaces 0.00 0.00 250,000.00 0.00 0.00 250,000.00 
TOTAL 20,971,470,451.42 2,237,426,914.00 710,214,264.76 791,763,466.00 1,395,670,188.50 26,106,545,284.68 
Source: Adapted from INGC (2001) 
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ANNEX 4: ACTORS DURING THE 2007 FLOODING 
 
Actor  Description  
The affected/victims Flood affected or victims emerged as an obvious actor in the arena.  Nonetheless, defining who exactly was a victim and deserved 
humanitarian relief  was a matter of contestation and led to an interruption in the distribution of emergency supplies by March 2007. The 
government defined victims only those living on the floodplains and had their houses inundated. However, those who lived on the 
upper grounds but had their agricultural fields on lowlands and were inundated, complained that they were also flood victims and 
deserved humanitarian aid as well. On February 15, distribution of emergency supplies was, for example, canceled at ‘Tchetcha’ 
resettlement centre in Caia district due to that dispute of victim definition. Furthermore one person was imprisoned accused of 
instigating such claims. This reignited the discussion on flood management approaches (between the flood free approach and living with 
floods). Some people accused, at CENOE meeting on February 16, 2007 the relief workers of perpetuating the moral hazard and rewarding 
the bad behavior of living on flood prone areas.     
The registers Distribution of aid depended on the registration of the victims. There were several registrations and list producers. There were parallel 
registration methodologies being undertaken by the different organization. Some organizations regarded local chiefs as the registers 
while others undertook themselves the task of enumerating the victims. For instance CVM trusted the local chiefs but INGC, in most of 
the cases, sent teams to undertake the registrations. Producing the lists was not an easy task and lists had to be made again and again 
delaying, in many cases, the distribution of emergency relief. The politics of registration are discussed at length in chapter 7.  
The list providers In many cases, the registers were not the same actors to deliver the lists to the decision makers. The lists were handled to their immediate 
hierarchical superiors who then took the lists to other superiors - eventually the decision makers. In this process, lists were reshaped and 
the distribution process delayed. To illustrate this, on February 16 a list was produced by local chiefs for flood victims in ‘Sena’ region, 
Caia district. The list was handed to the local government official who was supposed to hand it to the administrator of Caia district. It 
was then expected that the administrator would ultimately hand the list to the World Food Programme. This process took nearly 4 days 
and due to these delays those registered were not included on aid distribution during these 4 days. In meantime local chiefs in Sena 
region were being accused of inaction by the flood ‘victims’.    
The monitors of aid 
distribution 
Each organization involved in aid distribution tended to bring monitors of the process. The monitors are staff from the aid provider 
organization that are charged with the mission to decide whether the distribution could proceed or could be stopped for a variety of 
reasons. In a number of cases monitors had to stop or delay the distribution so that a proper environment was created and distribution 
could go smoother. In Caia monitors from CEDES- a organization in charge of making the distribution stopped distributions in DAF and 
Nhambalo resettlement centres on February 17 and 18 to allow a proper environment. 
The aid distributers Aid distributers were people hired for a short time by the organization in charge of aid distribution to give the ratios to the beneficiaries. 
Together with the monitor they commanded a considerable power over the beneficiaries as they could stop, delay, postpone, tiny or 
increase the amount one received. I witnessed different lobbies between aid distributers and beneficiaries in order to maximize the 
amount received by the beneficiaries.    
The transport(ers) 
including helicopter (s) 
Transports and access to them during the aid deliver become a source of competition and power relations. It marked the difference 
between international and national humanitarian organizations in their ability to deliver quick humanitarian response and the 
organization visibility.    Due to recurrent truck delays the INGC general director suggested on February 14 that INGC should have the 
 
 
 
247 
telephone numbers of all drivers and truck owners involved in humanitarian relief operations in order to reinforce their commitments 
and speed up the operations .  
Good’s suppliers Market and good supplies is a key issue during emergency operations. Some of the goods necessary for emergency relief were absent at 
the local markets. For example, CVM in Sofala Province had to search for goods in Manica province as they were not available in Sofala 
province. Truck delays were partly due to the fact that relief goods had to be purchased in different markets within and outside the 
country. In some markets  prices went up (see next chapter) and this had implications on how humanitarian organizations especially the 
‘smaller’ ones that depended on the local market could make their interventions. CVM for instance was obliged to send trucks straight 
from Maputo to Caia instead from Beira or Manica provinces. Hence, markets shape relief operations.  
Security providers In contexts of fragile security and robbery, trucks carrying humanitarian aid may require special protection and deals with security 
providers.  During the 2007 flooding  different truck drivers carrying humanitarian aid told me that they had to pay some amount of 
money, especial during evening time, so that the trucks and the content could not be robbed. The government provided security for the 
main emergency warehouses in Caia and other places but individual organizations and truck drivers required their own private security.  
Financial/logistic 
managers 
During the humanitarian operations financial and logistical personals from  a range of organizations such as INGC, CVM, WFP were the 
key player and the most requested. Amongst other duties, they had to sign the checks, the forms and other bureaucratic papers needed 
for bank issues and, loading or de-loading merchandise. Although other staff  was also relevant, the role of logistic and financial 
managers appeared to be critical. It is by recognizing their critical role that IFRC had to bring expats to manage logistics while CVM had 
to bring people from the headquarters in Maputo.  
Banks Access to funds during emergency operation becomes critical and this implies, as we saw, dealing with bank actors. Banks with their 
liquidity and regulations become an arena with exclusion, power relations and negotiations. The CVM case showed that by offering a 
first treatment to international actors, banks reinforce power relations and exclude, in some cases, the smaller and local humanitarian 
organizations.  Hence, they shape who operate where and when. 
Government institutions Government through INGC and other institutions tried and in most of the cases succeeded in defining where and when humanitarian 
assistance should be provided.  
Media The national media, especially the government controlled media, tended to resonate the government led ideology and prescriptions. 
Decisions taken by the government were hardly critically debated on the media and alternative views tended to be sidelined. In March an 
article by José Lopes was published on one of the local independent newspaper. The article depicted the flooding as a failure at the 
Cahora Bassa dam management. Following the publication the newspaper and the authors were widely criticized by the state media and 
regarded as anti-patriots.    
UN agencies  UN agencies provided different services either to the affected people or to other NGOs and government institutions. Nonetheless, the UN 
response tended to exclude other actors and to bypass the government. This brought in contestations and power conflicts.  
INGOs Different International NGOs made appeals and managed to get funds which allowed them to carry emergency related activities and 
shape the course of the humanitarian response. For instance, Save the Children was amongst the first INGOs to offer facilities for a 
quicker school return along the delta Zambezi.   
Local NGOs Local NGOs were also involved in humanitarian action. Although their response was mostly constrained by financial, human and 
material resource they attempted, within the limits of their capacities to help the affected.  
Donors The humanitarian operations run either by the government or by NGO were dependent, to a larger extent, to the funding from different 
national and international donors. The concept of donors was indeed very much fluid during the emergency. Some were at the same time 
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donors and implementers and the amalgam of different actors making donations made the concept of donor very diffuse and imprecise. 
On the other hand, there is a tendency to sideline local donors such as national private companies and civil society organizations.    
Scientists The decision as whether to evacuate people or not was backed by hydrologists and meteorologists who presented to the decision makers 
the science of flooding and the evolution of the flooding event. To illustrate, meteorologists forecasted rainfall while hydrologists 
provided information on river heights and flows. Scientists set 5,00 meters river height at the gauging stations as the threshold to start the 
evacuation process of the people living or working on the lowlands. This benchmark was indeed contested by a considerable number of 
local people living along the floodplains. For them 5,00 meters appeared as a manageable level within the limits of their capacity and 
knowledge (see next chapter).   
Military forces  Rescue operations were largely undertaken by the military forces deployed by the government. They were given orders to coercively 
evacuate people from the lower lands. Their intervention shaped, to a large extent, the live and the livelihood of many people affected by 
the flooding (see next chapter) 
Dam managers Flooding on the delta Zambezi depends, to a less or large extent, on how dams upstream (Cahora Bassa and Kariba dams) are managed. 
The amount and timing of water release by the dams influence the flooding of the delta.  During the flooding the government had been 
requesting the dam managers to release as less water as possible, so that flooding could be avoided.   
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TRAINING AND SUPERVISION PLAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Name of the activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
A) Project related competences 
 Ceres Orientation + presentation tutorials CERES 2006 10 
 Presentation at the World Conference of 
Humanitarian Studies: ‘The victimization of 
non-victims and the development of an 
emergency aid culture on the lower Zambezi, 
Mozambique’ 
Groningen/Wageningen 
University 
2009 2 
 Presentation at the MICOA/MPD/World 
Bank symposium in Mozambique: 
‘Mecanismos de Adaptação aos Regimes de 
Cheias no Vale do Zambeze’ 
MICOA/MPD/World Bank 
Mozambique 
2008 2 
 Course: Natural hazards and Disaster Disaster Studies Group, 
Wageningen University 
2006 4 
 Course: Risk Communication Communication and Innovation 
studies, Wageningen University 
2006 6 
B) General research related competences  
 The Art of Writing  WUR, Language Services 2009 1.8 
 Socio-Cultural Field Research Methods  Mansholt Graduate School 2006 4 
 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis VLIR/UEM 2010 2 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
 Summer School CERES, Netherlands 2006 3 
 Summer School UN-EHS, German 2008 3 
 Learning from Practice. Field exposure in 
Bangladesh and Philippines 
Care Bangladesh; CDP-
Philippines; ADPC Thailand  
2006 6 
 Workshop on Sociology of Disaster UDM University-Mozambique 2010 3 
 Workshop on Climate Change Adaptation 
and the Role of Universities and Research 
Centers   
MICOA/UNDP 2010 1 
 Total (minimum 30 ECTS)   47 
*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work 
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